R.P. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

THE METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

VOLUME TWO

DOCTOR EXIMIUS ET PIUS

R. P. FRANCISCO SUAREZ OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS

THE METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

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R. P. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ

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VOLUME TWO

PRINCIPLE PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF COIMBRA, PORTUGAL

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Table of Contents

Metaphysical Disputations

Disp. VI.	On formal and universal unity.	1
§. I.	Whether there is in things some formal unity distinct from numerical unity and lesser than it.	1
§. II.	Whether the universal unity of nature is distinct from the formal unity and exists in things before the operation of the mind.	13
§. III.	Whether common nature of itself has some unity of precision outside individuals and before the operation of the mind.	26
§. IV.	What is the aptitude in universal nature to exist in many.	38
§. V.	Whether universal unity arises from the operation of the intellect, and how the difficulties posed to the contrary should be satisfied.	51
§. VI.	Through which operation of the intellect things become universal.	56
§. VII.	Whether universals are real corporeal beings, substantial or accidental, and what causes they have.	68
§. VIII.	How many kinds of universal there are, or its unity.	76

§. IX.	How the unity of genus and difference are distinguished in reality both among themselves and from specific unity.	88
§. X.	Whether metaphysical abstractions of genera, species, and differences can truly be predicated of one another.	108
§. XI.	What is the principle of formal and universal unity in things.	114
Disp. VII.	On the various kinds of distinctions.	121
§. I.	Whether besides real distinction and distinction of reason there is some other distinction in things.	121
§. II.	By what signs or modes the various degrees of distinction of things can be discerned.	149
§. III.	How the same and diverse compare both among themselves and to Being.	174
Disp. VIII.	On truth or the true, which is a passion of Being.	182
§. I.	Whether formal truth is in the composition and division of the intellect.	184
§. II.	What is the truth of cognition.	189
§. III.	Whether the truth of knowledge exists only in composition and division, or also in simple concepts.	203
§. IV.	Whether the truth of knowledge or intellect is not in it until it judges.	218
§. V.	Whether the truth of cognition is only in speculative intellect or also in practical.	225
§. VI.	Whether there is truth equally in division as in composition.	230
§. VII.	Whether there is any truth in things that is a property of Being.	231
§. VIII.	Whether truth is predicated primarily of the truth of cognition rather than of the truth of things, and in what manner.	262
Disp. IX.	On falsity or the false.	274

§. I.	What falsity is and where it exists and whether it is a property of Being.	274
§. II.	What is the origin of falsity.	295
§. III.	Whence arises the difficulty of attaining truth.	303
Disp. X.	On the good or transcendental goodness.	313
§. I.	What the good or goodness is.	313
§. II.	The manifold nature of good.	331
§. III.	What good is that which converts with Being as its property.	356
Disp. XI.	On Evil.	378
§. I.	Whether evil is something in things, and of how many kinds it is.	378
§. II.	On the manifold nature of evil.	394
§. III.	Where and whence evil exists, or what causes it has.	399
§. IV.	Why evil is not numbered among the attributes of Being.	416
Disp. XII.	On the causes of Being in general.	420
§. I.	Whether cause and principle are entirely the same.	421
§. II.	Whether there is any common nature of cause, and what kind it is.	447
§. III.	On the multiple types of cause.	458
Disp. XIII.	On the material cause of Substance.	476
§. I.	Whether it is evident by natural reason that there exists in beings a material cause of substances, which we call prime matter.	477
§. II.	Whether the material cause of generable and corruptible substances is one or multiple.	486
§. III.	Whether the first and unique material cause of generable substances is some simple body or integral substance.	493

§. IV.	Whether prime matter has some actual entity that is ingenerable and incorruptible.	511
§. V.	Whether matter is pure potency, and in what sense this should be accepted.	523
§. VI.	How matter can be known.	536
§. VII.	What matter causes.	540
§. VIII.	By what does matter cause.	546
§. IX.	What is the causality of matter.	555
§. X.	Whether substantial material cause is found in incorruptible bodies.	570
§. XI.	Whether the matter of incorruptible bodies is of the same nature as elementary matter.	580
§. XII.	Whether celestial or elemental matter is more perfect.	613
§. XIII.	What kind of causality belongs to the matter of incorruptible bodies.	616
§. XIV.	Whether a substantial material cause can be given in incorporeal things, and how quantity is compared to this material cause.	621
Disp. XIV.	On the material cause of accidents.	636
§. I.	Whether a true material cause of accidents is given.	636
§. II.	Whether Substance as such can be the immediate material cause of accidents.	645
§. III.	What Substance can be the material cause of accidents.	660
§. IV.	Whether one accident can be the proximate material cause of another.	712

DISPUTATION VI

ON FORMAL AND UNIVERSAL UNITY

After individual or numerical unity, we must speak of formal unity, and consequently of universal unity, which is in some way opposed to numerical unity; for the latter includes incommunicability with respect to inferiors, while the former intrinsically requires a nature communicable to many inferiors. Concerning these formal and universal unities, therefore, we must examine first whether they are in some way real and whether they are diverse unities or whether they coincide in some way into one. Likewise, how manifold each one is and what is the principle of each in things; and finally, how and through what operation of the intellect they are completed.

SECTION I

WHETHER THERE IS IN THINGS SOME FORMAL UNITY DISTINCT FROM NUMERICAL UNITY AND LESSER THAN IT

1. The reason for doubting on both sides. The reason for doubting is that it was said in the preceding disputation that all things which exist in the world are individual, such that it is contradictory for there to be in things some true being which is not individual and

singular; therefore, there cannot be in things any true and real unity besides numerical or individual unity. On the contrary, however, it is the case that "one" is nothing other than undivided being, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics IV, text. 3, and book X, text. 2; but besides numerical individual indivision, which is called material, there is given in things essential or formal indivision, in the way that several men, for example, although they are materially or numerically distinct, are nevertheless of the same essence and nature; therefore, besides numerical unity, formal unity is given in things.

In what Authors Agree or Disagree

2. In this matter Thomists and Scotists agree, teaching that there is given in things formal unity in some way distinct from numerical unity. Thus Scotus, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, and VII Metaph., q. 10; and there Anton. And., q. 17; and Cajetan, de Ente et essentia, c. 4, q. 6; and Soncinas, VII Metaph., q. 4, says that nature considered according to itself, that is, as it abstracts from the being which it has in individuals, or through the intellect, has some unity; and Javellus feels the same way, lib. VIII Metaph., q. 13; indeed St. Thomas seems to teach this opinion openly, Opusc. de Natura generis, c. 7, which cannot be true except concerning formal unity, because it cannot be individual, since it is said that nature thus taken abstracts from the being of individuals. But in the manner of explaining this formal unity the aforesaid authors disagree; however, the difference seems to consist principally in two things. First, in this, that Scotus considers this formal unity or the nature itself, as formally one, to be formally and by the nature of the thing distinct from individual unity or difference. Others, however, think it is distinguished only by reason; their opinion is more approved by us, as was treated in the preceding disputation, sect. 2, and we shall touch upon it again in the following sections. Second, they differ in this, that Scotus does not consider this formal unity or nature as having this formal unity to be multiplied

numerically in the individuals themselves, but that all individuals of the same nature have one and the same formal unity, one (I say) not only by reason, but by the thing itself, or that nature, as it exists in the thing itself in many individuals, has a unique formal unity. Others, however, think that in individual things nature has formal unity distinct by reason from numerical unity, but that this is multiplied in individuals along with individual unities, and consequently there is no unity which according to true real unity is the same in many individuals, but only according to a certain agreement or similarity. And in this point also this latter opinion is more approved, although some think the difference is in the manner of speaking; for what the Thomists call distinction of reason, Scotus and others call formal; and what the former call agreement or similarity, Scotus calls unity; but whatever may be the case concerning the intention of this or that author, we have sufficiently explained what that distinction by the nature of the thing is, which we deny intervenes between the individual and the common essence; for we deny every distinction which in the thing itself can in any way be actual before the function of the mind. And in the same sense and by proportional reasoning we must speak of unity, which is opposed to distinction, when we ask whether nature either according to itself, or in the thing itself, with every act of the intellect excluded, has such formal unity which is true and real unity, such that it has and retains exactly the same in all individuals.

Foundations of the Former Opinion

3. First. But so that the truth may be better explained, Scotus's opinion must be persuaded in some way. First, because Aristotle, V Metaph., text. 8 and 12, among the modes of one places the unity of species and genus, insofar as they are in some way real unities; for there the discourse was not about intentions of reason, but about unity, which is a property of being, which necessarily must be in some

way real; but the unity of species and genus can be maximally real on account of formal unity. Hence VII Metaph., text. 51, the same Aristotle says there is the same notion of animal in all species; and II de Anim., text. 88, he says there is the same nature of transparency in air and in water.

4. Second. Second, by reasoning taken from St. Thomas above, because human nature which exists in Peter and Paul can be defined by one unique and most proper definition, as is self-evident; therefore as such it has some unity; but it does not have this through the intellect; therefore from itself; therefore it is true and real unity. The first consequence is established, because nothing can be defined except insofar as it is one, as Aristotle testifies, IV Metaph., text. 10, VII Metaph., text. 13. The minor is proved, because nature does not have from the intellect that it is definable, but from itself; therefore neither does it have from the intellect that unity which is necessary for definition; but everything that belongs to nature, and not through the intellect, is real, either positive or by way of privation, which is sufficient for unity, which formally consists in privation.

5. Third. The objection is dissolved. Hence I argue third, because unity consists in indivision; but human nature from itself has formal indivision; therefore from itself it has formal unity. The minor is clear, because human nature from itself does not have formal division, because, if it had it from itself, it would have it everywhere and always, nor could it be conceived without it; but it is conceived very well without such division; therefore it does not have it from itself; therefore it has indivision from itself; because indivision is nothing other than the lack of division. For it does not seem to satisfy what the Thomists are accustomed to say frequently, that nature from itself is negatively one and undivided, because from itself it does not have that it is divided and multiple, nevertheless from itself it is not positively one or undivided. For in this distinction there seems to be involved a contradiction; because nothing is positively one, but negatively, nor can indivision as such belong to something otherwise

than through the negation of division; therefore if from itself it has this negation of division, from itself it has indivision; therefore also unity, which consists in indivision. And it is confirmed and declared, for, if from itself it has negation of division, therefore division is repugnant to it; because what belongs to nature from itself is inseparable from it, and therefore its contradictory always repugnant to it; therefore lack of division intrinsically belongs to it, and consequently positively belongs insofar as it can belong by reason of the foundation. Perhaps it will be said that to nature from itself neither division nor non-division formally belongs, but it is in some way indifferent to either, just as a surface from itself is neither white nor not white, but can only be said negatively not to be white. In which sense seems to be understood that common response, that indivision, or negation of division, does not belong to nature from itself positively, but negatively; for these terms do not fall upon indivision, but upon this which is to belong from itself, so that the sense is that nature does not postulate division from itself, nor does it postulate from itself the lack of division or unity. For in this sense negation can rightly sometimes belong to something from itself positively, sometimes negatively, for lack of rationality belongs to animal as such from itself negatively, but to a brute it belongs from itself positively, because it so belongs that the positive form opposed to it is repugnant. But against this I insist, for even in this sense nature seems from itself positively undivided formally, for it so has from itself negation of division, that formal division is entirely repugnant to it; for although in individuals it is divided materially, nevertheless not formally, because to be divided formally is nothing other than to be divided essentially; but man, for example, cannot be divided essentially, although it is divided materially into several individuals.

6. Hence I argue fourth, because human nature, for example, from itself and positively is being; therefore from itself and positively (in the sense said) it has some unity, and not material, or individual, as was proved extensively above, and is self-evident, because otherwise it

could not be multiplied numerically, indeed nor truly conceived without numerical unity; therefore at least formal, because no other middle can be devised. The first antecedent is manifest, because being intrinsically and essentially belongs not only to singular things, but also to natures, which are universally conceived by us; for they are neither altogether nothing, nor are they from themselves several individual beings, because they do not include proper singularities, or individuating principles, but only essential principles; therefore each nature from itself is neither several beings nor altogether nothing, but real being, and consequently one something in some way, because some unity follows upon every being. And it is confirmed, because human and equine nature, from themselves and with all individuating principles excluded, are several and distinct really and essentially; therefore each of them from itself is one formally and essentially, for multitude presupposes unities, and division from others presupposes indivision in itself.

7. And from these it can be further concluded that this formal unity is common to all individual things to which the nature, which is said to be formally one, is common; because nature cannot be common unless its unity is common. Likewise, because this formal unity does not have that by which it is divided into several unities. For either it is divided into several formal unities; and this is not the case, because it is of its nature to be formally undivided; and its unity consists in this. Or it is divided into several material and individual unities, and thus the formal unity as such is not divided, but is communicated to many, which is what we intend. Finally, because otherwise formal and individual unity could not be distinguished in the individuals themselves; in what would they be distinguished, if both were multiplied numerically? For whatever is multiplied in this way is individual.

The True Opinion is Confirmed

8. But so that we may explain the contrary and true opinion, it must be said first, that there is given in things formal unity belonging per se to each essence or nature. In this all agree, and the arguments made in favor of Scotus prove this. Likewise, because, since unity means lack of division, as many as there are genera of divisions, so many there can be of unities; but in things there is material and formal division, or entitative and essential; therefore similarly there will be formal unity besides material. Finally, any individual, for example, Peter, is not only one numerically, but also is one essentially; and he has both unities in himself, and not through mental cogitation; for, just as on the part of the thing he lacks numerical division, so also he lacks essential division, whether specific or generic; but formal unity is nothing other than essential unity; therefore.

9. Formal unity is distinct from singular unity by reason. Second, it must be said that this formal unity is distinguished at least by reason from individual unity. The arguments made for Scotus also prove this. And it is clear briefly, because common nature is in some way, at least by reason, distinct from individuals, and as thus distinct it does not have individual unity, but retains formal unity; therefore these unities differ at least by reason. Likewise, individual unity does not belong to common essence through itself, but it is necessary to understand something added, at least distinct by reason, by which that common essence becomes individual; but formal unity belongs per se immediately to the common essence itself without anything added even according to reason. Finally, for this reason essence cannot be understood without this formal unity accompanying it, from which it cannot be abstracted at all, whereas it can be abstracted from individual unity; therefore these unities are distinct by reason, in the manner in which in an individual thing essence, as essence, is distinguished from such individual and singular entity.

10. It is not distinguished by the nature of the thing. Hence I say third: these unities are not distinguished on the part of the thing, or by the nature of the thing. This conclusion follows from what was

said in the preceding disputation. And it is proved, because common essence and singular entity are not distinguished by the nature of the thing, but by reason only; therefore, neither can formal and individual unity be distinguished by the nature of the thing, but by reason only. Moreover, nature itself, although it can be considered by us according to itself, that is, according to those things which belong to it from itself, as it is abstracted by reason from individuals, nevertheless such nature is not true real being, unless in individuals, because, with first substances destroyed, it is impossible for anything to remain, as Aristotle said, in the chapter on Substance, because outside individuals nothing can have real existence, without which no true real being can exist, either actually or potentially, according to what was said above about being; therefore nature according to itself does not have reality, except in individuals; therefore neither can it have true and real unity, except in individuals; therefore neither can it have formal unity, which in the thing itself is by the nature of the thing distinct from the singular unity of each individual. This last consequence is clear, because whatever is in an individual thing intrinsic and essential to it, is not distinguished by the nature of the thing from it.

11. Formal unity as it exists in the thing is incommunicable. From these it is concluded fourth that this formal unity, as it exists in things before every operation of the intellect, is not common to many individuals, but as many formal unities are multiplied as there are individuals. It is proved first, because this formal unity accompanies nature according to itself; but in the thing there is no common nature, but as many natures and essences are multiplied as there are individuals, as is clear from what was said above, and we shall say again in what follows; therefore the same must be said of formal unity, which is like an intrinsic and transcendental property of such nature, and therefore they mutually follow each other, and, with one multiplied, the other is multiplied, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, IV Metaph., text. 3. Second, because formal unity existing on

the part of the thing is not distinguished by the nature of the thing from individual unity, as was said; therefore it is necessary that it be multiplied in the thing itself, with individuals and their individual unities multiplied; therefore there is no formal unity in the thing itself common to many things of the same nature. The first consequence is proved, because, if formal and individual unity are not distinguished by the nature of the thing, therefore in each individual, in Peter for example, his formal and individual unity are not distinguished in the thing; therefore they are distinguished from the formal and individual unity of Paul; because, by the very fact that Peter's formal unity in the thing is entirely the same as the individual unity of the same, it is necessary that it be distinguished from Paul's individual unity, because it cannot in the thing be the same as things entirely distinct and in some way opposed. Third, for whatever exists on the part of the thing is singular, and consequently incommunicable or not common to several inferiors, as was shown in the preceding disputation, section 1, and will also be said in the following section; but this real unity exists and in its own way exists on the part of the thing, as was declared; therefore it is singular; therefore it is not in the thing itself common. The last consequence is clear, because what is singular is proper to some individual, and therefore cannot be common to many, and on this account such commonality requires abstraction from all individuals, which cannot really belong to things, but only through the intellect.

12. And from these it follows first, that although each individual on the part of the thing is formally one without mental cogitation, nevertheless several individuals, which are said to be of the same nature, are not one something by true unity which is in things, but only either fundamentally, or through the intellect. And for this reason Aristotle whenever he says that several things are one in essence or by formal reason, explains that unity through reference to the intellect; namely, because they are conceived under one notion or definition, as is clear V Metaph., c. 6, text. 11, and lib. X, at the

beginning. And St. Thomas, de Ente et essentia, c. 4, said in this sense that nature from itself does not have common unity, because otherwise it could not become singular. Second, it follows that it is one thing to speak of formal unity, another of the commonality of the same unity; for unity is in things, as was declared; but commonality properly and rigorously is not in things because no unity which exists in the thing is common, as we have shown; but there is in singular things a certain similarity in their formal unities, on which is founded the commonality which the intellect can attribute to such nature as conceived by itself, which similarity is not properly unity, because it does not mean indivision of the entities in which it is founded, but only agreement, or relation, or coexistence of both.

The Foundations of the Former Opinion are Solved

13. To the first foundation of the former opinion it is responded that Aristotle numbered among the modes of one the generic and specific unity, either on account of the formal unity, which they say exists in individual things in which they exist, or because they are in some way fundamentally in things, as we shall declare later; and in this way several things are said to be of the same nature, either by identity of reason, or in fundamental unity, which consists in similarity. Hence it is said to the second, that for nature to be able to be defined, this unity suffices, because definition properly is not in things, but in reason; and therefore there is not one common definition, except insofar as the mind conceives something as common, separating it from any singular, for which the formal unity which nature has in each individual suffices along with the similarity of all such unities among themselves, for from this it comes about that the intellect conceives and defines that formal reason by one common concept. Hence, when it is said that nature does not have from the intellect that it is definable, it must be said that this is true

fundamentally and remotely, but not proximately, or (which is the same) this is true as regards the essence which is explained by definition, for this precedes in things, but not as regards the condition which it requires in order to be defined by us, which is commonality; for this it has only through mental cogitation.

14. To the third it is said that it proves that nature from itself has formal unity, but not the commonality of the same formal unity. Hence it has unity altogether inseparable, but by no means commonality, for in individual things nature is one formally, but nevertheless it is not common, nor indifferent to several, but in each one it is singular and proper to its effect. Therefore, when it is said that nature from itself is so formally undivided that it is repugnant to it to be formally divided, this can be equivocal, for either the sense is that nature, which is thus formally one, is not further divisible through formal and essential differences; and in this sense in generic natures it is simply false; for generic nature has its formal unity, and nevertheless is formally divisible through specific differences. But in specific natures this is indeed true, but it matters nothing for what we are discussing; for, although specific nature is not further divisible through essential differences, it is nevertheless divisible through individual differences, and in each individual it has its formal unity, distinct from that which it has in others, and this suffices so that such unity cannot be common in the thing. Or the sense is that nature is so undivided from itself, that all division or multiplication of its formal unity is repugnant to it; and in this sense the assumption is simply false, even in specific natures. Because, just as we were saying above, although in individuals there is no essential division or distinction, nevertheless there is division or distinction of essences, so it must be said in the present case, although individuals of the same species are not said to differ formally simply, nevertheless they have distinct formal unities proper to individuals. For to be distinguished essentially or formally signifies not only having distinct essence or form, but also having according to it dissimilitude and disagreement,

and thus to be distinguished not only according to the thing, but also according to the common reason and definition which the mind can fabricate. But to have distinct essence or formal unity only means entitative and real distinction, in the way that, just as Peter has distinct humanity from Paul, so also he has distinct essence, and distinct formal unity, although in it they are similar. Therefore, to nature, which is said to be formally one from itself, it is not repugnant to be multiplied according to that unity in many, and to have in individuals that unity incommunicable and consequently distinct from others, but only dissimilitude is repugnant, or disagreement according to that reason, that is, that those which participate in that formal unity should not be similar in it and agree among themselves.

15. To the fourth with the confirmation the response is the same; for it proves that common nature has from itself formal unity, according to which one specific nature differs formally and specifically from another, but it does not prove that formal unity to be common in the thing itself, except according to similarity or agreement, as was declared. And in almost the same way response is made to the arguments by which it is proved in the last place that this formal unity is common in the thing; for it is thus common, just as the nature itself, of which it is the unity. But nature is not common according to the thing, but according to reason or fundamental similarity, as has been often touched upon and will be said ex professo in the following section. Therefore in the same way formal unity is common, which in the thing is divided into several formal unities, each of which is in itself formally undivided, but among themselves, or one from another, they are not in the thing formally undivided, except according to similarity and agreement, by reason of which they are not said to be simply and properly formally distinct, as was said, but they are formal unities distinct entitatively or individually. For these two things are not repugnant, namely, that the formal unities themselves are multiplied, and that they are not multiplied formally, but materially, or in the individual; for formal unity itself in each individual is singular and

individual, although it does not have this from the force of formal unity, but from individual difference. We confess therefore that every formal unity, as it is in the thing, is individual and singular, but it nevertheless differs according to reason from individual unity, because formal unity per se and from its proper concept only means indivision in essential predicates; but individual unity means indivision in the entity itself. Hence formal unity means in the thing the foundation of similarity with another thing of the same nature; but individual unity means absolutely and simply the foundation of distinction; and finally formal unity means the foundation of communicability at least according to reason; but individual unity means complete incommunicability, both according to the thing and according to reason.

SECTION II

WHETHER THE UNIVERSAL UNITY OF NATURE IS DISTINCT FROM THE FORMAL [UNITY] AND EXISTS IN THINGS BEFORE THE OPERATION OF THE MIND.

1. The things which are called universal truly exist in reality. First, it must be established that those natures which we call universal and common are real and truly exist in things themselves; for we do not invent them by the mind, but rather apprehend them, and we understand them to exist in things, and concerning them thus conceived we provide definitions, produce demonstrations, and seek knowledge. Thus Aristotle, in Metaphysics I, chapter 6, and book IV, chapter 5, reproves Heraclitus and Cratylus for saying that nothing exists in things except singulars. And in Metaphysics VII, text 56, he teaches that universals are not separated from things, and in texts 37 and 53 he says that definitions are given of universal things, and in Posterior Analytics I, texts 5, 11, 33, 39, 43, he says that knowledge is

of universals, which exist in singulars and are abstracted from them; and he maintains the same in Metaphysics I, chapter 1. And in the same sense, in On Interpretation I, chapter 5, he says that some things are universal, others singular. And in this all philosophers and interpreters of Aristotle agree, except the nominalists, who say that only words are universal in signifying, and universal concepts in representing, and that definitions and sciences are most directly concerned with these, as can be seen in Ockham, In I Sentences, distinction 2, question 4, and Quodlibet V, questions 12 and 13, and Gabriel, In I Sentences, distinction 7, questions 7 and 8; whom Fonseca extensively attacks in book V, chapter 28, question 2. And they deserve to be criticized regarding certain ways of speaking, for perhaps in reality they do not dissent from the true opinion; for their arguments tend only to this end, that they prove universality is not in things, but belongs to them insofar as they are objectively in the intellect, or through denomination from some work of the intellect, which is true, as I shall say below. And therefore in relating and resolving their arguments we need not linger; for they present no obstacle whatsoever to the truth that the natures which are called universal exist in singulars, and that the singulars themselves have among themselves something in which they agree or are similar, and something in which they differ or are distinguished. Hence they falsely deny that demonstrations or definitions are given of things, because the sciences are not about names and our formal concepts, but directly about things or objective concepts. Therefore, although the denomination of universality comes to things from concepts, nevertheless the things thus denominated are real and exist in things.

2. Universals in reality are not separated from singulars. Second, it must be presupposed that these things or natures, which we call universal, are not really separated from singular things; because, as was demonstrated above, every thing that exists is necessarily singular and individual; and it involves a manifest contradiction that there should exist a man, for example, really separated from all singular men,

and be universal with respect to all of them. For if it is separated, it is not in them intrinsically and essentially; but if it is universal, it ought to be in them intrinsically and essentially, because this belongs to the nature of such a universal; nor can it simultaneously be separated from them and intrinsically in them, because these two things taken in reality itself involve a contradiction. Likewise, because either man as such is a thing really distinct from Peter, Paul, etc., or it is not a distinct thing; if the latter is said, this is what we intend, for in this sense universals are said not to be separated, because they are not things really distinct from singulars, nor do they have their own entity and real unity distinct from them; but if the former is said, it clearly follows that man as such is some thing distinct from Peter and Paul, for real distinction cannot be understood except between certain and determinate things; therefore that thing will be some man distinct from other men. Hence it could neither be of the essence of those men, nor could it simultaneously be in all of them. Likewise, otherwise for the same reason there would have to be granted an animal separated from all species of animals, and a living thing separated from all genera of living things, and so on concerning other essential predicates, all of which are impossible and utterly useless, because neither for knowledge nor for providing definitions is it necessary to fabricate such monsters of ideas.

3. In what sense Plato asserted universals to be separated. This is so manifest and self-evident that it seems incredible to many that Plato taught the contrary in the sense which Aristotle attributes to him in Metaphysics I and VII, and in other places, and extensively attacks. That Eustratius and Simplicius thought this way is related by St. Thomas, in book IV On the Government of Princes, chapter 4; and in particular, treating of the ideas of Augustine, in book LXXXIII Questions, question 46, and book VII of the City of God, chapter 28, he declares that Plato spoke of ideas which are in the divine mind; which Seneca also thinks, in book VIII, letter 66. Indeed, this seems to be signified by Plato himself, in the Parmenides and Timaeus. Let one

read Eugubinus, book I On Perennial Philosophy, chapter 10. If this is so, it must consequently be said that Plato did not posit ideas because of our mode of conceiving, defining, or knowing things in a universal way; for ideas as they are in the mind of God contribute nothing to this; because we neither conceive nor define them; and if per impossibile there were no such ideas, universals could be conceived and defined by us in the same way. But such ideas are posited so that they may be the first exemplars of these lower things, and influence them as the first and immutable principle in their genus; concerning which ideas under this consideration theologians treat in I Sentences, distinction 36, with St. Thomas, I, question 15, and below when treating of causes we shall touch upon something. But whatever may be the case concerning Plato's mind, this consideration has nothing to do with the present investigation, because we are not dealing with the universal which they call "in causing," whether by way of efficient cause or by way of exemplar, but with the universal in being or in predicating.

The Meaning of the Question & Various Opinions

4. With these things presupposed, therefore, the question remains whether the nature which is called universal, although it exists in singular things, nevertheless has from itself sufficient unity on account of which it is called universal, so that not only the universal nature, but also its universality exists in things. Three opinions are held regarding this matter. The first is that nature has from itself and through itself some universality such that even existing really in individuals themselves it retains it and is actually universal, which opinion John Monlorius defends extensively in a special disputation on this matter, chapters 5 and 6, and is commonly attributed to Scotus, In II Sentences, distinction 3, question 1, and Metaphysics VII, question 18, where Antonius Andreas, question 16, defends it.

Although Scotus, in the aforementioned distinction, rather speaks in such a way that he simply denies that the universal in act exists in things, and seems to admit only the universal in aptitude or potency, which Aristotle and all concede. Therefore in expounding Scotus's opinion the disciples vary, as Fonseca, to be cited below, treats extensively, where he also, like others, attempts to bring him to his own opinion. But lest we labor in equivocation, it is necessary to clarify these terms, "universal in act" and "universal in potency."

5. Therefore, if by "universal in act" is understood a nature abstracted from all individuation, which is conceived by way of one undivided being common to many and having proximate aptitude to be predicated of them, thus it is self-evident that the universal in act as such is not in things; and in this way Scotus explained this universality above, and Aristotle speaks in the same way when he denies against Plato that there is a universal in things, namely, one subsisting universally and separated from every singular and individual contraction. Therefore this universal is given only by the intellect, as we shall declare in the following section. Again, if "universal in potency" is said to be whatever does not have actual universality explained in the aforementioned way, but offers the intellect a foundation so that it can conceive or form it, thus also it is certain that universality in potency is given in things, because there is given in them some foundation of abstraction or universal conception which the intellect makes. But what is this foundation? For in this lies the point of controversy. Therefore the opinion cited affirms that this foundation is a certain universality which belongs to nature from itself and really, as it is by nature prior to its inferiors contracting it. For although in reality it is not separated from them, nevertheless it is truly common to all of them according to the same reason and formal unity. And thus this universality, although with respect to the prior it is called aptitudinal or fundamental, nevertheless, with respect to the singularity or individuation of nature, it is true, real and actual universality, which differs from formal unity only in this, that beyond

the negation of division in itself it expresses indifference and community to many.

6. The opinion thus declared is proved first, because nature, for example human nature, has from itself formal unity, as has been said; it also has from itself that it is communicable to many; therefore from itself, and before every intellect, it is one in many and of many, in which the nature of the universal consists, as Aristotle testifies, Posterior Analytics I, text 25; therefore nature has from itself and in things themselves some universality, which is a real property of it, and not merely of reason. The minor premise, in which lies the force of the argument, is proved first, because human nature from itself is not incommunicable, otherwise it could not be multiplied according to number; therefore it is from itself communicable; because between communicable and incommunicable there is no middle to be given with respect to the same nature, for they are contradictorily opposed. Second, because nature is not from itself this particular and individual thing, as was proved in the preceding disputation; but it needs something added by which it is individuated; therefore from itself it is apt to be contracted by individuating principles; indeed, since it is not apt to subsist abstractly and universally, it postulates and requires this determination so that it can subsist; therefore it is from itself apt for that; therefore it is also from itself communicable to many individuals. This last consequence is proved, because such a nature is not adequately contractible by one individuating difference alone, indeed this is repugnant to it; therefore this repugnance which such a nature has to being adequately contracted in one individual alone is founded in the natural aptitude which it has to be able to exist in many; therefore this aptitude belongs to it really and according to itself. Third, the same is proved from the attributes of universal natures as they are universal; for they are said to be the proper objects of the sciences, immutable and perpetual, ingenerable and incorruptible; they are also said to be the immediate things signified by words or common concepts, to which essential predicates and intrinsic

properties belong per se primo; but all these things are not fabricated by the intellect, nor do they consist in some extrinsic denomination proceeding from some act of the intellect; therefore nature in things themselves has some universality which is the reason and foundation of all these things. And it is confirmed, because otherwise we can scarcely avoid falling into the opinion of the nominalists, who deny that there are universal natures in things, but only singular things, because if nature in reality has no universality, nor is distinguished by the nature of the thing from individuals, as was shown above, it does not appear what can immediately correspond in things to common terms or their concepts, besides the singulars themselves, which the nominalists teach, and consequently there cannot be knowledge of common things, but only of words, as the same contend.

7. The second opinion is that nature existing in individuals is not actually universal, nevertheless it does not have from the intellect alone that it is actually universal, but from itself and before the operation of the intellect, and before every contraction to individuals, and therefore before every existence both in the intellect and in the thing itself, it is actually universal. This opinion Fonseca treats and defends extensively, book V of the Metaphysics, chapter 28, through the first five questions. We shall see its foundations later, when we confirm the true opinion; for this opinion is intermediate between the other two, and therefore takes arguments partly from the same sources to refute them, partly to protect and persuade to itself.

8. The third opinion is that natures become actually universal only by the work of the intellect, with some preceding foundation on the part of the things themselves, on account of which they are said to be universal in potency on the part of the thing. This opinion is common among ancient and recent philosophers, with Aristotle very often in these books of the Metaphysics, especially in VII; and the Commentator, On the Soul I, comment 8, saying that it is the intellect that makes universals in things; and Avicenna, who in this sense said, book V of his Metaphysics, in the beginning: "Horseness according to

itself is only horseness, neither one nor many"; and St. Thomas speaks in the same way, in the opuscule On Being and Essence, chapter 4, where he says that nature according to itself is neither universal nor singular, and in other places in the same sense he says that the intention of universality is from the intellect, as I, question 85, article 1, and I-II, question 29, article 6, and Metaphysics VII, lecture 13, and in the same opinion agree all his disciples, Cajetan, in the cited place On Being and Essence; Soncinas and Javellus, cited in the preceding section; Soto in the Logic, question 2 On Universals, and others.

Resolution of the Question

9. This last opinion is without doubt true. But in order that we may explain and confirm it, two things which we proposed in the title of the question must be clarified. First, how the unity which is necessary for the universality of nature differs from formal unity. Second, how the aptitude for being in many belongs to nature thus united. From these will finally become clear the third thing, namely, how the universality of nature cannot be found in things themselves. But I presuppose what Aristotle often taught, that the nature of universality as such consists in two things, namely in unity and communicability. For these two things are contained in that definition by which the universal is said to be "one in many and of many," or "besides many," which is taken from various places of Aristotle, On Interpretation I, chapter 5; Posterior Analytics I, chapter 18; Metaphysics VII, chapter 13. For if nature is not one in some way, it will not be something universal, but will be a multitude or aggregation of things; but if it is not apt to be in several, it will not be universal, but singular, and therefore it is necessary that it be in many in a way opposite to singularity or individuation, that is, that it be in many inferiors, which can be multiplied and numbered under that common nature. These two things, therefore, namely unity and community, must be explained, so that it may be established that the constitutive

nature of the proper universal is not found in things, apart from the intellect.

10. I say first: formal unity by itself alone does not suffice for the unity which universal nature requires, as it is universal and is so called, but some greater unity is required. This is proved first, because the unity of a universal thing as universal must be such that it is proper to it, and cannot belong to a singular thing as singular; but formal unity is not of this kind; therefore it as such does not suffice for the unity of universal nature as such. The major premise is established from the common consent of all, and from the opposition which exists between singular and universal as such; for since they are opposed as communicable and incommunicable, that unity which is indifferent to both of these cannot be sufficient for the nature of the universal, as will become more clear from the following argument. But the minor premise is established from what was said above concerning formal unity; for it was shown that it is from itself indifferent to nature, whether universally conceived or contracted in individuals. Second, it is proved because formal unity is multiplied in individuals with the nature itself; but the unity which is proper to universal nature as universal cannot be multiplied in inferiors, for rather they are one under that nature, as Porphyry said, "by participation in the species several men are one man"; therefore universal nature as such has another mode of unity besides formal unity. The major premise was proved above. For we showed that each individual nature is in itself formally one by its own and intrinsic formal unity distinct from that which is in another similar nature, because each through what it is in itself is in itself formally undivided. And from this the minor proposition is easily proved, because if the unity of universal nature, as it is universal, were multiplied in inferiors, specific unity would be multiplied in individuals, or generic unity in species, which is impossible, otherwise even several men would be several species, and each of them would have in itself the unity of universality, and consequently each would be one universally, just as it is one formally,

which is plainly false. Hence I argue third, because formal unity only expresses the formal or essential indivision of that thing which is thus called one; hence it is irrelevant to this unity whether that thing is singular or common; but universal unity intrinsically expresses the indivision of several things in that thing or nature which is called one universally, so that none of those inferiors which are contained under such a nature, taken by itself, has the whole of that universal unity, but all are one under that nature; as all species of animal are one in the nature of animal; but no species taken by itself has in itself the universal unity of animal, which is as it were potential, although it has in itself the formal unity of it. Although, therefore, formal unity is presupposed for the unity of the universal, and is the foundation of it, nevertheless it is not sufficient by itself, but universal unity adds something beyond it.

11. You will say, what therefore or what kind can this unity of universal nature as such be? For every unity, as was suggested above, must be either formal or numerical; because every division is either formal or material; but universal unity cannot be numerical unity, because this is proper to singular things; if therefore it is neither formal, what can it be? It is answered that it is a certain unity distinct from these, having its own name and proper nature. For this unity is called universal, and its nature consists in the indivision of some nature into several similar natures under the same name and nature with aptitude to be divided into them. Therefore such unity includes both, namely indivision, and aptitude for division into several things of the same name and nature, or which are such that each whole divided includes and contains the whole of its actuality in itself. Hence this indivision closely approaches proper privation, because it expresses the negation of division in a nature apt for such division. In this this unity differs from individual unity, which not only expresses indivision, but also inaptitude for division into several things which are such as the divided thing itself is. It differs from formal unity, because although this unity does not conflict with that aptitude, or

communicability to several, it nevertheless does not require it. Hence in God there can be understood formal unity with incommunicability to several natures. When therefore it is said that every unity is either formal or numerical, this is true of unities which belong to things themselves according to themselves, or in the thing itself; but besides these there can be another unity, which is perfected by the intellect; and of this kind is universal unity, as we shall show.

12. Hence it is further added that this unity can be reduced to the numerical, which nevertheless is not simply real, but of reason or objective. This is clarified, for the human species in the nature of species is so one that with others it composes the ternary, or quaternary, etc., number of species contained under animal; but every unity which can make number can under that aspect be called numerical. For which reason, although man and horse differ essentially and specifically in absolute terms, nevertheless in the nature of universals or species they differ numerically. Likewise the formal concept of man as such is numerically one; hence its object in the nature of an object can also be said to be numerically one, and thus man, insofar as it is presented to that concept, is said to have objective numerical unity or in the nature of an object, which is also unity of reason, or by extrinsic denomination from a concept of the mind; therefore this unity is necessary for the nature of the universal, and under that aspect can be reduced to the numerical. This can also be explained in this way, for if we were to imagine according to Plato's opinion, as explained by Aristotle, that universals are things separated from singulars, it would necessarily have to be understood that man as such, subsisting in himself, is some thing in itself indeed transcendentally numerable with others, and thus numerically one, although simultaneously it would be imagined as existing in several numerically distinct things, which otherwise involves contradiction, as has been said, which does not pertain to the present matter; for from this we only intend to declare that the universal, in the way in which it is or is apprehended, must be understood as individed in itself and

numerable either according to the thing, if it is imagined as separated in the thing itself, or according to reason and concept, if it is only abstracted by the mind.

13. Universal unity does not exist before the operation of the mind. From these things I say second, that the unity of universal nature as universal is not real, nor is it in things as they exist in reality itself and precede every operation of the intellect. This conclusion follows clearly from the preceding; because in things no unity can be understood besides the formal and numerical; but neither of these suffices for the nature of the universal as such. Perhaps it will be said that in things is found not only that formal unity by which each human nature, for example, is said to be formally one in itself, but also is found the unity by which all human natures are said to have the same formal nature, and consequently formal unity, by reason of which they participate in the same definition, and all men are said to be of the same nature on the part of the thing. But against this, for this is not truly unity, but only similitude; for nothing truly one and individed in reality is on the part of the thing in this and in that human nature, but only in this one is something to which something similar is in the other nature; but this is not real unity, but similitude. Hence several things can only be said to be of the same nature on the part of the thing, that is, similar; for this identity, since it is said to be between distinct things, cannot be anything in the thing itself besides similitude, by reason of which they are also said to participate, or to have the same definition, fundamentally indeed by virtue of the said similitude, but formally by reason, for definition is a work of reason.

14. The real relation of similitude is neither sufficient nor necessary for the nature of the universal. But this similitude is neither simply necessary for the nature of the universal, nor sufficient. I understand that it is not necessary according to actual existence and relation, because it is not of the nature of the universal that it actually be in many; for if Plato's ideas were true, they would be universal from themselves, although actually no other individual existed, and in fact

the natures of the heavens and of Gabriel are universal, whether or not there are in reality several individuals of them having among themselves the aforesaid similitude. But if there were talk of that similitude in potency, thus it is necessary for the universality of nature, because otherwise nature could not be understood as common, as we shall shortly explain more broadly. But that that similitude does not suffice for the nature of the universal is proved, because by virtue of that similitude precisely, whether taken in act or in potency, something is not conceived as one thing common to many, but many things are conceived as similar among themselves; but the universal as such must be conceived as one. Likewise, because the universal, as universal, is conceived as actually individed, insofar as it is such, and divisible, and communicable by aptitude; but things insofar as they are similar in nature on the part of the thing, are rather actually divided, and unitable by aptitude or fundamentally (so to speak) in one nature universally conceived.

15. And from this the conclusion posited is more clearly confirmed. For universality as such expresses some indivision, otherwise it would not be universality, but only multitude; but that cannot be an indivision which belongs to things as they are in themselves, but only as they underlie concepts of the mind; therefore the unity which is taken from this is not real but of reason. The minor premise is clarified, for as Aristotle correctly said, Metaphysics VII, chapter 14, and often elsewhere, to be individed in the thing itself, and simultaneously to be actually divided into several things of the same name and nature, involves a contradiction, for if a thing is individed on the part of the thing, it is singular and numerically one on the part of the thing; but if it is divided into several similar things of the same name and nature, it will also be several in number, which cannot happen. And this contradiction followed from Plato's position, which ceases if the universal is understood to have indivision only according to reason; because to be individed according to reason, and divided according to the thing, are not opposed to each other. And in this way

all men in the nature of the species are said to be one man, because in the concept of man, as such, they are not divided; and thus the unity of man, insofar as it is universal, is consummated by reason, because man, as such, has indivision only as it underlies the conception of the mind. This indivision consists in this, that man, for example, abstractly conceived, is not communicable to many men or objective concepts thus abstracted, although it is communicable by contraction to many individuals.

SECTION III
WHETHER COMMON NATURE OF ITSELF HAS SOME UNITY OF PRECISION OUTSIDE INDIVIDUALS AND BEFORE THE OPERATION OF THE MIND

1. Before we respond to the arguments of the contrary opinion, we must treat an objection that occurs here, and a certain opinion that has seemed to me almost singular and novel. It can therefore be objected against the preceding resolution that any common nature, for example human nature, not only insofar as it is abstracted by the intellect, but also insofar as it of itself prescrinds from individual differences and is by the order of nature prior to them, has a certain unity; because as such it is not many, but only one; but that unity, since it belongs to the nature of itself, will be real; therefore it will suffice for the nature of the universal. Concerning this, Fonseca, lib. V Metaph., c. 28, q. 3, sect. 2, 3 et 4, holds that to the universal nature taken according to itself there belongs a certain unity, which it does not communicate to its inferiors, but belongs to it alone and precisely before it exists, both in the nature of things and in the intellect, which unity he says is distinct from formal unity, because this latter is multiplied in individuals, but not the former. He calls that unity one of precision or numerical, not simply and absolutely, but of

common nature, which is a diminishing condition, whence he also calls it in some way mixed from formal and numerical. And for this opinion he cites St. Thomas, Opusc. 42 de Natura generis, c. 7 et 8, where he indicates that there are universal natures having a certain unity belonging to nature absolutely taken, which is not communicated to individuals of such nature, nor belongs to nature through the intellect. He also cites Soncin., VII Metaph., q. 40, where he says that nature considered according to itself, that is, neither as it is in individuals nor as it is in the intellect, has a certain unity, and he does not seem to speak of formal unity, because he adds that nature does not communicate this unity to its inferiors; and Capreol. thinks the same, In III, dist. 5, q. 5, a. 3, ad argumenta Scoti cont. I concl., where he affirms this not of all universals, but of certain ones from St. Thomas in the place cited, namely, of those which have not only logical but also physical unity and agreement. This limitation makes the matter more difficult and obscure, because it is impossible to find universal unity not founded in formal unity, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said and will be more apparent from what is to be said; but given formal unity, there is the same reason with regard to any other unity in any universal nature whatsoever; because every such nature can be considered according to itself and absolutely and, as such, the same non-repugnance, indifference, or indivision is found in any nature whatsoever; and therefore Fonseca does not admit that limitation, but generally attributes this unity of precision to all universal natures.

2. But if you ask where or when this unity belongs to such a nature, he responds that an existing nature never has this kind of unity because it does not have it in individuals since it is contracted in them; but nature does not have existence except in individuals; nor does it belong to it only as it is in the intellect because it belongs to it according to itself before anything is understood to be had from the intellect; nor does it belong to it through extrinsic denomination alone, but through true negation or indivision belonging to the nature

itself according to itself. And Soncin. above holds this same view, who therefore says this unity is not actual but potential; and both explain it through this conditional, that if nature existed without contraction to individuals, it would have this unity. But if you object again, because if this unity belongs per se to nature absolutely taken, it will be inseparable from it, for what belongs per se to anything always belongs to it, nor can its opposite belong to it; but in individuals nature does not have that unity but rather the opposite multiplicity; therefore that unity cannot belong per se to such nature. They respond that "per se" or "according to itself" can be taken in two ways: first to signify necessary connection of predicate with subject as being of the essence of the existing thing or flowing intrinsically from it; in this way Aristotle took it when he enumerated two modes per se, I Poster., c. 4; and in this way the argument correctly proves that the aforesaid unity does not belong per se to universal nature; in another way "per se" is taken for what is absolute or solitary, and in this way this unity is said to belong to nature according to itself or taken per se; because that nature considered absolutely and solitarily, that is, insofar as it does not have adjoined contracting or individuating differences, immediately has that unity. For it is not necessary that whatever belongs to nature taken according to itself in this latter way, also belongs per se in the prior way, that is, intrinsically and necessarily; for many predicates, especially negative ones, can contingently belong to it thus taken, such as not existing, not being generated or corrupted, not being white, black, or similar things all of which do not belong to common nature except by reason of individuals. Thus therefore this unity of precision, which consists in negation or privation, belongs to nature considered according to itself and absolutely, because as such the differences by which it is contracted and divided do not belong to it; yet it does not belong per se and necessarily, because through the mediation of inferiors the opposite can belong to it.

3. Refutation of the preceding opinion. Predicates belonging to nature solitarily belong per se in the posterior manner. Porphyry.

But nevertheless this opinion cannot be proved to me, for (to omit that it is plainly contrary to St. Thomas, lib. de Ent. et essent., c. 4, and Cajetan, there, and other authors cited and to be mentioned below, concl. 4) I do not sufficiently understand what kind of unity can belong to nature before the intellect and yet can never belong to it existing in inferiors or in singulars; for if that unity belongs to nature before the intellect, therefore it is real unity; therefore it can really belong to the nature itself at some time; therefore it is necessary that it be able to belong to it in individuals or in some individual; for nothing belongs really to nature at all, except what can belong to it as existing in some individual. For what they say, that this unity belongs really to nature according to essential being, not according to existential being, does not seem to be able to be understood; because, as I said above treating the concept of being and will say again below treating the essence and existence of creatures, essential being cannot be conceived as real unless it at least includes by aptitude an order to existence; therefore, if this unity cannot belong to essence as existing, neither does it belong to it as apt to exist; because, just as it does not exist except as individual, so neither is it apt to exist except as individual; therefore it belongs to it really in no way. And it is confirmed, because no predicate, neither positive nor negative, belongs to nature taken according to itself and solitarily, unless either it belongs to it per se in the posterior manner or it can belong to individuals; but this unity does not belong per se in the said manner to nature taken according to itself, as they themselves confess; nor can it belong to it by reason of individuals, because it rather repugnates to it as such; indeed, by the very fact that it is taken in individuals, it is no longer considered per se and solitarily; therefore it belongs per se primo in no way. The major premise is clear from Porphyry, c. de Commun.; St. Thomas, Cajetan and others, in the places cited. And it is evident by induction in negative predicates also (for concerning positive ones there is no reason for doubt), because not being white, or black, etc., belong to man as such, insofar as they can belong to

some individual of man; indeed, even not existing itself, although it cannot belong to man by reason of some existing individual, nevertheless belongs to it insofar as either some, or all individuals of human nature do not exist. The reason is that these predicates are contingent, and therefore do not belong to the species except by reason of individuals.

4. Response to the objection. But if someone objects that there are certain negative predicates which belong to common nature according to itself and yet do not belong to individuals, as these seem to be: not being generated, not being corrupted (for it is repugnant for universal nature absolutely taken to be generated, or created, or even to exist), it must be said that there is a sophistical equivocation; for the sense of those negations can be multiple. The first is that abstract nature can neither be generated nor corrupted nor exist, and in this way those negations are true; yet if they are correctly understood, they are not said of nature taken according to itself and absolutely, but as having a certain state which it can have only through the intellect; for really there is no nature thus abstract and solitary, but it is considered through the intellect, and to it as thus considered such negation is attributed. Therefore it is not surprising that it does not belong to it in individuals, because through existence in individuals that state is destroyed, by reason of which such negation belongs to nature. Whence, if that unity of precision is to be compared with these negations, from this it is rather gathered that it belongs to nature only as it is subject to the operation of the abstracting and prescinding intellect. Another sense of those negations is that common nature absolutely is not generated nor corrupted, and this can be understood either that it is not generated in any way, and thus it is false, for at least secondarily it is generated and exists in individuals. Or that it is not generated per se primo, but by reason of individuals, and this is true; yet this can also be said of nature existing in individuals, just as Aristotle says second substances exist in first ones and by reason of them, and consequently not per se primo. Whence this negation taken

in this sense does not belong to nature contingently, but per se and necessarily; just as conversely, to be made and to be per se primo belongs to individuals if it ought to belong to anything. Therefore no contingent predicates, even negative ones, belong to common natures, unless either by reason of individuals, or in the individuals themselves, or by reason of the state which they have in the intellect.

5. Finally I argue in this way against the said opinion, because common nature is not distinguished ex natura rei from individuals, but only through the intellect; therefore it cannot have some unity according to itself which it does not have in individuals except only through the intellect. The antecedent has often been proved; the consequent is proved first, because real unity follows being; therefore if nature according to itself does not have entity distinct from the entity of individuals, neither can it have real unity distinct from the unity of individuals; therefore it can have no unity of itself, which it does not have in individuals, but every other is through the intellect. Second, the same consequent is proved from the very terms which the other opinion uses; for it calls this unity one of precision; if therefore precision is not in the thing, nor belongs to nature according to itself but only through the intellect, neither can unity belong to nature according to itself, excluding the intellect. Indeed, if anyone rightly considers, by the very fact that it is said "according to itself" in the sense declared above, the operation of the intellect is involved, because nature is not prescinded or separated from all individual differences except by the work of the intellect. Whence, whatever belongs to nature taken according to itself properly and peculiarly by reason of that condition or state, which is explained through that particle "according to itself" in the aforesaid sense, belongs to it through the intellect; but the aforesaid unity is of this kind, as has been shown.

6. It is vindicated from calumny. And from this it is incidentally understood that no equivocation is committed by St. Thomas, Cajetan and others (as Fonseca thought), when they say that

whatever belongs to nature according to itself or per se, belongs to it existing in individuals, because whatever belongs per se to anything, always belongs to it; for in both places they take "per se" in the same way, namely posteriorly, as it ought truly to be taken. And similarly, when the same authors distinguish in three ways that something belongs to nature, namely, either as existing in individuals or as in the intellect or according to itself, they take that "according to itself" in the same sense, namely, for what belongs per se and intrinsically to nature and not by reason of some state of contraction or precision or abstraction. For it supposes (what we have shown to be true) that nothing can belong to nature proximately and immediately, insofar as it is such a nature, unless it also belongs per se; and conversely whatever contingently belongs to common nature, belongs to it by reason of the state of individuation which it has in reality, or of separation which it has through the intellect. Whence to remove equivocation more clearly, every predicate which is said immediately (so to speak) of common nature, that is, not by reason of individuals, can be said to belong to it according to itself; yet this predicate can be twofold: one belonging to nature, as precisely having such formal character, such as being a rational animal and consequently being risible, capable of wonder, etc., and predicates of this kind are said most properly to belong to nature according to itself and per se, that is, from this precisely that it is such a nature. And in this way is the discourse of St. Thomas and others concerning nature according to itself, when they distinguish it from its twofold state, namely, in individuals or in the intellect, and therefore they correctly conclude that whatever belongs to nature according to itself in this way, belongs to it wherever and however it exists. But other predicates can be said to belong to nature according to itself, that is, taken in common, yet not by reason of the nature itself but by reason of that precision and separation which the particle "according to itself" circumscribes. And such consideration of nature coincides with the state which nature has through the intellect, and those predicates similarly coincide with the

attributes which belong to that nature by reason of that state; otherwise it would be necessary to apply a fourth consideration of nature besides the threefold one recently expounded, which is unheard of. Since therefore that unity is said to belong to nature according to itself, yet not by the very fact that the nature is such, but precisely by the fact that it is taken or considered according to itself, it is clearly proved that that unity belongs to nature only according to the state which it has in the intellect.

7. Third, the same principal consequent of the argument is proved and declared more fully, because nature actually existing is not distinguished ex natura rei from the individual, and therefore as such it cannot have real unity repugnant to individuation such as would be common unity; but common nature also taken as possible or according to essential being, is not distinguished ex natura rei from individuals taken also in possible being or according to individual essential being; therefore by the same reason no unity repugnant to individual unity can belong to such nature according to itself and before the intellect, such as would be that unity of precision or common numerical unity. The major premise is clear from what has been said, and is not denied by others. The minor premise is easily proved, because the same is the proportion of possible things among themselves as of existing things among themselves, because no other things exist or come to be except those which are possible. Nor does possible humanity have another essence except what it has while it exists; therefore if humanity as such, when it actually exists, is not distinguished ex natura rei from this and that humanity, neither is humanity as possible distinguished ex natura rei from this and that possible humanity. Indeed, if we speak properly, humanity is not possible except insofar as this and other individual humanities are possible, just as neither does humanity exist except insofar as individual humanity exists. But the consequent is proved by the same reason and proportion, because possible humanity is not other than this and that humanity according to the thing and excluding the

intellect; therefore repugnant unities cannot belong to it. And it is confirmed, for if this unity belongs to nature before the intellect, to which nature, I ask, does it belong? To the singular? And this is not so, as is known per se and they themselves confess. Or to the common insofar as it is common? And this is not so because there is no such nature even as possible, with the operation of the intellect removed. Or to nature as it is nature, adding nothing else even through the intellect? And this also is not so because as such nature has only formal unity, which is communicated to individuals, and is multiplied in them; therefore excluding the intellect, there can be no adequate subject and foundation of such unity.

8. The foundation of the opposite opinion is overthrown. To the difficulty therefore the response is given by denying what is assumed in it, namely, that human nature, for example, has of itself some unity distinct from formal unity. But that objection proceeds from a false principle, namely, that specific nature of itself prescinds from individuals by some real precision or one that belongs to it ex natura rei; when in reality it does not prescind except through the abstracting intellect conceiving common nature without individuals, of which precision indeed there is a foundation in nature itself; but this is nothing other than formal unity which is multiplied in individuals and is in them through identity. Another thing also seems false to be supposed in that objection, namely, that specific nature, for example, is by order of nature prior to individuals and as such has that unity of precision or common numerical unity; for if there is talk of real priority, that is, founded in some real causality or relation or real order, this is not true, both because where there is no distinction ex natura rei, there cannot be real order or causality. And also because neither in the character of existing nor in essential being can such priority be understood. The first is clear because, if there is some order, rather specific nature exists because some individual of it exists, just as Aristotle said of first and second substances. The second is clear, because essential being prescinded from existence is nothing

other than the entity of the thing in possible being, as will be shown below; but we have proved that even in this way universals are possible by reason of possible singulars. But if essential being is taken for quidditative predicates precisely taken and abstracted from individuating differences, essential being of this kind involves the operation of reason conceiving the common character in which individuals agree, abstracted from their proper differences. But if common essence taken in this way is said to be prior by nature, not by proper and real priority but by that which is said to be a consequence of subsisting, that is rather a priority of reason; for it involves a concept of mind abstracting common character from singulars; whence to be prior in this way is nothing other than to be more universal. But from this priority no numerical unity can be gathered which belongs to nature according to itself before individuals and before every intellect; therefore there is no such unity except only through reason and concept of mind, as we said in the conclusion.

9. But against what has been said it can be objected, because universal nature as such cannot be said to be one in number in the character of universal through extrinsic denomination from the formal concept of mind, namely, because it is represented through one concept in number; therefore it must be said to be one in number in the character of universal from some other unity which precedes in nature itself and is represented through that concept; therefore such unity belongs to nature of itself and not through the intellect. The first antecedent is clear first, because rather the concept has unity from the object than conversely; therefore the object is not one because the concept is one, but conversely. Second, because otherwise the same nature represented by diverse men through distinct concepts would be several universals in number, for with the form giving unity multiplied, unity will be multiplied. But the consequent is plainly false; for we will not say there are several human species in number because human nature is represented by several concepts; just as there are not several faces of Christ the Lord because it is represented by several images;

therefore just as several concepts do not give plurality to universal nature, so neither does one concept give unity, but supposes it; therefore this unity of which we speak is not made through reason but belongs to nature of itself insofar as it is objectable to several similar concepts.

10. It can be responded that only formal unity is proved to belong to nature according to itself and that this is supposed by the conception of mind, and by reason of it human nature, for example, can have the character of one object with respect to the abstracting and prescinding concept, and because that is not multiplied even if formal concepts of the same nature are multiplied, therefore such universal as universal is simply not multiplied in number. But against this, because formal unity alone does not suffice to constitute this universal as numerically one unless something else is added, because such unity is common to individual things and multiplicable in them; therefore besides formal unity another unity is necessary from which common nature as such is said to be one in number in the character of universal; for nothing can be denominated numerically one except from unity which is numerical under that character, and the argument proceeds concerning this. As, for example, human nature is said to be one species in number; therefore it cannot have that unity from its formal unity as such, because Peter has similar formal unity and is not such a species; therefore there is another unity of human nature incommunicable to individuals from which it is denominated one species. Either therefore it has that unity from a concept of mind and thus this unity will be multiplied with the concept multiplied, as the argument made contends, or it is not made through concept and thus will belong to nature of itself, as the opposite opinion said. The response is given by declaring the response given more fully, that it is indeed true that formal unity does not suffice for the unity of universality or so that nature is said to be one universal in number, but the precision of mind is necessary, by reason of which there belongs to nature thus abstracted unity incommunicable to individuals, which

consists in indivision or incommunicability to several natures thus abstracted and common with aptitude so that it is communicated to several contracted or individual natures; but this negation or incommunicability is not multiplied in nature even if formal concepts are multiplied in number, and therefore it is not necessary that on account of several formal concepts distinct in number, conceived nature be said to be several universals distinct in number.

11. To the objection therefore in form, the response is given by denying the first antecedent in the sense now expounded. To the first proof the response is given that for the unity of formal concept it suffices that on the part of the object the fundamental unity of objective concept is supposed, which consists in the similarity or agreement of several singulars in formal unity; for this suffices so that the intellect by its power and efficacy of understanding can abstract a common objective concept; whence as to this precision of such common and universal object, the intellect does not suppose its object but makes it, or rather confers on it that state of precision through extrinsic denomination. To the second proof the response is given that the form from which nature is properly denominated thus one, is not the concept of mind itself but is the negation of incommunicability to several natures thus common, which negation is founded in the abstraction of mind; but the same is such negation whether this abstraction is made through one or through various formal concepts distinct in number.

12. It could also be said otherwise that, although in the abstract the intentions of universality are multiplied from the multiplication of formal concepts concerning the same nature (in the way dialecticians are accustomed to say that a distinct relation of reason of species arises in number in human nature through distinct comparison of it to individuals made by Peter and Paul, or by the same person at different times), nevertheless the universal in the concrete is simply not multiplied, because that which underlies such intention of universality is not formally multiplied, but is taken as having the same

formal unity entirely with the same precision. Just as, although several whitenesses distinct in number could inhere in the same man, he would not be called several white things but one; and a wall, although it is constituted or denominated in the character of seen from vision which is in the eye, is not denominated several seen things but one, although it is seen by several visions simultaneously; for in concrete things of this kind unity is taken from the supposit or subject or what is related in the manner of subject. But in the present case the nature which is denominated universal is related in the manner of subject with respect to the intention of universality and therefore, although the forms or concepts denominating are multiplied, the universal is not multiplied because all are concerned with the same nature, and they prescind it according to the same formal unity.

SECTION IV
WHAT IS THE APTITUDE IN UNIVERSAL NATURE TO EXIST IN MANY

1. The reason for doubt is sufficiently clear from the two preceding sections and especially from the arguments proposed in section 2; for this doubt has been proposed in order to resolve those arguments more clearly.

2. The aptitude for existing in many is nothing in nature as it exists on the side of reality (a parte rei). I say therefore first: the aptitude of common nature to exist in many is not something pertaining to that nature insofar as it exists on the side of reality. This conclusion seems to be most widely accepted and evident, especially if we suppose, as has often been said, that the universal is not distinguished by the nature of the thing from singulars or inferiors. It is therefore proven because on the side of reality there is nothing except what is singular and individual, and in the singulars themselves there is nothing distinct from them by the nature of the thing;

therefore in nature, insofar as it exists on the side of reality, there can be no aptitude for existing in many. The consequence is clear because in an individual thing as such there is no such aptitude or non-repugnance, but rather the opposite repugnance; but nature, insofar as it exists in the order of things, is individual, completely undistinguished in reality from the individuals themselves. Some say that although there is no proximate potency in existing nature to exist in many, because as such it is contracted and determined to one, there is nevertheless a remote aptitude because, as far as it is concerned in itself, if the contraction were removed, it could be communicated to many, just as prime matter existing under one form and under dispositions accommodated to it is not proximately apt for other forms, yet retains its remote aptitude for them. But the example is not to the point, because matter and its substantial aptitude for form is one in number and a singular entity really distinct from the form and dispositions it now has, which can lose this form and receive another, and therefore it is not surprising that matter existing under one form retains a radical aptitude for receiving others. But truly the common nature as contracted to this individual is not something distinct by the nature of the thing from the individual itself or from the contracting difference; nor can it happen that human nature, for example, existing in Peter should lose according to reality the same individuation it has in Peter and acquire another, and therefore, as it exists in reality, it has neither proximate nor remote relation to existing in many, neither simultaneously nor successively.

3. Whence I argue secondly because every common nature, as it exists in reality in each individual, is so determined to that individual that the same thing according to reality cannot be determined to another; therefore in no individual is it indeterminate with respect to several individuals; for to be determined to this and to be indeterminate with respect to several are contradictorily or privatively opposed; therefore in no individual does it have real aptitude for existing in many, because this aptitude cannot exist

without indifference; therefore absolutely as it exists in the order of things it does not have that aptitude, because it exists only in the aforesaid manner determined in individuals. You will say that it is not repugnant to be indifferent of itself, but determined through individual difference; therefore nature existing in individuals will be able to have both. It is answered that, whatever may be the true sense of that assumed proposition: "Nature is indifferent of itself," concerning which I shall speak immediately, nevertheless from that proposition it is only gathered that nature does not have determination without individual difference, which, although it may be so, nevertheless after such individual difference is joined to nature, the nature thus contracted cannot remain actually indifferent. But at most it can be said that if it did not have that contraction, it would be indifferent; because however it is never in fact without such contraction, therefore it never in fact exists indifferent nor with aptitude to be indifferent.

4. Thirdly this is declared because universal nature does not exist in many except through identity with the singulars of them; but such nature identified with one individual cannot be the same according to reality and according to real existence when identified with others; therefore such nature, as it is communicated to individuals in reality itself and exists in them, cannot have real aptitude for existing in many. The major premise is certain from what was said above, in which we showed that the universal is not distinguished from singulars by the nature of the thing. Indeed, real identity suffices for the efficacy of the aforesaid reasoning; for by reason of identity itself, a genus already contracted to one species cannot be contracted to another according to the same reality and real existence. Therefore in genus, species, and essential difference the major proposition taken is evident, because, since these are essential to their inferiors and are predicated essentially of them, not in the manner of a part but in the manner of a whole, because a part is not predicated of the whole, it is necessary that, insofar as they are

predicated of them, they should be in them through identity, because nothing is more identified with each thing than its essence. But concerning property and accident one might hesitate, because these do not seem to be in their inferiors through identity, but through information. But we speak principally of the prior universals; for the most proper unity of universal nature is with respect to inferiors, which are essentially contained under it. Nevertheless, even in property and accident as they are universals, the assumed proposition holds true. For property and accident do not have the character of universal as they are certain physical forms informing their subjects, both because under this aspect they are considered in the abstract, in which way they are not predicated of their subjects, and also because even in this way no property or accident is given in reality itself that is of itself universal for informing several subjects. And, although according to the common character of some property or accident, for example, of whiteness or risibility, it can in some way be called a universal form with respect to such subjects, nevertheless this very thing pertains to this form only insofar as its common character exists through identity in the singular individual forms informing such subjects. And in this way such aptitude for existing in many is reduced to the mode of existing in inferiors through identity. But properly these are said to be universals insofar as, taken concretely, they are apt to be predicated of their subjects, and thus also they are in them through identity not by reason of accidental form but by reason of the supposit. For to that extent one thing is truly predicated of many and of singulars to the extent that it is the same as them; for an affirmative proposition stating that this is that, in order to be true, requires some identity between predicate and subject, because it is necessary that they stand for the same thing and that they signify the same thing either explicitly or implicitly. Thus therefore it is true that every universal exists in its inferiors through identity, which was the major proposition assumed. But the minor premise has been sufficiently proven in the preceding reasoning and is nearly evident from the

terms, because specific nature, for example, insofar as it exists in reality is so identified with each individual in which it is, that insofar as it is in that individual it cannot lose identity with it, and consequently neither can it as such have real identity with others; therefore it is repugnant to such nature as it exists in reality to have aptitude for existing in many through identity; therefore, since the act of existing in many of universal nature is through identity, real aptitude for such an act is repugnant to be found in nature existing on the side of reality.

5. A third reason can be added, because if this aptitude exists in existing nature, therefore the aptitude itself also exists in reality; therefore the aptitude itself is also singular and individual, for whatever exists in reality is singular and individual; therefore such aptitude will be in some individual nature; for it cannot be separately per se but in nature, since it is a property and aptitude of it; but since it is really existing and individual, it is necessary that it be in nature really existing and individual, and consequently since there is no greater reason for one individual nature than for others, such aptitude will be in all and each individual nature. But from this many absurdities follow. First, that there are as many universal human natures as there are natures contracted in singular individuals, because each of them is one in itself having its own proper and real aptitude for existing in many distinct from the aptitude of another. Nor can it be imagined that the same aptitude in number for existing in many is in all individual natures. Otherwise it would also have to be said that the same nature in number is contracted to singular individuals, than which nothing can be more absurd. The consequence is clear because aptitude is only in nature; indeed, it cannot even be imagined as a thing distinct from nature; therefore if the aptitude is one in number in all, nature also will be one in number in all. Likewise, either that aptitude is said to be one in number quasi collectively so that it is not whole in singular natures but in each there is something of that aptitude and from all results one aptitude for several individuals, and this is beside the point. Because according to that explanation in each

individual nature there is only aptitude for existing in itself and none has aptitude for existing in many. But if the discourse is about collection, just as the whole collection of aptitudes is considered in the manner of one, so also the whole collection of natures can be considered; but that, as such, that is, as one collectively, is not in many, because the whole collection is not in singular individual natures but in the aggregate of all; therefore this unity of collection is irrelevant to the character of the universal, which ought to be in many such that the whole is in each of them. Or that aptitude is one in itself simply and is whole in singulars and in all individuals, and thus the same will have to be said of nature itself because of the same reason, and because it is no greater inconvenience to admit this in nature itself than in that aptitude. But that both are most absurd is clear; both because this is much greater than positing one accident in number simultaneously in diverse subjects; and also because repugnance is involved in the terms when it is said that the same nature in number is contracted to several individuals; because, if it is the same in number therefore it is one in number and individual; therefore incommunicable to many individuals. Again it follows that in each individual there is some intrinsic real aptitude for the individual difference of another individual; but this is impossible, because there cannot be real aptitude for that which is altogether repugnant; but it is altogether repugnant that something which is essentially and really in me should be contracted and individuated through the individual difference of another man; therefore there cannot be real aptitude for this in me.

6. The aptitude for existing in many does not pertain to common nature according to itself before the intellect. I say secondly: the aptitude for existing in many is not some real property pertaining to common nature according to itself before the operation of the intellect. This assertion can be proven by nearly the same reasons by which we showed a little earlier that nature according to itself does not have unity of precision except through the intellect; for these two things follow each other. For if nature as actually existing is not really

apt to be in many, this is because it does not exist except contracted and determined to this or that individual; therefore such aptitude for existing in several cannot pertain except to nature as it is prescinded from every contraction; therefore, if nature does not have this precision of itself but through the intellect, neither will it be able according to itself to have this aptitude before every intellect. Secondly, because if this aptitude pertains to nature according to itself before every intellect, it either pertains to existing nature or to non-existing nature; certainly not to existing nature, as has been shown, because it does not exist except made individual through identity; nor can it pertain to non-existing nature, because, in order that non-existing nature can be conceived as having this aptitude, it ought at least to be conceived as possible, because to be able to be in many intrinsically includes and supposes to be able to be; but it has been shown that nature as possible is as much individual as nature as existing; therefore it can no more be in nature as possible than as existing.

7. Thirdly: for I inquire what this aptitude is. They respond that it is a certain positive mode pertaining to nature according to itself, in which is founded the non-repugnance of nature to be in many; yet that mode is not actual, but potential, that is, it is such that it cannot pertain to actually existing nature, but only to nature existing in potency or objectively. By which it also happens that such a mode is not altogether inseparable from nature but rather separable, because actually existing nature does not have such aptitude nor such mode of being. Just as (they say) the mode of being that a thing has in its causes is a real mode, pertaining to things as long as they do not exist, which ceases to pertain to them as soon as they are produced, because they are now said to be not in causes, but outside causes. But these things are not proven to me: for I do not sufficiently conceive a real and positive mode and that it is impossible for it to exist in the order of things. For, in the way in which something positive and real is said, it is included under the latitude of real being; but real being is only in

order to the act of existing; therefore, to what the act of existing is altogether repugnant, it cannot be comprehended under the latitude of real being; therefore it can neither be a thing nor a positive real mode. But if it is not a real mode, it will be a mode of reason and consequently will not pertain to nature before the intellect. Furthermore, the argument made above also presses here, that contingent predicates do not pertain to nature according to itself but by reason of something added, or of some state that it has in reality or in the intellect; if therefore this aptitude pertains to it of itself, and not by reason of some state, it will also pertain to it per se and not contingently; therefore it will pertain to it inseparably, which they rightly deny, because it does not pertain to it in individuals.

8. Then concerning that aptitude which is said to be conceived as a certain real potential mode, I will also inquire whether it is to be conceived as one in number or as one only in species and multiplicable in number. This latter cannot be said, because it would be necessary to conceive it as multiplicable in individuals, which is repugnant. The former also can scarcely be conceived by the mind; for how can one real aptitude in number be conceived in order to several distinct individual differences, since truly there is none that can be contracted simultaneously or successively in all of them as the same in number? But if it is said that it is not one in number simply, but in a qualified sense, namely, with common numerical unity, it has already been shown that such unity can be understood only through reason. Finally, either that aptitude intrinsically follows the formal unity of specific nature, or it comes to it from outside. If the first is said, it follows that it can no more be one in number than the formal unity itself is, which we have shown is not one in number since it is multiplicable in number. It also follows that that aptitude is found wherever formal unity is found, which is false; otherwise it would be found in individuals. But if the second is said, it must be assigned whence or from what principle or cause this aptitude happens to nature having such formal character; it must then be declared in what

state or under what condition that nature is to be imagined or conceived, which condition is held from the part of nature itself and not from the part of the intellect, which is as it were the adequate subject of that aptitude, and it will be plainly understood that neither of these can be declared except in order to the abstraction and separation that is made by the mind, because with this set aside, there is no common nature distinct by the nature of the thing from individuals either in the state of actual existence or in potential state or in the being of essence or the possible, as has often been declared.

9. Whether the mode of being in cause is something real in the effect. But that example about the potential mode that a thing is said to have in a cause before it exists helps the aforesaid opinion not at all. First, because that mode insofar as it is said or considered to be real, is sometimes in the order of things, namely, as long as the thing is said to be in the cause. Then, because that mode either does not cease to be when the thing is produced outside its causes, or insofar as it ceases to be it is not a positive mode but rather privative; for when a thing is said to have being only in causes before it exists, two things are said: first is that in the cause there is power to give being to such a thing, which power as it were by extrinsic denomination denominates the effect to be, not simply but in the cause, and as to this such being in the cause is not lost even if it is produced in itself and outside the cause, because the power of the cause remains intact. The other thing that is indicated, when a thing is said to have being in the cause, is that it does not yet exist in itself, and this is what is lost when it is produced in itself; but this is not positive but privative, as is clear. You will say that beyond these things there is on the part of the effect a certain potential mode, by which it is said to be possible, which mode is lost from the moment it begins to exist. It is answered that this is not a positive mode on the part of the effect distinct from the aforesaid, because, as will be said below in treating of essence and existence, the objective aptitude of possible things for existing is nothing on their part except a certain non-repugnance and on the part of the cause

denotes power to produce them. Although, as far as the present matter is concerned, even if we were to grant that that aptitude is a positive mode, it would consequently have to be said that, when the thing is produced, it does not lose that aptitude as to what is positive but only as to the lack of its act; for when a thing exists, it is not less apt to exist than before; but it only has the act of existing, which it did not have before; nor is it likely that it loses a positive real mode precisely by the fact that it actually begins to exist.

10. I say thirdly: the aptitude of common nature to be in many is only a certain indifference or non-repugnance, which has its foundation in nature itself according to itself, but actually pertains to it only insofar as it is subject to the abstraction of the intellect. This assertion is common; and in it the cited authors seem to agree, especially Cajetan and other Thomists. But it must first be explained, then proven. For this indifference can be understood to pertain to nature according to itself in two ways. First, that the non-repugnance itself pertains per se to nature from the force of its formal unity. And this sense is false; otherwise non-repugnance or indifference (which is the same) would be inseparable from nature, and consequently nature, as existing in reality, would have that non-repugnance, which is openly false; for as it is in reality, it is so intrinsically and through identity made individual that it is repugnant to it to be in many. In another way it can be understood merely negatively, namely, that nature from the force of its formal unity taken precisely does not have repugnance to be in many. And this sense is true. From which the conclusion is easily clear, as to both parts, for first such non-repugnance thus explained is founded in the formal unity itself which is not individual of itself, and in this way nature can be said, even as existing in reality, to have this non-repugnance, because even in reality itself it is not incommunicable from the force of its formal unity but from the force of individual unity; for although the whole nature and formal unity that is in the individual is incommunicable to it and it is repugnant to it to

be in many, nevertheless it does not have this from the force of the formal unity of nature, but from individuation.

11. And hence the other part is confirmed, namely, that this aptitude for existing in many, even explained through non-repugnance, does not pertain to common nature as existing on the side of reality insofar as it is necessary for the character of the universal. Because, in order that nature be universal, it is not sufficient that it not have determination to one of itself, if it has that determination from elsewhere, at least from adjoined individual difference; but it is required that it be absolutely and simply indifferent. But insofar as it exists on the side of reality it is not thus indifferent but rather is simply determined to one wherever it exists; therefore nature, insofar as it exists in reality, does not have indifference or non-repugnance. This is confirmed and explained, because repugnance to existing in many pertains to existing nature by reason of individual difference; therefore for nature to be apt to exist in many through non-repugnance is nothing other than to be apt to exist in many through abstraction or precision from every individual difference; but this precision and abstraction does not pertain to nature as existing on the side of reality nor does it pertain to it in any state that precedes every consideration of the intellect, because there is no such state, in which nature according to itself abstracts from individuals, whether existing or possible, as has been declared above; therefore. Finally it is confirmed by sufficient enumeration of parts, because this aptitude or repugnance does not pertain to existing nature according to itself before every act of the intellect; therefore it can only pertain to it as it is subject to the conception of the intellect. Especially because it has already been declared that this non-repugnance or indifference consists in or arises from separation of all inferior or individual differences; but this separation in no way precedes in nature itself, neither in reality existing nor taken in any state of possibility, but only insofar as it is objectively in the intellect; therefore.

12. Objection. Response. Why several individuals can be under one species, not under another. But someone will object, because that several individuals can be multiplied under the same species does not come from the intellect, but is founded in the nature of the thing itself; therefore the aptitude for existing in many also pertains to nature of itself and not from the intellect. The consequence is clear, because these two things either are the same or mutually follow each other in reality itself, namely, that individuals can be multiplied under the same species and that specific nature can be communicated to them. But the antecedent is clear, both because that individuals are multiplicable under the same species is not something contrived by reason but found in things themselves; and also from the contrary, because if angelic nature (as many want) is not multiplicable in number, this comes from some real and intrinsic property of it; which is most certain in divine nature; therefore, conversely, that human nature is multiplicable in number is a real property of it and not something excogitated by reason. It is answered that this argument confirms the conclusion, and concludes that the aptitude for existing in many is fundamentally and remotely in things themselves, but not proximately insofar as it expresses indifference and indetermination of common nature to one. But this remote and proximate aptitude is not used by us in that sense in which some (as I was saying above) assert that aptitude or potency under one act is remote to others, and that nature existing in reality has this aptitude; for that has been sufficiently disproven by us. But I call the remote foundation of this aptitude the natural condition or property of such nature, by reason of which multiplication of individuals within the same species is not repugnant to it; but this property is not some aptitude of common nature as such, which is understood as a certain potency actualizable through several differences, but is only such perfection and limitation of such nature. Whence this property that founds this indifference or non-repugnance can be understood not only in common and prescinded nature, but also in the particulars or individuals themselves, as they are

such. As, for example, in the human species each individual is of such condition that it is not repugnant to it to have another similar in species, and it is common to both or to all individuals of that species that it is not repugnant to them to have others similar only according to some genus and not in species, which comes to them either from the fact that they are material or from the fact that they are finite substances, to which it is not repugnant that they have among themselves univocal similarity or agreement. Thus therefore it is correctly understood both that this aptitude for existing in many has its foundation in things themselves and that such foundation is not some positive aptitude in reality itself common and indifferent, but a limitation or condition of such things which include nothing in their entity by reason of which it would be repugnant to them to have other things similar to them in perfection, or equal. And finally it is understood that this foundation of indifference or non-repugnance is not to be imagined only in common nature according to itself, but in the individuals and singular things themselves, because, although in each individual nature is determined to that alone, nevertheless it is so in it that from its force it is not repugnant to be in another similar, or rather for similar nature to be in another individual; and this alone is the sufficient foundation of that indifference and aptitude for existing in many, which is in common nature as abstracted by the intellect, and it is not some indetermination that nature itself has of itself or in individuals.

13. Response. Therefore to the objection in form I concede the antecedent, namely, that some individual things can be multiplied similar in species is founded in things themselves and not in the operation of the intellect; but I distinguish the consequent, namely, that aptitude for existing in many pertains to nature of itself. For it can be understood of proximate aptitude, that is, which is conceived by us in the manner of a certain capacity prescinded from all contracting differences, and actualizable through them; and in this sense the consequence is denied, because, in order that individuals can be

multiplied in reality in the same species, such capacity is not necessary, which would precede in nature in reality itself, but it suffices that in individuals there be no property by reason of which it would be repugnant to them to have others similar. But if that consequent is understood of remote foundation in the aforesaid sense, thus the consequence is conceded; yet it is not against what we have said, as is clear. Whence, what is said in the proof of the consequence, namely, that these two things are the same, that individuals can be multiplied in the same species and that specific nature can be communicated to them, is also equivocal. For in the multiplication of individuals of the same species there is no other communication of nature in reality than assimilation and a certain agreement among the individuals themselves; whence neither is there in common nature according to itself any other aptitude to be communicated to many than there is in the individuals themselves non-repugnance to having others similar. If therefore by communication of specific nature nothing else is understood, the whole is conceded and nothing is inferred against what has been said. But if (as the words more sound) that nature can be multiplied to many is understood in the manner of a certain superior aptitude of common nature, which, since it is one, is conceived as diffusing and communicating itself to many, this is the work of reason and our mode of understanding; for in reality nothing of this sort precedes nor is it necessary for the multiplication of individuals similar among themselves.

SECTION V

WHETHER UNIVERSAL UNITY ARISES FROM THE OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT, AND HOW THE DIFFICULTIES POSED TO THE CONTRARY SHOULD BE SATISFIED

Section V

1. Universality exists through the intellect with a foundation in reality. From all that has been said, the true resolution concerning universal unity and the response to the arguments proposed in section 2 can easily be gathered. It must therefore be said that universal unity arises through the function of the intellect, taking its foundation or occasion from singular things themselves. And thus it is a certain unity of reason, befitting natures insofar as they are presented to the mind, and through the denomination arising therefrom. I consider this to be the opinion of Aristotle in the places cited, who for this reason said in De Anima I, text 8, that the universal is either nothing or posterior, that is, after the operation of the intellect, as St. Thomas, Albert the Great, and all others understand it there; and therefore he said there in the Commentary that the intellect makes universality in things. And in Metaphysics XII, comment 4, he says that universals according to Aristotle are collected from particulars in the intellect which perceives similarity among them, and makes them one intention; and comment 27 says: universals do not have being outside the soul; and comment 28 says: demonstration is not made of the particular, although that alone is the thing in the truth of reality. The same is the opinion of St. Thomas, De Ente et Essentia, chapter 4, and in other places cited above, whom Avicenna cites, Metaphysics V, chapter 1. All the Thomists also agree on this: Capreolus, Cajetan, Soncinas, and others cited above. Durandus holds the same, In I, dist. 3, q. 5, and In II, dist. 3, q. 7; Giles, In I, q. 2, Prologue, and dist. 19, part 1; and Scotus could be drawn to the same opinion, for his words do not contradict it, since he says there is only universal in potency in things, not in act; and thus his disciples seem to expound him, as Fonseca extensively reports and treats, in the aforementioned chapter 28, q. 5, section 2; but there is no need to linger on this; for it matters little to our purpose what Scotus thought, especially since his words are quite ambiguous. And for this opinion Damascene is cited, book III On the Faith, chapter 11, where he says that nature is contemplated either by thought alone, or in all hypostases of the same species which it unites, or in one

individual only. Where by nature contemplated by thought alone he understands nature as universal; which he says does not exist, but is only thought; but in individuals he said it exists, either in all according to its entire specific breadth as really existing, or in one only.

2. This is proven by reason, because unity and the aptitude for being in many, insofar as they are necessary for the notion of universal, do not belong to nature itself really, but through the intellect; therefore universality also belongs in the same way. This is confirmed and clarified because, if nature has universality before the intellect, then either in individuals or in itself; not in individuals, because neither as in one only, since in that it is individual and determined to one; nor in many or all simultaneously, both because nature can be universal even if found in only one individual; and also because no real property belongs to nature as existing in many individuals that does not belong to it in each or in some of them, besides the very multiplicity of individuations or singularities, in which universality does not consist, as is self-evident. Nor can universality belong to nature in itself, prescinding from individuals, except through the intellect, because if such nature is taken as existing in reality itself, it does not prescind by its nature from individuals since nature is not distinguished from them by its nature, as has been shown; but if nature in itself is not existing, it cannot be conceived what or what kind of status it has unless it has it objectively in the intellect, because it does not have it really nor can it have it, nor is it distinguished by its nature from individuals considered in the same state even according to essential or possible being, as has often been said. Finally, if being universal belongs to nature really, it belongs either per se or accidentally; neither can be said; therefore it does not belong really; therefore only through reason. The minor regarding the first part is evident, because if being universal belonged to man per se, it would also belong to all individuals; for whatever belongs per se primarily or secondarily to a superior, also belongs to an inferior; and because no property can be added to a superior nature by reason of an inferior

that is repugnant to the essence or properties belonging to it per se, since neither can these be separated from it, nor can they remain simultaneously with repugnant properties. Regarding the latter part, however, the minor is proven because if universality belongs really and contingently or accidentally, it will be some accident of nature; therefore, if it is a real accident, it will belong to it by reason of some singular, as we argued above concerning unity and the aptitude for being in many. Likewise, this accident will belong to it through some action of an extrinsic agent, or through the lack of action, if it is imagined to be a privative accident; but every action of this kind regards individuals per se. Finally, such a real accident can neither be imagined nor explained; therefore it is of reason and through reason.

3. The opposing arguments are resolved. Regarding the contrary foundations posed in the second section, it has already been declared how nature in reality is communicable to many, not through some aptitude or indifference that belongs to nature itself as such, but only through the non-repugnance of the singular things themselves to having others similar to them, which non-repugnance is not sufficient for the notion of universal, as has been declared. Hence, regarding the first, that consequence is denied: human nature is not of itself incommunicable; therefore it is of itself communicable, for strictly speaking it is from the negative to the affirmative on the part of that mode or term "of itself"; and it can happen that neither of these belongs to it of itself, although in reality one or the other is always present. But if that particle "of itself" is not taken in that strict sense, namely, that it is the same as "per se" and "from within," but only signifies the same as "nature of itself" as "nature according to its formal and precise reason apart from every inferior difference," thus the consequence can be conceded rather by reason of the matter than by reason of the form. For nature can be said to be communicable of itself in the sense explained above, because it is not repugnant to it to have several individuals similar to each other in essence and nature, nor is it repugnant to one individual to have another similar to it, which non-

repugnance, however, is not sufficient for the notion of universal, as has been said. And the same response should be accommodated to the second argument; for in the real nature itself there is no positive and real aptitude for several individual differences, but only non-repugnance in the individuals themselves to having others similar to them. And from this arises both that nature is said to be communicable or apt to be in many and that such nature cannot be adequately contracted by one individual difference, as has been sufficiently explained. To the third it is responded that all those attributes speak in some way of an order to the intellect; but they are founded in the things themselves, not insofar as nature has some universality in them, but insofar as in those individuals there is agreement and similarity in essence and its properties and in the intrinsic connection that essence and properties have among themselves, by reason of which common objective concepts are abstracted from which universal predications are made, of necessary and perpetual truth, insofar as they are abstracted from time. And in this way it is said that there is science of universals and not of singulars, not because it is of common names[1], but because it is of common objective concepts, which, although they are not distinguished from singulars in reality itself, are nevertheless distinguished by reason and this suffices for all the aforementioned locutions. The nominalists did not sufficiently notice this and therefore spoke otherwise, although in reality they do not differ much from us, as we have said. Through this response has been given to the final confirmation. To the other foundations nothing remains to be responded, for from what has been said, satisfaction has been given to all.

[1] not of singulars, ... common ones, 1960 and other editions; not because it is of names and not of singulars... Vivès edition. Cf. BHF, Madrid 1960, vol. I, p. 750, "We have accepted in this paragraph the text of other editions because it seems clearer to us than that of Vivès. Cf. BHF, vol. 1, p. 750.

SECTION VI
THROUGH WHICH OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT THINGS BECOME UNIVERSAL

1. This question is usually treated under other words at the beginning of dialectic, namely, whether the universal is made by abstraction or by comparison of the intellect. It is also usually treated, and more properly in De Anima III, explaining the object of the intellect, which is said to be universal. Since, however, it has been said by us that universal unity results through the work of the intellect, we cannot omit to declare what and what kind this work of the intellect is. But we must briefly distinguish a twofold intellect, agent and possible; the function of the former is to produce intelligible species; of the latter to operate and understand through them; but it has a twofold operation (setting aside others that do not pertain to the present purpose): one is called direct, by which it tends directly to the thing that the intelligible species represents and to which it leads the intellect per se and simply. The other is called reflexive, by which the intellect turns back upon the prior cognition or upon its object according to those conditions or denominations that it receives from cognition.

Three Opinions are Proposed

2. Three opinions, therefore, can exist in this matter: the first is that the universal is made through the operation of the agent intellect which precedes every operation of the possible intellect, and consists in the production of an intelligible species representing nature as precise and abstracted from all individuals, which is therefore usually called the abstraction of common nature made by virtue of the agent intellect. Thus St. Thomas indicates, I, q. 85, a. 1, in the body,

and ad 4, and a. 3, ad 4, VII Metaphysics, lecture 13, De Ente et Essentia, chapter 4; and the Commentator, II De Anima, comment 10, saying that the intellect is moved to ultimate perfection by universal things, namely, represented in intelligible species. And therefore III De Anima, text 8, he says, if universals were outside the soul, the agent intellect would be in vain. Flandria, III Metaphysics, q. 2, a. 2, VII Metaphysics, q. 16, a. 1; Fonseca, V Metaphysics, chapter 28, q. 5 and 6; Soto, in Logic, q. 3 on universals. This opinion supposes first that the possible intellect directly and by virtue of the species it receives from the agent intellect does not cognize material singulars but only common natures. From this it infers that the species produced by the agent intellect only directly represents common nature as precise from all individuals and consequently is universal in representing. From this finally it happens that nature thus represented objectively and by extrinsic denomination becomes universal through such abstraction; for if it becomes singular and individual by contraction, it will become universal and common by abstraction. And this is confirmed, because the universal is the object of the agent and possible intellect, of the former as active power, of the latter as passive or receptive; therefore it is made through the action of the agent intellect, but precedes the operation of the possible intellect; for it is of the nature of active power to make its object, but passive power supposes it; for it is accustomed to be acted upon by it.

3. The second opinion is that the universal is not made by the agent intellect, but by the possible through direct operation by which it cognizes common nature according to its precise formal reason and essence, considering nothing of inferior reasons or of individuals, nor even formally and as if in signed act considering the community of that nature but only the essence, which is common. This opinion, regarding the prior negative part in which it differs from the preceding, must necessarily be taught by those who hold that the possible intellect directly cognizes singulars, even material ones. For according to that opinion, it must consequently be said that the agent

intellect, properly speaking, produces a singular species, not only in being but also in representing an individual and singular thing; because it could not first and directly cognize it unless it received a species properly and particularly representing it. Whence it happens that according to this opinion the agent intellect does not abstract the universal from singulars and is only said to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm because it separates it from the conditions of matter, as to the real being of that species, but not as to the object that it represents; for it produces a spiritual and immaterial species in its entity, representing the same individual thing by number that the phantasm represents; for it is not repugnant for a material individual to be intentionally represented through an immaterial form or quality. And this can be confirmed in the universality of genus in any opinion, because, although we grant that the agent intellect abstracts specific nature from individuals in that way, it is not necessary that it abstract generic nature from species; because it is certain that the possible intellect can directly and immediately be carried to cognizing specific nature, and the agent intellect can produce an intelligible species that in its representation does not abstract from specific difference, whatever may be the case with the individual; therefore then the universal that is genus will not be made through abstraction of the agent intellect.

4. The other affirmative part of the opinion, namely, that this universal is sufficiently made through abstraction of the possible intellect, can be taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 3, ad 2, and Opusculum 42, chapter 5, at the end, where he brings forward that saying of the Commentator, I De Anima, text 8: The intellect makes universality in things; which, although it might be thought to be said of the agent intellect, nevertheless it will be true a fortiori of the possible intellect, of which Averroes speaks; for he treats of the intellect defining and demonstrating. Finally, the authors cited in the preceding opinion, although they teach that the first universality is made by the agent intellect, nevertheless cannot consistently deny that

this operation of the possible intellect suffices for similar or more perfect universality. And thus St. Thomas in other places cited speaks indifferently of the abstracting intellect, whether agent or possible. More expressly, however, Durandus teaches this of the possible intellect alone, In I, dist. 3, q. 5, n. 27, and In II, dist. 3, q. 7, n. 12. And a fortiori this can be proven by the reasons of the first opinion, because the concept or expressed species of the possible intellect represents more formally than the impressed species; therefore, if the intellect precisely and abstractly contemplates man, man, as represented in that concept, will be objectively universal, much better than if he were represented in an impressed species, because he has more actual and more proper objective being, and according to that being he is universal. And this is confirmed first, for man becomes singular through individuating differences; therefore, by this very fact that he prescinds from all of them through an actual abstract concept, he will become universal. It is confirmed second, because if man existed in reality just as he is presented to that concept, he would be universal in being, such as is attributed to Plato; therefore even now he is universal through denomination from the intellect. It is confirmed third, for if the intellect reflects upon man thus conceived, considering his condition or quasi-state, it cognizes him not to be some singular but to be something common to all singulars, in which conception the intellect is not deceived, as is evident, nor does it attribute something new to man thus conceived but conceives what was already present in him; therefore before this reflection man was already universal through the prior direct conception. And the reason adduced for the superior opinion can also serve for this, that the operation of the intellect supposes the object; for this is true of the object that is cognized through the operation, but not of the condition that results in the object insofar as it is cognized, when that condition is not cognized through such act; because, since such condition results from the act, it is compared to the power rather as active than as passive; thus it is in the present case; for the universality that is said in some

way to be present in or to belong to nature abstractly cognized, is a certain condition or denomination resulting from such act and mode of cognizing, which nevertheless is not cognized through that act but only the nature itself that is denominated universal, and therefore it is not necessary that the universality of that object be supposed before that action. But when afterwards the intellect reflects and contemplates that very condition or state of abstracted nature, now that is the object cognized through such act; therefore it is supposed to that act, and nevertheless that condition is nothing other than the universality of nature; therefore universality is supposed before this reflexive, or (which is the same) comparative knowledge; but it is made through abstractive or (which is the same) through direct and precise cognition of universal nature.

5. The third opinion is that the universal is made through comparative knowledge by which the possible intellect, after it apprehends nature precisely and abstractly, compares it thus conceived with the things in which it exists and understands it as one something apt to be in many inferiors and to be predicated of them. Therefore, according to this opinion, nature existing in singulars has universality only in remote potency, because it is not common either positively, as something truly one existing in many, or even negatively, as something proper to no singular thing. But there is only in it a certain similarity and agreement of several things among themselves which provides occasion and remote foundation for universality. Nature abstractly cognized, however, can be said to be universal in proximate potency, because it is now common negatively, because it is conceived according to itself and not as proper to some individual; nevertheless it is not yet considered to be actually universal, because it is not yet conceived as having aptitude and relation to many in which it may be, which relation it receives through comparative knowledge, and therefore through that it is said to be finally constituted as universal in act. This is further proven, because universality is not some thing having true existence, but is only a being or relation of

reason; therefore it only has being objectively in the intellect; therefore it only exists when it is actually made by the intellect, for then alone it is objectively in the intellect; therefore it only exists through comparative knowledge, because through that alone it is made or thought out by the intellect. This is confirmed, for the universal as universal is relative, as is evident, both from its definition; for it is defined through its correlative, namely: It is one in many and of many; and from its species, such as genus, species, difference, etc.; for these are spoken of relatively, as is evident from the definitions given by Porphyry in the predicables; but relatives are simultaneous by nature and cognition; therefore the universal in act is not in that way in which it can be, namely, objectively in the intellect, until its correlative is in the same way; but it cannot be in that way until one is compared to the other, which is done only through the aforementioned comparative knowledge; therefore. And this opinion is favored by St. Thomas, who everywhere teaches that relations of reason exist only in the apprehension of reason comparing one to another, as I, q. 28, a. 1, in the body, and ad 4, and q. 7 De Potentia, a. 1, and he indicates IV Metaphysics, lecture 4, and book I De Interpretatione, lecture 10. Cajetan also indicates this, treating in general of relation of reason, in the aforementioned q. 28, first part, and in particular of the relation of universality, De Ente et Essentia, chapter 4, q. 7, and a little before that. Scotus is also cited, VII Metaphysics, q. 11; Antonius Andreae, q. 17; and Antonius Trombeta, q. 2 Metaphysics, a. 1; for in the way they posit the universal in act through the intellect they seem to posit it in comparative rather than in precisive knowledge. But there is a difference among these authors in that some of them by comparative knowledge understand direct knowledge, by which the universal is compared with inferiors as existing in them, or as predicable of them. Thus St. Thomas seems to think, and more clearly Scotus above, and In IV, dist. 2, q. 2; Soncinas, VI Metaphysics, q. 18. Others, however, understand reflexive knowledge, by which after the aforementioned comparison the

intellect conceives the very comparison as a certain relation, and the compared nature as genus or species, etc., with respect to inferiors.

Judgment is made concerning the First Opinion

6. Among these opinions the first is indeed probable from the supposition of that opinion, that the agent intellect does not produce species representing individuals, and even with that supposed, it does not proceed generally concerning every universal but at most concerning the specific and concerning that alone formally speaking, as a certain reason made above proves. And it can be further clarified, because first it is certain that the agent intellect never impresses a species representing difference alone, as difference is, but the entire specific nature. Because, just as the phantasm does not represent something in the individual by way of form but by way of the whole individual, so the agent intellect produces a species representing the entire specific nature of the individual by way of the whole, nor can it prescind or change this action so that it would then produce one species representing difference by way of form, then produce another representing the entire specific nature by way of the whole; because it is neither free in acting, but naturally impresses the species as much as it can, given such a phantasm; nor is it cognitive so that it can now conceive nature in one way, afterwards in another. Hence in property and accident too, although we grant that it produces species representing them in common abstracting from individuals, nevertheless each of them by virtue of such intelligible species is only represented as something common to many individuals similar in that respect. And the same is true in its own way in the generic grade, if perhaps sometimes on account of the weakness of the phantasm an intelligible species is produced representing precisely that grade; for just as the phantasm then represents only this animal, for example, so the intelligible species taken from it will represent the grade of animal

only as abstracted and precise from similar individuals. And for this reason we say, even supposing that opinion, that through this abstraction of the agent intellect, per se only specific nature is abstracted. You will object that this discourse can be made concerning abstraction made through conception of the possible intellect especially regarding the universal of property and accident. I respond that the reason is not the same, as will be evident from what we will say in the following section.

7. I add therefore further that, if the reason and nature of intelligible species is properly and truly understood, it is said quite improperly that universal nature is made through this abstraction, because according to the true opinion, the impressed species neither is a formal image nor formally represents in any way, but effectively insofar as it is like a seed or instrument of the object for producing formal intentional representation, which is made through the concept of the mind. Hence nature is not said to be properly objectively represented in the impressed species except very remotely and mediately, insofar as that species is effective of the act, to which that nature is presented as object. And finally, even if we grant that the universal is made in some way through abstraction of the agent intellect, that will only be in habit or in first act; from which it happens that it is made much more and more perfectly through second act proportioned to that first act, as I was arguing above. I omit that the first opinion proceeds from a false hypothesis; for it is simply more true that the impressed species from the agent intellect does not abstract from representation of the same individual represented in the phantasm but only from the real material and entitative nature of the phantasm itself without which there can be representation of the same individual, however material; for this is not repugnant to be or to be made through spiritual form or quality or entity, as is evident in angels and in God himself. But if this is not repugnant, no physical reason can be brought why such form or species cannot be made by the agent intellect; but without reason this should not be denied, since this is

more consonant both with various experiences and with the natural order of cognizing and with the end and natural activity of the agent intellect itself, which is given for this purpose that through spiritual mediate action it renders the possible intellect similar to the representation of the phantasm, as much as it can, which it would be foreign to the present purpose to pursue and prove more broadly here. According to this opinion, however, it is evident that abstraction of the universal is in no way made by necessity by the agent intellect, indeed perhaps it cannot be made in any way; for if the agent intellect is once posited as productive of species of singular things, it is likely that it can never produce species representing natures abstracted from singulars; but more on this in its proper place.

The other Two Opinions are Examined & the Question is Resolved

8. Setting aside therefore the first opinion, that we may judge concerning the other two, it must be noted that the universal can be conceived or denominated by us in two ways. First, as something absolute according to being, which can found some relation. Second, as relative according to being, expressing an order to inferiors. In the first way universal substance would be understood, if there were man subsisting on the part of reality separated from every contraction, according to Platonic opinion; nor would it be universal on account of real relation according to being to inferiors, but on account of its unity with intrinsic and substantial aptitude for existing in many. In nearly this way the Doctors cited in the preceding section said that nature in the potential state, which it is imagined to have before existence in individuals, has a certain universality that does not consist in relation according to being but in a certain absolute property of nature having such unity and community; this is usually called by some "universal before the thing" (universale ante rem); which if it existed, would be absolute; nevertheless it is truly nothing. Indeed, even those who posit

the universal actually in the individuals themselves really existing, which they call "universal in the thing" (universale in re), do not posit its universality in relation. For they think universality to be real, but relation minimally so, because either there is not sufficient distinction in reality between nature and individuals for real relation; or nature, as it prescinds from individuals, does not have sufficient entity for founding real relation, since it does not have singular entity as such in which such relation can be founded. Therefore they posit this universality in absolute property, which is a certain unity and community of such nature. These examples, therefore, although they are not true, nevertheless declare that the concept of universal as such is not the concept of something relative according to being, but of something absolute having such a mode of being, in which it has indifference and aptitude for being in many. Nor does it matter that this aptitude seems to be explained by way of respect. For just as in real potency we understand transcendental respect and according to predication, prior to predicamental respect according to being and included in the absolute thing, so in the present case we can conceive this aptitude of the universal thing as absolute indeed in itself, although it is explained by way of transcendental respect. And hence it further happens that this aptitude, because it is conceived in the manner of potency having at least transcendental order to those to which it can communicate itself, can also be understood as sufficient foundation for relation or disposition to those to which it can communicate itself, which disposition is conceived as a certain relation according to being, and can also be called a certain universality, since it is the disposition of one to many in which it can be or of which it can be predicated.

9. The universal therefore conceived in the prior way is made through direct operation of the intellect, which precisely and abstractly conceives common nature without contracting differences; which the reasons made in the second opinion sufficiently prove. And this can be confirmed by overturning the foundation of the third

opinion; because relation according to being is not of the essence of the universal; therefore, although no relation according to being to inferiors is understood in nature thus abstracted, it can be understood as actually universal. The consequence is evident, because if that relation is not necessary, nothing else can be lacking, because there is common nature and in the manner of something subsisting abstractly from individuals. Hence it is related in that state through the intellect, just as it would be related really, if it subsisted on the part of reality outside individuals; but then it would be really universal; therefore even now it is intellectually universal, so to speak. Finally, in nature thus conceived there is new unity of reason because it has one indivisible objective concept into several similar ones; it also has community or aptitude to be present in many and to be predicated of them; therefore nothing is lacking to it for the notion of universal.

10. But truly, speaking of the relation of universality as conceived by us in the manner of relation according to being, this cannot result through abstraction alone but in the way that it exists, it is made through comparison, because, as I suppose, this relation is not real but of reason; therefore it is not in nature itself while it is absolutely and abstractly thought, because by virtue of that action, it is not referred by the intellect because the intellect does not yet compare it to its inferiors, nor is it referred really either; therefore there is not yet such relation. And this the reasons adduced in the third opinion also sufficiently prove. Therefore, if those two opinions affirm one thing and do not exclude another, they are not contrary to each other nor do the reasons of one proceed against the other. Because nothing prevents the same nature from being able to have through the intellect a twofold notion of universality, namely, absolute and respective, and that these are fabricated through diverse operations of the intellect, and that one, namely, which is absolute, is the proximate foundation of the other, namely, the relative. Nor is it repugnant for something to belong to nature through the intellect and to be by way of the absolute, when that something is of such a kind that it belongs only through

extrinsic denomination; for thus that nature is abstract or universally conceived adds nothing to nature except a certain being belonging to it through extrinsic denomination; which is called objective being. Just as being seen or being cognized is not some real being added to things, nor does it formally consist in relation of reason, but in denomination proceeding from the act of seeing or cognizing, upon which the intellect can fabricate a relation of reason, if it compares one with another; thus therefore it is in the present case.

11. But still there remains to be explained concerning these opinions what kind this precisive or comparative cognition is, through which the universal is made in both ways mentioned. For universal nature can be prescinded or compared in various ways. For first, common nature can be abstracted through pure precision of nature from one inferior without any comparison either of the superior concept to some inferior or of the inferiors among themselves, as when from Peter alone I simply prescind individuating properties and stop at consideration of human nature. And through this purely precisive knowledge some think no universal is made. It is more true, however, that through it absolute universal is also made, according to what we have said about the second opinion. For the reasons made also prove this; although this knowledge does not suffice for cognizing in nature thus conceived the universality or superiority that it has, as I will now say.

12. Second, common nature can be abstracted through comparison of singulars or inferiors among themselves, as when comparing Peter with Paul, I cognize them to be similar to each other in human nature. This comparison supposes prior precision, for it supposes that each singular is cognized to be of such nature; hence it supposes a concept of such nature as it is prescinded from single individuals. Hence through this comparison only cognition of agreement and similarity of several inferiors in such abstracted and precise nature is added. But this comparison can be further subdivided, insofar as through it can be considered either the sole

disposition of particulars among themselves as they have among themselves the disposition of similar things, and this comparison as such does not pertain to the constitution of the universal but to consideration of a certain mutual relation among the particulars themselves. Or insofar as through it is considered the disposition of common nature to particulars in which it exists. For after the intellect apprehends that Peter and Paul are similar in the being of man, it again considers this predicate "man" to be related to Peter and Paul as something common to particulars; and in this comparison the notion of universal, even respective, seems to be consummated; for through it there arises in the mind, or rather in the thing presented to the mind, a disposition of reason of one common thing to many. Beyond this, however, another more reflexive knowledge can be understood, which the intellect makes by cognizing as if in signed act the nature thus abstracted and compared with its inferiors, thence to have the denominations of genus, species and similar, and these denominations to be of reason, not of the thing. But this cognition is no longer fabrication of universality, but is a certain more formal and express contemplation of it.

SECTION VII

WHETHER UNIVERSALS ARE REAL CORPOREAL BEINGS, SUBSTANTIAL OR ACCIDENTAL, AND WHAT CAUSES THEY HAVE

1. From what has been said, various questions that are customarily treated concerning universals can easily be resolved.

The First Doubt is Resolved

2. The first question, therefore, is whether universals are beings or not. This can be asked either about the nature which is denominated universal, or about the intention or denomination of universality itself. Concerning the nature, we have already said that it exists in things themselves; hence it follows that, with regard to the thing denominated, universals are real beings. This, however, must be understood either permissively or concerning those universals which per se fall under the direct operation of the intellect, so that they can be directly conceived either per se primarily or at least through their own proper singulars when directly known. This is said because in those beings of reason (entia rationis) which are fashioned by reflection and multiple operations of the intellect, the intellect can proceed so far as to abstract from these also universal and common notions, and to fashion the universal even in fictitious things, which are not true beings—as dialecticians say that genus taken in a second intentional sense is a certain specific universal, common to many genera, which differ only numerically in the intention or notion of genus; and so concerning others. The reason is that the universal in act has being only objectively in the intellect; but to have being objectively in the intellect can belong not only to true beings but also to fictitious ones; and therefore those relations or denominations which require only this kind of being can also be attributed to them, such as the notion of subject and predicate, and the same applies to the notion of universal. And therefore we say permissively or indefinitely that universals are real beings, but not necessarily and entirely universally. Since, however, the cognition of the intellect necessarily begins from real beings, both because reflective operation presupposes direct operation, and also because fictitious beings are not conceived except through some relation or proportion to true beings, it is therefore also correctly said that those universals are real beings which can be abstracted through the direct operation of the intellect. If, however, the discussion concerns universality itself or the intention of universality, it is commonly said not to be a real being but

a being of reason, which is true in this sense, namely, that it is not some property nor something intrinsically and really inhering in the nature which is denominated universal, according to what we have said. Nevertheless, in another sense some distinction and clarification is needed. For we have said that a nature can be denominated universal in two ways: first, by absolute denomination as if it subsisted universally; second, by respective denomination. In the former way, universality is not a being of reason as something properly fashioned by reason, but only as an extrinsic denomination proceeding from an act of reason, like being abstract, known, and other such things, which do not signify something existing really in the denominated nature nor properly signify some being of reason fabricated by the intellect as something objectively fashioned by it—because such beings are not feigned except while they are being thought; but then the intellect thinks or knows nothing of this sort. It is therefore an extrinsic denomination from the concept of the intellect; for, because it is represented through the concept abstractly and universally, it is therefore denominated universal in the aforesaid manner. Wherefore, for this universality to be said to exist, it is not necessary that it be formally and quasi-reflectively known as if in a signate act, but it suffices that the nature itself be known in such a way, namely, precisely and abstractly, that as if in an exercised act the nature is constituted universal. And Soto explains this universality in this manner through extrinsic denomination, in Logica, q. 3 Univer., a. 1, dub. 2; and he adduces Scotus and St. Thomas as holding this opinion.

3. Speaking in the latter way about the universal relatively or about the relation of universality, it is sufficiently clear from what has been said that the universal is not a real being because that relation is not real but of reason. This is briefly explained in the following manner. For multiple relations can be feigned or conceived in universal nature: one in the order of the act of being, another in the order of the act of predicating; but each can be apprehended either according to aptitude or according to act. For common nature is

conceived as apt to exist in many things and as such can be conceived as having a relation of aptitude to communicating its being to them; it can also be conceived as actually existing in them and as such having an actual relation or of a thing actually communicating itself to many. For just as in accident we understand a relation of aptitudinal or actual inherence, so we can feign or conceive it in universal nature as communicable or as communicated to many. And the universal is customarily defined in both ways; nevertheless, the aptitudinal relation suffices for a nature to be completely considered universal. For that it actually exists in many things that exist is contingent and does not change the nature of the thing; but aptitude is simply necessary, for in this the universal is distinguished from the singular. Hence those involve a contradiction who say that angelic natures are universal and are incommunicable to many.

4. Similarly, in the order of the act of predicating, nature can be conceived either as apt to be predicated of many or as actually predicated of many; but the former consideration properly denominates nature as predicable. But all these relations are of reason only; for universal nature is not in many things except through identity, and therefore under this notion it cannot be really referred to those many things. Also because, as we have said, there is no nature in reality which is in many things or which is apt to be in many things; therefore the proximate foundation of those relations is not in reality, but in the mode of conceiving of the intellect; therefore the relation founded on it cannot be real. And this reasoning proves exactly the same thing concerning the relation of the predicable or predicate, for all these are also founded on extrinsic denominations of the intellect and therefore cannot be real.

The Second Doubt is Resolved

5. Whether universals are corporeal or not.—And according to these things, another question must be defined, which Porphyry

proposes in the Predicables, namely, whether universals are corporeal. For it must be said in the same manner that some universals can indeed be corporeal, namely, those which belong to things composed of matter and form, as is evident concerning the concept of man, horse, animal, body; indeed, these universals are most accommodated to the human intellect joined to the body; for it receives cognition from sensible things, and therefore it conceives and abstracts these universals first, speaking per se. Nevertheless, absolutely speaking, the notion of universal is not limited to corporeal natures; for it is found in spiritual natures; for in them also there are singulars having among themselves some agreement and difference or distinction, by reason of which common and universal natures can be conceived in them. Since, however, not only spiritual things among themselves and corporeal things among themselves, but also corporeal things with spiritual things have some agreement and likeness, therefore not only are there certain universals that are corporeal and others incorporeal, but also certain ones are given common to both, like substance, quality, etc. For these abstract from corporeal and incorporeal things.

The Third Doubt

6. Whether universals are substances or accidents.—Hence a similar question is also easily resolved, whether universals are substances or accidents. For this question, like the preceding one, is not properly made concerning the intention of universality; for since that is not something real but only a denomination or relation of reason, it is neither truly substance nor accident, neither body nor spirit, although it should be conceived in the manner of an incorporeal accident. The aforesaid question is therefore about the nature which is denominated universal; and this can be not only substantial but also accidental, as is manifest per se. But Aristotle is accustomed sometimes to say that universals are not substances, as in III Metaph., text 20, lib. VI, text. 45; but he means that they are not things

subsisting per se and in themselves outside of singulars. And therefore in the Categories, in the chapter on Substance, he calls substantial universals second substances; but the individuals of substances, or supposita, he calls first substances, which he says are more substances than the second ones, because those first subsist, while the others exist in them.

The Fourth Doubt

7. How universals are said to be eternal.—An objection is resisted.—Another question about universals is defined from what has been said, namely, whether they are eternal. For such are commonly thought to be so, because, since they are the proper objects of the sciences, they must be necessary and immutable and consequently eternal. But how this should be understood is not explained in the same way by all. For Plato, for this reason, posited ideas which are eternal and immutable forms, as Aristotle relates. But Aristotle himself would perhaps say that in these corruptible things universals are eternal, because some of their singulars in which they subsist are never lacking. But we suppose that these singulars do not always exist and that outside of them universals do not exist; hence we conclude that these cannot be called eternal according to the real existence which they have outside their causes. These universals are therefore said to be perpetual according to the being of essence or potential being. You will say: in this way individuals are also eternal because they too are possible from eternity and have their immutable essences according to the being of essence. Hence propositions can also be made concerning them which have perpetual truth, insofar as they are abstracted from time. It is answered that, as regards the thing itself, it is indeed so; nevertheless, there is a difference in the mode of conceiving and speaking; for universals as such, by the very fact that they are abstracted from singulars, are consequently also separated from time and place, and from all change, beginning and ceasing, and therefore

St. Thomas correctly said, I, q. 16, a. 7, ad 2, that universals are customarily said to be everywhere and always, not positively, but negatively, that is, not because they are in every place and time but because as such they do not determine for themselves place and time insofar as they are abstracted from here and now. But this does not properly belong to individuals; for actions and changes, beginnings and ceasings, are concerned with them. Hence, although some universals are generable and corruptible, like man, animal and similar things which from their formal notion carry with them such potency or postulate such a mode of beginning and ceasing, nevertheless they do not have this very property except in relation to individuals; for man as such can neither be generated nor corrupted, yet he is said to be generable and corruptible because he is of such a nature that he cannot be communicated to individuals in a connatural way except through generation, and the very individual which participates in such a nature is of itself subject to corruption. Some also add that universals are said to be eternal because the unity of precision and the aptitude of existing in many things belongs to them perpetually, even when they do not exist in that way in which other properties are said to belong to them perpetually, absolving the copula from the existence of time. So Fonseca, lib. V, c. 28, q. 8, sect. 3. But I do not see how this can be true unless we admit that some universality belongs to nature per se and necessarily; for a proposition which is said to be of perpetual truth must be necessary from the connection of terms; but it cannot be necessary in this way unless it is somehow per se; and therefore I think that universals cannot be said to be eternal in that way, except in relation to some intellect which is eternal, as St. Thomas expressly said, in the said solution to the second.

The Fifth Doubt

8. Whether universals have causes or not.—Finally, it is understood from what has been said whether and how universals have

causes; for either the discussion concerns universal natures or their universality. In the former way, just as universal natures do not flow except in individuals, so they do not have causes except in them, nor other causes than those very individuals have, for they are made by the same efficient cause and (if they are composite) they consist of the same principles or the same matter and form, and they are ordered by their nature to the same end. But if we speak of universality itself, since that is not a real being, it is not necessary that it have proper and real causes; nevertheless, in the way that it is a being or rather imitates a being, it has in its own way a material and efficient cause. For the very nature which is denominated universal imitates the material cause insofar as it is like a subject which underlies the intention of universality and is denominated universal by it; but since that form is not real and intrinsic, therefore that subject is not one of inherence but of denomination, and it is more matter about which than matter in which or from which. But the efficient cause is the intellect itself, which makes the concept representing that nature abstractly, or the comparison of the same nature thus abstracted to its inferiors; for it does not properly effect the relation of reason, but considers or feigns it not so much in a signate act as in an exercised act, as I said, namely by conceiving the relation as if it were a true relation. But it is not necessary to seek here the formal cause or the final cause, for of the universal itself considered in act in this way, universality itself is quasi the form which is nothing other than either the denomination proceeding from the act of intellect or the relation of relation founded and conceived in it. But the end of this universality either is none, properly speaking, because it is only something resulting from the conception of the intellect intending the cognitions of things; or if some end must be assigned, it is only the very cognition of the intellect itself because by considering the essences of things it abstracts their degrees and formal notions; and because it has the power of perceiving and discerning all things and reflecting upon its own actions, it intends not only to know the natures of things, but also

the denominations or relations which they seem to have insofar as they are themselves presented to the intellect, and for this end it fabricates universals and feigns their relations.

SECTION VIII
HOW MANY KINDS OF UNIVERSAL THERE ARE, OR ITS UNITY

1. We have explained what universal unity is and how it belongs to things; it remains for us to declare the various modes of this unity or universality, so that from this it may also be established what differs in this matter between the metaphysician and the dialectician, and in what way universals are to be distinguished or multiplied by each.

First Division

2. What is universal in causing. What is universal in representing. First, therefore, the universal is customarily divided into universal in causing, in representing, in being, and in predicating. But this division does not pertain to the present undertaking regarding the first two members. For a cause that is called universal, because it can produce various effects, is some singular thing, like God, the heavens, etc.; hence it has no other unity than real singular or numerical unity; but it is called quasi-universal in object, because its power extends to many effects; just as the intellect and will are customarily called universal powers objectively, because they are concerned with all beings, and the common sense with respect to external things can also be called universal in the same way, although in itself it is one and singular. The same must be said of the universal in signifying or representing, whether this be taken in names which are called common terms by dialecticians, or in intelligible species, or in formal

concepts, or finally in any image, in whatever way it may be conceived as representing many things uniformly; for whatever is of this kind of representing thing, is in itself one singular individual, and is only called universal from the side of the object because it signifies or represents many things. But the third universal, which is called universal in being, either is nothing, or in reality coincides with the fourth and they differ only in name and relation of reason. For if universal in being is said to be that which is universal in the thing itself, no such universal exists, as we have shown; but if it is that which has some foundation in the thing, yet is conceived by the intellect as something one existing in many and thus becomes universal in being, this very thing is universal in predicating; for it can be predicated of many precisely because it is in them through some identity, as we have shown. But by reason of the former relation in order to being it is properly called universal; by reason of the latter relation in order to predication it is called predicable. Hence it is customarily said by dialecticians that being predicable is like a passion or property of the universal.

Second Division

3. What is metaphysical universal. What is physical universal. Hence secondly the universal is customarily divided into metaphysical, physical, and logical universal, which can be called by other names: universal before the thing, in the thing, and after the thing. The metaphysical universal would be most properly so called if it were actually separated from individuals; for it would actually abstract most completely from all change and contraction; but the metaphysician considers principally things so abstracted. And therefore Aristotle, in these books of the Metaphysics, especially VII, carefully inquires about this universal and shows that there really is none; but that this metaphysical universal is to be distinguished from those not in reality but only in reason. Again, the physical universal

can be called the universal nature itself as it exists in things; and in this way the universal is not taken formally as universal, but only materially for the nature, which can be abstracted and denominated universal. But this is called physical universal because, since it is contracted in singular things themselves, it is subject to change and sensible accidents from which physical consideration begins. Although this universal is not outside metaphysical consideration, both because it can also be found in immaterial things and those abstracting from matter according to being; and also because this universal requires some formal unity whose consideration belongs to the metaphysician. Indeed, even the dialectician considers this universal in some way, not per se on account of the natures themselves thus universal, but only insofar as it is a remote foundation and quasi-subject of the intention of universality.

4. What is logical universal. But the logical universal is called the universal itself in act, which arises through the operation of the intellect; for because it is the dialectician's task to direct the operations of the intellect in order to making definitions, divisions, and argumentations or demonstrations correctly and orderly, which are principally handed down concerning things universally conceived and compared and coordinated among themselves, therefore it is necessary that he consider the intentions of reason or denominations arising therefrom, although this is not so proper to the dialectician that it cannot more properly and per se belong to the metaphysician, and in some way also to the physicist. For the latter, disputing about the soul, consequently treats of the intellect and of its acts and object; hence it is necessary that he consider the universal insofar as it is universal, both because it is in some way the proper object of the intellect, and also because it arises through abstraction or comparison, which are proper operations of the intellect. But this belongs most especially to the metaphysician; for, as we have seen above, it pertains to him to distinguish beings of reason from real ones, and to declare what essence or entity they have; which is quite alien and extrinsic to

the dialectician's undertaking, but he only touches on these things in passing, so that he can order the very works of the intellect and reduce them to a certain method and art. But if we wish to attribute to each what is proper to him, the metaphysician considers the proper nature of the universal, insofar as it is one in many and whatever follows upon that by reason of the way it imitates the nature of being and essence and its properties. But the dialectician per se considers only the nature of the predicable, not indeed considering its quiddity or entity, but only what it is necessary to know for making definitions or predications. Therefore, as far as the present matter is concerned and for the appropriate use of terms, let us call every universal in act under the aspect of universal, metaphysical; but under the aspect of predicable, let it be called dialectical.

Third Division into Five Universals

5. Thirdly, and what pertains most to the matter, the universal is customarily divided into those five members which Porphyry distinguished in the predicables, namely, genus, species, difference, property, and accident. We do not now intend to dispute about the quality and sufficiency of this division; for this cannot be done conveniently without exact knowledge of the individual predicables; but to discourse on the individual predicables would be alien to our undertaking; we hope, however, with God's help, to treat of each thing in its proper place. Therefore, only that distinction given above is to be recalled concerning the universal conceived in the mode of the absolute, such as arises through simple abstractive or precisive conception of the intellect, and the universal related or compared to its inferiors. It can therefore be inquired in what way this division is to be understood, or concerning what universal or under what aspect conceived—absolute, namely, or respective, or metaphysical, or logical. And there can be two ways of responding. The first is that the logical universal is divided there as respective of reason and not the

metaphysical universal, or as precisely abstracted. Because in it as such, those five members do not seem to be able to be distinguished always and universally in a suitable way. For although sometimes in diverse natures or concepts these are easily distinguished, as in man, animal, etc., yet in others these cannot be distinguished, stopping at the absolute concept, until a relation or comparison is made to diverse things. Thus white, for example, abstractly conceived is a certain universal; yet it cannot, stopping at that abstraction, be denominated rather an accidental predicable than a species, because with respect to diverse things it is capable of either relation; hence until a comparison is made to diverse things, that double aspect cannot be distinguished in that universal. Something similar can be considered in property, which with respect to diverse things can have the nature of property and of species; indeed, even a generic nature, even a substantial one, although it is denominated genus with respect to species, nevertheless with respect to proper individuals (according to the probable opinion of many) has the nature of species. And even concerning difference itself it is probable that, although with respect to species or individuals it constitutes a proper universal, nevertheless with respect to inferior differences formally taken it constitutes another nature of predication or is reduced to the predicable of species; for rational is predicated of this rational, for example, formally taken, not in quale but in quid, which we do not wish to discuss and examine further here. Therefore, only the ultimate species of substantial or accidental nature taken in the abstract is entirely incapable of another relation of universal; and it has no other inferiors to which it can be compared besides individuals whose integral quiddity it contains. Therefore, that division does not seem to have place in the universal, insofar as it arises precisely through abstraction.

6. But if you ask what that universal is to be called, it can be answered that the nature of universal under that consideration consists only in precisive separation from singulars, from which arises a certain unity of reason with aptitude for many things, which under

this precise consideration is of the same nature in any universal; and therefore the universal, as such, is not further divided but retains only the nature of universal until it is compared with inferiors and receives various denominations in order to diverse things. And thus under this aspect the universal is not compared to the aforesaid members as genus to differences, but rather as subject to accidents, or as proximate foundation to various relations by which it can be denominated. Hence, when it is customarily said by dialecticians that universal or predicable is genus to the five universals or predicables, it must be taken formally and with due proportion, as a relative conceived in common.

7. Sufficiency of the five predicables. But considering the universal as it is compared to inferiors, it is correctly divided through those five members, the reason for which division can be briefly assigned thus. For what is one in many or predicable of many, can say something essential to them, or something outside the essence; again, if it be essential, it either says the whole essence and thus is a specific universal, which can only be common to individuals differing in number, because only individuals of this kind can agree in the whole essence; or it says only part of the essence; and this can happen in two ways. First, that it be like something material and potential and thus is constituted the universal of genus, which, as such, necessarily regards diverse species, because that agreement in generic nature, which is the foundation of this universality, is neither in the whole essence of the thing, nor in the ultimate formal constitutive and determinative of it, but in a certain potential degree and one determinable through many differences. Second, it can happen that the universal says part of the essence in the mode of a form constituting the formal unity of it, and thus is constituted the universal of difference and is said to be predicated in quale quid, because it is related in the mode of a form constituting quiddity. This mode of universality and predication can sometimes be common to things differing in species; sometimes indeed to things differing only in number, as is evident in ultimate and

subaltern differences. And the reason is that such a mode of constitution through essential difference neither per se excludes further differences essentially also constituting and distinguishing specific essences, nor does it per se require them; hence, because this is accidental to such a universal, it also happens to it that the inferiors in which it is found differ in species or number. But how these things are to be accommodated to what Porphyry taught in the chapter on Difference and what he himself thought about this, must be referred to dialectical commentaries. Finally, if the universal or predicable is outside the essence, it can be either per se connected with the essence and flowing from it; and this is called property; but if it is in no way connected per se with the essence, but contingent and altogether accidentally agreeing, it is called accident, the fifth predicable.

8. Although both property and accident are forms of those things of which they are predicated, they are nevertheless not to be taken in the abstract but in the concrete, so that they may be able to take on the nature of such universals, because otherwise they are not apt to be said of inferiors in such a way. Indeed rather, if such forms are conceived in the abstract, they do not regard their subjects with that relation by which a universal regards inferiors but in the way that act regards potency which it can inform; therefore, so that these can be compared to such inferiors under such aspect and relation of universals, they ought to be conceived in the concrete in the mode of a common whole, which is in the inferiors subject to it and can be truly predicated of them directly. This can be observed in all universals as well, for in all it is true that only concretes can be predicated of concretes, and consequently only with respect to them can they have the nature of universals. For this reason it is customarily said that a universal does not regard or is not predicated of its inferiors except in the mode of a whole; for, although we have said that genus and difference formally do not say the whole essence, but a metaphysical part, nevertheless, so that they may have the nature of universals, it is necessary that they be conceived in the mode of a whole and therefore

ought to be taken in the concrete, so that they may say the whole thing at least implicitly, and insofar as they at least potentially include many inferiors, in the way that Porphyry said genus is a whole (namely potential) with respect to species; and Aristotle, Physics I, c. 1, said the universal is a certain whole. But how substantial abstracts participate in the nature of universals and how universal predication has place in them, we shall touch upon in section 10 of this disputation.

9. Several objections are met. But various objections occurred here, which are customarily made against the sufficiency of this division so expounded, which are proper to dialecticians, and therefore I only advise that this division can be thought not aptly handed down under a double title. First, because in it are not numbered all the ultimate natures of universals, for difference could be divided into many, and similarly property, etc. Or if all these things are said to be comprehended under the general natures of difference or property, from elsewhere the division will seem inept or superfluous, because it could be reduced to fewer general members; for genus and species seem to agree among themselves no less than general and specific difference.

10. Why difference is contained under one predicable. But this difficulty is of no moment, because whether those members be ultimate and specific, or general, the division will nevertheless be sufficient at least from this point, because no other member is brought forward which is not contained under those enumerated. And although we grant that some members are general, others specific, the division will not therefore be inept; for it is not necessary that the members of a division be equal or equally abstract and common; for it suffices that they be contained under the thing divided and be supposits of it in some way and exhaust it; but that some are numbered under a more common, others under a less common aspect, is accidental and can sometimes be expedient for particular reasons, as perhaps was done in the present case, because the

distinction of those five members was necessary and sufficient for coordinating predicaments and making definitions and other tasks of dialecticians for which that division was invented. Finally, it can be added that it is not necessary to admit that not all those members are specific and ultimate in the nature of universal and predicable. Because for the proper relation of universal and its essential difference, it does not matter that inferiors differ more or less among themselves, provided that the relation of the superior to them be of the same mode and nature; but this happens thus in ultimate or subaltern differences. The same reason applies to property and accident, but not to genus and species compared among themselves, as can be sufficiently established from the reason adduced to explain the sufficiency of the division; for to explain and discuss these things more fully is not of our undertaking.

11. From a second point the aforesaid division can seem insufficient, because there seem to be certain other universals which are in no way comprehended under these; but these are in a double genus: some are transcendentals, which are superior to species and to genera, which since they have one objective concept, as was said above, and can be in many things and be predicated of them, nothing seems to be lacking why they should not be called universals. Hence Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 10, says being and one are most universal.

12. Why transcendentals are not universals. But it can be answered that such transcendentals are not properly and simply universals, although they are sometimes called so broadly and in a qualified sense, for that reason by which everything that is in some way one and common to many can be called universal. Nevertheless, since these are analogous, or do not have unity simply, or do not equally regard many things, therefore from this part they are excluded from the proper nature and division of universal, which is to be understood as divided in that partition. Hence Aristotle, Ethics I, c. 6, expressly requires for the nature of universal that it be univocal, and

Metaphysics IV, c. 2, in this way denies that being and one are universals. But if you insist, because it is not repugnant that there be given some objective concepts common, essential to many predicaments, and univocal, and consequently universal, and not generic because to many predicaments there is no common genus, such as many think the concept of accident to be, or the concept of successive being and similar ones, which consequently they say are not genera but in the mode of transcendentals, it is answered briefly, either there are no such univocal predicates (as many hold), or certainly, if there are any, they are reduced to genus, because in the nature of universal and in the mode of essential predication in quid incomplete, and not predicating the whole essence of the thing, they agree with it; they differ however from proper genus, because they do not have proper differences by which they are contracted; and therefore they serve neither for definitions nor for coordinating predicaments; concerning which matter there will occur a more convenient place for speaking below when we speak of the division of accident into nine predicaments.

13. Whether vague individual is universal. But from elsewhere from another extreme there seem to be certain common predicates, quasi-inferior to the lowest species and intermediate between it and singular determinate individuals, such as Cajetan thought the vague individual to be, in the chapter on Species; and a more probable example can be adduced concerning the common nature of person or supposit, or concerning the very nature of individual. To this difficulty some deny that these predicates are univocal. But this is incredible, for truly to be a person is said univocally of any man, and to be a first substance is said univocally of any first substance; for what reason of analogy or equivocation can be devised in these predicates? Others say they are contained under the universal of species, for the nature of person is compared as specific to this and that person, and the nature of individual to this or that individual as such. But, although perhaps this can be defended

formally by comparing, for example, the nature of person to this person as such; nevertheless it does not seem true if the comparison is made to this man as such, because as such it is not a quidditative predicate of that. This can be taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 30, a. 4, ad 3. And this suffices to constitute a distinct universal according to relation, as it is now considered by us. Just as risible is also a species with respect to this and that risible as such; and nevertheless with respect to this or that man as such it constitutes a new predicable, because under that aspect it is not predicated essentially.

14. Therefore it seems to be said that individual as such with respect to many individuals does not constitute a new universal, because formally it says nothing other than the transcendental unity of each entity as it exists in reality; and thus it is excluded, like other transcendental predicates. Especially because, if it is taken according to the positive thing it says, it adds nothing above being; but if it is taken according to what it formally adds, that is only a certain negation. Hence among individuals of the same species, for example, two men, precisely considering their individual essences, besides specific agreement there is no other in the nature of individual, except insofar as they agree in the nature of undivided being, which is only transcendental agreement. But I think the nature of person or supposit can be reduced to the predicament of property, insofar as that mode by which it is constituted, namely, personality or subsistence, is not essential but per se concomitant with essence, just as actually to inhere can be said to be a certain property of accident. Nor does it matter that that mode of personality or subsistence is not in its entity an accidental property but a substantial mode; because this does not vary the mode of universality or predication, just as to be headed, to be actually biped, is called accident of the fifth predicable, although the thing from which it is taken is not accident but substance, because the mode of predication is accidental and contingent; but concerning these things let these suffice.

15. Finally we can add another mode of explaining that division concerning the absolute universal or insofar as it arises through abstractive consideration of the intellect, in which although the aforesaid members cannot be entirely distinguished according to various relations to inferiors, as the discourse made above shows, they can nevertheless be distinguished in some way in order to metaphysical composition. So that genus is said to be that which in the mode of potency is apt to constitute species; difference, which in the mode of form or act contracts and divides genus and constitutes species; but species will be what is composed from these; property indeed, what per se happens to species; accident, what contingently inheres in individuals or in species by reason of individuals. And in this way the universal is not so much divided according to diverse natures of universality, as according to diverse relations of the universals themselves among themselves. Yet so that the universal of species is quasi-principal, total and absolute; but the others say some relation quasi-partial or formal to the species itself, as has been declared. Hence it is also probable that universal under this aspect is not said equally primarily and univocally of these universals, but primarily of those which are essential, then indeed of others which are outside the essence, and among the former the universal of species is principal; on account of which also Plato, as Aristotle sometimes signifies, posited ideas only of species. But it is not necessary to understand analogy between species, genus and difference in the nature of universal, because all say essential agreement and unity and have the same mode of identity with respect to those things from which they are abstracted, which happens otherwise in property and accident. And this consideration of universals according to their proper natures, and according as they are distinguished or compared among themselves, contributes most to knowing and defining the essences of things and therefore is most necessary for the metaphysical undertaking. Since however property and accident are outside the essences of things, nothing occurs to be considered

concerning them insofar as they are universals, besides the intentions and relations of reason which are declared by dialecticians in order to predications; and what we shall say below in its proper place concerning the proper and real essence of accident and its distinction from substance, and the various relations it has to substance, among which one can be intrinsic emanation from which it has that it is named property; therefore concerning the other three universals, genus, species, difference, it remains to be said how they are distinguished in things and what they have in them as principle and foundation.

SECTION IX
HOW THE UNITY OF GENUS AND DIFFERENCE ARE DISTINGUISHED IN REALITY BOTH AMONG THEMSELVES AND FROM SPECIFIC UNITY

1. That genus and difference are distinguished in reality can seem to be persuaded by these arguments: first, because the species is composed of genus and difference, which composition is called metaphysical and is not considered to be entirely fabricated by reason, but found in some way in things themselves, and therefore the more reliable theologians teach that it is not found in God, because it is repugnant to His supreme simplicity; therefore it is a sign that genus and difference are distinguished in some way in reality itself, and not only by reason or by our concepts, because otherwise they would not make composition in reality; for distinction of reason alone, even if founded in virtual distinction or eminence of the thing, does not suffice for true composition of the thing; therefore there is some distinction in reality between genus and difference. And this is confirmed, for by this reasoning Aristotle, in Metaphysics VII, chapter 10, text 33, when he had said that the definition ought to consist of

parts, namely genus and difference, adds: as the definition relates to the whole thing, so the parts of the definition relate to the parts of the thing; therefore there is some true distinction between them, just as between the parts of a thing.

2. Second, the same is proved, because those things which in reality itself have integral or partial essences that are in some way diverse, are in some way distinguished in reality itself; but genus and difference are so related; therefore [they are distinguished]. The minor is proved from those things which are commonly attributed to genus and difference. For first, Aristotle in Metaphysics III, text 10, says that difference is outside the notion of genus; therefore difference is not of the essence of genus, nor conversely. Whence in Topics VI, chapter 3, Aristotle says that neither does genus participate in differences, nor differences in genus; and in Metaphysics VII, chapter 12, text 42, he says that differences are not placed in the notion of genus, but genus is compared to differences as potency to essential act, and therefore one thing per se is made from them. And this is evident by reason, for the differences dividing genus are opposed among themselves; therefore both cannot be of the essence of genus; therefore neither one nor the other can be of the essence of it. The consequence is evident, both because there is no greater reason for one than for the other; and also because, if one were of the essence, it would be inseparable, whence the other could never belong to it, since opposites cannot simultaneously inhere in the same thing; therefore genus has an essence distinct from differences in itself or one not including them. But that conversely difference also expresses an essence not including genus is evident, both because otherwise genus would be transcendent, and also because otherwise difference would include everything that species includes, whence a certain nugation would be committed when difference is added to genus.

3. The third argument can be that those things which are separated in reality must be distinguished in some way also in reality; but the inferior and superior grades are separated in reality, for

somewhere there is the notion of animal where rational is not found, and so of others. A similar argument is that in reality itself two species are similar in generic notion, but not in specific; whence it seems necessary that these notions be distinct in reality itself. Likewise, that difference contracts genus and actualizes it; therefore they are not entirely the same because the same thing does not contract itself. Fourth, I argue, because these expressions taken precisely and abstractly are false: "Animality is rationality" and similar, and this is only on account of formal distinction, for if they were entirely the same predicate and subject, the affirmative proposition would be true; but by those words the generic and differential grades are signified precisely; therefore these grades are distinguished from the nature of the thing.

4. And hence it is further concluded that genus and difference taken individually are distinguished from the nature of the thing from the whole species, because they are compared to it as parts to a whole truly and really composed from them; but the whole is distinguished from the nature of the thing from the individual components, although it is not distinguished from all taken together and united; for it is distinguished at least as including something which the other does not include. Whence for this reason it is also commonly said that genus and difference taken precisely in the notion of parts cannot be truly predicated of the species; because a part is not predicated of the whole. And this is confirmed first, for if in reality man and animal were distinguished in no way, neither would horse and animal be distinguished; therefore neither could man and horse be distinguished, for things that are the same with a third thing are the same among themselves; and whatever is of the essence of one, will be of the essence of the other, and conversely; for if man and animal are the same in reality, whatever is of the essence of man will be of the essence of animal; and it will be similar in horse; therefore it will be the same comparing man and horse among themselves; or certainly it must be admitted that something is of the essence of animal in man

which is not in horse and conversely; from which it follows that animal is not said univocally nor according to the same notion of man and horse, but equivocally, or at most according to a certain analogy of proportionality. Finally, it is confirmed by that reasoning often made, because diverse things cannot be similar and different according to the same thing entirely, but two species are simply and essentially different, and yet they are similar in genus; therefore it cannot happen that genus and species are not distinguished in some way in reality itself.

Various Opinions are Reported

5. In this matter there can be various ways of speaking. The first is that these grades are distinguished not in any way from the nature of the thing, but entirely really, at least through the inclusion of something really distinct, which is in one and not in the other. John of Jandun signifies this opinion in Metaphysics II, question 9, and all those who think that these generic and specific grades are taken from really distinct forms ought to hold the same; for from this it follows that body signifies only a composite of matter and the form of corporeity, but living signifies a composite of body and vegetative soul, animal truly adds sensitive soul really distinct, man truly adds rational soul. But concerning differences like rational and similar, perhaps this opinion would say that they signify only the ultimate form as informing; whence it also happens to say something really distinct from genus. And hence perhaps Durandus thought, in Sentences II, distinction 3, question 1, that in simple things, such as angels and accidents or forms themselves, proper differences cannot be given and consequently neither composition from genus and difference.

6. The second opinion is that these predicates are distinguished from the nature of the thing among themselves and from the composite itself, at least by formal or modal distinction, as

they call it. Thus holds Scotus, in Sentences II, distinction 3, question 1, and Metaphysics VII, question 16, and there Antonius Andreas, question 7; for although Scotus sometimes posits real distinction between common and proper physical forms, as between the form of corporeity and soul, for example, and then he must necessarily say that between the grades taken from these forms there is greater distinction than formal, according to the preceding opinion, nevertheless he does not think that real formal distinction is necessary for distinguishing these grades, for in the same physically simple thing he admits true genus and difference and their composition, and therefore, speaking generally, he says formal distinction from the nature of the thing suffices and that this is minimally necessary. Whether this formal distinction in Scotus is actual in the thing or only virtual or fundamental, and thus coincides with another which is called of reasoned reason, is not sufficiently certain, for he speaks variously, as we shall touch upon in the following disputation; now this opinion must be treated by us in that sense in which it posits actual distinction in the thing; and in this it seems to be followed by Ferrariensis, Contra Gentiles I, chapters 24 and 42; and Fonseca, Metaphysics II, chapter 2, text 11, where he collects this from the text of Aristotle, who denies that there can be infinite process in essential predicates, because if they were distinguished only by thought, there would be no inconvenience in giving infinite process in them. The same repeats Fonseca, book IV, chapter 2, question 4, section 3, book V, chapter 7, question 3, section 3, ad 2.

7. The third opinion can be extremely contrary to this, that they are distinguished neither really nor even by reason, but are entirely the same, although they are signified by diverse words. Which opinion can be attributed to the nominalists, insofar as they entirely deny that these universals are found in things; but it is scarcely credible that this opinion came into the mind of any philosopher, as the arguments made in the beginning conclude at minimum.

8. The true opinion therefore is that all these things are distinguished by reason, taking some foundation from things themselves, but there is not true and actual distinction either real or from the nature of the thing between all such grades, insofar as they exist conjoined on the part of the thing. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, as is evident from Summa I, question 50, article 4, ad 1, question 76, article 3, ad 4, and De Ente et Essentia, chapter 4 and following, Metaphysics VII, lecture 4, and often elsewhere, and the Thomists commonly hold it, Hervaeus, Quodlibet I, question 9; Capreolus, Sentences I, distinction 8, question 2, article 3; Cajetan, Soncinas, and Soto, in the places cited in the preceding section; Gregory, Sentences I, distinction 38; Gabriel, and other nominalists. And since the affirmative part concerning distinction of reason is evidently proved by the arguments made and has no difficulty, nothing needs to be added about it; but the foundation of such distinction will be declared in the solutions of the arguments, and more in the following section.

The True Opinion Is Declared

9. To prove the other part denying, it must be noted that when we deal with the distinction of these grades, of genus, difference and species, they can be conferred or compared in four ways, first as they are found on the part of the thing in diverse things or species, as if animal which is in man is compared with the species of lion or horse, or if animal as it is in lion, is compared to the difference of rational, for example, or another similar; and this comparison is outside the matter and impertinent, for in this way it is certain that the generic notion existing in reality can be really distinguished from some difference or its species; because in diverse species the formal unity of the genus itself is multiplied according to the thing; just as we said above that specific formal unity, as it exists in reality, is multiplied in number in individuals. Whether genus, as it is on the part of the thing in one

species, is distinguished from another species or its difference, not only really but also essentially and quidditatively, perhaps pertains to the manner of speaking and depends on the proofs of this opinion, and is explained in the solutions of the arguments.

10. Second, these can be compared according to themselves abstracting from existence both in things and in the intellect, in that manner in which we cited above some saying that nature according to itself, that is, taken nakedly and solitarily, is universal, as it precedes even every work of the intellect; for in the same sense those seem to think that quidditative predicates are distinguished among themselves from the nature of the thing. Because if animal, for example, from itself and before every intellect has positive aptitude to various differences and unity of precision from itself common to many species, it necessarily follows that it has from its nature some distinction from all differences by which it can be divided, and from species to which it can be contracted. But given those things which we have said about the notion of universal, this comparison has no place; for we have shown that there is no state in which common nature, whatever it may be, can have some unity of precision excluding the intellect, if as existing in things themselves it cannot have it. Because nature outside the intellect can have only a twofold state, namely, of actual existence and of possibility, nor can any other middle state be feigned or thought out; but nature as possible is not otherwise prescinded or distinguished from possible differences or species than existing nature from existing differences or species; nor is there any possible nature distinct from its inferior individuals or species, if existing in reality it can never be distinct; because existing and possible nature are not other and other, but the same considered in diverse states; therefore this comparison can really be none which has foundation in reality.

11. Third, genus and difference can be compared both among themselves and with the species which they compose, as they are in the intellect conceiving each of them precisely and abstractly, and in this way it is certain that they are distinguished by reason, as we said;

whether they are distinguished by more than reason, cannot (which is very noteworthy for solving the arguments made in the beginning) be sufficiently collected from this comparison alone unless some other sign of greater distinction is found in things themselves. This is proved, because this is the power of the intellect, that it prescinds and abstracts those things which in reality are not actually distinct or precise; therefore, from the fact that some things as objects of the mind are distinguished by reason, no distinction in reality between them can be collected; because to be thus distinguished by reason is nothing other than to be objected to distinct concepts of the intellect and to be conceived in a diverse manner or under diverse relation, all of which can stand without distinction in reality. And this can be confirmed from those things which we said above about the objective concept of being, how it is made precise by the intellect and according to the thing indistinct from all inferior beings; for the reasonings made there proceed in the same way here and we shall touch upon them briefly immediately.

12. Fourth, therefore, these can be compared as they exist in reality in one and the same species and in one and the same individual of such species, and in this sense this comparison is truly intended in the present question, and in the same sense we say that in Peter, for example, being sensitive is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from being rational, nor the grade of animal from the grade of man, and so of the rest.

13. Second notable. Where it must be considered second that in the thing itself and in the same individual the generic grade can be understood to be distinguished from the specific in two ways: in one way, as universal from particular; in another way, as individual from individual at least formally distinct from the nature of the thing. The prior mode of distinction would have place, if it were true that universals existing on the part of the thing are actually and from the nature of the thing distinguished from individuals in which they exist, and in this way Scotus seems to have proceeded and consequently to

have spoken, because animal, for example, does not descend to individuals except through the mediation of species; and therefore, if once we admit that specific nature as such is distinct from the nature of the thing from the difference by which it is contracted to individuals, by equal reason and quite consequently it will be said that generic nature is distinguished in the same way from the differential grade before by nature it is contracted to individuals. But this mode of distinction has no place, given those things which we have said against Scotus about the universality of nature, that it is in no way actually in things nor inherent in nature existing in individuals, but as it is only abstracted by the intellect. For if nature in reality does not have universality, therefore neither does it have the universality of genus, nor of difference, nor of species; therefore these cannot be distinguished in reality as one universal from another, or from its inferior. And this is confirmed, because the reasonings by which it was shown above that universal is not distinguished in reality from singular, equally prove concerning any universal, whether generic or specific, with respect to that singular in which it exists; therefore in reality there can be no distinction between one inferior and superior grade taken universally, since on the part of the thing they are not distinguished from singulars.

14. Therefore only the other mode of distinction remains to be examined, which being excluded, it will be sufficiently shown that there is no distinction from the nature of the thing between these grades. And in this there is some discernment and not a little greater difficulty in the present question than in that treated above about the distinction of universal from individual difference; for, the individual difference being excluded, there does not remain a singular and individual thing, and therefore neither can there remain an existing thing which is distinguished in reality from such difference; but truly in the present case, the specific difference being excluded, the generic grade can be understood not only in universal, but also in the individual and really existing; for Peter, for example, is not only this

man, but also this animal and this rational; and therefore, the specific difference being excluded by the intellect, the generic grade can still be understood as existing in the individual and singular and therefore there is still place for the question how in the individual this animal and this man or this rational are distinguished; that therefore they are not distinguished in reality must be proved from elsewhere than from universality.

First Proof of the True Opinion

15. It can therefore be proved first from individuation, because in one individual there is one entirely and the same and most simple individual difference contracting proximately and immediately the ultimate species and with it and through it consequently determining all superior grades; therefore those grades cannot be distinguished among themselves more than each is distinguished from its individual difference; but none of them is distinguished from the nature of the thing from its individual difference, as has been proved; therefore neither are they distinguished among themselves from the nature of the thing in the same individual. The first antecedent is common among dialecticians and metaphysicians, as Fonseca reports and declares at length, book V, chapter 28, question 14, section 3, where he shows that genus does not regard individuals, except through the mediation of species. And the reason is, first, because the generic notion taken precisely is indifferent and as it were in essential potency to be determined by specific difference, and therefore, as long as it is understood to be determined in this way, it is not proximately capable of individuation. Second, because the order between generic, specific and individual difference is not less essential than between superior essential differences more and less universal up to the specific; but body, for example, is not apt to be contracted by the difference of animal except through the mediation of the difference of living, nor vegetative by the difference of rational except through the

mediation of the difference of sensing; therefore neither is animal determinable by the individual difference of this animal, for example Peter, except through the mediation of the difference of man or rational; therefore there is one entirely indivisible individual difference, which by contracting man to this man simultaneously contracts animal to this animal, and so of the other superior predicates. Whence I argue third, because such individual difference, unique and indivisible, suffices to determine in the singular the whole and integral essence of the thing, as it includes all specific, generic or superior predicates, which can be abstracted or thought out in it; therefore it would be superfluous to fabricate several such metaphysical differences in the same individual. And this is confirmed by a sign; for this animal, for example, which is Peter, is entirely intrinsically and as it were essentially determined to be Peter; and therefore it entirely repugnates to understand this individual animal outside this individual man, and the same is true of the other superior predicates; therefore it is a sign that animal is not determined immediately and according to itself to this individual animal, but insofar as it is determined to the being of man; therefore by the same individual difference it is determined to the being of this man and this animal.

16. Finally this is confirmed, for an individual thing as such is understood to be proximately capable of existence; for universal as such, that is, in its universality, cannot exist; and therefore the more universally some predicate is understood, the more as such it is conceived to be elongated from existence; as, for example, substance in common is not understood apt to exist unless it is determined to material or immaterial; and the same is the reason for the whole series of general predicates up to the ultimate species, which contracted to its individual is proximately capable of existence; therefore just as no individual can exist unless it is in some lowest species, as is most certain (especially excluding the false opinion about real distinction of several substantial forms, essentially subordinated in the same

composite), so no generic notion is understood to be determined to its proper individual except as contracted and determined to some species. Which certainly in things especially simple, both integral and partial, seems evidently clear per se; for who would feign or conceive in mind that Michael, for example, is this substance, this spirit and this angel through different things? or that the rational soul of Peter is this soul and this rational soul through different things, and so of others? Indeed, in some things, neither by abstraction of mind can this individual be sufficiently conceived as existing under generic notion and not under some specific, as, for example, this existing substance not understanding this body or this spirit; therefore let it be established that all essential attributes in one and the same individual are individuated by unique singular difference in the ultimate specific notion. From this however it is openly concluded (which we inferred in the first consequence), that essential attributes in the same individual cannot be distinguished among themselves more than from individual difference, because that is one and indivisible; therefore those things which are individuated through it cannot be distinguished as two individuals distinct from the nature of the thing, because in distinct individuals in the mode in which they are distinct, distinct individual differences must also be found; again, those things which are entirely the same from the nature of the thing with the same individual and indivisible difference, cannot be distinguished among themselves individually; therefore they are distinguished in no way from the nature of the thing, because, as has been proved, distinction from the nature of the thing cannot intervene except between individual and singular things as such.

Second Proof

17. Second, the assertion posited is proved, because in one individual, for example Peter, being this animal and being this man proceed from the same physical principle, namely, from this soul, as is

manifest per se and will be declared in the following section; but in this soul, for example of Peter, being rational, sensitive and vegetative (whether formally or eminently) are not grades distinct from the nature of the thing; therefore neither are the grades of man and animal distinguished in any way in Peter; the consequence is evident, because we correctly conclude that this animal is not really distinguished from the man himself, because this soul which gives the being of animal is not really distinct from that which gives the being of this man; therefore in the same way it is concluded that they are not distinguished from the nature of the thing. You will say that this argument proceeds from equally unknown things; for whoever posits this distinction in the composite, also posits it in the form and in any other thing, even if it is physically simple. It is responded that, even if it must be spoken consequently in that opinion, nevertheless the argument is rightly recalled and the difficulty to the roots of these grades and to simple physical entities, because in them it can appear more clearly how superfluously and without cause this distinction is feigned, since there is no sufficient indication of it in the foundation and root of such grades. Which is evident thus, for rational soul, for example, is in reality one simple form; which if it is considered as efficient principle of all operations which are in man, it is understood to be one eminent and as it were universal principle of them, nor is it necessary to feign in it various entities or real modes distinct from the nature of the thing through which it is principal and radical principle of such operations; otherwise also in the form or light of the sun, insofar as it can be universal principle of several actions, various grades or modes of being distinct from the nature of the thing would have to be feigned. And similarly it would have to be philosophized about every general principle of several actions or effects, which is alien to every reason and right conception, because those things which are distinct in inferiors are united in the superior principle. Therefore rational soul through its entity in reality entirely the same and simple, is radical principle of all human operations without any actual

distinction which is in it, as it has the notion of such principle, although through inadequate concepts it can be conceived by us in multiple ways, and thus be distinguished by reason in order to various operations. Therefore in the same way the same soul in the genus of formal cause confers to man all grades of living, animal and man, according to entirely the same reality without any actual distinction which is found in it from the nature of the thing. The consequence is evident, both because the same is the reason about soul considered in one and in another genus of cause; and also because it is the same or through the same that soul is radical principle of operations, through which it is principle formally constituting the operator. Indeed, we do not otherwise distinguish those grades in soul, than in order to operations. Whence, if in order to them distinction from the nature of the thing is not necessary in their principle, neither will it be necessary in the notion of informing.

18. But if in these grades which are taken in order to diverse operations, distinction from the nature of the thing is not necessary, much less will it be necessary in other superior or inferior genera or differences, as are, for example, the notion of body or substance; or, if we speak of forms, the notion of substantial form or form of body; for, by this very fact that something is form of matter actualizing its substantial potentiality, it is substantial form and is also form of body; but this is inseparable and indistinguishable from the nature of the thing from any form actualizing matter and composing with it one substantial composite. Similarly inferior genera, as is the notion of brute under animal and other such things, can be distinguished less than the aforesaid grades in man; for, if in the soul of man as it is principle of various operations distinction from the nature of the thing is not found, much less can it be found in the soul of a brute, for example, in order to sensitive operations effected in such manner in that grade and order.

Third Proof

19. Third, there is an excellent reason a priori, because this abstraction of genera and species, so that it is made by the intellect, has sufficient foundation both in it and in things without any actual distinction which precedes in the things themselves; therefore such distinction is not to be asserted. The consequence is proved, because the whole reason for introducing this distinction was taken from our manner of conceiving, and consequently from the manner of speaking founded in the manner of conceiving; therefore, if on account of this cause that distinction is not necessary, neither is it to be believed, because real distinctions or those from the nature of the thing are not to be multiplied without foundation. But the first antecedent, although it has been proved in treating of the concept of being and of the identity between common and individual nature, is here briefly declared and proved. Because, so that the intellect may form those concepts and prescind, on the part of things the agreement and similarity of them among themselves more or less perfect suffices, with some dissimilarity and disagreement; but on the part of the intellect it suffices that it can conceive that in which things agree through the mode of one thing precisely conceiving that; but all this can be done without actual distinction of grades which is in the thing itself; therefore. The minor is proved by examples adduced above; for two men agree among themselves in the notion of man and are distinguished as they are individuals, without distinction in reality between the common notion and individual difference. Likewise God and creature agree in the notion of real being and differ in the notion of such being, without distinction between common and proper notion, neither on the part of God, as is certain, nor on the part of creature, because no grade can be prescinded in creature, if it is positive and real, which does not have that agreement with God in the notion of being. These examples therefore declare that entirely the same thing can be principle and foundation of agreement and difference with another on account of greater or lesser similarity with

it, without any actual distinction which precedes in the things themselves.

20. Which is true not only in analogical agreement, as some signify, but also in univocal, as the example of specific agreement and individual difference sufficiently declares, and others can be adduced of more universal or generic agreements; for common sense, for example, agrees with sight in perception of color, and from this a common concept can easily be abstracted; but it agrees with hearing in perception of sound and from this another concept can be abstracted; but no one would say that the power of perceiving sound and color is distinguished from the nature of the thing in common sense itself. Similar is the case of the light of the sun insofar as it agrees with heat in effecting heat and with dryness in drying. Likewise middle qualities between extreme contraries, as green or red color between whiteness and blackness, and liberality between avarice and prodigality, have a certain agreement and dissimilarity with extremes; for liberality compared to avarice differs from it and agrees with prodigality in force and propensity of pouring out and communicating itself; but compared to prodigality, it differs from it in moderation and agrees with avarice in retaining; but it would be vain to feign in liberality various grades or real modes distinct from the nature of the thing, on account of these comparisons and conceptions of our intellect which (if the matter is considered attentively) can be multiplied almost to infinity and scarcely can differences be thought out so simple that the intellect could not divide them finding in them agreement and difference with other things; as in man, insofar as he is rational, it finds agreement with angel in understanding and difference in the mode of understanding; and so of others. Therefore it is sufficiently established from these things that such concepts of the intellect are not sufficient signs of actual distinction of things.

Solution of Arguments

21. Composition from genus and difference is composition of reason. To the first argument posited in the beginning it is responded that composition from genus and difference is not real composition, but of reason only; because, as the argument well proves, without distinction from the nature of the thing neither true composition and one which is in reality can be understood; because composition is nothing other than union of distinct things; therefore where there is no distinction in reality, neither can there be composition; therefore this is composition of reason. But this composition is said not to be entirely fabricated by reason, not because it actually precedes in reality, but because in reality there is foundation so that the intellect can conceive one notion as potential and precise from another, and another as actual and determining the other, and thus properly composition is only in concepts, but in reality only by extrinsic denomination from concepts of mind and in this way it is said to be composition of reason. Wherefore such composition is not repugnant to God on account of simplicity alone, as I shall say below, but also by reason of divine unlimitedness and eminence. For first on account of this cause He cannot have univocal agreement with creature; and consequently neither generic. Then no common notion can be so abstracted and prescinded in God that it is not included in any proper and particular notion on account of God's supreme unlimitedness and simplicity, which also repugnates to composition of genus and difference.

22. Definition and its parts insofar as they are commensurate with the thing and its parts. To the confirmation it is responded that parts of definition are not properly said to signify parts of the thing, but to have a certain proportion with parts of the thing, as St. Thomas expounds, Metaphysics VII, lecture 9, because genus and difference are related in the manner of matter and form, which are parts of the thing from which therefore genus and difference are said to be taken, as we shall explain more broadly in the following section. Then it is said that definition is work of the intellect and necessarily requires

some true and proper composition from distinct concepts, just as definition pronounced by voice must consist of distinct partial voices; for it explains the nature of the thing distinctly, which cannot be done by us with one voice or one simple concept; and for this reason it is said to consist of parts; nevertheless it is not necessary that individual parts of definition explain individual parts of the defined thing distinct in reality, but each can express the whole nature or entity of the defined thing; but one expresses it confusedly and under some common and potential notion, another under more determined and proper notion; and such diverse notions can be called parts of the defined thing not according to reality, but according to reason only; for the defined as defined expresses denomination of reason.

23. To the second it is responded that genus and difference express diverse essential essences or notions according to reason, not according to reality; and in this way genus is said to be outside the notion of difference and difference also outside the notion of genus; for the notion of each is so conceived and prescinded by mind, that according to that precision and abstraction neither is formally included in the other; for which it is not necessary that they be distinguished in the thing itself in one and the same thing, but on the part of genus it suffices that its notion, as it responds to such conception, is not constituted intrinsically through its divisive difference and consequently that it can be found in reality without such difference; but on the part of difference, so that genus is said to be outside its notion it suffices that in its precise objective concept the objective concept of genus is not included, but difference is conceived as act of genus entirely distinct by reason. And this is also sufficient so that genus and difference are said to be compared as potency and essential act, not according to reality, but according to reason only; for such as the composition is, such ought to be act and potency; but this composition is of reason, as we said; therefore in the same way it is said that one per se is composed from genus and difference according to reason and not according to reality, and therefore such composite is

maximally per se one because the components are one in reality, and according to reason are compared and subordinated per se. And in this sense St. Thomas said, Metaphysics VII, lecture 12, that difference is not added to genus as diverse essence from it, but as contained in it implicitly, just as the determinate is contained in the indeterminate; and for this cause one per se is composed from them.

24. To the reasoning it is responded that we can speak of genus and difference in two ways. First, as they exist on the part of the thing; second, as they are prescinded by the intellect. In the prior way, since genus and difference are not distinguished in reality in each species, genus and difference have the same essence which the species has, although in diverse ways it is signified through concepts or words signifying genus and difference, as St. Thomas just cited said. And in this way genus as it is in reality, actually includes opposite differences, as it is in diverse species, in which way it is said that equivocations lie hidden in genus. And thus also Aristotle said, Metaphysics X, chapter 11, text 24, that genus, as existing in one species, is diverse from itself as it is in another. Nor does it impede that those differences are opposite, because genus thus considered does not have real unity but its formal unity is multiplied in diverse species, and therefore in them it can be actuated by opposite differences or rather identified with them. But in the second way and more properly and usually we speak of genus and difference as they underlie our abstract and precise concepts; and thus only that is said to be of the essence of each which is per se necessary for the formal notion and constitution of the thing as thus conceived; and in this way (as was said) both divisive differences are not of the essence of genus, nor is genus of the essence of differences; nevertheless all this distinction and precision is through operation of the intellect, to which it expresses relation or involves it, and the essence consists when it is signified by names of genus and difference.

25. The third argument, and all things that are indicated in it, have often been resolved in the above, for the same arguments are

made in species with respect to individuals and in being with respect to lower things. I say therefore that genus, as it is on the part of reality conjoined with its difference, is entirely inseparable from it; and from such difference we say it is not distinguished in reality itself; but that genus, as it is in one species, is separable in reality from the difference of another species is no argument that in one and the same species genus and difference are distinguished, because genus as it is in reality in one species and in another, is not really one and the same, but only by reason and abstraction; therefore only a distinction of reason is included, of which in reality itself there is some foundation, namely some incomplete and imperfect similarity of diverse natures, which can be in reality without actual distinction, as has been declared. That expression therefore that difference contracts genus or actuates it, refers to our concepts, and therefore a distinction of reason suffices for its truth and propriety.

26. The fourth argument touches on a difficulty which demands the following section; but the other arguments which were brought forward to show the distinction from the nature of the thing between genus and species among themselves and difference and species among themselves, have an easy solution from what has been said. Whence to the first it is responded that genus and difference are not compared to species as parts distinct from the nature of the thing, but only by reason. And this is sufficient that genus or difference when taken with precision cannot be predicated of species, as has been declared. To the first confirmation also the solution is clear from what has been said; for although in man animal is the same with man and in horse it is the same with horse, it does not follow that man and horse are the same among themselves, because they are not really one animal but only have similarity in the being of animal, by reason of which they agree in one concept of animal; and this is sufficient that animal be univocal and be said of both according to the same conceived reason, although according to reality animal has one real essence in man than in horse, and conversely. To the last confirmation

the assumption is denied; for nothing repugnates, as has also often been shown, that a thing entirely the same and without any distinction which is from the nature of the thing in itself, should found similarity and difference to another; because they can be assimilated imperfectly and only in a qualified sense, yet differ simply.

SECTION X

WHETHER METAPHYSICAL ABSTRACTIONS OF GENERA, SPECIES, AND DIFFERENCES CAN TRULY BE PREDICATED OF ONE ANOTHER

1. I call metaphysical abstractions those which are abstracted from metaphysical concepts, such as animality, rationality, and similar ones; I call them metaphysical abstractions in order to distinguish them from physical ones, such as whiteness, color, etc., among which there is no doubt that true and proper predications can be made, such as "whiteness is color," and similar ones. Concerning the former terms, therefore, and the propositions that are constructed from them, such as "animality is rationality," and similar ones, Scotus, in Book I, distinction 2, question 7, and distinction 5, question 1, and in Predicables, question 16, holds that they are false because of the formal distinction of the extremes and from the nature of the thing. But Soto, in question 3 of Universals, article 2, says that Scotus differs from all the realists in this matter; hence he himself holds the contrary opinion on the opposite foundation, namely, because a distinction of reason alone does not suffice for the falsity of a proposition.

2. But not only Scotus, but also other authors judge that those locutions should be denied not because of a distinction from the nature of the thing, but because of the mode of signifying, which, joined with a distinction of reason, suffices to make a proposition false when one formal concept (ratio formalis) precisely conceived is predicated of another distinct concept, similarly precisely conceived,

which happens in those locutions. For abstract terms signify precise formal concepts; hence when one is predicated of another, it is signified that one is the other, not only according to the thing, but also according to the precision of the mind and according to the concept, which is false; and in this way Niphus holds this opinion, Book III of Metaphysics, disputation II; and Cajetan, On Being and Essence, chapter 4; and Thomas Aquinas indicates this, in the same work, chapters 3 and 4; and it can be confirmed because these abstractions signify nature by way of a part; but one part cannot be truly predicated of another nor of the whole; hence it is commonly said that even the genus itself, for example, animal, if it were taken precisely by way of a part, could not be truly predicated of the species, and is only truly predicated insofar as it confusedly at least signifies the whole that is in the species, or because it adequately signifies that which has such a nature, which is the whole itself; therefore much less can those propositions taken in the abstract be verified.

3. But if you object: if predications of this kind can be made in the abstractions of accidents, why not in the abstractions of substances? It is answered from Scotus that these abstractions are ultimate abstractions, that is, such abstractions that they cannot be further abstracted or resolved into others more abstract; but the accidents that are signified in the abstract according to common usage and in which we say those predications can be made, are not abstract by ultimate abstraction; for they could be further resolved or abstracted, as if from whiteness there were abstracted "whiteness-ness" (albedineitas), from color "color-ness" (coloreitas); then indeed in these abstractions also the aforesaid predications cannot be made; for the same reason militates. But it will be said more properly and formally that there is the same reason for substances and accidents, if the abstraction is of the same kind, namely, either physical or metaphysical; but between these there is a different reason. For through physical abstraction, namely, of whiteness from the subject, the essence is not abstracted from the very thing (so to speak) that it

constitutes, but the form is abstracted from the subject, and therefore by virtue of such abstraction only universal predication is removed by way of the proper or accidental, because as such, such a form cannot be predicated of its subject nor of the composite, because it is compared to this as a part, and to that as a thing distinct from it, and is not signified as existing in it, but as standing by itself. Finally, as such it does not signify in any way the one having the form, nor does it suppose for that, but only for the very form that it signifies. And something similar to this will be found in substances if we abstract the form from the composite and signify it abstractly, such as the soul from the animated being, etc.; for thus the abstract will not be able to be predicated of the concrete; but among abstractions, predications of superiors concerning inferiors will be able to be made; for soul is correctly predicated of such a soul. But through the other metaphysical abstraction, the essence is abstracted from the entity that it constitutes, and is formally conceived and signified, as when "whiteness-ness" is said, and therefore in these abstractions true predications cannot be made when the conceived concepts are distinct at least according to reason.

4. Among these opinions, the last one has touched upon the truth more closely; nevertheless, so that we may explain the matter further, we can distinguish here four kinds of predications: first, a superior and quasi-generic abstract can be predicated of an inferior abstract, quasi-specific and integral, as when we say: "humanity is animality." Second, the same generic abstract can be predicated of an abstract not of a species, but of a difference alone, which is compared to another as formal to material, as if we say: "rationality is animality." Third, conversely, this formal or differential abstract can be predicated of a specific abstract, as in this: "humanity is rationality." Fourth, the same abstract of a difference can be said of a generic or material abstract, as in this: "animality is rationality."

5. Beginning, therefore, from this last predication, it seems to me to be false in rigor because of the reasons given; and because those

two extremes, as they are precisely and abstractly signified, are in no way compared such that one is formally included in the other; and consequently neither can one say that total which the other says, neither actually nor potentially, neither explicitly nor confusedly. And although sometimes animality and rationality are identically the same essence, nevertheless this is not signified by that mode of enunciating, but rather it is signified as if the predicate were of the formal and quidditative concept of the subject. Hence the best confirmation is taken, because rationality cannot be truly predicated of animality, except as its divisive and contractive difference and thus existing outside its concept; but in that locution it is not predicated as a divisive difference; because a divisive difference, since it is outside the genus, is adjacent to it and is related by way of an accident, and therefore cannot be predicated of it in the abstract but only in the concrete. For which reason Avicenna correctly said, tract. V of his Metaphysics, chapter 6, that rationality, as it is signified in the abstract, is not a difference, but the principle of a difference. And for the same reason I think the third locution is false in rigor, because also in that one rationality is not predicated as a difference, because it is not predicated in quale; therefore it is predicated as the total and integral concept of humanity, and thus it produces a false sense. Similarly I think the enunciations of the second kind are false in rigor, although in an identical sense they are less indirect than the first ones; for every essence that is really rationality is also animality, but not conversely.

6. But truly the locutions of the first kind seem to be able to admit some true sense in all rigor and propriety, although they appear equivocal, and therefore should not be admitted without distinction. For humanity, since it expresses the integral essence and nature of man, includes in its concept animality and rationality, because all this is of the essence of man. Likewise, because humanity does not express rationality alone, for it includes more in its concept, as is self-evident; for it does not express the ultimate difference of man alone, nor only the abstract of the difference, but it expresses the form of the whole,

which physically includes the total nature composed of matter and form, and metaphysically all the grades of such nature. Therefore humanity is truly a certain sensitive nature and in this has some agreement and similarity with the nature of horse and lion taken in the abstract, for all are an integral principle of sensing; therefore one common concept can be abstracted from all of them, which is generic to them and can be predicated of them and confusedly and potentially expresses all that which is found in the individual members; and certainly this concept seems to be signified by that expression, "integral or total principle of sensing," which without doubt is truly predicated of all those natures. If therefore by the name "animality" the same concept is signified in the same way, that locution will be true. But this signification does not seem foreign to the propriety of that word; because although that abstract is signified as a part with respect to the concrete, and therefore cannot be truly predicated of it (according to the truer opinion to be treated below in the disputation on the suppositum), nevertheless with respect to the total form itself, although it does not formally express the total concept of that, nevertheless it seems to be able to signify confusedly that total or its common concept, as including potentially all its determinations; in this sense, therefore, that proposition will be true; just as this is also true: "this humanity of Christ is humanity," and it pertains to the predication of species concerning the individual.

7. Nevertheless, because of the formal signification and precision of the abstract word, there can be equivocation in that word "animality," such that through it is signified the constitutive concept of animal as precise from every inferior, and in this sense the locution would be false, as the arguments previously made convince; and therefore that locution should not be admitted without distinction, and in this respect there is not the same reason concerning common physical abstractions of forms or accidents; for since these by their nature are real and physical forms, when they are signified or conceived in the abstract, they are clearly understood to be abstracted

from subjects, but not to be prescinded from all inferior differences; but substantial nature is only a metaphysical form and is not properly in a subject, and therefore when it is conceived and signified in the abstract, it seems to be signified with complete precision from every contracting element as well, according to that saying of Avicenna: "equinity is only equinity"; although it is not repugnant for it also to be signified by way of a potential whole with respect to inferiors, as we said. But you will ask: if animality can be conceived in this sense as the genus of humanity and other natures taken in the abstract, why will rationality not have the concept of a difference, or what will be its difference? It is answered that if anyone wishes to define humanity metaphysically, he will easily understand this; for he will not say that humanity is animality rationality; for that would be an incongruous locution; nor would that be a definition; because those two parts are in no way joined together to compose one statement. Therefore he will say that humanity is rational animality; therefore "rational" is the difference also of that abstract; because, as I was saying above, an abstract as such cannot be predicated by way of a difference, but of a genus or species; for it is always predicated in quid; for predication in quale is only made through connotative or objective terms that signify a form as informing or adjacent to another. And therefore also in accidents, although the genus is predicated in the abstract of the species, the difference will never be expressed by way of the abstract, but of the concrete; for we will not say that whiteness is color and separation of sight, but color separating or separative of sight. But if finally you object that the same difference cannot be of the genus taken in the abstract and in the concrete, it is answered that "rational" joined to animal in the concrete and to animality in the abstract is not attributed to each in the same sense; for in one it signifies being a nature only rational, in the other truly being a rational suppositum.

SECTION XI
WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF FORMAL AND UNIVERSAL UNITY IN THINGS

1. Although universal unity differs in some way from formal unity, as we have said, nevertheless, because it is not unity according to the thing but according to reason, therefore in reality there is no different principle of each unity and therefore it is not necessary to raise different questions about them; but once the principle of formal unity is explained, the universal will be explained; because this is not founded in things except through formal unity. And therefore Ferrara rightly said, in II contra Gentiles, chapter 95, that when it is asked from what genus and difference are taken, the question is not about genus and difference second-intentionally, that is, as they have unity or relation of reason through the intellect, but first-intentionally, that is, according to formal unity or the agreement which they can have in reality. But here we speak of the physical principle; for just as in the preceding sections, having explained individual unity, we investigated and explained its principle, that is, the physical foundation which it can have in reality, so here we investigate a similar principle with respect to formal unity, which is either the unity of genus or difference, or of the species composed from both; for I omit now transcendental formal unity, because it is either analogical and thus is not unity simply speaking, or, if it is univocal, it must be reduced to the generic, as I said above, and it has the same proportional foundation, as I shall explain.

2. Thus declared, the question coincides with that common one, from whence genus and difference are taken. And the reason for doubt is that it is commonly said that genus is taken from matter and difference from form; which nevertheless does not appear true. First, because formal unity of genus and species is also found in angels; and

yet in them neither matter nor form is found. Second, because if genus were taken from matter, then those things which do not have common matter could not have a common genus; the consequent is manifestly false, because both material substances agree with immaterial ones in some genus, and terrestrial bodies with celestial ones, although they do not agree in matter. Third, because even in substances having similar matter, genera are not taken from matter, as is evident concerning the genus of living thing, animal and similar ones; for the living thing does not have life from matter, but from form; and so with others. On the contrary, that mode of speaking belongs to almost all the ancients, especially St. Thomas, in On Being and Essence, chapters 4, 5 and 6, II contra Gentiles, chapter 95, and in the question On Spiritual Creatures, article 1; and Averroes signifies this, X Metaphysics, at the end, commentary 26, because of Aristotle there saying that corruptible and incorruptible differ in genus, because their matters also differ. In which he signifies that genus either is matter, or is altogether to be taken from matter.

The Prior Opinion is Rejected

3. In this matter there can be a twofold way of speaking. The prior is that matter and form, taken properly and strictly, are the proper and necessary principles of generic or specific formal unity; and in this sense genus is taken from physical matter as from its proper principle, but difference or species (for these two are considered the same, since difference constitutes species) is taken from form. And in this way seem to have thought those who deny that immaterial things are composed of genus and difference but only things composed of matter and form, among whom is Durandus, In II, distinction 3, question 1, and Albert indicates this in Predicaments, chapter On Substance; and there Giles, and Quodlibet I, question 8, for moved by this reason (as it seems) they deny that corporeal substances are univocally substances with incorporeal ones. Which Averroes also

denied, in the place cited above, concerning terrestrial and celestial bodies, because he thought the heavens do not consist of matter, concerning which elsewhere. It is true that from this principle it does not necessarily follow that these authors denied genera and differences in angels or heavens, because they could have thought they have generic agreement among themselves, even if they denied having it with lower substances. Nevertheless, if they think thus, they will be able to offer no probable reason why they deny common genera to those substances composed of matter and form and to those immaterial ones which admit composition of genus and difference in themselves; because, just as in this they are similar to lower substances, so they can have some union and generic agreement with them; nor will this conflict with their simplicity or perfection; therefore they will say more consistently that by the very fact that they do not have matter and form, they cannot have genus and difference either; because this is founded in those. But of this assertion thus expounded I do not see what foundation can be offered, except that just as matter is in potency to several forms, and with them composes diverse essences, so genus relates to several differences. But this opinion thus expounded is manifestly false, as the arguments made at the beginning and which we shall bring forward prove; and that foundation is very weak, because that agreement is not through true likeness and property, but only according to a certain proportion.

Resolution of the Question

4. In what way genus is said to be taken from matter, but difference from form. Therefore the second opinion is that matter and form, not according to physical property, but according to a certain proportion and analogy, are principles from which genus and difference are taken. For matter is the first and as it were essential or substantial potency of substantial nature, of itself indifferent to several natures or acts; but form is the first substantial act determining or

constituting nature. Because therefore genus is something potential and indifferent and is actuated and determined through difference to a certain grade or species of nature, therefore genus is said to be taken from matter and difference from form, that is, through a certain proportion to matter and form. And this is the opinion of Aristotle, VIII Metaphysics, text 6; St. Thomas, in the said work On Being and Essence, and II contra Gentiles, chapter 95, and VII Metaphysics, lectures 11 and 12, and other places to be cited below. And this sense is true and easy. Therefore it must be said that, speaking universally, the principle of formal unity is the whole essence and nature of the thing, but in different ways; for the principle of generic unity is the nature itself, as it is further perfectible or determinable, or as it has agreement and similarity with others in some potential grade, or one more determinable. But of specific unity or difference is the same nature according to its ultimate essential perfection. This is proved first by the reasons given, because no other mode can be assigned which is common to all substances and accidents and forms. Second, because in material substances themselves neither form nor matter is a sufficient principle of genus and difference; because, as was said above, both genus and difference signify in some way the whole nature of the thing and therefore can be predicated of the species. Whence, if per impossible we understood a composite of rational soul and other matter of a different nature from that of which man now consists, from such matter and form would not be taken the genus and difference of which man now essentially consists; because rational, although taken principally from the soul, nevertheless essentially includes such matter. And conversely, although this matter be imagined without composition with any form, no proper genus of substance could be taken from it, except perhaps the genus of matter, with respect to which that matter relates as a whole nature, from which, as it has agreement with the matter of heaven in some grade further determinable, such an incomplete genus can be taken; and consequently from the same, as it has completion in its essence, will be

taken the ultimate difference constituting the species of such matter; and the same is true in its own way in form; therefore in each thing all such unity is taken from the whole nature, differently and differently compared or conceived. But this must be understood with due proportion, for in complete and integral substances this is true simply and with all propriety, because those are the ones which have proper and integral natures; but because generic and specific unity is also found in its own way in partial substances, such as matter and form, in them it must be understood with proportion that from the whole nature, namely, partial, that is, from the whole entity of form or matter, according to diverse reasons such genus and difference are taken, which must be accommodated in the same way to accidental forms also, as can be seen extensively in St. Thomas, work On Being and Essence, chapter 7.

Responses to Arguments

5. Genera and differences are truly found in angels. To the first therefore we confess that there are genera and species in angels, as St. Thomas extensively declares, in the said work On Being and Essence, chapters 5 and 6, and I, question 50, article 2, ad 1, and others, as we shall treat below in disputing about intelligences. Nor is it necessary that there be matter and form in them, because, as we said, those are not always principles of genus and difference, but any nature, even simple, provided it is such that it can have univocal agreement with others in some grade abstractable by the intellect as determinable or determining; but this is not incompatible with being found in angelic natures, since they are of finite and limited perfection. You will say: therefore there is no difference in this between material and immaterial substances; because in both genus and difference are taken from the whole nature according to a more perfect or less perfect grade; whence matter and form relate as it were accidentally, because they only concur insofar as they are component parts of such a nature;

but the consequent seems contrary to St. Thomas in the cited places, especially I, question 50, article 2, ad 1, where he says there is a difference between material and immaterial substances because in the former genus is taken from one thing and difference from another, but in the latter both are taken from one and the same thing according to diverse reasons. Ferrara responds above that if we speak of the proximate principle, there is no difference, because that is the whole nature in all substances, as we said; but if there is discussion of the radical principle, in this there is some difference; for in immaterial substances, since they are not composed of physical parts, the same is the radical principle as the proximate principle of all formal unity; but in material substances, because they are composed of physical parts, although the whole nature is the proximate principle, matter is considered the radical principle of genus, because it is the root of all potentiality and because through proportion to it genus is considered as determinable through differences; but form is considered the first root of difference, because it gives ultimate perfection and reduces complete nature to act. In which also some difference between matter and form can be considered, because matter per se is not properly the radical cause of any grade even generic, until it is actuated through form on which primarily and essentially depends every grade of substantial nature. Whence St. Thomas, question On Spiritual Creatures, article 1, ad 24, says that when genus is said to be taken from matter, this is not to be understood of prime matter, but according as through form it receives a certain imperfect and material being with respect to the specific, just as the being of animal is imperfect with respect to man and both are from the soul. Whence it happens that, properly speaking, matter is not a principle of genus except through analogy and proportion, as we said. But form seems to have something more with respect to any difference, because it is its proper root, which is true not only of the ultimate, but also of subaltern differences. Although matter is not to be entirely excluded in its genus; because every natural form is its act, and from it as such

difference is taken, and therefore matter is always included in some way in such difference.

6. Material substances agree univocally with immaterial ones. To the second, there are those who do not lack in conceding the consequence, namely, that no common genus is given to things not having common matter or of the same nature, as was cited above. But this rests on no probable foundation, because, as we showed, composition of genus and difference is not incompatible with finite things, even if they consist of no physical matter, or of matter of a different nature from the matter of these lower things. Likewise it is not incompatible with them to have univocal agreement or similarity with these lower things, as is evident concerning the concept of substance, which, considered according to its precise nature, equally befits integral material and immaterial substances, and terrestrial as much as celestial ones. Therefore the argument is answered by denying the consequence; for first, as regards celestial and terrestrial bodies, although we grant that their matters are specifically different, since those very matters agree among themselves generically, there will be no inconvenience in one common genus being taken from them in their own way for these bodies, not only insofar as they are substances, but also insofar as they are bodies. But as regards immaterial substances, they agree univocally with lower ones in the nature of existing per se or subsisting in substantial nature; whence they can have a common genus, not taken from proper matter, but from the whole nature according to its indeterminate nature, as was said. Nor does that Aristotelian saying conflict with this truth: corruptible and incorruptible differ in genus, because, as St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales and others expound, both there and in V Metaphysics, text 33, that is not to be understood of logical or metaphysical genus, which is considered through agreement in some formal unity, but of physical genus, which is matter itself; concerning which interpretation more below, disputation XXXIX, section 3. The third reason is already dissolved by what was said.

DISPUTATION VII

ON THE VARIOUS KINDS OF DISTINCTIONS

This disputation seemed necessary at this point for the complete exposition of this attribute or property of being; for since unity includes indivision and is therefore opposed to multitude, which arises from division or distinction, in order to comprehend all modes of unity it is necessary to comprehend also all modes of distinction; because in as many ways as one of opposites is spoken of, so also is the other. This is no less necessary than difficult in metaphysics; for, as is taken from Aristotle, Posterior Analytics II, chapter 14, the essence and quiddity of each thing is reached through division or distinction, for by dividing one thing from another one arrives at the proper definition of each thing; hence, as difficult as it is to know the essences of things, so difficult is it to explain the various grades and modes of distinctions. Therefore, we must inquire how many these are, and by what signs or modes they can be discerned.

SECTION I

WHETHER BESIDES REAL DISTINCTION AND DISTINCTION OF REASON THERE IS SOME OTHER DISTINCTION IN THINGS

Section I

1. Real distinction is given, and what it is. In this title two things are supposed as certain and a third is investigated. First, it is self-evident that real distinction is given in things, which for greater explanation is usually called distinction of thing from thing, which consists in this, that one thing is not another nor conversely; but it is established that there exist many things, of which one is not another at all. Only it should be observed that sometimes things are not only thus distinct, but also are not united among themselves, as are two supposita or accidents which are in distinct supposita and other things of this kind, in which there is no difficulty in recognizing the aforesaid distinction, because there is no vestige of real identity in them. Sometimes, however, it happens that such things thus distinct are united among themselves, as is evident in matter and form, quantity and substance; and in these it is often most difficult to discern real distinction, which is of thing from thing, if there can be another lesser one in things, which will be treated immediately; and then it will also be explained how one distinction is to be discerned from another.

2. Some positive, others negative, and what each is. It should also be observed in this distinction that it is customary to distinguish it into positive and negative; this division is given not so much from the part of the distinction itself as from its extremes; for distinction itself formally always consists in negation, as was said above; nevertheless this negation sometimes intervenes between positive and real things of which one is not the other, and then it is called positive distinction, and this is the proper real distinction of which we have spoken. Sometimes, however, such distinction is considered between being and non-being, or between non-beings completely diverse, and then it is called negative real distinction; because one of those extremes does not have the reality which the other has, if it is a positive and real being; or, if both are privative beings, like darkness and blindness, because they are so separated and distinguished among themselves that if they were positive things they would be really distinguished, or certainly because they have foundations really

distinct in which they are considered to exist in their own way. Hence this negative distinction is to be understood and explained through proportion or analogy to the positive; and therefore, omitting that, we must deal here only with proper and positive real distinction.

3. Finally, it should be noted that it makes no difference to the present disputation what real relation or relation of reason follows upon real distinction; for we do not consider distinction here as it can import a formal relation, but only by reason of the foundation, to which that relation can be consequent. Hence for real distinction (speaking formally) real relation is not necessary; for God is really distinguished from an angel, although he is not really referred to it. But if you say that the angel is referred to God, it is answered that, whatever may be the case about this, nevertheless the angel is understood to be a thing distinct from God before that relation; for that relation, if there is one, results from this. And in God the three persons are really distinguished, although the distinction among them is not a special real relation. Therefore this relation is to be omitted as irrelevant to the present undertaking.

4. Distinction of reason, whether and what it is. Second, it is certain that besides real distinction there is given distinction of reason. And this is that which formally and actually is not in things, which are so distinguished as they are denominated according as they exist in themselves, but only as they underlie our concepts and receive some denomination from them, in the way we distinguish in God one attribute from another, or the relation of identity from the term, when we say that Peter is the same as himself. This distinction is usually distinguished as twofold: one, which has no foundation in the thing and is called distinction of the reasoning reason (rationis ratiocinantis), because it arises only from the negotiation and operation of the intellect; another, which has a foundation in the thing and is called by many distinction of reasoned reason (rationis ratiocinatae), although this expression is not only quite improper but can also be equivocal. For distinction of reasoned reason so called can

be thought to exist because it pre-exists in the thing itself before reason reasons, so that it is said to be quasi reasoned from itself, and only reason is required to know it, not to make it; and it is only called distinction of reason and not real, because it is not so great, nor in itself so evident as real distinction, and therefore requires attentive operation of reason to distinguish it. But having explained the meaning of this term according to this etymology, such distinction is not truly distinction of reason of which we now speak, but coincides with distinction from the nature of the thing (ex natura rei) of which we will speak immediately. Therefore, distinction of reasoned reason can be called in another sense: of reason indeed, because it is not actually and formally in things, but is made or devised by reason; reasoned however, because it is not entirely from the mere work of reason, but from the occasion which the thing itself provides, about which the mind reasons. Hence the foundation, which is said to be in the thing for this distinction, is not true and actual distinction between those things which are said to be thus distinguished; otherwise not the foundation of distinction but the distinction itself would precede; but it must be either the eminence of the thing itself which the mind thus distinguishes, which is usually called by many virtual distinction, or certainly some relation to other things truly and actually distinct in the thing, according to which such distinction is devised or conceived.

5. These two kinds of distinction of reason, although they are explained otherwise by others, can nevertheless be conveniently declared in this way, namely that distinction of the reasoning reason is in relation to the same adequate or simple concept of the same thing, only through a certain repetition or comparison of it, which is made in the mind. For thus Peter is distinguished from himself, either in the character of subject and predicate when something is enunciated of himself, or in the character of term and subject of relation, when he is said to be the same as himself; for in these and similar distinctions of reason the same and complete concept of Peter is maintained, and

only a certain repetition and comparison of it is made. But the latter distinction of reason is made through inadequate concepts of the same thing; for, although the same thing is conceived through each, nevertheless through neither is exactly conceived all that is in the thing, nor is the whole quiddity and objective character of it exhausted, which often happens by conceiving that thing through relation to diverse things or to their mode, and therefore such distinction always has foundation in the thing, but formally it will be said to be made through inadequate concepts of the same thing. Thus we distinguish in God justice from mercy, because we do not conceive the most simple virtue of God, as it is in itself and according to its whole force, but we divide it by concepts in relation to diverse effects of which that eminent virtue is the principle, or by proportion to diverse virtues which we find distinct in man and are found united in the most eminent mode in the most simple virtue of God.

6. From these things it is understood first that distinction of reason is not called such because it is concerned with beings of reason, in which many have been deceived, as we will see later; for it is established from the examples given that those things which are said to be thus distinguished are real beings, or rather real being conceived in diverse ways; and this is also evident by reason, because reason does not feign beings which it thus distinguishes but only conceives as distinct through a mode those which are not distinct; therefore not the things which are distinguished but only the distinction itself results through reason. Nor however does the mind err in thus distinguishing, because it does not affirm that those things which it thus conceives are distinct in reality, but it conceives them simply and without composition or affirmation or negation as distinct through precisive abstraction, through which it quasi effects such distinction. But if afterwards it predicates either that reflection or composition of things thus conceived, it does not affirm simply that they are distinct but only in a qualified way, that is, according to reason. Although however this distinction does not require extremes which are in

themselves beings of reason, it nevertheless always supposes in them some denomination of reason, such as the denomination of subject or predicate, or at least being thus conceived concisely or inadequately. From which it also happens that, although this distinction does not require extremes which are absolutely beings of reason, it can nevertheless also be feigned and devised among those; for a being of reason once conceived can be compared to itself, and thus be distinguished by reason. Indeed, the relation of species, for example, although it is in itself one being of reason by number adequately respecting all individuals, can also be conceived precisely as it is terminated to one or another and thus be distinguished by reason. Although therefore distinction of reason does not require beings of reason as extremes nor is it denominated from that, it can nevertheless be extended to those or be concerned with them.

7. Distinction of reason is one extrinsic, another intrinsic. From which it is further understood that distinction of reason can be called or denominated in two ways: first intrinsically, namely because it is not in itself true distinction, but only conceived or fabricated by reason, and this is the proper distinction of reason of which we speak; in another way, however, distinction of reason can be called quasi-extrinsically from the extremes in which it is understood to be concerned, so that distinction of reason is called that which is entirely concerned with extremes or beings of reason, and this is not always distinction of reason in the prior mode, but only then when it is concerned with the same being of reason, as has been explained. But sometimes two beings of reason can be distinguished which cannot be said to be properly really distinguished, because they are not real beings; yet neither can they be said to be distinguished by reason properly and intrinsically, because in the mode in which they are, not now from fiction of reason, but from themselves they are truly distinguished. For, since distinction is negation, it can be common also to fictitious beings and thus that distinction is rather quasi-real, as we said above about the distinction between darkness and blindness;

for similar is understood between the relation of species to individuals, which is conceived in human nature to its individuals, and in equine nature to its own; for those two relations are so compared among themselves that, if they were real, they would really have to be distinguished; for they have foundations and terms really distinct.

8. Whence any distinction of reason arises. Finally, from what has been said it is understood that proper and intrinsic distinction of reason of which we speak is not properly and per se except through the mediating intellect conceiving things imperfectly, abstractly, confusedly or inadequately. Because since this distinction is not in the thing nor in the known object, it consists only in a certain denomination from concepts of the mind, and therefore it requires distinction at least in the concepts themselves and in the denomination which is taken from them; but this distinction of concepts with respect to a thing which is in itself completely one, is never except on account of the imperfection of the concepts themselves. Therefore the divine intellect per se does not properly make distinction of reason, although it comprehends that which can be made by finite intellect conceiving imperfectly.

Point of the Question & Various Opinions

9. These things having been established, the principal difficulty remains whether besides these two kinds of distinctions another should be admitted, which would be as it were a middle between them. Many deny that any middle distinction can be devised or understood. Thus Durandus thought, In I, dist. 2, q. 2; Ockham, q. 3; Hervaeus, Quodl. III, q. 3; John of Gandavo, VI Metaph., q. 10; Soncinas, VII Metaph., q. 36; and Cajetan thinks the same, I, q. 54, a. 2; and Soto, q. 3 Univer., and c. de Prop., q. 2. But in these authors equivocation must be avoided, by reason of which they can differ either in names only, or also in reality. For no distinction between positive and real extremes can be devised, which if it is not fabricated

by reason, must not necessarily precede in the thing itself and be before every operation of the intellect; and because, whatever is of this kind, is real insofar as it exists in things, therefore in this sense every distinction which is not of reason can be called real; and thus it seems manifest that there cannot be given a middle between real distinction and distinction of reason. Nevertheless, this having been established, there still remains the question whether every distinction which precedes in things every operation of the intellect, not only fundamentally and virtually, but also actually and formally, is as it were of the same character as regards this, that it is between distinct things, or whether in things themselves there is some greater and lesser distinction and that which is greater, namely between thing and thing, obtains the name of real distinction; but another is called middle distinction, or by other names to be explained below. If therefore the said authors deny middle distinction between real and of reason only in the prior sense, they differ from those who admit it only in terms, but those who now deny it, now use it, do not speak in a consistent manner; which can be seen especially in Soto in the cited places and in the chapter on Relation and others. But if they deny middle distinction in the latter sense, thus there will be very great disagreement about the matter.

10. In this sense, therefore, this opinion is persuaded first. There are not more kinds of distinctions than of beings, because one and many are consequent to being; but distinction is that through which multitude arises. But there are no other beings than real or of reason, as is gathered from Aristotle, Metaph. V, text. 14, and VI Metaph., text. 6; for since these two include immediate contradiction, no middle between them can be devised; therefore. Second, whatever things are in reality before the intellect, either are the same really, or really diverse; otherwise there would be given a middle between the same and diverse, which is repugnant to Aristotle, Metaph. IV, text. 4 and 5, where he says that the same and diverse adequately divide being, just as one and many; and book X, text. 11, he says that any

being compared to another is the same or diverse from it. And the reason is, because these also are opposed by immediate contradiction. Just as therefore the same and diverse in general, so also such same and diverse, namely really, befits any being with respect to another. Therefore all things which are conceived by us as two beings, either are the same really, or diverse really; if diverse really, they are distinguished really; but if they are the same really, they cannot have distinction in reality before the intellect, because it is repugnant to be at the same time the same and diverse from the part of the thing.

11. But if perhaps it might be said that it is not repugnant to be the same in the common character of being, but to be diverse in the character of such or such being, for example, of quality or relation, action or passion, etc., I argue against this. Third, the superior predicate having been multiplied, it is necessary that the inferior be multiplied in the same way; but any determinate characters of beings are inferior to being; therefore they cannot be multiplied from the part of the thing under determinate characters of beings, as, for example, in the character of quality and relation, whiteness, or likeness, without being multiplied under the common character of being. Therefore if they are many under these determinate characters, they are also many beings; therefore they cannot be distinguished in those characters from the part of the thing without being really distinguished. The first proposition seems self-evident from what was said above about universals; for the same universal or common attribute existing from the part of the thing one and the same in number, cannot be contracted or determined by opposite differences or modes, and therefore we said that unity in some common character is not true and real unity from the part of the thing but only likeness of the thing and unity of reason; therefore if some things are multiplied in reality according to determinate characters of being, it is necessary that in them also the very character of being be multiplied in reality. Because, since those two insofar as they are distinguished from the part of the thing, include opposite or repugnant modes or differences by which

they are distinguished among themselves, they cannot have in reality true and real identity nor numerical unity in the character of being, because the same being in number cannot be affected and determined by opposite differences at the same time. And it is confirmed, because otherwise there could also be one accident in number in reality and nevertheless be two qualities, and quality at the same time and quantity; and by the same reason there could be one substance two bodies; and one animal in number, horse at the same time and lion, or something of this kind. But if open repugnance is seen in these, there will be the same in all things which are distinguished in reality according to proper characters with respect to any superior, even being itself. Because being is no less essentially included in any inferior characters than all intermediate predicates. And because those opposite or dividing differences involve the same repugnance with respect to the same individual, under whatever superior or inferior character it may be considered.

12. Fourth, this same thing is explained otherwise, for whatever is from the part of the thing has its real essence; therefore those things which are distinct from the part of the thing, have distinct essences from the part of the thing, either in number, if they themselves are only distinct in number, or in species or genus, if they are said to be essentially distinct; therefore they also have distinct entities from the part of the thing, which is to be really distinguished. This last consequence is evident, both because the entity of a thing is nothing other than real essence placed outside causes, as we will show below; but if there are distinct essences, they are real and placed outside causes; therefore there will be distinct entities. And also because, if there are two real essences there, each of them is the essence of some real being, because being and essence are adequately compared as abstract and concrete; but one and the same being cannot have except one essence; therefore if there are two real essences, there are two real beings. The last minor proposition seems self-evident, because a thing has unity maximally from its essence and

because nothing ought to be more invariable and fixed and certain in a thing, than essence. And finally, if a thing is constituted through one essence, according to that it has ultimate difference, and species; therefore it is no longer determinable; therefore it cannot be actuated, determined or constituted by the difference of another species; therefore it cannot have another essence; if therefore there is another distinct essence, it constitutes another thing.

13. The sense of Scotus in positing formal distinction. The second opinion is that there is given in things some actual distinction before the intellect, which therefore is not of reason, but greater than that, nor is it as great a distinction as the real one between thing and thing. This opinion is commonly attributed to Scotus, In I, dist. 2, q. 7, 5 ult., and dist. 5, q. 1, and dist. 8, q. 4; In II, dist. 3, q. 1, and in innumerable other places, in which, either about the distinction of attributes of God, or about the distinction of universals, or about similar things he disputes. Although in these places Scotus does not sufficiently explain whether this distinction which he himself calls formal, is actual in the thing, or only fundamental or virtual; for sometimes he calls it virtual and thus among his followers there is various manner of opinion. For some think that formal distinction in Scotus is not different from distinction of reasoned reason, in that sense and manner in which it was explained by us, which they say is called formal, because diverse definitions or formal characters are conceived there; they also say it is called distinction from the nature of the thing (ex natura rei), because it has foundation in things themselves and is virtually in them, although it does not actually precede; in which sense Scotus does not favor the second opinion proposed; nor does it seem doubtful that in some places Scotus seems to think thus, especially when he treats of divine attributes. Nevertheless however other disciples of Scotus understand him to have spoken of true and actual distinction, which is in the thing before the intellect, which they think is found not only in creatures but also in God, at least between divine relations and essence. Of which the same

is held by Durandus, In I, dist. 1, II p., dist. 5, q. 2, ad 4, and more broadly dist. 33, q. 1; and many others, whom it would be long to recount here. Also many can be referred to for this opinion, who among various things admit distinction from the nature of the thing and not real, as between existence and essence, nature and supposit, quantity and substance, foundation and relation, and similar things, which we will see below in their places.

14. Whether formal distinction is Scotist according to the mind of Aristotle. This opinion is also wont to be attributed to Aristotle, either because in Physics III he asserts that the same motion is action and passion under diverse formal characters. And in Physics IV, in the same way he distinguishes time from motion, which however he says is not a thing distinct from it. And because in De Generatione I, he seems to constitute similar distinction between nutrition and growth, saying they are the same in subject, that is, in entity, but are distinguished according to being, that is, according to formal being. And finally because in the Categories, he constitutes the same quality, for example, heat under diverse species, which cannot be understood unless because two species can be the same according to the thing and be formally distinguished. But these testimonies do not compel much, because in the first two examples, and also in the last, distinction of reason through inadequate concepts suffices, as we will say more broadly below when treating of accidents and predicaments. In the second example, however, the exposition of those words of Aristotle is forced, with whom to be the same in subject, is nothing other than (what the words themselves sound) to be in the same subject and supposit conjoined; but to be distinguished according to being is rather to be distinguished in their entity or form. In which way the same Aristotle says, Physics I, text. 21, that white and musical are the same according to the thing, and distinguished by reason. Where he uses these words very equivocally; for he calls reason essence or definition, but thing the subject or supposit, in which these things are inherent. In this way therefore it can be explained, or even

ought to be, when he says that nutrition and growth are the same in subject, but distinguished according to being; especially if nutrition signifies change as terminated to substance, but growth change as terminated to quantity; for if each is taken as terminated to quantity, thus they can only be distinguished by reason or relation, insofar as acquired quantity is greater or equal to that which is lost; but about this elsewhere. Therefore from these and similar testimonies of Aristotle no firm argument for this opinion can be drawn. And I think the same about St. Thomas and other ancient authors, who almost always use the words of real distinction and of reason in the prior sense explained above, and do not distinctly treat the question in which we are now engaged.

15. This opinion is wont to be persuaded especially by reason; for, whatever is outside the essential definition of a thing, is in some way distinct in the thing from it; but many things are outside the essence of a thing, which are not things distinct from the thing itself; therefore there is given distinction in the thing lesser than real distinction. Or otherwise, those things which are distinguished by definition and objective concept, are distinguished from the nature of the thing and before the intellect; but many things are distinguished in this way, which are not distinguished as thing from thing; therefore. The Scotists use these and similar reasons, because in almost these ways Scotus seems to explain formal distinction; nevertheless if anyone rightly considers, either the principle is begged in them, or formal distinction is taken for distinction of reasoned reason through inadequate concepts, which can be said to be from the nature of the thing only virtually or fundamentally. What we say is proved or explained, because the essence of a thing is not always defined by us as it is in the thing, but as it is conceived by us; for thus we define the essence of man as common, when in reality it is not except singular; and speaking of essence in this way, it is false that whatever is outside the essence is distinguished from the part of the thing actually from that which is of the essence, as is evident from what was said above

about individuation and specific nature and about other universals, namely, genus and difference, about which the aforesaid authors seem chiefly to speak. Hence we also seem to speak of essence in the first reason; for if they speak of essence as it is in the thing, this is nothing other than the very entity of the thing, and therefore when it is supposed that there is something distinct from essence in the thing, which is not a distinct thing, that is supposed which is to be proved. But the second reason is much weaker. For the major is not universally true; for many things are distinguished in objective concepts with respect to us, which are only distinguished by reason through inadequate concepts, as is evident from what was said about the concept of being, and individual, species, and other universals; and in the same way they can be distinguished by definition only according to reason when the definition is not adequate to the thing as it is in itself but as it is objectified to such a concept of ours.

Resolution of the Question

16. Nevertheless I judge it to be simply true that there is given in created things some actual distinction and from the nature of the thing, before the operation of the intellect, which is not as great as that between two things or entirely distinct entities; this distinction, although by general vocabulary it can be called real, because it is truly from the part of the thing and is not by extrinsic denomination from the intellect, nevertheless to distinguish it from that other greater real distinction we can call it either distinction from the nature of the thing (ex natura rei), applying to it as to the more imperfect the general name (which is customary), or it can more properly be called modal distinction; because, as I will explain, it is always concerned with some thing and its mode. But the name of formal distinction does not please me so much, because it is very equivocal; for it often belongs to really distinct things, insofar as they are distinguished essentially among themselves, if they differ in species; for they have diverse formal

unities and thus also differ formally. Indeed, individuals of the same species, insofar as they have distinct individual formal unities, as we said above, can be said to be formally distinguished. Indeed, in the Trinity, paternity and filiation, which are really distinguished and not essentially, also can be said to be formally distinguished according to number in the objective characters of relations, which mode of distinction will not be found outside that mystery. Thus therefore formal distinction extends more broadly and can be greater than distinction from the nature of the thing, of which we now speak. On the other hand, it can also be lesser and thus is more common, because it is frequently applied to formal characters, as conceived and made precise by our intellect, and then that distinction does not transcend the grade of distinction of reason.

17. But that the assertion may be proved and explained, I suppose that in created things, besides their as it were substantial or radical entities (so to speak), there are found certain real modes, which both are something positive and affect the entities themselves through themselves by giving them something which is outside the whole essence, as individual and existing in the nature of things. This is evident by induction; for, for example, in quantity which is in substance, two things can be considered: one is the entity of quantity itself; the other is the union or actual inherence of the same quantity with substance. The first we call simply the thing of quantity, including whatever is of the essence of individual quantity and placed in the nature of things, which remains and is conserved even if the quantity is separated from the subject, and it is impossible to conserve that thing in number which is this quantity, without including this essence of quantity with its intrinsic individuation and actual being, about which being we will see later; for the rest are established from what was said above. The second, that is, inherence, we call the mode of quantity not indeed in that general signification by which every quality is wont to be called a mode of substance, as St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 49, a. 2. Nor even in that general manner of speaking by which

everything contracting or determining is wont to be called a mode of the contracted; for thus rational can be called a mode of animal and this word is especially wont to be applied to those modes, by which being or accident is determined to the most general genera. Nor is this word taken in that generality by which mode is wont to be called every determination or limitation prefixed to each finite thing according to its measure, as St. Thomas noted in the same place, from Augustine, book IV Genesis ad litteram, c. 3, saying: "Mode is that which measure prefixes." In which way the same Augustine says, book de Natura boni, c. 3, that of the three things necessary for the goodness of each created thing, of which two are species and order, the third is mode, that is, due commensuration to its principles, as St. Thomas explained, I, q. 5, and I-II, q. 85, a. 4, and often elsewhere. But receding from this general character of mode, and applying it to the present matter, the inherence of quantity is called its mode, because it is something affecting it and as it were ultimately determining the state and character of existing of it, not however adding to it a new proper entity, but only modifying the pre-existing one.

18. For that it does not bring a new proper entity can scarcely come into doubt, because if it were an entirely new entity it could not be actual union between quantity and subject, but rather would itself need some subject to which it would be united and to quantity, just as quantity itself needs inherence, by which it is united to the subject. But if inherence does not need another union or inherence by which it is united or inheres, this is because it per se does not bring proper entity which inheres and is united, but is only a certain mode which per se is the reason of union and inherence. A sign of this also is, because this inherence has such a mode of being that by no power can it be, unless actually conjoined to the form of which it is the inherence, and that this inherence in number cannot affect or rather unite except this form in number to which it is as it were affixed, which mode of affecting is never found in those forms or things which have proper entities from themselves. But what has been explained in the

inherence of quantity, proceeds in the same way in quality, and in the union of substantial form to matter and in subsistence or personality with respect to nature and in presence and local motion and in any action or dependence with respect to its term, about all of which this is not the place to speak. It will occur however in the progress of this work. Only the last example, which seems easier, I will explain a little; for light, for example, depends on the sun, which dependence is something besides light and sun; for it can be understood that light and sun remain and light does not depend on the sun, as if God did not wish to concur with the sun in producing or conserving light, but would conserve both by his virtue alone. But this dependence of light on the sun cannot be conceived by the mind to be an entity entirely distinct from the light itself, both because through that dependence the cause influences as through a way into the effect or term, whence it cannot be a thing entirely distinct from it; and also because otherwise that entity would at least be separable from the other by absolute power, which is plainly unintelligible; therefore that dependence is a certain mode of the light itself, which perhaps someone will call a relation; it is not however a predicamental relation, but includes a transcendental relation or habitude, as will be said more broadly below. Therefore there are given in created entities certain modes affecting them, whose character seems to consist in this, that they per se do not suffice to constitute being or entity in the nature of things, but intrinsically postulate that they actually affect some entity, without which they can in no way be.

19. The reason for positing modes that are distinguished from things only modally. The reason for positing these modes is taken a posteriori from induction that has been made; a priori, however, it appears to be because, since creatures are imperfect, and therefore either dependent, or composite, or limited, or changeable according to various states of presence, union, or termination, they require these modes by which all these things are completed in them. Because it is not always necessary that this be done through entities that are

entirely distinct, indeed it cannot be conveniently understood; nor can it be done through that which is absolutely nothing, and therefore at least a real mode is required. Of what kind this is, and in what category it is placed per se or reductively, I will discuss below in the divisions of the categories. Finally, Durand seems to have acknowledged these modes, In I, dist. 30, q. 2, n. 15, where, speaking of "being in" or the inherence of an accident, he says it is a relation which is analogically called a thing or being, because it is not a thing but a mode of being, nor is it an entity having a mode, but only a mode of entity; and in n. 16, he says the same about dependence and about everything that is only a mode of being. And Astudillo speaks in the same way about inherence, I de Gener., q. 5, ad 1. And in particular, treating of subsistence, many explain it thus, such as Aegidius, tit. de Composit. angel., q. 5. And finally Fonseca, lib. V Metaph., c. 6, q. 6, sect. 2, expressly posits these modes, although he distinguishes three kinds of modes: some which are entities distinct in themselves from others, such as whiteness, sweetness, and in this order he places figure, but undeservedly because it is constituted in the third [kind], because with respect to quantity it affects it as a mode, not as a thing entirely distinct from it. Others which not only are not distinct entities, but are not distinguished in any way in reality from those things of which they are said to be modes, but only by reason, such as are those modes by which being is contracted to inferior things. But these two kinds of modes have already been omitted by us, because the latter are not modes except according to reason; the former, however, are things or forms having proper entities from themselves. In the third order, therefore, he places those modes which we call real modes in a proper and special sense, about which he feels the same as we have explained, although he puts forward some examples that are uncertain to us, such as that concerning the existence of created things, concerning the mode whereby a thing is said to be necessary or contingent, or complete or incomplete being. For this last is ambiguous; because if these things are said of the whole

and integral parts, thus it is true that there is a certain mode pertaining to quantity; for the same portion of water, for example, if it is terminated per se and separated from others, is called a complete or total being; if however it is continuous with others, it is called a partial or incomplete being, which mode consists only in diverse union or termination. If however those things are said of being according to itself, they rather pertain to the intrinsic and essential modes of being, whether being is said to be incomplete according to reason, like a difference, or physically and according to the thing, like the rational soul, which is called incomplete being, not through something added to its essence, but through its very essence; whence that mode is distinguished from it only by reason. And I think the same about the other mode of necessary or contingent being, if these are considered in the absolute nature of being; for if they are considered in the nature of an effect, thus they are extrinsic denominations, as we will say below. But concerning existence the matter is more controversial, which we will dispute below. Whatever may be the case about examples, Fonseca most truly says that this mode is not properly a thing or entity, except broadly and most generally calling "being" whatever is not nothing; nevertheless taking entity for that thing which from itself and in itself is something in such a way that it does not demand altogether intrinsically and essentially to be always affixed to another, but either is not unitable to another, or at least cannot be united except by means of some mode distinct from itself by the nature of the thing, a mode is not properly a thing or entity, and in this its imperfection is best declared, that it must always be affixed to another, to which it is united per se immediately without another intermediate mode, as sitting to the one sitting, union to things united, and thus concerning others, about which there will often be occasion to speak in what follows.

20. From these things, therefore, the sense and proof of the position established is easily understood, for this mode as it has been explained by us is actually distinguished from the thing of which it is a

mode by the nature of the thing, as all confess; indeed many call that distinction real, because it is found in the things themselves, which will be evident more clearly from what will be said in the following section; but this mode is not properly distinguished from that of which it is a mode as thing from thing, it is therefore distinguished by a lesser distinction which is most properly called modal. The minor is proved, both because the mode considered per se and precisely is not properly a thing or entity, as has been sufficiently explained; therefore it is not properly distinguished as thing from thing; and also because this mode so intimately includes conjunction with the thing of which it is a mode, that it cannot exist without it by any power; therefore it is a sign that that conjunction is a certain mode of identity; there is therefore a lesser distinction between this mode and the thing than between two things; all of which will be more confirmed in the following section, by declaring the signs of these distinctions and consequently the differences by which they are distinguished among themselves.

21. Besides modal, real, or of reason, there is no other distinction. Finally I add that besides real, modal, and rational distinction, no other is found which either is not common to these or is not contained in those. I would say this because of some who add formal distinction, such as is between man and animal; which they distinguish into mutual, as between animal and rational, and non-mutual, such as is between animal and man; likewise essential distinction, such as is between man and horse, and potential distinction, such as is between parts of the continuous; and similar things are customarily multiplied, which do not seem necessary to me. The sufficiency of the aforesaid partition is therefore easily gathered from what has been said; for either the extremes of the distinction are not actually distinguished in any way on the part of the thing, and thus there is always a distinction of reason even if it is called by other names, because it applies only through extrinsic denomination, insofar as the same thing is objected to or subordinated to diverse concepts.

In this distinction, however, degrees can be found, as I have said, and when it has a foundation in the thing and is made through several inadequate concepts, it can be called formal distinction or sometimes also essential according to reason. And in this very thing there can be a multiple mode insofar as the extremes can be compared in various respects, namely, either only as determined and indeterminate, like being and substance; or as whole and part, like difference and species; or as two parts, like animal and rational. And thus this distinction can also be understood as between including and included, or as in that which according to reason neither includes the other, in which sense, and no other true one, this distinction can be called mutual or non-mutual, reciprocal or non-reciprocal; nevertheless all these things fall under the breadth of distinction of reason. But truly, if the extremes of the distinction are actually distinct on the part of the thing, either each is a true thing having proper entity simple or composite, or one is a thing and the other is its mode. In the former way real distinction is constituted, in the latter however modal; but no other relation between these extremes is intelligible; nor can any other middle between them be conceived; for they include between themselves an immediate opposition as if of contradiction; there is therefore no other mode of distinction.

22. Various modes of real distinction. In real distinction itself, however, or of several things, either various modes or various relations can be considered. For first we can understand that things thus distinguished are not only distinguished in reality, but also dissimilar in their intrinsic and essential entity; and then they are said to be distinguished not only really but also essentially, and the greater or lesser that dissimilarity is, they are said to be distinguished either by ultimate species, or by subaltern, or even by genus or category. Whence essential distinction either is common to real, modal, and rational; or, if it is taken most properly, it is included in real although it is not convertible with it; and it rather adds dissimilarity than distinction. All of which proceed by using that expression of essential

distinction in rigor; for if there is discourse about distinction of essences, such as also intercedes between individuals, as we said above, this properly adds nothing, but indicates the things between which there is distinction; just as personal distinction is called that which is between persons. Again these things thus distinguished sometimes can be in unity among themselves, sometimes however to a third: in the former way matter and form are united, and similarly continuous integral parts, to omit other more extrinsic and accidental unions. Therefore, just as matter and form although they are united, nevertheless retain real distinction among themselves, so also continuous parts although they are united are really distinguished, not only as to designation, as some speak, but also as to the partial entity of each one.

23. Potential distinction is truly real. It is only to be noted that matter and form from themselves are incomplete and partial beings, whether they are conjoined or are supposed to exist separately; and therefore they are always judged to be distinguished in the same way. But truly integral parts do not have the nature of a part, nor of incomplete being except when they are conjoined; for immediately as they are separated, each one begins to be an integral and total being because it is not per se ordered to composing another; and therefore they are judged to be distinguished differently (more as to denomination or mode, than as to the thing), when they are disjoined, or united; for in the former state they are distinguished as total entities, in the latter however as partial, and therefore such parts united are sometimes said to be distinguished actually as parts, but potentially as beings, that is, as certain wholes, because they are in potency to become such. All of which are most clearly seen in homogeneous continuous parts; for in heterogeneous ones, although in the thing it is almost the same, nevertheless in the mode there is some diversity because they have greater dissimilarity, and therefore they seem to have a certain greater distinction, even while they are in the whole; and when they are separated, even if they do not change

the substantial form but conserve the same one which they had in the whole, as happens in plants and sectile animals, they are still considered incomplete and partial beings; because they are always as if ordered per se to composing another. From these things therefore it is easily understood that that distinction which is called potential by some is real distinction; because truly distinction is negation, two things can be denied through it: one, that this is that; and this is actually true of parts actually united, because one is not the other, and this negation is what is required per se first and suffices for distinction. The other that can be denied is that this is conjoined to that, which is to say that this is not that, as a whole and integral being distinct from that, and this does not apply to parts united in act but in potency, and under this aspect that distinction can be called potential; nevertheless as such it is not yet, and therefore it is not necessary to number it among distinctions as distinct from others. Finally from here it is understood a fortiori, without cause some call this distinction between parts of the continuous a distinction of reason having foundation in the thing, because those parts are not distinguished in act, but by designation and potency. For this is not true, because there is not only a foundation of distinction there but true distinction, properly using this word, not as it says separation or disjunction, but as it says diversity of total or partial entity. Otherwise matter and form, when they are united, should not be said to be distinguished in act but only in potency, because there is no lesser union between matter and form than between parts of the continuous. Separation therefore between those parts will be able to be called rational, because only by reason can they be considered as if they were disjoined and like certain wholes; but the distinction of parts is actual and real. For those parts, even while they compose the whole, have some reality, because, as Aristotle said, I Phys., c. 2, substance is not composed except from substances, so integral being is not composed except from beings at least partial; therefore such distinct beings remain, although united;

indeed, unless they remained distinct, they could not make composition, because composition is not except from distinct things.

24. The distinction of the including from the included, real. And from this there arises further another mode of distinction which can be considered in any whole with respect to its individual parts; for they are not entirely the same, as is self-evident; nor are they distinguished as two parts are from each other, because those parts relate to each other in such a way that neither includes the other, but the whole in its entity contains both parts, and therefore they are said to be distinguished as including and included. Nevertheless, even that distinction, insofar as it intervenes here, is real because the whole includes some reality which the part does not include. Hence this mode of distinction, of the including and the included, can be found in its own way in real, modal, and rational distinction; for in each order that which relates as a whole can be compared to another which relates as a part; nevertheless in each case it remains within the latitude of real, modal, or rational distinction; because that which one extreme includes beyond the other is distinguished really or modally or rationally from the other included thing. From these considerations, therefore, it is sufficiently clear that there is no mode of distinction which is not contained in the aforesaid three.

25. It seems that objection can only be made because, besides the distinction between thing and thing and between thing and mode, a distinction can be found between mode and mode, as many think regarding subsistence and existence, and it is more certain regarding subsistence and local presence. For these modes cannot be distinguished rationally, because they exist on the part of the thing in such a way that they have diverse principles and diverse affections, and finally so that they can be separated, which are signs of actual distinction existing in the thing, as we shall say presently; nor are they distinguished really, because they are not distinguished as thing and thing, since they are not truly things; for by this argument we proved that a mode is not distinguished really from the very thing which it

affects. Nor finally can they be said to be distinguished only modally, both because one is not a mode of the other, and because often they are mutually and reciprocally separable, which is a sign of greater distinction than modal, as we shall say immediately.

26. Two modes which are distinguished among themselves. It is replied that, since these modes have no being or entity except from the thing or in the thing to which they adhere, from that thing must be considered how they are distinguished from other modes; nevertheless their distinction will always pertain to the real or modal, supposing that they exist in the thing. Which I say for this reason, because modes can also be conceived that are distinguished by reason alone; for just as reason through inadequate concepts can distinguish one thing, so also one mode, as is very probable regarding action and passion, motion and time, existence and duration, and others. Speaking, however, of modes distinguished in the thing itself, as are local presence, for example, and subsistence of humanity, either these are compared only insofar as they are in the same thing and thus they are only distinguished modally because of the argument made, since they do not have proper entity from themselves, they also do not have from themselves the basis for being distinguished more than modally; nor are they distinguished more from the thing which they affect, because we suppose it to be the same; therefore they do not have greater distinction than modal. And it is confirmed; because each of them has some identity with that thing which it affects; therefore in that thing and through that thing they have some identity among themselves; therefore they retain only modal distinction. Hence it does not matter that they can be mutually separated, that is, that one can remain while the other does not exist or conversely, because at least it is necessary that that thing always remain in which each exists with some identity. But truly if modes affecting diverse things are compared among themselves, whether those modes are of the same nature like two subsistences of two men, or of diverse natures like the sitting of one and the subsistence of another, thus the distinction

between these modes is real, not by reason of themselves, but by reason of the things in which they are; for each has some identity with the thing which it affects and those things are distinguished among themselves really; therefore also the modes by reason of those things. And this also well confirms that reasoning, because those modes are mutually separable both among themselves and each from that thing which the other affects; for this is a sufficient sign of real distinction. And in this way every distinction even among the modes themselves is reduced to the aforesaid three.

Solutions to Arguments

27. To the arguments of the previous opinion, insofar as they can proceed against the modal distinction posited by us, it must be replied. To the first it is replied that the argument from real being or being of reason can be taken in a double sense, to conclude real or rational distinction. First as from a proper reason and cause, so that such distinction is considered to be of the same kind as the things in which it is found. And this sense is false; for it has been shown that rational distinction intervenes between real extremes, and conversely between extremes of reason there is at least some imitation of real distinction. Second, the argument can be proportional or from parity of reasoning, so that because in beings there are given only real or rational, neither should distinctions be given except these, and in this sense the proportion of the argument can be granted, if it is made in the proper way, and it will conclude nothing against our position. For indeed, if real being is taken in its most ample conception for everything that is not absolutely nothing and which can be in things without fiction of the intellect, thus it is true that no medium is given between real and rational being, and in the same sense I grant that no medium is given between real and rational distinction; for every distinction from the nature of the thing can in this amplitude be called real; and thus nearly all the ancient writers spoke. In another way,

however, real being can be taken for that which from its proper concept or from the force of its formal reason can bring or constitute proper entity, and in this sense it is false that no medium can be given between real and rational being; for there is given a mode of being which is neither mere rational being, as is clear per se, nor is it real being taken in that rigor and propriety, as has been declared by us; and thus also modal distinction is given as intermediate between rational and real distinction rigorously taken.

28. Second. To the second it is replied that between the same and the diverse taken according to the same reason no medium is given, as the argument correctly proves; nevertheless according to diverse reasons it can happen that things which are the same in one way are diverse in another, as St. Thomas said, I, q. 11, a. 1, ad 2. Thus therefore being and mode can be said to be the same really and nevertheless have modal distinction in the thing.

29. Third. Nor does the third argument press anything against this, for we do not say that thing and mode are distinguished according to proper reasons and not according to common reason, which nearly all the replies made there suppose; for in the way in which being and mode are distinguished on the part of the thing, all superior predicates are distinguished, even transcendental ones included in the mode, from those which are included in the thing of which it is the mode. And thus it must be granted that insofar as the mode is being, to that extent it and the thing which it modifies are two beings and are distinguished in the thing itself, or really speaking broadly. Nevertheless we add that the mode is not properly and rigorously being and in this way we deny that there are two beings there; and we deny consequently that being thus properly taken is a superior predicate to the thing and its mode. And therefore it is not necessary because of the distinction of the mode from the thing to multiply beings taken in the said propriety and rigor. Hence to the confirmation of that third argument the same thing must be said about accident that was said about being; because accident sometimes

signifies a form having proper entity from itself, distinguishable and really separable from every other; sometimes it signifies only a mode of another, whether of an accident or of a substance. And in the former way it is repugnant for several reasons of accident to be found in the same thing, as the argument convinces; nevertheless it is not repugnant for one accidental entity to have one or several modes distinguished from it only modally. But substance simply said does not signify a mode but a proper and perfect thing in its being, and the same is true of body and of whatever grade of substance placed under these; and therefore it cannot happen that these grades are multiplied in the thing itself without multiplying things and substances. Nevertheless also in the latitude of substance taken in common or analogically, some substantial modes can be given in which it can happen that in the same thing or substance properly and simply said there are one or several substantial modes distinguished among themselves and from that thing modally, as are subsistence, union, etc.

30. Fourth. And from these things the solution to the fourth is easy; for what was said about being must be said about real essence. It can signify the proper nature sufficient from itself to constitute entity in the nature of things, or more broadly any real reason constitutive of being or real mode. In this latter sense we grant that in thing and mode there are distinct essences and therefore there is between them distinction from the nature of the thing and in some way real. In the former sense, however, there is only one essence in any entity; but the modes which are distinguished from that essence from the nature of the thing or modally, cannot be of its essence, but either accidents, or at most pertaining in some way to its integrity or causality, as we shall explain regarding individual cases later. From which it follows (which is very noteworthy) that in any entity properly said there is one essential reason, as all those arguments made in the beginning convince at minimum, which essential reason is as it were fundamental and invariable in such entity; so that it is impossible for that entity to be conserved in the nature of things without that

essential reason, because it is first constituted through that reason; hence there can be only one specific reason, as the arguments made convince. But the modal reasons, which can be as it were adhering or affixed to such entity, can be multiplied and varied, because in the thing they are outside its essence, as will be more clearly established in particular in the discourse of the whole Metaphysics.

SECTION II
BY WHAT SIGNS OR MODES THE VARIOUS DEGREES OF DISTINCTION OF THINGS CAN BE DISCERNED

1. Where the difficulty lies. The entire difficulty consists in discerning modal distinction from the others; for real distinction and rational distinction, since they are extreme opposites, are easily discerned; but modal distinction, since it is intermediate, is sometimes considered real because of the agreement it has with that, and sometimes indeed is considered nothing in reality, but according to reason only because of a certain agreement with the other. Therefore, so that we may have some general signs which can be applied to particular questions, certain things must be briefly stated, supposing that for some things to be distinguished by us more than by reasoning reason (concerning which distinction nothing need be added, because it is entirely fictitious), it is at minimum or primarily necessary that they have distinct objective concepts, and according to these, formal reasons somehow distinct, because unless they are conceived at least in this way, neither will they be conceived as distinct, nor will there be any reason for inquiring how much or what kind of distinction there is between them; but supposing several objective concepts, it is quite rightly and properly inquired how it will be known whether they have distinction in reality, and what kind that is.

Section II

Sign of Actual Distinction in Reality

2. I say first: whenever two objective concepts are so related that they can be separated on the part of the thing and in the individual, or so that one remains in the nature of things without the other, or so that they are really disjoined and lose the real union they had, it is a sign that there is a greater distinction between them than of reasoning reason; and therefore some actual distinction from the nature of the thing, or one which is on the part of the thing. This assertion is common among the Doctors, and is taken from Aristotle, Topics VII, ch. 1, at the fifteenth place, where he says thus: "furthermore, if one can exist without the other, they will not be the same"; where Alexander of Aphrodisias notes this. It can also be taken from Augustine, On the Trinity VI, ch. 6, where when he had said: "In each body, magnitude is one thing, color another, figure another," he adds such proof: "For even with magnitude diminished, the same color and the same figure can remain, and with color changed, the same magnitude and the same figure can remain, and with the figure not remaining the same, it can be equally large and colored in the same way, and whatever other things are said simultaneously about a body can be changed both simultaneously and severally without the others, and through this the nature of body is proven to be multiple, but simple in no way." And below he proves from this that the human soul is not simple, because it has various acts and affections which he shows to be distinct, because some can be found without others, and some more, others less. The scholastics also use this rule frequently, as is evident from the Master, in I, dist. 8; Durandus, dist. 30, q. 2; Soto, In II, dist. 1, q. 5, and In III, dist. 8, q. 1; Ockham, In I, dist. 1, q. 3; and there Gabriel, q. 3, a. 3, dub. 1; Hervaeus, Quodl. III, q. 3; and among the metaphysicians use this rule John of Jandun, VI Metaph., q. 10; Antonius Trombeta, V Metaph., q. 3, a. 1; Fonseca, V Metaph., c. 6, q. 6, sect. 1. Likewise Ferrariensis, I Phys., q. 10; and Paul of Venice, III

Phys., text. 19; Astudillo, cited in the preceding section. Many use the same to prove the distinction from the nature of the thing between subsistence and created nature, as is evident from Giles, cited in the preceding section; Medina, III, q. 4, a. 2. And below we shall refer to many others in their place. And by the same argument it is usually proved that inherence is distinguished from the existence of an accident; and dependence or action from the term, all of which we shall see in what follows.

3. It is proved by reason, because if those things which are conceived by us as having two objective concepts are found conjoined in reality and afterwards are separated, either both remain existing on the part of the thing after separation from the other, or one ceases to be and the other remains; if it happens in the first way, it is necessary that those two are distinguished from the nature of the thing, indeed even really; first, because it is impossible for the same thing entirely to be disjoined and separated from itself on the part of the thing; for an open contradiction is involved; for no greater union in reality can be devised than total identity in reality; indeed that is not union but unity. Therefore, just as it is impossible to divide what is indivisible, so also for what is entirely the same to be disjoined from itself. Then, because if those two remain on the part of the thing and not united among themselves, one is not a mode of the other nor conversely; because it is of the essential nature of a mode, as we have seen, to be actually united or affixed to the thing of which it is a mode; therefore whenever something can be separated from another and conserved when separated, it is an evident sign that it is not a mode of that; it will therefore be either a thing distinctly real from another, or a mode of another really distinct thing, by reason of which the mode itself will also be really distinguished from another thing. But if two things are so separated in reality that one existing remains and not the other, it is necessary that they be distinguished at least modally. First, because it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be; therefore, if this does not exist which previously existed and something remains

existing, they cannot be entirely the same in reality, otherwise the same thing would simultaneously exist and not exist. Second, when these two are so separated, something positive is what is taken away in reality from the other and ceases to be, taking something broadly as distinguished from nothing, for every thing or real mode; for we suppose each of them to be such as are separable in the aforesaid way; therefore that positive thing, after it is separated, is not; therefore when it was, it was in some way distinct from that which remains existing. Finally, because it is not less impossible for the same thing entirely to be separated from itself, with the other extreme destroyed, than with both conserved; but it has been shown that the same cannot be separated from itself with both extremes remaining; therefore neither will it be able with one not remaining; therefore, whenever such separation can be made, distinction in reality is presupposed. And therefore those greatly err who think that relation is something real and positive without which the foundation can remain in the thing itself, and yet not be distinguished actually and on the part of the thing from the foundation itself; for it is an open implication of contradiction. For if relation in its essence is something real, and now is with the foundation and afterwards is not, with the foundation itself remaining integral in its entity and essence, it is necessary that whatever that is, which is relation, be in some way distinguished in the thing itself from the foundation; otherwise the entirely same thing according to reality would cease to be and would remain.

4. An objection is resolved. But you will object: for animal is conjoined in reality to man and is separable from him in a horse or in a lion; and yet it is not distinguished in reality from him, as was said above. I respond that therefore in the proposed rule I said: That which is separable in the thing itself and in the individual; for animal (and the same is true of all similar predicates) is only separable from man according to the common notion conceived, according to which it does not have unity in reality in many things but only by reason; but insofar as animal is conjoined in reality and in the individual to man, it

is not separable from man; for this individual animal which is in reality this man, can never remain in reality unless man remains, nor conversely can this man endure unless this animal endures.

5. Theological replies are answered. Divine relations are in no way distinguished in reality from the essence. You will press: for at least in God the divine essence is conjoined in reality to paternity; and the same numerically is separable from that insofar as it is conjoined to filiation; and yet they are not distinguished actually in the thing itself. Some theologians, because of this difficulty, seem to admit actual distinction, and in the thing itself at least modal between the divine relation and essence, which is usually attributed to Scotus but Durandus holds this more clearly; for Scotus speaks more obscurely and very generally about his formal distinction. But that opinion in the aforesaid sense is very false and much repugnant to divine simplicity and perfection. But we leave this disputation to the theologians; and we respond briefly. First, by denying that the essence is separable from paternity; for it is one thing to be communicable to filiation or procession, another indeed to be separable from paternity; rather from its intrinsic nature it demands to be so communicated to those that it is not separated from this; therefore the rule posited about separation does not have place here. Second, it is responded that to be communicable in that way to many mutually really distinct, without distinction from that which is common to them, except only by reason or virtually, is proper to an absolutely infinite thing; and therefore, although speaking broadly about separation for conjunction with another thing really distinct, in creatures it is an excellent argument that whatever is conjoined with another really distinct is also itself distinguished in reality from the other extreme, because one finite thing cannot be conjoined by the same number through identity with really distinct things, nevertheless in an infinite thing this is no argument, because of its supreme simplicity and perfection; and this is the mystery of the Trinity, which we hold by faith alone and most certain.

Sign of Merely Modal Distinction

6. I say second: separation of one from another, which is only non-mutual (as it is commonly called), that is, in which one extreme can remain without the other, but not conversely, is a sufficient argument of modal distinction, but not of greater or real properly taken. The prior part is sufficiently proved in the preceding assertion. The posterior is proved, because from such non-mutual separation it is rightly convinced that that thing which can remain with the other extreme destroyed, has through itself its own reality independently intrinsically and entitatively or essentially from that extreme, which can be destroyed, with it remaining; but it cannot be concluded from this that the other extreme, which can be destroyed, has from itself proper entity, because, as is supposed, that extreme is such that it cannot remain without the other; but it suffices for this that it be a mode of it; indeed this is intrinsic, as we have said, to modal entity, that it cannot remain through itself nor be separated in act from that of which it is a mode; therefore from the aforesaid separation a greater distinction than modal cannot be concluded. And it is confirmed; for thus local motion is compared to the movable, sitting to the one sitting, action to the term, among which no one who thinks rightly posits a greater distinction than modal.

7. A notable little question. But someone will ask, granted that this rule is true as quasi-negative, that from this separation a greater distinction is not necessarily collected, whether the positive rule is also true, namely, that those things which are separable only in this way, are also distinguished only modally and not by greater real distinction. For such a rule seems uncertain, and therefore fallacious; for although that sign alone is not a sufficient argument of greater distinction, it does not seem however a sufficient sign for denying greater distinction. For it can happen that that inseparability which is on the part of the other extreme, does not arise from some identity or

lesser distinction but from some mode of dependence more intrinsic and inseparable. As, for example, subject and accident are so compared that the subject can remain without the accident, but the accident cannot naturally remain without the subject, even if it is a thing distinct from it. And some think that certain accidents, even if they are really distinct, cannot even supernaturally be conserved without a subject, such as vital acts and if there are perhaps other similar ones. Therefore that positive rule is either false or uncertain. It is responded that it is one thing to speak of natural inseparability, another indeed of inseparability in order to God's absolute power. For from the former alone a sufficient argument of real indistinction most properly and rigorously taken cannot be taken, as the argument made convinces and the example about subject and accident; and similar about matter and individual material forms; for matter can be separated from any individual form and conserved without it; but no such form can naturally be separated from matter so as to be conserved without it.

8. An objection is met. But truly, if there is discussion of inseparability in order to God's absolute power, a very probable argument is taken that those things which are compared in the aforesaid way and cannot be conserved when mutually separated, are distinguished only modally. The reason is because if one extreme from those two is such that it cannot be conserved without the other by God's absolute power, it is a great argument that it is essentially only a certain mode and not a true entity, because if it were a true entity it could not have such intrinsic dependence on another entity that God could not supply that with his infinite power; therefore it can only come from this that that extreme in its intrinsic essence is not an entity but only a mode. The antecedent is evident because God can supply efficient causality as such, as is known to all. Likewise, by conserving an accident without a subject he supplies material causality not with respect to the composite but with respect to the other extreme, which alone of that kind can intervene in the present case.

And by the same reason he could supply similar formal causality, if it intervened, because it is not of itself less intrinsic than material. Nor can another genus of dependence be feigned among absolute things, omitting relation and term about which immediately. You will say: many think that matter cannot be conserved by God without form, although form can be conserved without matter; and yet it does not follow that they are distinguished only modally. It is responded that those who think thus, let them see by what probable foundation they assert this; for that opinion could never be proved to me, as I shall say below treating of causes. Then it is not similar about matter; for although we grant freely that matter cannot be conserved without every form, nevertheless it is certain that it can naturally be conserved without this or that one and without any form determinately; and this is a sufficient argument that matter is not a mode of form, but is a distinct thing as far as it is from itself; for that which is only a mode, not only cannot be separated from every thing of which it is a mode, but also this mode individually cannot be separated from this individual thing, as this sitting from this one sitting; since therefore matter individually and this numerically, can be separated from this form and be under any other, it is rightly collected that it is not a mode of form. But again from the fact that form is a separable thing and able to remain without matter, at least from absolute power, it is also rightly concluded that it is not a mode of matter, but has in itself its own entity which is conjoined to matter by distinct union; besides other arguments, which can be taken from the perfection of form over matter and from its activity and other similar things. Therefore the rule posited, even in that positive way declared, is very probable as far as we are concerned. I say as far as we are concerned, because perhaps it can happen that things are distinct in themselves which with respect to our knowledge do not exhibit a sufficient sign of distinction. Nevertheless, because we cannot make judgment about those things which do not appear in themselves except through effects or signs known to us, and because we have the general rule that distinctions

are not to be multiplied without sufficient foundation, because distinction is not made by nature without sufficient cause or necessity, and finally because that inseparability seems also to show directly some identity, therefore we probably conjecture that where there is not possible mutual separation, but only non-mutual, there is no distinction except modal.

Signs of Real Distinction

9. I say third: although several indications are usually assigned for knowing real distinction, nevertheless two, which are taken from separation, seem most powerful. One is about separation only as to real union, that is, if both simultaneously and actually can be conserved in the nature of things without real union among themselves. The other is about mutual separation as to existence, that is, that one can be conserved without the other and conversely, through itself immediately, and without order or necessary connection with some third thing. These two rules are almost proved by explaining the two preceding conclusions. And the first is evident, because those two things which are so separated, cannot be so related that one is a mode of the other, nor conversely, because it is of the essence of a mode that it cannot exist unless actually united to that of which it is a mode, because it unites itself and not by another mode of union, as has been sufficiently declared; therefore those two will either be distinct things, which we intend, or will be modes of distinct things, or one will be a thing and the other will be a mode of another distinct thing; and in whichever of these ways they are related they will be distinguished really, either through themselves or by reason of distinct things, according to what was said in the preceding section. The second is proved, because, when two things are so related that they can be mutually separated and one conserved without the other, neither can be a mode of the other, because it is of the intrinsic nature of a mode that it cannot remain without the thing of which it is a

mode; therefore each of those will be a true thing bringing with itself true entity which can be conserved without the other. Therefore it is necessary that those things which are of such kind be really distinguished, because they are distinguished on the part of the thing since they can be separated, and they are not distinguished as thing and mode of thing but as thing and thing; therefore they are distinguished really. But I said through itself and immediately, because it can happen that two modes of the same thing can mutually be one without the other and conversely; and then real distinction between them is not rightly collected, because, although not by reason of themselves formally speaking, at least by reason of the thing which they modify, they have among themselves a certain real identity and neither of them is separable, so as to be conserved without the thing which it modifies.

10. And from these things it is established that it makes no difference whether this separation can be made naturally or from absolute power, because it is so essential to that thing which we call only a mode to be actually affixed and modifying the thing of which it is a mode, that it is repugnant to it from absolute power to be conserved without that thing, or otherwise than by actually modifying it. For which reason neither can figure be understood by the mind separated from all quantity and thing of which it is a figure, or relation without foundation, if it is a mode of it, or motion without the movable, and so of other similar things. And the reason is touched above, because those things which are of such kind, do not have from their proper concept sufficient entity in which they are conserved, but only from a certain identity to those things in which they inhere; therefore whatever is separable in the aforesaid way, even from absolute power, is not a mode but a distinct thing. Therefore as pertains to inferring distinction in the thing itself, it makes no difference whether the aforesaid separation is made naturally or supernaturally; only as regards us the distinction will be able to be better known when separation is made naturally, but sometimes it is

made known to us through supernatural mysteries, whose knowledge helps much for knowing natural things. How through the mystery of the Eucharist it was established more certainly for us that quantity is a thing distinct from substance, than could have been established through natural knowledge.

11. Worthy of attention. Where also it can be observed in passing that, although sometimes mutual separation and conservation of two things has not been made, but only of one from another, nevertheless it suffices for us to infer real distinction as in the aforesaid example, up to now indeed it has not been done by God that material substance be conserved without quantity, but only that quantity remain without material substance, and nevertheless this is a sufficient argument for us to collect that quantity and substance are distinguished not only modally but also really. Not indeed by reason of form (so to speak) but by reason of matter; for in humanity and subsistence it has also been done that humanity is conserved without created subsistence; but it has not been done nor do we believe it can be done that created subsistence be without its own substantial nature of which it is the term, whence in this example from the aforesaid separation we do not collect real distinction but only modal. Therefore in these things besides separation it is necessary to consider the nature of that which is conserved without the other; for if that is by its nature as if adhering to the other and more imperfect than it, and finally that which seems maximally to be able to have the character of a mode and nevertheless is conserved without the other, it is a sign of real distinction; but it is otherwise when that which remains in reality is more perfect and having the principal entity of the thing. As in the aforesaid examples comparing substance and quantity from themselves it is clear that substance is more perfect, and, if one ought to be a mode of the other, not substance of quantity, but quantity ought to be a mode of substance; therefore, since through the separation of quantity from substance it is sufficiently declared that quantity is not a mode but a true thing, it is sufficiently consequently

declared that substance and quantity are not distinguished as thing and mode, but as two things. But truly in nature and subsistence it is rather established that substantial nature is the principal entity of the thing, and that, if one of them is a mode of the other, subsistence is a mode of nature and not conversely; but from the force of the separation made it is not declared that subsistence is more than a mode since it is not conserved without nature, and therefore from that it is not permitted to collect real distinction but only modal.

12. Whence distinction is to be conjectured in those things which have not yet existed separated by any force. But a difficulty remains here when no separation, neither natural nor supernatural has been made, how then real distinction can be known, because then the aforesaid rules cannot serve, although it is not repugnant that many things are distinguished really which up to now have not been separated in any of the aforesaid ways, such as the matter and form of heaven. But if you say, granted they have not been separated, they can be known as separable, this is said the same as if it were said they are known to be distinct, or at least is of the same difficulty; for we inquire this, how we will know them to be separable if they are neither naturally separated, nor have they been separated by God up to now in any of the aforesaid ways. And the difficulty is increased because some things are inseparable, even from absolute power, which nevertheless are judged to be really distinct, as many think about intellect and will, both among themselves and with respect to the soul. Because of the prior difficulty it can be said that the said sign taken from separation is neither adequate nor unique nor always first or necessary, and is only assigned as more certain and better known when it can be had; and therefore besides that, certain other things are usually assigned which must be briefly touched.

Another Sign of Real Distinction is Rejected as Useless

13. The first is distinction of existences; for those things which are distinguished really, have distinct existences; but those which are distinguished modally have only one existence; for a mode is therefore a mode because it does not have another existence besides the existence of the thing, of which it is a mode.

14. But this sign is of no moment; because it is either more obscure than that about which we are treating or begs the question or involves something false. For first, if it is true that existence is the actual entity of the thing, it is the same to say that those things are distinguished really which have distinct existences as if it were said that those things are distinguished really which have distinct entities. But if existence is feigned to be a thing distinct from actual essence, either it is supposed that those things which have distinct existences also have distinct essences; and this is indeed true, nevertheless it is not less difficult to know distinct existences than distinct essences, unless perhaps through separation; or it is asserted that two essences can have one existence and then they are distinguished only modally, but real distinction is when with distinction of essences there is also conjoined distinction of existences; and I consider this not only to be so hidden that it can naturally be known of no things, but also to be false, because there is no greater reason for distinguishing essences than existences in those things which are distinguished modally; for the same mode of distinction which is between essences, can be between existences. Wherefore supposing, what we shall prove below, that existence is nothing other than the thing itself of actual essence, just as distinct essences are understood in thing and mode, distinct existences are also to be understood, because a mode as contradistinguished from the thing which it modifies has its own actuality; therefore the same is the reason and the same mode of distinction between those two, whether they are considered in potency, or in act, or according to the being of essence, or according to the being of existence. Add finally that according to the opinion asserting existence to be a thing distinct from essence, really distinct

things can exist by the same indivisible existence, such as matter and form, and all parts of the same composite; therefore even according to that opinion the distinction of things is not sufficiently or truly manifested through distinction of existences in those things which are so distinct, that they are conjoined among themselves, in which the present difficulty is chiefly concerned, since distinct things can have the same existence. But if perhaps someone does not admit this, there is no reason why he can consequently admit that thing and mode have entirely the same existence, but also modally distinct, so that each has being accommodated to itself; therefore the same question will be about the distinction of things or modes, and about the distinction of existences.

Another Sign of Real Distinction taken from Aristotle is Expounded

15. A second sign can be taken from diverse production or corruption, so that those things are said to be really distinguished which are generated and corrupted by diverse generation and corruption. But conversely those things are really the same, which are generated by the same generation; for Aristotle used this sign, Metaphysics IV, text 3, to prove that being and one are the same. Fonseca relates this opinion, from Antonius Trombeta, treatise on Formalities, ch. 2, and he attacks it because the properties of the soul are produced by the same action with the soul itself, and yet they are distinct things; and conversely relation is not really distinguished from the foundation nor figure from quantity, and yet they are produced by diverse action. But I do not judge this sign to be false, if it is understood with due proportion; I judge however that it is almost useless for knowing distinction unless insofar as it somehow includes the sign of separation. I explain each thing, and first I suppose the discussion to be about natural action or production of things, not mixing miracles. Likewise that the discussion is about those things

which from themselves and by their nature require distinct actions by which they are made, even if they are produced simultaneously. Why I suppose these things, I shall explain below. Again I warn that in two ways some things can be understood to be produced by distinct action. In one way, through themselves first and without any natural connection or consequence of such actions among themselves; in another way, with connection of actions, so that one results from the other by natural necessity. Whence conversely in two ways also some things can be said to be made by the same action, namely, either equally first and without any emanation of one from another, or one primarily and the other secondarily, insofar as it necessarily results from the prior term.

16. Therefore, those things which are made in the first way through themselves first by actions distinct in reality must be distinguished in reality, and in this respect the rule posited above is most true. Because the entire reason and distinction of actions is taken from the terms; therefore, if the terms are such that they require distinct actions, they themselves will also be distinct; nevertheless real distinction between the terms cannot be inferred from this absolutely, nor greater than is between the actions themselves; which sometimes can be really distinguished, as the production of wood and its heating; sometimes indeed only modally, as the production of wood, and its local motion, which are distinguished only as two modes of the same wood; and in the same way the things produced through such actions are distinguished, for through the former are produced substance and heat, which are really distinct; through the latter indeed substance and Where or local presence which are distinguished only modally. Therefore the things produced maintain proportional distinction with their productions. Which indeed is true not only when such actions are made separately and without natural conjunction as happens in the production and heating of fire, but also when those actions are naturally conjoined and one results from the other, as happens, for example, in the production of some heavy thing in the aerial region,

and its motion downward, which naturally follows such generation; for there evidently and almost to the senses the distinction of actions is evident, because one is made intrinsically in one instant, the other is only begun extrinsically in the same. But there can be the same distinction and consequence between instantaneous actions, as between the production of fire and the following of heat; and the same is true of the production of the soul and the emanation of its powers from it; for if those powers are distinct things, that emanation is also a physically distinct action, although it results from another and therefore is said not to be made through itself first. And similar examples can be applied in actions distinguished only modally, as are the creation of an angel, for example, and the production of some Where, or local presence, which naturally follows that; and the production of some quantity and its figuration, which is made afterwards; and the same is true of the production of foundation and the resulting of relation, supposing it to be a distinct mode. And thus it is established that the instances or examples adduced against that opinion do not press; for in all those, just as there is distinction between actions, so also between terms and conversely.

17. It is then established in what sense the principle posited by Aristotle in the said place is true: that those things which are generated by one production, are the same. For this is true of those things which are made through themselves and immediately, by one real action; but those things which are only said to be produced or rather co-produced by one action, insofar as one results from the other, need not be really the same, but only by subject or by some colligation, because they are not really made immediately and proximately by one real action, as was declared in substance and really distinct properties. Indeed it is necessary that that one action be taken indivisibly; for if it is composed in some way, some distinction will be able to be found in its adequate term. As by one action, for example, heating, or the eduction of form from the potency of matter, is made heat or form, and it is united to the subject or matter, where in the

term two things are made distinct from the nature of the thing or modally, namely, the entity of form or heat and its union, and yet the action is one, nevertheless composed in some way from quasi-partial modes which can be considered in it.

18. And from what has been said it is further established why I said this sign is almost useless for knowing the distinctions of things; for the same various modes of distinctions can be found between actions which are between terms, namely, real, modal, and sometimes of reason, as is between the generation of man and animal; but these modes of distinctions are not better known to us in actions than in terms. Rather more frequently and more a priori we hunt the distinction of actions from terms; for we judge by no other reason that heating is an action really distinct from wood, but its constitution in such a Where is only distinguished modally, unless because heat is a distinct thing, but local presence is only a distinct mode. I added moreover that these things are to be understood about the distinction of actions which the terms require through themselves by their nature, because, if actions are only distinguished either from succession of time or from the diverse way in which they are made, it is not necessary that from the distinction of actions some distinction in the term be collected. For just as distinct modes can inhere in the same thing, especially successively, so distinct actions can be terminated to the same term if they are from distinct agents or at distinct times, in which way the same light is now produced by one action from one lamp, and can then be conserved by another through a distinct action; and the same man is produced through generation and reproduced through resurrection. I said finally that miracles are not to be mixed, because by divine power not only successively but also simultaneously the same thing can be produced or conserved by several actions, as I treated more broadly in tome III of the third part. Conversely indeed, I do not think it can happen that entirely distinct things are produced by the same action. But the reason of the difference is not difficult from what has been said, because action is a certain mode of the thing

which is made; but one and the same indivisible mode cannot inhere in distinct things, as was proved in the above; but that several modes inhere in the same thing is not a repugnance, when the modes themselves are not opposed among themselves; but it can seem superfluous when either they are of the same nature or tend to the same thing; nevertheless with respect to divine wisdom it can be not superfluous, and no conflict is shown, because of which it would not be possible.

Another Sign of Real Distinction is Weighed

19. A third sign is commonly employed, namely, when one thing stands in the relation of producer and another as produced, this is a sufficient sign of real distinction. Thus Fonseca, lib. V Metaph., c. 6, q. 6, sect. 1, following St. Thomas, I, q. 41, a. 4. But this sign is primarily not universal, as is evident in itself. Furthermore, if it is assigned only to conclude distinction from the nature of the thing, abstracting from modal or proper real distinction, it is generally true; but if it is understood concerning proper real distinction, in order that it may hold true, it must be restricted to production that is either substantially proper, perfect and primary, or accidental which terminates in something that is not united to the producer itself; for in these two cases real distinction is always required; in others, however, not always. The first is evident, because the same substantial supposit cannot produce itself properly and primarily, because, in order to produce, it is supposed to exist; and therefore if it produces a supposit, it produces another distinct from itself. Hence also the divine persons, although they have unity in essence, are really distinguished from one another on account of the real production of one from another. But I said properly and primarily, because through a miracle it can perhaps happen that some thing reproduces itself; nevertheless then it is necessary that that thing be supposed to have been previously produced by another action, and therefore the second action is not

primary production nor proper, but only by way of conservation; concerning which matter more extensively in the matter of the Eucharist. The second is thus declared, because whatever is produced by something must be distinguished from it in the thing itself in act, because the production itself must be distinguished from the producer in some way, especially when it is posited to be accidental; therefore also its terminus must be distinguished from the part of the thing from the producer itself; therefore, if it is supposed from elsewhere that such terminus is not produced with union and conjunction to the producer itself, it is necessary that it not be its mode, but a thing distinct from it or a mode of a thing distinct from it; it is therefore necessary that it be distinguished not only modally but really as something else, either immediately through itself, or by reason of that in which it exists. But truly, if the production is accidental and terminates in something that is united and conjoined to the producer, it is not a sufficient sign of real distinction. For, although sometimes such distinction can intervene, as in sight producing vision, and intellect, will and similar faculties, which produce qualities really distinct from themselves by which they themselves are informed, nevertheless this is not simply necessary, as is evident whenever that which is produced is only a mode of the producer itself, whether it is produced through itself and through proper action as in local presence which one who moves himself effects in himself; or through action only resulting, as in the emanation of subsistence from nature, and similar cases. But if it is said that not just any production, but that which is a thing distinct from the producer, infers real distinction of producer and produced, this will be an entirely useless circle; for such action being really distinct from the producer cannot be gathered from elsewhere than from the fact that through it some mode of the producer is not produced, but a true quality or form affecting it, which was being inquired about.

20. And the same judgment holds concerning another sign which the same author there adds concerning the relation of cause and

effect, for this can especially have place in efficient cause from which all the things said proceed and can be applied in its own way to formal or material cause; for, although they are most properly found only between act and potency really distinct, nevertheless they also intervene in some way between an affecting mode and the affected thing; but in final cause it has no place, since the end and effect can coincide in the same thing; indeed both the end and agent, or end and form.

21. A conclusion is drawn from what has been said. Therefore scarcely can any certain indication of real distinction be given, when such things are naturally always and necessarily really united among themselves and have not thus far been separated by divine power; I do not deny, however, that several such things can be found really distinct, as is evident from the examples given above; but I only assert that such distinction cannot be discerned by any general sign, but in individual cases the proper essential nature and degree of perfection and function to which they are ordered must be considered, so that from all these collected into one, judgment about distinction can be made; as for example, between the matter and form of heaven we easily believe there to be real distinction, because from the common essential natures of matter and form we understand that neither of them is a mode, but true entity; and elsewhere from the various properties of heaven we understand both to be found in it according to their proper natures, and finally from their limited perfection we conclude that they are distinct from the nature of the thing and consequently really distinct. In a similar way between substantial form and potency ordered through itself primarily to producing accidental act, real distinction is believed to intervene, because the nature of operative faculty is very perfect in its genus; hence it does not seem to be some accidental mode which is usually very imperfect, but true entity and form ordered through itself to such act; but elsewhere, considering the limitation of finite substance, it does not seem in its essential nature, as it exists in reality, to comprehend such diverse

natures or relations to acts so diverse as are the acts of being and operating; hence we conclude there to be real distinction between those two, since it is not between thing and mode, but between essences constituting proper entities. In this way therefore one must philosophize in other matters, considering first whether those natures, between which distinction is sought, exceed the nature of mode, and each through itself suffices to constitute entity; and then, whether such diversity appears in them that in finite reality they require some distinction from the nature of the thing, and actual in the thing itself; and thus a probable conjecture about the quality of distinction can be made.

A Doubt Occurring Concerning the Separability of Distinct Things

22. Really distinct things can be mutually separated, if they are preserved in being. But a doubt remains which was touched upon in the other part of the proposed difficulty, namely, whether all things that are really distinct from the part of the thing can be separated by divine power. This can be understood concerning the twofold separation touched upon above. First concerning separation only as regards real union, with both extremes conserved in being. Second, concerning separation as regards being, that is, in which one being destroyed, the other is conserved in being. But I suppose the question to concern things entirely co-distinct among themselves, so that they do not stand as whole and part, or as including and included; for concerning these it is evident that what includes cannot be conserved without that which it includes, because it consists intrinsically of it. But concerning things co-distinct in the prior way, various opinions could be reported, which I omit, because they pertain to particular matters. And to the prior sense I respond that such things can always be separated in that way by absolute power (for thus we speak), nor does any exception occur which must be made in this. And the reason

is that mutual separation of one from another cannot be repugnant to these things from defect of sufficient entity (as happens in modes), because, as we suppose, each of them has true entity distinct from the other; if therefore there is repugnance, it can only be either from dependence of one upon another or from natural connection or emanation of one from another; for no other reason can be conceived. But, although natural inseparability can rightly be inferred here, nevertheless not in order to the absolute power of God, because, as was touched upon above, God can supply all that dependence, because it is either dependence in the genus of efficient cause, or, if it is of formal or material cause, it is not as intrinsically composing but as sustaining or actuating a thing distinct from itself, which is called causality in some way extrinsic, which God can entirely supply. But much more easily can he impede any natural emanation, both because that cannot happen without the influx of God which he himself can not give; and also because he can destroy any union between those two things, and by his virtue alone effect or conserve each. Therefore in this I find neither general repugnance, nor reasonable exception. For that which some make concerning accidents and essence, either rests on no reason, or, if there is some apparent one, it rather proves those not to be distinct in reality than, supposing distinction, they cannot be separated.

23. An objection is met. Only could be urged concerning relations of union, for example, of matter and form, which are really distinguished just as matter and form themselves, because they are adequately in them and yet cannot be conserved disjoined but only united. It is responded first, if the speech is concerning predicamental relations, perhaps those are not something real distinct in reality from such union but only mutual denomination of things united among themselves; or, if we admit those relations to be positive real modes of united parts, it is responded that they are not united among themselves, formally speaking, but exist between united parts; and therefore they cannot be conserved without union of those parts,

because they are founded in that, which is not against what has been said. But if the speech is concerning formal union itself, which is relative according to its designation or transcendentally, that is not a thing distinct from united parts, but their mode; and therefore it is not wonderful that such mode cannot be conserved with the union itself dissolved, since the mode and union are the same thing.

24. One of distinct things can be destroyed while the other remains in existence. To the latter sense I respond that even in this way distinct things can be separated by the power of God, with three exceptions applied which can be comprehended under the single name of essential relation or dependence. The general reason of the rule has almost already been touched upon, because if things are really distinguished, they can also be really separated; and those things which are thus separated do not involve repugnance or contradiction for one to be conserved by God without the other, because regularly there can only be effective dependence between them, not truly essential, and God can supply that.

25. First exception concerning God and creatures. Hence the first exception is concerning creatures with respect to God; for they are things distinct from God and God can exist without them, but not they without God; not only because God is being necessary through himself but on account of the essential dependence which they have from God; by reason of which, if it were impossible for God not to exist, creatures could not exist without him. One creature does not have such essentially effective dependence from another, especially if it has true entity and reality of which we now speak; for perhaps that which is intrinsically only a mode can essentially depend on that of which it is a mode; concerning which elsewhere, for it does not pertain to the present matter.

26. Second concerning relation and term. The second exception is of relation and really distinct term; for one cannot be mutually conserved without the other in the nature of things, although they do not have proper real union between themselves, but

relation (habitudinem). The reason is that relation as such essentially and quasi-formally depends on its term; and therefore it can neither arise nor be conserved without it; nor can this reason be proven further except that such is the essence of relation, as is now supposed from common opinion; for we speak of real relation purely predicamental.

27. Third concerning the divine persons among themselves. The third example is concerning the divine persons, which, although they are really distinguished, cannot be separated from each other in being on account of the intrinsic and necessary connection which they have among themselves. This can be reduced to the preceding chapter: for they are relative persons, and therefore one cannot exist without another. It also arises from the union which they have in essence through true and perfect identity with it, by reason of which it comes about primarily that any of those persons is being simply necessary, and thus that it is absolutely and simply repugnant to it not to be; and consequently it comes about that none can exist without another; because, if none of those persons can not always exist, neither can one exist when another does not exist. Just as on account of this cause also, although creatures do not depend per se on the divine relations as such, nonetheless they cannot be separated in being from the same relations in the aforesaid way; because creatures cannot exist unless those relations are supposed to exist; for they are being simply necessary; and although from the part of the creature they are not per se necessary for its creation, nevertheless from the part of God they are necessary, because they both exist per se in God and they essentially are God. Finally, this proceeds formally and sufficiently from union with essence through identity; for, since any relation and essence are altogether the same thing among themselves in reality, neither can essence exist from the part of the thing without any relation, nor any relation without essence. Hence it comes about that neither can one relation exist without the others. You will say that this argument is founded on that principle of Aristotle, Metaphysics IV,

text 3: "Things which are the same as a third thing are the same among themselves," which does not have place in the Trinity; otherwise it would be inferred not only that one relation cannot exist without another, but also that it is the other; it is responded that it is not formally founded on that principle, but either on this that those things which are altogether the same in reality cannot be so separated in reality that one exists without the other, or certainly on this that the divine essence and relation are not the same in just any way, but such that essence is of the essence of relation and relation is the intrinsic term of essence; and therefore neither can relation exist without its essential essence, nor essence without its intrinsic and simply necessary term. But enough concerning these for the occasion of this place.

Signs of Distinction of Reason

28. Finally, from what has been said it can easily be understood how distinction of reason can be recognized and discerned from others. For first concerning distinction of reasoning reason there is no difficulty, because, since this is not only not in the thing, but also does not have foundation in it, it will most easily be known; especially since it also does not have formal diversity in the objective concepts themselves, but only quasi-material through repetition, or comparison of the same concept, which, since it is one, we use as many, as Aristotle said, Metaphysics V, chapter 9, text 16. But distinction of reasoned reason primarily requires some formal diversity in objective concepts, in which it differs from the other distinction of reasoning reason; but it agrees in this with distinctions found in reality. But in order that such distinction be judged of reason and not of thing, it is sufficient that beyond that distinction of concepts, no sign be found from all those established for knowing modal or real distinction; for, since distinctions are not to be multiplied without cause and distinction of concepts alone does not

suffice to infer distinction of thing, whenever with that distinction of concepts no other sign of greater distinction is joined, distinction of reason and not of thing must always be judged. From which I infer that whenever it is certain that some two things which are united and conjoined in reality are so distinct in objective concepts that in reality and in the individual they are entirely inseparable, both mutually and non-mutually, and both by absolute power and naturally, and both as to being and as to real union among themselves, then there is a great and almost certain argument that they are not actually distinguished in reality, but by reasoned reason. This is proved from what has been said, and first by induction; for Peter, man, animal, and other predicates, as they are in Peter in reality, are not distinguished from the nature of the thing. Similarly in the intellect the higher and lower reason, synderesis, memory, and similar attributes of it do not signify things distinct in reality, but only by reasoned reason; because that power is such that it comprehends all these things in its adequate notion, nor are they separable in it in any way even by the absolute power of God, as to the faculty itself or first act, although as to use they can be separated. Second, by the reason intimated, because those things which are of this kind seem to be so inseparable for no other cause except that they have one and indivisible essence and entity in reality; otherwise why could they not be separated at least by divine power, especially in creatures? Finally, because there is no sufficient sign of greater distinction there; therefore that distinction should be judged to be of reason, as long as a greater one is not established.

SECTION III

HOW THE SAME AND DIVERSE COMPARE BOTH AMONG THEMSELVES AND TO BEING

1. Aristotle treats of the same and diverse in Metaphysics V, chapter 9, and many place this among the distinct passions of being,

which we said above is comprehended under unity and is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics X, text 9, chapters 5 and 6, and therefore at the end of these disputations on unity and multitude a few things must be said concerning the same and diverse, rather to explain the use of several terms in this science than to add something new to the matter; for whatever pertains to the thing has been handed down in what we have said about unities and distinctions.

2. First therefore it should be noted that "the same" can be said in two ways, namely, relatively and negatively; or (as others speak) formally and fundamentally. For "the same" taken formally seems to import relation, in which it is especially distinguished from unity; but negatively "the same" is said of what is not diverse or distinct from something; in which way it differs little from "one," except that "one" expresses negation of division in itself, but "the same" expresses negation of division from itself or from that with which a being is said to be the same, on account of which Aristotle said, Metaphysics V, chapter 9, text 16, that identity is a certain unity of being itself. And it is declared in that identity by which someone is said to be the same as himself; for, if this is taken relatively and formally, it only expresses relation of reason, as is taken from Aristotle above, and it is a certain and common opinion, because there cannot be real relation of the same thing to itself, because there ought to be true opposition between relation and term, which cannot be of the same thing to itself; nevertheless in this way or formally someone will not be said to be the same as himself, that is, to be referred to himself by such relation unless when he is so conceived or compared through the intellect. But truly without any comparison or fiction of this kind of intellect, someone is said to be the same as himself fundamentally or negatively, because he is not diverse or divided from himself. And in this latter way identity can be numbered among the passions of being, although that negation, as we said above, can be attributed not only to true being but also to fictitious, and not only to being per se, but also to any aggregate of beings or multitude and number; for any number is

the same as itself, just as one or unity. In another sense Scotus distinguished identity into absolute and relative, as Hervaeus reports, Quodlibet IV, question 2; and Soncinas, Metaphysics X, question 3; Javellus, question 7; he calls absolute identity that by which one thing is said to be the same as itself, because there a respect to another thing is not implied; but he calls relative identity that by which one thing is said to be the same as another. And Scotus wants these two identities, as the said authors report, to be really distinct and in this they attack him. And indeed if respective identity is taken between things only distinguished by reasoning reason, as are man and Peter, that opinion is rightly disapproved, because the identity of Peter to himself or to man, or animal, do not differ in reality, but as greater and lesser according to reason; otherwise the extremes themselves would have to be distinguished in reality; but if respective identity is taken between really distinct things, and thus the identity by which Peter is the same as himself is compared to that by which he is the same as Paul, thus they can be said to be really diverse identities, since one is of the thing, the other of reason; but names should not be cared for, since the thing is established.

3. Second, it should be observed from Aristotle above that identity is sometimes considered in some thing in itself, or with respect to itself; but sometimes in many things compared among themselves, or in one thing compared with another. In the former way Peter is said to be the same in number with himself. But in the latter way he is the same in species with Paul, or the same in genus with a lion. And in this way Aristotle said, Metaphysics V, chapter 9, that those things are the same which are one in something, whether in genus, or in species, or in some analogous notion. The prior identity, if it is considered as to negation or foundation, is identity simply, just as unity also is, because it is real identity; but in the notion of respect it is only secondary, because the relation of identity to itself is not real, but of reason. On the contrary, the identity of many distinct things in a common notion (for we speak of creatures, so that we omit the

identity of three divine persons in one essence in number) as to foundation and as to negation of division, is only identity secondary, or rather is a certain similitude, because it is only unity of reason, as was shown above; but as to the relation of identity this identity is considered simply, because this relation, since it is between distinct things, is real according to the common concept of relations, which we shall see below. And these indeed, as far as the thing is concerned, are general; but what pertains to the use of words, it should be observed that this agreement of many things in a common notion in substances has retained the name of identity, speaking simply, from accommodation of use and as if by antonomasia; but in qualities it is called similitude, but in quantity it is called equality, although this word signifies not only agreement in essential notion, but also in magnitude; in all these however, just as there is the same mode of unity, so also the same formal reason of identity, and thus all these things are comprehended under the same and diverse as they are taken transcendentally and attributed to being.

4. As many kinds of distinction, so many of identity. Third, it should be observed that, since "the same" is said through negation of division, either from itself, if one is said to be the same as himself, or between some two things, if they are said to be the same, as many as are the modes of division or distinction, so many can be the modes of identity, according to that: "In as many ways as one of opposites is said, in so many can the other also be said." Hence it comes about that some things can be the same in reality, and in mode, and in reasoned reason; for by reasoning reason, there is nothing which cannot be distinguished from itself, if it is compared to itself in some way; for if it is not conceived in any way as many, then it will not be some things in any way, but only something, whence Aristotle in the cited place says that identity is a certain unity either of many things or when someone uses one as many. But some things are the same in reality and in mode, not however in reason; others can be the same according to thing, not however according to mode; others finally are in no way the same

according to reality, but only according to reason. And hence it is understood first, how the same and diverse are opposed among themselves; for they are opposed primarily with respect to the same thing, not with respect to diverse things; because they are opposed in the manner of relatives. Then they are opposed when compared to the same kind of distinction or division. Because negation will not be opposed to affirmation, unless it be concerning the same according to the same; but these things are opposed insofar as one includes negation of the other; therefore to be the same in reality excludes being diverse really, not however being diverse modally or rationally. And conversely, to be the same rationally does not exclude being really distinct or diverse, because reason, just as it distinguishes by concepts those things which are the same in reality, so conversely it unites by concept those things which are diverse in reality, as is clear from what was said above concerning universal unity.

5. But if you object that, although not every identity infers negation of all diversity, nevertheless greater identity seems to infer negation of greater diversity, so that, if some things are the same modally, it is inferred not only that they are not diverse modally but also that they are not diverse really; but rational identity seems to be maximal; therefore from it modal and real identity is rightly inferred. It is responded that there is equivocation in rational identity, for it is not always maximal; for there is a certain rational identity which reason does not make but only conceives; and this is maximal, because it supposes not only actual negation of distinction in reality, but also negation of foundation or virtual distinction; but another is rational identity which reason constructs, and this is not maximal; indeed it is only secondary, because it does not suppose identity simply in reality, but only foundation of similitude or agreement, and therefore this unity does not exclude diversity simply or according to reality.

6. What it is to be distinguished, to differ, and to be diverse, and how they compare among themselves. Here however one must beware of equivocation of these terms: to be distinguished, to differ,

and to be diverse; for Aristotle says, Metaphysics V, chapter 9, Metaphysics X, chapter 5, that to differ and to be diverse are not the same; for those things are said to differ which agree in something and are distinguished in another; but those things are said to be diverse which agree in nothing; hence to be diverse seems to be something superior to differing, as the same Aristotle says, Metaphysics IV, chapter 2. And in this latitude "to be diverse" is taken here; but "to be distinct" is also taken for the same as "to be diverse"; although in another acceptation and quite usual, "to be distinct" only seems to express negation of real identity; but "to be diverse" also seems to add negation of similitude and agreement, so that one image is said to be distinct from another, however similar they may be among themselves; but when it is said to be diverse, not only this seems to be signified, but also that it is dissimilar or less perfect. But these, as I said, only regard the signification of words from accommodation of use, for the thing is sufficiently established. Therefore, so that the same and diverse are opposed, they must be taken proportionally and with respect to the same thing, and in this way they include immediate opposition, just as one and many, as Aristotle said, Metaphysics IV, chapter 2, because one includes negation of the other.

7. And hence it is also established how every being is either the same or diverse, as Aristotle expressly says, Metaphysics X, chapter 5, concerning which much in Soncinas, there, questions 5 and 6; Javellus, questions 7 and 8; but it is an easy matter. For, if these are taken relatively, they need not apply to every being, because neither is relation of reason necessary, as is clear per se, nor does one being always require another to which it is really referred by real relation of identity or diversity, as is clear in God; for in a creature, because it essentially depends on God, there will always be real relation of diversity or distinction, if such real relation exists. But if we speak (as we truly ought to speak) of fundamental or negative identity, or with respect to diverse things, every being is the same as itself and is diverse from anything else, whether existing, or possible, or even from

fictitious or imaginary being, because of any of these it can be denied, according to which sense many say that something is a passion of being, because it only signifies division from anything else. But truly with respect to the same thing, every being is either the same or diverse from it, if they are taken proportionally, for thus they include contradiction; but otherwise if the modes of identity and diversity are varied, as is sufficiently established from what has been said. You will say: man and animal are neither the same nor diverse, because they are neither of the same genus or species, nor diverse, because they do not agree in ultimate difference, and thus they cannot be of the same species, nor do they have opposite ultimate differences so that they can differ in species. It is responded that the same and diverse with respect to the same thing are immediately opposed, if they are taken as negatively or privatively opposed, but not as if contrarily; as in the case proposed, if "to be diverse in species" is taken only negatively, genus and species, or man and animal can be said to be diverse in ultimate species, because they are not constituted by the same ultimate difference. But if "diverse in species" is taken as if positively and contrarily, thus they are neither the same in species nor do they differ in species; and in similar proportion, they are neither the same in genus nor diverse, but negatively, they do not agree immediately in the same genus and thus they can be said to be not of the same genus. When therefore these are said to be immediately opposed, one extreme must be taken negatively. Hence also to be opposite to another is considered to be a passion of being, not indeed by relative opposition which requires both extremes, but by fundamental opposition insofar as every being has in itself some notion, difference, or essence, which excludes from itself every other opposite or repugnant one. But this must be understood either of opposition taken broadly, so that it includes not only the four kinds established by Aristotle in the Categories and Metaphysics V and X, but also any repugnances; or certainly it can be understood of the foundation of opposition, which at least suffices for contradiction with respect to

anything else, and in this way nothing more is explained by the name of opposition than by the name of diversity. And thus this property of being is sufficiently declared.

8. Exposition of the Aristotelian pronouncement. Finally, from what has been said it can be gathered how that axiom which Aristotle established in Metaphysics IV should be understood: "Whatever things are the same as a third thing are the same among themselves"; for it must be understood with proportion, for if they are really the same as a third thing, they will be really the same among themselves in a similar way, but they will be able to be rationally diverse; but if they are the same as a third thing both in reality and in reason, they will be the same among themselves in the same way. But this principle holds simply in creatures and in finite things; but in infinite reality, such as the divine essence, that maxim is not verified speaking absolutely, because on account of its infinity it can be the same as opposite relations which on account of opposition among themselves cannot be the same except only in essence; concerning which elsewhere.

DISPUTATION VIII

ON TRUTH OR THE TRUE, WHICH IS A PASSION OF BEING

Order of the disputation. After the consideration of unity, there follows a disputation on truth, which is prior in nature to goodness and holds second place among the passions of being after unity, as we have seen above. For just as the intellect is prior as a power to the will, so also the true, which expresses a relation to the intellect, is prior in nature to the good, which pertains to the will. This is especially so because the goodness of each thing is in some way founded in truth; for no thing can be good in its species unless it is first understood to be true in the same species. For gold is not good gold, nor health good health, unless it is true gold and true health; for feigned health cannot be considered good, just as feigned virtue is not honest; but in order to be honest, it must be true. For these reasons, therefore, we institute in this place a disputation on truth, which Aristotle taught pertains maximally to this science in Metaphysics II, text 3, where he says that this science is maximally contemplative of truth. This can be understood not only of truth (so to speak) in the exercised act, but also in the signified act. For we must consider that there can be a twofold contemplation of truth: the first can be called quasi-material or in the exercised act, which is accomplished by knowing things and their properties as they exist on the part of the

thing; and in this way all sciences, even practical ones, consider or demonstrate truth. But speculative sciences do this more properly and per se, for practical sciences consider truth for the sake of operation, while speculative sciences consider it for itself, for the sake of knowledge of truth. Therefore this most especially befits this science (which Aristotle chiefly intends in the aforementioned place), because it is both maximally speculative and treats of first beings and those most true, and discusses the first causes and principles of truth. The second consideration of truth is quasi-formal, and (so to speak) in the signified act, namely, by inquiring what truth itself is in things, and how manifold it is, and how it is compared to being. In this regard, it should again be observed that truth is customarily distinguished in three ways: namely, in signifying, in knowing, and in being. The first truth is properly found in words or writings, or even in concepts which they call non-ultimate. The second is in the intellect knowing things, or in the knowledge and conception of things themselves. The third is in the things themselves, which are denominated true from it. The first consideration of truth pertains to the dialectician; the second to the natural philosopher, insofar as he considers the soul and its functions; the third, however, is proper to this science, which treats of being as being and of the passions of beings. Nevertheless, because all these truths have some agreement or proportion among themselves, by reason of which they will be better understood if we dispute about all of them together and declare how they differ among themselves, therefore we shall speak of all of them in this place. For thus it will more easily be established what truth is, which is said to be a property of being. This is especially so because every other truth, if it is real, is in some way contained under transcendental truth; but if it is of reason, it must be explained through analogy and proportion to real truth. Since the meaning of the term is necessary at the beginning of every disputation, we assume from the common consent of all that real truth consists in a certain adequation or conformity between thing and intellect, whether it is conformity of intellect to thing, or of

thing to intellect, which we shall see later when we explain this definition more broadly. From this, however, taking analogy or proportion, truth of reason or of signification consists in adequation between the signifying proposition and the thing signified.

SECTION I
WHETHER FORMAL TRUTH IS IN THE COMPOSITION AND DIVISION OF THE INTELLECT

1. That the intellect is called true or false by composing and dividing is certain from the common consent of all. Whence Augustine, in On True Religion, chapter 36, says: "To whom it is manifest that falsity is that by which something is thought to be which is not, he understands that to be truth which shows that which is." But then the intellect conceives or shows something to be or not to be when it composes and divides; therefore it is certain that truth is in the intellect through composition and division. But what that truth is, and how it is in conception, is not easy to explain, and therefore there are various opinions.

The First Opinion is Advanced

2. That truth is not in the formal act or cognition of the intellect, but is in the thing known as objected to the intellect, insofar as it is conformable to itself as existing on the part of the thing, and in this way it explains truth to be conformity of intellect to thing, that is, to be conformity of the objective concept of the enunciating intellect to the thing according to its real being. This opinion seems to be insinuated by St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles I, chapter 59; but we shall examine that passage better in the following section. Durandus taught this more clearly in Sentences I, distinction 19,

question 5; and Hervaeus teaches almost the same thing in Quodlibet III, question 1, articles 2 and 3; and Soncinas defends it as probable in Metaphysics VI, question 16; likewise Flandria, question 23; and Javellus, question 13. Durandus's foundation is that this truth cannot be conformity between the formal act by which the intellect judges something to be or not to be and the thing judged according to the real being of such act or according to the real agreement it has with the object, because in this way they are very dissimilar, and the act of intellect is spiritual, but the object can be something material. Therefore it can only be conformity in representing; but conformity of this kind is attended to only according to that which holds itself objectively in the intellect; therefore truth is only objectively in the intellect. And thus it will be nothing other than conformity of the thing in objective being to itself in real being. The minor is proved, because conformity in representing consists only in this, that the thing known is so represented as it is in itself; but in this only the conformity of the thing in objective being to itself in real being is declared. For when it is said that the thing is so represented as it is in itself, through those two particles, "so" and "as," the act of understanding is not compared to the thing; for thus there would be false comparison and proposition; but that which is objected to such act according to known or apprehended being is compared to itself according to real being; therefore truth consists in conformity between these. Secondly, this can be confirmed, because the object of the intellect or of its judgment is true as true; therefore truth is not conformity of the judgment itself, but is conformity of the object itself. The consequence is evident, because the intellect directly judging about truth does not judge about the property or conformity of its act, but about the truth of the object itself; therefore it is conformity in the object itself. Whence I argue thirdly: for when the intellect reflects to know truth formally, it does not compare its act with the object, but compares the object in apprehended being to itself in real being. Indeed, in order to know that its judgment was true,

it begins from the thing itself judged, and comparing it to itself as it is in itself, if it finds conformity in it, then it judges that it judged truly. Therefore it is a sign that truth consists in conformity of the thing in objective being to itself in real being and that judgment is denominated true from it only by extrinsic denomination.

Resolution of the Question

3. Nevertheless, this opinion is not approved by me, and I think that the truth of complex cognition, or of composition and division, or of the judgment by which we judge something to be this or that, or not to be (for we take all these as the same), is conformity of judgment to the thing known as it is in itself, from which conformity it results that the thing itself judged is said to be in itself as it has been judged. I think this to be the opinion of St. Thomas, as can be gathered from Summa Theologica I, question 16, articles 1, 2, and 8, where Cajetan holds this in article 2. The same St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles I, chapters 59 and 60, and there Ferrara; Soncinas, Metaphysics VI, question 17; Aegidius, Quodlibet IV, question 7, and others who follow St. Thomas. And it is proved first from Aristotle in the Categories, chapter on Substance, saying: "From the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is true or false," where (as St. Thomas rightly weighed in the aforementioned question 16, article 1, ad 3) he does not say "from the fact that a thing is true," but "from the fact that a thing is." Therefore cognition is not denominated true from the conformity or truth of the object itself, but from the truth or conformity of the judgment itself to the object; therefore the truth of it consists in conformity of this kind. Secondly, this can be declared from truth in signifying which is in vocal proposition; for it does not consist in conformity of the thing as signified to itself as existing in itself, but consists in immediate conformity of the signifying voice to the thing signified. Indeed, in any image that is called true, something similar is found; for the image of Peter, for example, is then called a

true image when it represents him as he is in himself. Whence its truth does not consist in conformity between Peter in some represented being which would be as if objective with respect to the image to himself as existing in himself, but in immediate conformity between the representation of the image and the thing itself represented.

4. Thirdly, there is a general reason, because a thing as known or as represented, when it is truly known and represented, does not have any other objective being besides that which it has in itself; which is said to be actually object to such cognition only by extrinsic denomination from the cognition which is terminated to it, just as a thing seen in objective being with respect to sight, if it is taken in aptitude or in first act, says nothing other than the very colored or bright being which the thing has in itself. But if it is taken as actually seen, it adds nothing except extrinsic denomination from vision. Therefore there is no conformity of object to thing there, but that is rather complete identity. But if the object is taken as denominated by cognition or by the form representing it, thus it formally includes the form denominating it. Whence the object thus taken as known or represented cannot be said to be conformable to itself in real being for any other reason than because the very form by which it is known or represented has immediate conformity with the thing known or represented according to itself; therefore the truth of cognition consists primarily and per se in this.

5. Fourthly, finally, because often a thing has no being in itself which is exercised being of existence, besides the being which it has as object to intellect; in what way God has true cognition of those things which will never be future, whether they are known as possible only, or as those which would be future if this or that should happen. But in these objects, conformity of the thing as objected to intellect to itself as in itself cannot easily be conceived, because it has no other being in itself besides that which is objected to intellect. The same is true of intuitive cognition which is terminated to a thing as it exists in itself, as is, for example, the beatific vision of God himself, which can be called

true cognition of God, since through it God is acknowledged as he is in himself. But it cannot be imagined how that truth is conformity of God himself, as seen, to himself as he exists in reality, because he is immediately seen as he exists in himself, and to be seen adds only extrinsic denomination. Therefore the truth of such vision or knowledge is immediate conformity between it and the object; therefore the same is true in every cognition or judgment by which something is judged to be or not to be.

Solution of Arguments

6. To Durandus's argument, however, it is responded that this conformity of cognition, which we say is its truth, does not consist in similitude of entities, as is evident per se; nor even in similitude of formal image or of such representation as is in formal image, because this is not without similitude in some entity or real form which is not necessary for cognition, as must be said more broadly elsewhere. Therefore it consists in a certain intentional representation, by which, namely, it happens that the intellect through act or judgment so perceives the thing as it is in itself. And thus this conformity is a certain due proportion and relation between the perception of intellect and the thing perceived. Which proportion is correctly explained by those words, that the thing known is so represented or judged as it is in itself; by which the thing itself known is not compared to itself in itself, as Durandus says, but the cognition itself or judgment of intellect is compared to the thing known in the character of representing and represented, and therefore there is no falsity in that comparison. Just as when we say this image is proper, because it so represents as the thing is, we do not compare the thing itself represented to itself, but the image to the thing.

7. If someone should say that to compare an image as image to a thing is nothing other than to compare the thing in representative being to itself in proper being, it is responded that if by the name of

thing in representative being something other than the image itself representing as such is understood, the assumption is false; but if the very being of the image as representing is called imperfect or diminished being of the thing represented, thus the same thing is said by those words as we assert. But this is not really to compare the same thing to itself, but the image from which it is extrinsically said to have representative being to itself according to true being; and the same is true of cognition insofar as it represents and is called intentional image of its object.

8. To the second, St. Thomas responds above ad 3, and Soncinas, in the aforementioned question 16, ad 1, that the true is not formally but fundamentally the object of judgment or cognition of intellect, because, as Aristotle said, the being of the thing causes truth in intellect or is the object of true judgment. Whence, when it is said that intellect only assents to the true, the sense is that it only assents to the object insofar as it is shown to be so; and in this way it judges about the truth of the object not formally (so to speak), but causally or fundamentally, that is, about the very being of the thing, so that from conformity to it truth results or exists in cognition.

9. To the third, the assumption is denied; for to formally know truth we only compare our cognition to the thing, or conversely the thing to cognition, according to that principle: "From the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is true or false."

SECTION II

WHAT IS THE TRUTH OF COGNITION

1. It remains to be explained what this conformity is which we say is the truth of cognition, whether, namely, there is something absolute or respective, real or of reason, in the act itself. For some think that truth is something real and absolute in the very act of knowing or judgment of intellect. This opinion can be persuaded, for that this truth is something real in the act itself seems very probable.

First, because judgment is denominated true on the part of the thing and without any fiction of intellect; therefore that denomination comes from some real form and not from an extrinsic form; because, as we have shown, truth is formally in the act itself and not extrinsically. Secondly, because truth is a perfection simpliciter of intellect; therefore it is something real in the intellect itself and is not in it except through the mediation of act; for we are dealing with actual truth; therefore it is a real property of the act itself. Whence it is confirmed thirdly, because there is great perfection in the habit of knowledge, that it is true; therefore habitual truth (so to speak) is a real property of it; therefore it will be similar in actual cognition.

2. But that this property is absolute and not respective can be proved first from what has been said, because it is a perfection simpliciter. Secondly, because it does not depend, properly speaking, and by necessity on any real and existing term, except when such being is judged; which is per accidens, for truth of the same nature ought to be in all things. But in this judgment "A chimera is a fictional being," there is real truth without real relation; therefore the same is true in all cases, whatever it may be whether in some cases real relation follows upon truth; just as also in knowledge the disposition toward the knowable object is not formally speaking a real relation, although it can sometimes follow upon it. Thirdly, an argument can be taken from divine truth, for in God there is truth of cognition which is without doubt a great perfection of him, and yet it cannot be a real relation, because if it is compared to the very essence of God, it is not distinguished in reality from it; but if to creatures, it cannot be really referred to them; therefore it will be an absolute property and perfection. Finally, because truth or falsity necessarily accompanies judgment of intellect, and yet no real relation necessarily accompanies it; therefore it is not something relative, but something absolute. And Soncinas seems to hold this opinion in Metaphysics VI, question 17, where, although he says that truth expresses something absolute with respect, nevertheless explaining this respect he says in sum that it is

according to saying, not according to being, and uses this example: Just as "intellective" can be said to include respect, because it cannot be conceived without relation to the intelligible; but it is established that respect of this kind of the intellective is only transcendental or according to saying; and Capreolus feels the same in Sentences I, distinction 19, question 3, conclusion 3.

3. However, to others it seems that truth of this kind consists only in relation. This is held by Durandus, and Hervaeus, Javellus, and Flandria cited in the previous section; Ammonius, Perihermeneias I, chapter 1, and other expositors there. The common foundation is that the being of truth entirely depends on the term, so that when it is changed, truth is changed, and when it is posited, truth is posited, with no change made on the part of the one knowing; for according to Aristotle's testimony, the same proposition is changed from true to false and conversely, with the object changed; therefore it is a sign that truth consists only in relation, for it is proper to relation that, with the foundation remaining, it arises when the term is posited, and is changed when it is changed. Whence it is confirmed first, because truth is not of the essence of the act, since it is changed while the act remains; therefore it is an accident of it; and yet it is not an absolute accident; for it is not quality, because a second and ultimate act is not the subject of another quality; nor is it in any other genus of absolute accident, as seems evident per se; therefore it will be relation. It is confirmed secondly, because truth is nothing other than a certain conformity; but conformity is nothing other than agreement or similitude or proportion; but all these indicate relation; just as conformity of image to its exemplar is a relation, and so of others.

4. But whether this is real or rational relation is controversial, even among the aforementioned authors; for the arguments by which the first opinion proved truth to be a real property seem consequently to prove that this relation ought to be real. But the arguments by which the same first opinion proved truth to be an absolute property seem to conclude that it is not real but rational relation. But both

arguments compared among themselves seem to prove that this relation is sometimes real, sometimes rational; for sometimes we seem to have all things concurring that are necessary for real relation, but sometimes something can be lacking; therefore sometimes it will also be real relation, sometimes not at all. The antecedent is explained, for real relation first requires a real term and then a foundation not only real, but also capable of relation or orderable to a term; but often these two concur in this relation of truth. For it often regards a real and really existing term; and on the part of judgment itself there is often sufficient foundation, because judgment is something created and from this part really referable to an extrinsic term, and moreover it is such that it is compared to its object as measured to measure, which is real relation on the part of the measured, for which reason the relation of knowledge to the knowable is considered to be real. But of this kind is this relation of truth. But sometimes a real term is lacking in this conformity, as when true judgment is about non-beings; sometimes, however, a foundation apt for founding real relation is lacking, either because it is not orderable to something else extrinsic, as happens in divine knowledge with respect to existing creatures; or because it is not distinct from the term, as in the same knowledge of God with respect to God himself; or because it is not compared as measured to measure, but rather as measure to measured, as the same knowledge of God to all creatures; and the same is considered of human art with respect to artifact. Therefore in these cases this relation will be of reason, and not real.

Resolution of the Question

5. To explain this matter, it should be noted that it is one thing to inquire what truth adds above the act that is denominated true, another thing what is included in the whole of what is signified by the name of truth; in the manner in which we said above about

unity that it is one thing what it adds above being, another thing what is signified by the name of unity.

6. First, therefore, I think it certain that truth does not add to the true act any thing, or absolute mode distinct from it by the nature of the thing or from its essence and entity. In this all authors seem to agree; nor do I find anyone who has expressly taught the opposite. And it is sufficiently proved by the arguments made in the second opinion. Also, because it can neither be understood nor explained what or what kind this absolute is, nor for what it is posited. Which I thus explain, because either it is something separable from the true act, or it is completely inseparable; if the latter is said, it is posited as distinct from the act by the nature of the thing without cause; but if the former is said, it will not be absolute but respective, as the argument made proves; because it is separated through change of object alone, without other absolute change on the part of the act; for the act from itself remains the same and in the same way represents, and only its truth is changed, because the thing does not hold itself in the same way. You will say that truth adds something absolute inseparable from the act, not however really but rationally distinct from it. But on the contrary, because either this absolute completes the act as its ultimate specific or individual difference, or it does not complete but supposes it perfectly completed. If the first is said, therefore such absolute is not added to the constituted act but constitutes it; therefore it is not correctly said that truth adds this absolute above the act. But the second cannot be said, because it is impossible to understand that something real absolute distinguished by reason alone is added to a fully constituted act. And then against this proceeds the argument about change of the same act from true to false.

7. Secondly, it must be said that truth does not add above the act a proper and predicamental real relation of the act to the object. This too is sufficiently proved by the arguments made, for in many cases such relation is impossible, and from them an argument is taken

that such relation is never necessary for the nature of truth as such. Both because the concept and mode of truth is of the same nature or proportion in all things. And also because, although we might freely concede that sometimes all things necessary for real relation to arise between act and object concur, nevertheless the act is understood to be true by nature prior to the real relation being understood to arise. For this is said to arise when foundation and term are posited; but the act is most formally true by the very fact that such foundation and term are posited in the nature of things; so that if by impossibility the resultance of relation were impeded, still the act would be true by virtue of such act and object posited in the nature of things. Therefore real relation does not enter into the formal concept of truth, whatever it may be whether it sometimes follows from it.

8. Thirdly, it must be said that truth as such does not add to the true act an actual relation of reason properly and strictly taken. This too sufficiently persuades me by that argument that the denomination of truth does not depend on relation of this kind; for this, in the way it can be, is not actual except with intellect actually thinking or comparing one thing to another; but without comparison of this kind the act is simpliciter true; therefore [the conclusion follows]. Moreover, the argument made about real relation proves a fortiori about relation of reason; for just as the former arises when foundation and term are posited, so the latter is feigned by intellect supposing that which can intervene by way of foundation and term; but by virtue of what is supposed for such relation or fiction, the act is true; therefore such relation does not formally enter the concept of truth; therefore neither does truth have such relation above the act itself.

9. Fourthly, it must be said that the truth of cognition beyond the act itself adds nothing real and intrinsic to the act itself, but only connotes the object so holding itself as it is represented through the act. This assertion follows from the preceding ones; for that an act is true says something more than that an act is; and it does not say

something real absolute or relative beyond the act itself, nor does it say proper and rigorous relation of reason; therefore it can add nothing else besides the said connotation or denomination arising from the connection or conjunction of such act and object. Moreover, this confirms the argument by which the later opinion proves that truth is not something completely absolute, namely, because when the object is changed, the truth of cognition is changed, and yet nothing intrinsic to the act is changed there, but the concomitance of the object is removed; therefore it is a sign that truth includes or at least connotes the aforesaid concomitance of the object.

10. The same enunciation becomes true from false through extrinsic change. Some respond by denying that the same mental proposition can be transferred from true to false without intrinsic change of it, speaking of proper cognition or judgment of the thing itself; because a proposition that was true for some time cannot be false for the same time, and in order for it to become false it is necessary that the mind conjoin the extremes for another time, which it cannot do unless there is some change in it. But this is simply repugnant to Aristotle, in the Categories, chapter on Substance, and St. Thomas, Summa Theologica I, question 14, article 15, ad 3. And first an argument can be taken from vocal or mental propositions, which are said to be in the mind as non-ultimate; for in these it cannot be doubted that it is the same proposition entirely which was true before and now is false through change of the thing signified without any change of the sign or its signification; therefore that truth in signifying which befits these propositions, besides the whole of what is held on the part of the signifying proposition, connotes such concomitance of the object. So therefore it can be understood in the truth of judgment itself or truth existing in the mind as ultimate, at least imperfect and abstractive. Which I add for this reason, because in perfect intuitive cognition, by which a thing is exactly seen in particular according to all conditions of existence completely determined, there cannot be change of conformity between cognition

and object with cognition remaining unchanged; for then the argument made correctly proceeds, that the act is always terminated to the thing as existing in such time and moment; for which time and moment truth cannot be changed, although it is changed for other times. For which reason divine knowledge is always conformable to known objects, however much these are changed for their diverse times. And the same is perhaps true in angelic cognition, when it is perfectly intuitive, although it differs from divine in that the latter is simpliciter immutable, the former however can be changed. Nevertheless, however, in imperfect and abstractive cognition, such as is our cognition, the same judgment entirely being changed from true to false without intrinsic change is not repugnant, because that duration which we conceive and signify through the copula is not indivisible nor completely determined, but in some way indifferent and confused and consequently having latitude, by reason of which the object can hold itself in one way in one part of that succession and in a different way in another part. And for this reason it can happen that the same cognition is changed from true to false by change of object, with the cognition itself remaining invariate in itself; just as cognition or proposition indefinite on the part of the object, remaining the same, can now be true by reason of one singular, afterwards by reason of another, although it is not changed in itself, because in that confused concept of the thing common and indefinitely conceived it includes in some way several singulars of which each suffices for its truth; and therefore, although they themselves are changed, truth can remain in the same confused concept; but if all singulars were lacking, truth would entirely perish. The same therefore is true with respect to time or duration confusedly conceived; for also with respect to it the proposition or cognition is quasi-indefinite and therefore remaining the same, it can be compared to diverse instants or times, and in them be found now true, now false, without change of itself through change of object alone. Therefore it is

a sign that this truth of cognition connotes at least the concomitance of the object in such state as is represented through cognition.

11. Finally, it is confirmed from a similar case about goodness; for just as the true expresses conformity, so the good expresses convenience; but the good as convenient only adds denomination or concomitance of the other extreme having such nature, or aptitude for such perfection, as we shall show below; therefore the same way of philosophizing about truth should be adopted.

12. Truth requires intentional representation of the object as it is. Fifthly, from what has been said I conclude that the truth of cognition includes such representation of cognition which has conjoined the concomitance of the object so holding itself as it is represented through cognition. This is proved from what has been said, because for truth neither representation alone suffices, if the object does not so hold itself as it is represented; nor can concomitance of the object suffice for the denomination of truth, unless the aforesaid representation is presupposed or rather including it; because truth is not that extrinsic denomination alone, but includes the intrinsic disposition of the act terminated to the object so holding itself.

Censure of the First Opinion & Solutions of its Arguments

13. And hence it is understood first what the first opinion has of truth and what should be said to its arguments. For if by "absolute" it understands the entity of the act alone with real and transcendental disposition to the object, which it has completely inseparably and immutably, thus it is false that truth consists in this absolute alone, because otherwise it would be completely immutable with the same act remaining. But if it says that it consists in something absolute, because no intrinsic relation need be added but only concomitance of

the object, thus we confess that truth is something absolute or rather consists in something absolute with respect according to saying; for that denomination taken from concomitance of the object can not incongruously be called respect according to saying. Nevertheless, because the arguments of that opinion seem to proceed in the prior sense and can obstruct what we have said, they must be satisfied.

14. To the prior arguments, therefore, by which it is proved that truth of cognition is a real and intrinsic property of the act, it is responded by noting that the denomination of true can be attributed to the act of cognition in two ways. In one way formally, in another way radically. I call formal denomination of true that which I have explained thus far, which consists in actual conformity to the object. But I call radical that perfection of the act from which it has conformity of this kind with the object, as evidence is in knowledge, or certitude in faith, by reason of which it has that it is infallible and consequently that it cannot exist without having conformity with its material object. This therefore being supposed, to the first I respond that the denomination of true taken radically from the intrinsic perfection of the act or habit is real and absolute; but we do not now speak of that, because that is not so much a denomination of true as of certain or evident assent. Whence that perfection from which this denomination is taken is not something distinct from the judgment itself by the nature of the thing, but is the very specific difference which is taken from such formal object or reason of assenting. But the formal and actual denomination of true is indeed in the thing itself without fiction[2] of intellect, as the argument correctly proves, yet it is not a completely intrinsic denomination but partly is from intrinsic form, partly connotes objective coexistence or concomitance of the object so holding itself as it is judged through cognition. Whence, what we said, that truth of this kind about which we are treating befits the formal judgment or cognition itself and not only its object, should be understood that the judgment itself is primarily and per se

[2] fictione, 1597, 1960; actione alit. Cf. BHF, t. II, p. 90.

denominated true from this conformity, although the form from which it is denominated is not completely intrinsic, but includes concomitance of something extrinsic.

15. To the second objection, the same distinction must be applied in providing an answer; for the radical truth which is taken from the formal nature of such cognition is a perfection of the intellect simpliciter, because it pertains to the nature of intellectual virtue simpliciter; but the actual truth of which we speak is not per se a perfection simpliciter; indeed, it does not even add perfection beyond the nature or species of the act of knowing itself. For this actual truth, insofar as it connotes or includes on one side the concomitance or agreement of an extrinsic object, adds nothing real to the act and consequently can bring no perfection whatsoever to it; but insofar as it presupposes or requires in the act itself a representation or real relation (habitudo) to the object, it indicates some real perfection of that act; however, that perfection can sometimes be a perfection simpliciter, but sometimes it is only secundum quid. For sometimes this actual truth is infallibly and necessarily conjoined with the essential and real perfection of such an act and by virtue of that perfection; and then the perfection which it presupposes per se in the act is a perfection simpliciter; for it pertains to the nature of intellectual virtue simpliciter. Sometimes, however, this actual truth is not necessarily conjoined with the act, or not by virtue of its formal and essential nature; and then the perfection which is presupposed in the act is not simpliciter but secundum quid, because it does not pertain to the nature of intellectual virtue simpliciter, and it always and intrinsically has mixed with it the imperfection of obscure or confused cognition, as exists in human faith and opinion, etc. To the third objection, the same response applies, for in the habit of science, that it be true radically is a perfection of it, beyond which actual truth adds no perfection to it.

16. Other arguments, however, by which it is proved that truth is an altogether absolute property can indeed be admitted,

insofar as they prove that a real relation is not necessary for truth of this kind; but insofar as they might exclude every extrinsic connotation, they do not conclude correctly; hence to the first [objection] it has already been declared when and how truth is a perfection simpliciter, not indeed formally and in itself but in its root, when it is such that it necessarily has truth conjoined with itself. To the second, I concede that truth as such never consists formally in a real relation, but I deny that it follows from this that it does not include the concomitance of the object to which the cognition conforms. Nor does it matter that truth of cognition of this kind does not always require an actually existing object, because we do not say that the real existence of the object is included in the concept of truth, but only that it is disposed just as it is represented or judged through cognition; or that it has such being as it is known. This being is not always of existence, but whatever suffices for the truth of an enunciation, as Aristotle touched upon in Metaphysics V, ch. 7, and book VI, final chapter, and book IX, final chapter.

17. Truth in God in how many ways, and whether it is a perfection simpliciter. To the third [objection] the same must be said about divine truth as was said about the truth of science and of any intellectual virtue, that in God it indicates perfection as regards radical truth; but as regards actual conformity with the object it adds no new perfection nor even a real relation, as the argument correctly proves. So that this may be better understood and every equivocation removed, it should be noted that the supreme perfection of truth is attributed to God in a threefold manner, namely by reason of essence or being, by reason of intellect, and by reason of will; in these ways God is called the first truth in being, in understanding, and in speaking. Concerning the first notion of truth in being we shall speak below because that is nothing other than transcendental truth, which is in God in the highest and first degree of perfection. The last notion of truth also has nothing to do with the present matter, because the name of truth under that signification is very equivocal and signifies a

certain moral virtue existing in the will which inclines one always to speak and say what is true according to one's mind; this virtue is in God in the most eminent degree, and is so natural to him that he can in no way speak other than the truth, and in this way truth is a perfection simpliciter, but a moral one. The second truth, therefore, namely the intellectual, can signify two things in God: first, a power of understanding so perfect that it never deviates from its target nor can deviate, and this is a great perfection simpliciter which God has from himself in the most eminent degree; and for this reason he is called the first truth in knowing. Then it can indicate the actual conformity between God's cognition and the thing known; and this indeed presupposes the aforesaid perfection, but does not add a new one, but only connotes that the object is disposed in itself just as it is known.

Responses to the Arguments of the Latter Opinion

18. To the foundation of the contrary opinion, it is responded that by that argument it is correctly proved that truth, beyond the entire real and intrinsic perfection of cognition, connotes and co-signifies the concomitance of the object, but not however a proper relation arising from the coexistence of cognition and object, as has been sufficiently declared. You will say: if this argument is not effective in the present case for inferring a relation, no sufficient one remains for proving real relations, especially those which are said to be founded in unity, such as relations of similarity, equality, and the like; for although, when the other extreme is changed, similarity is said to be changed, it can be said that no relation is thereby varied, but only the denomination arising from the coexistence of both extremes. It is responded that this argument pertains to the category of relation (ad aliquid), about which we shall speak later; now two things seem to be said: one is that such a mode of arguing is not sufficient for inferring a real relation which is a mode distinct ex natura rei from its foundation

and terminus and as it were something intermediate between them, as the argument (in my opinion) convinces; hence, whatever may be the case about such relations, it cannot be denied that, by nature prior to their arising, the foundation and terminus are understood to exist simultaneously, in which there is fundamental unity or agreement. Hence secondly it is said that, granted that some relation arises between cognition and object, when in one there is sufficient foundation and in the other sufficient reason for terminating, nevertheless it is not necessary formally for the notion of truth, but what is understood to precede such a relation in both extremes suffices; just as it also suffices whenever the extremes are such that they cannot found or terminate a real relation; and surely it is most probable that this relation is never real, as I shall now say.

19. Hence to the first confirmation I concede that, speaking generally, the truth of which we treat, according to all that it includes, is not of the essence of the act of cognition; nevertheless it does not follow from this that it is some intrinsic accident inhering in the act itself, but only that beyond the entity and intrinsic perfection of the act it connotes something else extrinsic without which the notion of truth does not subsist, by reason of which the truth of the act can sometimes be varied, although the act itself is not changed intrinsically in itself; and then truth is related in the manner of a separable accident or fifth predicable by reason of the variable extrinsic connotation. But in those acts which have inseparable and indefectible truth, that perfection from which arises such necessary conjunction with truth (which has been called radical truth by us) is in no way an accident but an essential property of such an act; but formal truth in these is related in the manner of an inseparable property.

20. To the second confirmation, it has already been responded first that, although conformity can be taken most formally for a relation, nevertheless it can also be taken for the concomitance of those extremes between which that relation is conceived, as it

precedes such a relation in the order of nature, and we have shown that conformity of this kind suffices for the notion of truth. Therefore the controversy about that relation—whether it is always real or always of reason, or sometimes real and sometimes of reason—contributes nothing to explaining the essence of truth; for whatever may be the case about this, truth itself precedes such a relation. And without doubt it is true that such a relation is not always real, as the argument about the truth of divine science and about the truth of cognition concerning non-existing objects correctly proves; and this is sufficient for us to understand that a proper relation is not necessary for the notion of truth; because neither is a real one necessary, as is clear from what has been said, nor one of reason, because this is not properly [a relation] except when it is thought or conceived. But I add further that a real relation never follows in the act of cognition precisely from that conformity which is necessary for truth; because that conformity does not consist in true and proper formal similarity, but only in a certain proportion and intentional representation, by reason of which the thing is perceived just as it is, which will become more manifest from what follows.

SECTION III

WHETHER THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE EXISTS ONLY IN COMPOSITION AND DIVISION, OR ALSO IN SIMPLE CONCEPTS

1. The common opinion appears to be that the truth of knowledge, properly and strictly speaking, exists only in the composition and division of the intellect and not in its simple acts. So holds Cajetan, I, q. 16, a. 2; and there some Thomists; Hervaeus, Quodl. III, q. 1, a. 2 and 3; Durandus, In II, dist. 16, q. 5, n. 14; and this appears to be the opinion of St. Thomas there, for he writes thus: "Properly speaking, truth is in the intellect composing and dividing,

but not in sense nor in the intellect knowing what something is." He has similar things in I cont. Gent. c. 59, and q. 1 de Verit., a. 3. And he appears to have taken this from Aristotle, I de Interpretat. c. 1 and 3, where he says that truth and falsehood consist in composition and division. He has similar things in III de Anima, c. 6, where he says that in the indivisible conception of the mind there is no falsehood. But where falsehood cannot be, neither can truth be; for opposites are naturally disposed to be about the same thing. Hence Aristotle concludes: "But in those things in which both falsehood and truth are already present, in these there is already some composition of the concepts of the intellect"; and in IX Metaph., c. ult., and lib. VI, c. 2, he says that truth exists only in the intellect, because only in that is there composition and division.

2. This opinion can be founded on reason, first because in words there is no truth and falsehood in signifying, except in complex speech by which we signify this to be or not to be, but not in the utterance of incomplex words; therefore the same must be judged about truth in knowing with respect to the concepts of the mind, namely, that it is not in incomplex and simple concepts but only in those by which, composing, we know and judge this to be or not to be. The consequence is proved, because words are signs of concepts and whatever truth or falsehood is in the concept, can be in the word as in a sign. This whole argument is taken from Aristotle, I de Interpret., c. 1.

3. Second, because if there is truth in simple conception, either every simple concept is true and never false, or sometimes it is true, sometimes false, or it is always true and false with respect to different things; but none of these can be said probably; therefore neither can truth be attributed to simple conception. The minor is declared as to its individual parts. For first, if there can be truth in a simple concept, no reason can be devised why there cannot be falsehood in the same; for, as I was saying, contraries are concerned with the same thing; therefore, although a simple concept can be true,

not every such concept will be true; but rather, from the same principle one may infer that it can sometimes be false. And this is confirmed and declared by example, for if the simple and proper concept of true gold is true, therefore, if bronze is simply conceived as true gold, that concept will be false. Then if this is conceded, namely, that some simple concept can be false with respect to something, I prove that it must necessarily be true with respect to another; because it is impossible for there to be given a concept of the intellect that does not have some proper object that it represents; therefore, if it is compared to that, it cannot not be a true concept of such an object, because it must naturally represent that; but it cannot naturally represent that unless it is intentionally conformed to it; but if it is conformed, it is also true, because truth is nothing other than the conformity of the intellect to the thing. As in the example adduced, although the concept of bronze is judged false with respect to gold, nevertheless with respect to bronze it is a true concept of it. Indeed, there can be no object so fictitious and impossible that the concept of it as such would not be true, as the concept of a chimera, or of a hippocentaur, even if it could be said to be a false concept of a true or possible animal, nevertheless with respect to the chimera or hippocentaur it is a true concept of it. Finally, if for this reason the same concept is said to be true and false with respect to different things, it follows that in all concepts there is some falsehood, which is alien to all truth; otherwise there would also be falsehood in the divine concept. Likewise, who would say that an image of Christ the Lord, by the very fact that it is a true image of him, is a false image of the Antichrist?

4. You will say: just as the same thing, by the very fact that it is similar to one thing, is dissimilar to another, so there is no inconvenience that the same concept should be true and false with respect to different things. It is replied that this argument rather shows that the truth or falsehood of knowledge does not consist in simple similarity or dissimilarity, but in some other comparison or

composition by which the proper concept of a thing is attributed to it, or an alien one; as in the example adduced, in conceiving bronze there cannot be falsehood, but in attributing to the thing so conceived the nature of true gold. And this is confirmed and declared because it is one thing not to know something, another to be deceived in knowing it; but he who conceives one thing with a simple and true concept, although by virtue of that he does not conceive other dissimilar things, nevertheless is not deceived in the conception of them; because he neither conceives them, nor attributes anything alien to them; therefore a simple and proper concept of one thing cannot be called a false concept of other things because it does not represent them, and for the same reason it cannot be called true from the mere simple representation of its object. And finally it is confirmed, because otherwise there could be truth in the intelligible species alone; because that also simply represents, and in its representation there could be understood some conformity to the thing represented; but the consequent is false, because in the intelligible species alone as such there is no knowledge; therefore neither can there be truth.

The Second Opinion

5. The opinion of others is nevertheless that the truth of knowledge is found not only in composition and division, but also in simple concepts of the mind. This opinion is held by Ferrariensis, I cont. Gent., c. 59 and 60; and Capreolus thinks the same, In I, dist. 19, q. 3, a. 1, concl. 3; Soncinas, VI Metaph., c. 2, q. 17; Aegidius, Quodl. IV, q. 7; Fonseca, lib. IV Metaph., c. 2, q. 6, sect. 4. And it can be proved first from Aristotle, III de Anima, c. 6, at the end, where St. Thomas, lect. 11, says that although the incomplex intelligible is neither true nor false, nevertheless the intellect understanding it is true, insofar as it is adequate to the thing understood. And thus he expounds Aristotle, ibid. saying that the intellect, which is of the what-is from the what-was-to-be, is true, even if it does not, supply,

enunciate or affirm something of something. And it is confirmed by the example that Aristotle there adduces, because he himself had said, II de Anima, c. 6, that sense in the knowledge of its proper sensible is true; but it is established that in sense there is only a simple act or knowledge; therefore much more will there be truth in the simple knowledge of the intellect. Also, lib. IX Metaph., c. 7, text. 21 and 22, where St. Thomas also notes this, lect. 11, saying that in simple things there is truth, through the fact that a thing is known according to its proper quiddity. This opinion is confirmed by reason, because for a thing to be conceived through a simple concept, it is necessary that there be some conformity of the concept to the thing in representing, on account of which Aristotle said, III de Anima, c. 8, that the soul by understanding becomes all things, because through representation it is conformed to all things; therefore that conformity is a certain truth, for the definition of truth fits it.

6. Second, in the divine and angelic intellect there is most perfect truth, and yet in them there is no composition nor division; therefore also in our intellect simply knowing there can be truth. It will perhaps be said from St. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 5, ad 1, and I cont. Gent., c. 59, that although God knows simply, nevertheless by that simple act he judges that it is so or not so, which we judge in a complex way. But against this it is objected from the same St. Thomas in the same c. 59, lib. I cont. Gent., for we also through simple conception judge something about a thing, so that some simple concept virtually contains whatever is judged through a complex concept or through composition. As when I conceive man under the distinct concept of rational animal, and apprehend this as the quiddity of man, there I virtually judge man to be a rational animal and that simple conception virtually contains the whole of what is signified through this enunciation; therefore there will also be proper truth in that simple concept. Third, every thing that is conformed and adequate to its measure and its principles has proper truth; but in a simple concept there is conformity to the object as to its measure and

principle, to which it ought to be conformed; therefore there is truth in it which is none other than the truth of knowledge, since that is the conformity of knowledge.

Two Certain Points Collected from the Said Opinions

7. The foundations of these opinions seem to convince of two things. One is that some truth is found in simple conception of the mind, and not only of the mind but also of the senses. The other is that some truth is found in a proper and special way in the composition of the intellect which is not found in simple knowledge of the intellect. And the first indeed is established first from the adduced testimonies of Aristotle and St. Thomas, and from the same St. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 2 et seq., and I cont. Gent., c. 59, and other places which Ferrariensis there adduces. Second, from the common way of speaking; for we rightly say that he forms a true concept of man who apprehends him as a rational animal, and so of the concepts of other things. Third, because these concepts of the mind are certain things or qualities; if therefore there is truth in other things, as we shall show below, it is also necessary that there be truth in these concepts; whence, just as true gold is said to be that which has the proper nature of gold, so a true concept of gold will be said to be that which has an entity commensurate with true gold in representing intentionally, and the like is the case with the rest. And hence it is also established what or what kind this truth is which is found in simple knowledge of the mind; for it is nothing other than transcendental truth itself, accommodated to these beings. For, if the truth which they call in being is an adequate property of being, as we shall say, it will be found in each being according to the mode of its nature; therefore also in these beings which are simple concepts of the mind. Whence, because the proper being of these concepts is the being of knowledge and consequently formally to render knowing the one in whom they

inhere, therefore the truth of such a concept is also the truth of knowledge.

8. Second, namely, that truth and falsehood are found in composition and division in a special way is proved. For not without cause did Aristotle in the cited places specially say that truth and falsehood are found in composition of the mind alone; since this cannot be true of all truth and falsehood, as is established from the prior point, it is necessary that truth be in such composition in some proper and peculiar way, so that the doctrine of Aristotle may also be true. And thus St. Thomas clearly thought in the same cited places, especially in the first part. Second, this is established from the common way of feeling and speaking; because then someone is censured to have true knowledge of a thing when he knows and judges that it is so or not so as it is or is not in the thing, which men do not do except by composing or dividing. Whence, just as in speaking truth or falsehood is in propositions in a singular way because no one is censured to speak truly or falsely until he enunciates a proposition, so also in the mind there will be truth and falsehood in composition and division in a special way. Third, the same can be shown from the contrary, because falsehood properly is not found in a simple concept of the mind, but in composition or division, as I shall explain more broadly in the following disputation; therefore it is a sign that truth also, to which falsehood and deception are opposed, is found in a special way in composite knowledge.

The Point of Difficulty & Various Ways of Resolving It

9. The difficulty, however, is in explaining what this special way is by which truth is said to be found in composition. For some are content to say that complex truth is found only in composition, but incomplex truth in simple knowledge. But this is nothing to say, nor does it explain the matter; for by the same reasoning it could be said

that truth is found in simple knowledge in a special way, because it is found in that only incomplexly. Also, because from this it is not obtained that truth is otherwise in composite knowledge, formally speaking, than in other things, but only as it were materially, that it is in that in a mode accommodated to it; but this is common to all other things; therefore on account of this cause alone it was not the case that the truth of knowledge should be attributed to composition alone in a special way. The assumption is declared by examples, for truth is also otherwise in man, for example, than in an angel, for in man there is truth through composition (I speak of entitative truth), but in an angel there is simple truth, in man it is material, but in an angel immaterial, and the like is the case in other beings; for individual things are true with truth accommodated to themselves, and nevertheless not on account of this is truth said to be in one in a special way more than in others; but it is said absolutely to be common to all with transcendental commonality; therefore, if in composition of the mind nothing else singular is found except this alone, that just as the being of such knowledge is composite, so also its truth is complex, there is no reason why truth should be said to be found in composition alone with a singular title.

10. Others therefore respond that truth is found in simple knowledge, but not falsehood, at least regularly and per se speaking; but in composition and division truth and falsehood are found indifferently and therefore Aristotle specially asserted that truth and falsehood are found in composition and division alone. But this neither sufficiently declares the matter itself, nor Aristotle's way of speaking. For, if truth is so found in a simple concept that falsehood is not found in it, but in composition truth and falsehood are found indifferently, it should rather have been said that truth is in some way proper to simple concepts, but falsehood is found in composition alone, or at most it should have been said that composition is indifferent to truth and falsehood, not that it is as it were the proper receptive of both. And finally (as I was saying) this very thing, namely,

that in simple apprehension there is truth of such a kind to which no falsehood is opposed in such a subject, but in composition there is found truth to which opposed falsehood can be present, indicates that truth is in composition in a special way; for that former is common to all truth in being, as I shall say below; but what this special mode of truth is, is not declared by that indifference alone.

11. It is otherwise customary to say that truth or falsehood is specially attributed to composition and division, because according to it we are said to truly think or to be deceived, which we are not properly said to do by reason of simple concepts. But this indeed (as I was also arguing above) is an indication a posteriori that truth and falsehood are in composition and division in a singular way, but it does not declare the matter a priori, namely, in what this mode consists. For composition is not true or false because according to it we truly or falsely think, but rather on the contrary, because it is true or false, therefore according to it we truly or falsely think; for it is itself the composition that is the form, which just as it communicates its being so also its properties to us.

The Doctrine of St. Thomas on This Matter is Examined

12. St. Thomas therefore, I, q. 16, a. 2, declaring this matter says that truth is singularly attributed to composition and division, because through this operation alone is truth in the intellect as in one knowing truth itself. Thus he signifies that through simple knowledge there is truth in the intellect, only as in one knowing a thing apprehended by such knowledge, but not as in one knowing truth itself; but through composition there is truth in the intellect, not only as in one knowing a thing, but also as in one knowing truth itself. For truth consists in conformity. But while the intellect composes, it compares the thing as simply conceived in one way to the being of the thing itself, and knows the conformity which they have between

themselves, and therefore it knows not only the thing but also the truth, and for this reason truth is said to be in composition and division in a singular way. And this is the same as what others say, that truth is indeed subjectively not only in composition, but also in simple knowledge, but objectively it is only in composition and division.

13. But this response has no small difficulty, because the discourse is either about direct or about reflexive knowledge. If about direct, it is not true that in direct composition and division there is truth objectively and much less falsehood. Nor also is it true that the intellect composing and dividing not only conceives the thing but also its truth. This is proved, because when the intellect composes that man is white and knows this directly, it does not compare its concept to some thing, nor the thing to the concept in order to know truth, but only compares one thing to another, in order to know the conjunction of them among themselves, which is to compose; therefore. Whence that way of arguing seems fallacious, that because the intellect then compares one to another, therefore it is said to compare and know the conformity in which truth consists, because it does not compare the formal concept to the thing nor the thing to the concept, but compares the thing conceived to another or to itself. Whence it does not happen that through such composition it knows truth, but only that being of the thing which founds truth, according to that of Aristotle: From the fact that the thing is or is not, opinion is true or false; which being is not formally truth although it causes truth in the intellect, as the same St. Thomas said in the said q. 16, a. 1, ad 3. And it is confirmed, for it is one thing when the intellect composing says: Man is white, but another when it says: That man is white is true; for this latter composition is reflexive and therefore in that there is truth objectively, because it is formally known through that. But truly the prior conception is only direct, and does not have the same object as the posterior; therefore through that truth is not formally known, nor is it in that objectively.

14. But if it is said that the discourse is about reflexive knowledge, it follows first that it is not universally true what Aristotle says that truth and falsehood are found in composition and division; but the consequent is false, because, just as every vocal enunciation is true or false, so also mental composition or division. Whence through all of that we either truly or falsely think. Second, it follows that there is no difference, because also through simple reflexive knowledge truth can be formally and truly conceived; for just as we simply conceive what man is, so also we can simply conceive what truth is and through a simple concept we can conceive the conformity between concept and thing in the manner of a certain relation; then therefore there will also be truth objectively in simple knowledge; therefore there is no such difference as mentioned.

15. It can be replied that the doctrine of St. Thomas should be understood about composition and division which is made through direct knowledge, for it is certain that in every such composition proper truth or falsehood is found. But to the objection made against this, if the opinion of Durandus were true that truth is the conformity of the thing as it is in the objective being of the intellect to itself as it is in the thing, there would be an easy response by saying that the intellect, when it composes, compares the objective concept of one thing to another or to itself otherwise or previously conceived; and thus knows the conformity between them, and therefore is said to know truth. And in this way St. Thomas seems to have declared this matter, I cont. Gent., c. 59, in the 1st reason, saying: "Since the truth of the intellect is the adequation of intellect and thing, according to which the intellect says that to be which is or not to be which is not, to that in the intellect does truth pertain which the intellect says, not to the operation by which it says it; for it is not required for the truth of the intellect that the very understanding of the thing be adequate, since the thing is sometimes material, but understanding immaterial, but that which the intellect by understanding says and knows must be equal to the thing, namely, that it be so in the thing, as the intellect

says." According to this interpretation therefore it is easily understood that through direct compositive knowledge the conformity in which truth consists is known.

16. But this response, if nothing else is added, cannot satisfy us. First because that opinion of Durandus was rejected by us above, nor is it likely that St. Thomas in the cited words intended that sense, as is clear from the reason which he adduces, that it is not necessary that the understanding be adequate to the thing; because sometimes the thing is material and understanding immaterial. Where it is clearly established that he speaks of understanding, as to the agreement which it has with the thing understood in the being of being and its conditions, and not of the agreement which it has in the reason of representing and represented. And thus Ferrariensis there, distinguishing between understanding and the concept or word of the mind, and thinking that understanding is not representative of the thing, but the concept or word represents it, expounds St. Thomas as speaking of the concept itself or word and in that constituting conformity or truth, not in the understanding itself. But I think, if we speak properly, that understanding is formally made through the word itself or concept as informing the intellect, and therefore the word as word cannot be conformed in representing to the thing of which it is the word, without the intellect also, insofar as it formally understands through the word, becoming conformed to the same thing. St. Thomas therefore could not exclude this conformity in the reason of representing, but only conformity in being. In the same sense therefore must be understood what he says a little above: that truth pertains to that which the intellect says, not to the operation by which it says it. For the sense is that truth does not pertain to that operation as materially taken, as it is a certain spiritual quality, but formally insofar as it refers to the intellect the thing which is said through it or insofar as in representative being it contains the thing known.

17. Second, that opinion is not rightly applied to explaining the present difficulty, because when the intellect composes, either on

the part of the predicate it enunciates the thing as it is in itself or as objectively conceived. If the first is said, therefore through that comparison it does not know the conformity of the thing, as objectively conceived, to itself as it is in itself, in which truth was said to consist, and thus it will not know truth. But if the second is said, therefore also on the part of the subject there is no comparison to the thing as it is in itself, but as objectively conceived, because there is no greater reason for the predicate than for the subject; for the intellect compares both, as they are conceived by it, so that composition is as it were a certain collation of simple objective concepts and knowledge of the conjunction which they have in themselves; therefore neither in this way is truth conceived as explained by Durandus, because the conformity of the thing in objective being to itself in the thing is not known, but conformity, or identity, or union between one and another thing as both are in objective being. Third, that mode can much less be applied to falsehood; for, when through composition one thing is falsely affirmed of another, the difformity which is between them is not known, but rather the conformity which is not in the thing is known or conceived; therefore then falsehood is not objectively in such knowledge or composition of the intellect.

The Mind of St. Thomas & the Matter Itself is Explained According to It

18. It must therefore be said that it is not the mind of St. Thomas, when the intellect composes or divides formally and in the signate act (as Cajetan there well distinguished) to know truth and that conformity in which truth formally consists; for the objection made convinces that this cannot be verified in this sense. St. Thomas therefore understands that when the intellect composes or divides, in the exercised act it knows that in which truth consists and consequently affirms or denies truth itself or falsehood. And for this special reason truth is said to be properly in composition and division.

But what it is to know or affirm truth in the exercised act can be declared thus: for our intellect through one simple concept does not conceive adequately, nor does it exhaust distinctly and clearly the thing conceived, as God or angels do, and therefore after it has in some way confusedly and inadequately conceived it, in order that it may know it distinctly and adequately, it attributes to it several predicates either really or only rationally distinct. Just as Aristotle said of words that because we cannot bring things to the schools, we use terms for things, and therefore when we affirm one thing of another, we do not do this externally, except by means of the word signifying and insofar as it is signifying, so when we mentally affirm one thing of another, although we principally intend to affirm thing of thing, nevertheless we do not do this except through concepts insofar as they naturally represent things to us. And hence it happens that, while we compose one thing conceived with another or with itself otherwise conceived, comparing the thing itself simultaneously in the exercised act we compare our concept as representing that thing. As, for example, when the intellect composing says that man is white, it formally and directly knows the identity or conjunction which white has with man; but simultaneously in the exercised act it knows that the concept of white in some way contains man under itself and represents him and consequently is in some way conformed to him. And thus while the mind affirms that man is white, in the exercised act it affirms truth or that this is true, because while it affirms that white is in man it affirms that the concept of white has some true conformity with man. And in this sense St. Thomas said, in the said a. 2, that the intellect knows the conformity of itself to the intelligible thing, when it judges that the thing is so as is the form which it apprehends of the thing, which it does by composing and dividing; not that, when the intellect composes it judges the thing to be so, as is the form which formally or inherently is in the intellect, but that it judges it to be so as is the form apprehended through the intellect, and consequently in the exercised act it judges the thing to be so as is the form or concept formally

representing in the intellect, because the formal concept, as representing, is considered as one thing with the thing represented and because the intellect does not compare the thing represented except as conceived by itself. In this way therefore it is rightly understood why truth is said to be specially in our intellect knowing by means of composition and division; for through simple concepts the intellect in no way knows conformity, whence it neither properly affirms nor thinks truth, as it does when it composes simple concepts. Whence, although both composition and simple apprehension of things is absolutely direct knowledge, nevertheless if we compare composition to simple apprehension, it is in some way as it were reflexive upon it as in the very exercise, because through composition a collation is made between simple concepts, by reason of which there is truth in it, in the aforesaid special way.

The Opposing Arguments are Resolved

19. And through these things the response to the foundations of the aforesaid opinions is clear, which we do not think are contrary to each other if they are rightly understood, as we have explained, and the authors themselves truly expound, as is clearly established from St. Thomas and Cajetan above. But Ferrariensis, who opposes Cajetan, either did not want to understand him and St. Thomas, or explains the same thing only in different words. The foundations therefore of each opinion, insofar as they confirm them in the true sense, are to be admitted; but it remains to be declared how in another sense they are not repugnant to them. To the testimonies of Aristotle therefore adduced in the first place it is replied that Aristotle there speaks of truth existing in our intellect as knowing truth itself in some way. Whence to the first argument it is replied that words must be spoken of in the same proportion as concepts; for in a simple and incomplex word there is truth of the sign as in having it in the manner of transcendental truth or in being; for this word "man" both signifies

true man and can be called a true sign of man; nevertheless in a simple word there is not truth as in signifying truth as it is in complex enunciation, which while it signifies this to be that, consequently signifies and as it were in the exercised act conformity and truth, as has been explained of concepts. To the second, which touches the matter of falsehood, it will be said more clearly in the following disputation. Now it is replied that, of the three members there enumerated, that one is to be chosen by which it is said that simple concepts are so true that they are not properly false, as the arguments made there sufficiently prove. Nor indeed is it necessary that in every subject where one of the opposites can be, the other also can be. Especially because since truth is in simple apprehension in another way than in composition, for that reason it can happen that that truth is such that it does not have opposed falsehood. But why this is so, and why rather the truth of composition can have proper opposed falsehood will be clear from what is to be said. But what is touched upon in the last confirmation about the intelligible species will be declared immediately. To the foundations of the second opinion nothing need be added; for they only prove that in simple conception there is truth as in having it, not as in knowing it. Only concerning the second it must be noted from what has been said that there is not the same reason for the simple knowledge of God or angels; for they through a simple concept perfectly judge about the thing and that it is so as it is known, or that there is in it what is judged and known about it. Indeed that simple judgment is such (especially if the discourse is about the divine), that through it there is also most perfectly known every conformity which can be between it and the thing known, and therefore there is no similarity concerning that simple knowledge.

SECTION IV

WHETHER THE TRUTH OF KNOWLEDGE OR INTELLECT IS NOT IN IT UNTIL IT JUDGES

1. Before judgment there can be understood in the intellect the power of understanding itself, the intelligible species (under which I comprehend the other habits), the very act of cognition insofar as it is in becoming, and apprehension itself. Therefore, it can first be doubted whether this truth can be said to be in the intelligible species, or in the act, or in the concept, or in the habit, or in the very power of understanding. For St. Thomas, I Contra Gentiles, chapter 59, reason 1, in the words cited above, signifies that it is only in the concept or word of the mind, where Ferrara so understands him, and adds that it is not in the act of understanding, because it is not an image nor does it represent the object. Hence he infers that truth is in the intellect by order of nature prior to the intellect's knowing the thing through the concept represented, because by order of nature the action of the intellect is terminated to the concept prior to its knowing the thing represented in it. In this sense St. Thomas seems to have said, q. 1 De Veritate, a. 1, that cognition is an effect of truth. Concerning the intelligible species, however, he says that truth is in it insofar as it also represents the object and according to that representation has conformity with it, though in an imperfect mode, insofar as the representation of the species is imperfect and insofar as habit is compared to act as imperfect to perfect. But concerning the very power of understanding and its judicative habit which holds itself on the part of the power, he says nothing; nevertheless, consistently he would also say that truth is not in them, because they do not represent the object.

2. But we must suppose here that there is only discourse about the truth of cognition. We believe, however, that cognition is made formally through the concept or word of the mind as informing the intellect itself; but that the concept or word of the mind is not really distinguished from the act of understanding insofar as it is something made by the intellect or a quality in having been made; but that intellection, insofar as it is action in becoming, is distinguished

modally from the word as action or dependence is usually distinguished from the term. Since therefore cognition simply signifies actual cognition, the truth of cognition absolutely and simply is in the concept or word or act of understanding in having been made, because all these are the same and signify the form by which the intellect becomes actually knowing, as if we were to say that the truth of the hot as such is in heat. But in the action of understanding as such there is indeed not the truth of cognition, because that action is not cognition simply but a way to cognition; nevertheless, in the mode in which it is, it has its truth, just as heating, although it does not have the truth of heat, nevertheless has the truth of heating because it is a true tendency toward heat; for thus the action of understanding is also a true tendency toward cognition of the thing. And although it is said not to represent by mode of form, it nevertheless represents by mode of way, because it is a tendency toward true representation; therefore the truth of cognition can be said to be in becoming in the act of understanding as it is action. But in the intelligible species there is not the truth of cognition except as in a principle and first act; nevertheless there is in it proper entitative truth, by reason of which the intelligible species is said to be true of such an object. To this it matters not whether the intelligible species represents formally as an image, or only effectively and virtually as a seed of the object, because in whatever way it represents, according to that it can have its truth through due commensuration to such an object, just as the seed of man does not indeed have in itself the truth of human nature except virtually or instrumentally, but nevertheless has the truth of human seed according to due proportion and relation to such a nature or action. By which it also happens that the power of understanding or light of intellect or the habit perfecting it, formally and properly do not have per se the truth of cognition of which we treat, as is evident per se; nevertheless they have their accommodated truth which can radically be called truth of cognition, insofar as the intellectual light is

true to that extent that it of itself inclines toward true cognition of the thing; and the same is true in its own way of habit.

3. From this it is finally understood that what was said is false, that truth is by nature prior in the concept of the mind or in the intellect through the concept, than the intellect actually understands, because the concept of the mind or word is not by nature prior to its being in the intellect; for it is not made except through eduction from its potency and therefore is not made in any sign of nature in which it is not united to the intellect, so that the intellect can concur to its production by mode of active and receptive potency; therefore the word does not by nature prior have truth than it formally communicates it to the intellect; therefore neither is truth by nature prior in it than the intellect is actually knowing. The last consequence is evident, because the intellect is not otherwise constituted as actually knowing except through information of the word or concept. Therefore the truth of cognition is first and per se in the intellect actually knowing through the word, concept, or act in having been made as through the form by which it actually knows. Hence, what St. Thomas says in the cited place, q. 1 De Veritate, a. 1, that cognition is a certain effect of truth, must be understood either of fundamental truth, which is the very being of the thing from which as object cognition has that it be true, or of the truth of conformity, which is through the intelligible species, or certainly of the formal effect which the true concept gives to the mind.

On Apprehensive Knowledge

4. Second, it can be doubted whether the truth of cognition is in apprehensive knowledge or only in judicative. And the reason for doubting can be because simple knowledge is only apprehensive, and yet we have said that truth is in it. Likewise in the senses there is simple truth, as we said above from Aristotle, and yet in them there is only apprehensive cognition. Finally in apprehensive composition,

even if the intellect does not know how to discern and judge whether there is truth or falsity in it, nevertheless one or the other of these really inheres in such apprehension; for if a vocal proposition is necessarily either true or false, much more so a mental one, even if only apprehensive. But to the contrary is the fact that the intellect is not denominated true or false unless when it judges. For although I may apprehend this proposition "the stars are even," if I doubt and suspend judgment, I am neither false nor true; therefore it is a sign that in that apprehension there is neither truth nor falsity, otherwise it would denominate true or false. Hence where Aristotle says, Metaphysics VI, chapter 2, that truth is in the mind, the Greek word is dianoia, which signifies sentence or intelligence.

5. It is responded that the truth of cognition is properly in judgment and any act of the intellect participates in this truth as much as it participates in judgment. For if the matter is attentively considered, the intellect truly knows nothing until it judges; therefore it cannot be true or false in knowing until it judges; therefore the truth of cognition cannot be except in judgment. The antecedent is manifest in compositive cognition; for when the intellect apprehends composition and suspends assent, it is because it is ignorant whether those extremes are really so joined in the thing as they are apprehended through composition. As in the said example of apprehension of this composition "the stars are even," although the intellect knows in some way what stars are and what an even number is, it nevertheless is entirely ignorant whether those two are joined in the thing and therefore, although it apprehends the composition, it does not judge; but to the contrary it cannot happen that the intellect composes the predicate with the subject by actually knowing their conjunction which they have or are thought to have in the thing, without judging that it is so or is not so. Because if it knows all this, there is nothing that judgment could add. Therefore the judgment of composition consists in that cognition by which it is known that the predicate agrees with the subject, by reason of which we said above

with St. Thomas that truth is in the composing intellect as the known in the knower. Thus therefore the truth of composition is properly only in judicative knowledge.

6. But simple knowledge which is usually called simple apprehension, is capable of some truth insofar as it is cognition and participates in some aspect of judgment. For although conception through simple acts is usually called simple apprehension insofar as the knowing potency forms in itself a likeness of the thing and in some way draws it to itself, and as it is distinguished from proper judgment which is given by us when we compose one thing with another or divide them, nevertheless insofar as that same apprehension is some cognition of the thing, it is also some judgment by which it is implicitly judged that the thing is what we know about it. And in this way in such apprehension or simple cognition of the thing some judgment is included in some way, because since that apprehension is an act of a cognitive potency, something must necessarily be known through it; but what is known, is judged for that reason; for what cannot be judged, is ignored.

7. Therefore to the previous reasons for doubting it is responded that in simple apprehension of the intellect there is some judgment although imperfect, and according to that there is truth of cognition in that act. And the same must be said proportionally about cognition of sense; for when a sheep conceives a wolf and flees, although it has only a simple act, nevertheless it truly knows it as an enemy and thus judges, although in an imperfect mode; and sight while it knows this white thing, also in some way judges this to be white. But if sometimes the intellect or imagination seem to apprehend something simply while judging nothing at all, as when a golden mountain or chimera or something similar is feigned, then something is not apprehended as a true thing but either as possible, at least as to that figure under which it is apprehended, or as imaginable or signifiable through voice; in which way some say that then the signification of the voice is apprehended more than some thing.

Hence then only that is known which would arise if these or those parts were joined, and thus this itself is judged in some way and in the same way there is some simple truth in such apprehension, because truly that object is so apprehended or known as it would arise if those parts were coupled in the thing.

8. Hence to the other part about apprehensive composition it is responded first that mental compositions of this kind which are without judgment are regularly made through concepts of voices rather than of things, because since the conjunction of predicate with subject is not known in the thing itself, it is not apprehended according to the thing, but according to the voice or copula signifying such union. But if it is so, then that apprehensive composition is in the mind, as they call it, not ultimated, and in it there is truth or falsity, not as in cognition but as in a sign only by convention, just as it is in voice or in writing. Then it is said, if this non-judicative apprehension is said to be in some way in the compositive concept of the things themselves, either this is only insofar as through that something is conceived and something else is ignored, or it is apprehended only in order to the signification of the voice. The prior mode will be if I conceive the stars as even and know this to be possible and am ignorant whether it is so. And then as to what is known the cognition is not only apprehensive but also judicative, and consequently either true or false; as to the other however, just as it is not judicative cognition so it is neither true nor false. Indeed it is not even apprehensive by mode of composition of the intellect affirming or denying, but by mode of some simple apprehension of that possible enunciation, about which it is doubted whether it is so or not. For if this is not known through such a concept, namely, that this is possible, I do not see what there could be apprehended by true composition which includes a copula of being present; therefore it can only be apprehended by mode of question whether this is so or is not so and then it is not necessary that there be some truth or falsity there. The posterior mode will be if the extremes of that composition or the

composition in itself is only apprehended insofar as it is something signified by this voice, for example, "the stars are even," and then also the intellect does not apprehend something by affirming or denying but as if simply apprehending this as signified by that voice, whether it is so in the thing or not, and as to that first thing some cognition is involved there and consequently something of simple truth. Thus therefore all truth of cognition, in the mode in which it is, exists in judgment.

SECTION V.

WHETHER THE TRUTH OF COGNITION IS ONLY IN SPECULATIVE INTELLECT OR ALSO IN PRACTICAL

1. The reason for doubting can be taken from a certain common doctrine indicated by St. Thomas, I, q. 16, a. 1 and other places, that truth expresses conformity of cognition to the thing known as of the measured to the measure, according to that of Aristotle: "From the fact that a thing is or is not, a proposition is true or false." From this therefore it seems to follow that truth is properly only in speculative science, because speculative science alone is measured from its object, for practical science is rather the measure of its object; therefore a thing made by art is true because it is conformed to art. But St. Thomas touched on the reason in that place, because a thing understood can have a twofold order to the intellect, namely per se and per accidens; per se it has order to the intellect on which it depends, per accidens to the intellect on which it does not depend but is only known. In the prior way the effects of art depend on art and created things on God, and therefore they are not things that are measures of cognition but rather the contrary; therefore in such cognition there is no truth, but rather in things, insofar as they are commensurated to it. But in the posterior way things are compared to

speculative science and therefore in this cognition there will be truth only insofar as it is commensurated to the thing known. But to the contrary is the fact that also in practical cognitions and judgments there is truth or falsity; for who would deny that in composition and division which is made in practical things, not only moral and agible but also in factible things, there is most proper truth and falsity? or how could practical sciences be true sciences if there were not truth in them? Therefore they have not only truth, but also their principles known per se and conclusions evidently true. Likewise, if we speak not of complex truth but of incomplex, also the idea of the artificer if it is proper and adequate to the thing to be effected through art is maximally true, and so much the more as it is not only true itself, but is also the cause of the truth of the artifact. Finally in the science which God has of creatures there is most perfect truth, although it is also the measure of creatures.

2. Therefore it must be said that truth is not only in speculative intellect but also in practical, insofar as there is in it cognition of things to be done or to be effected, as the posterior arguments prove and Aristotle teaches, Ethics VI, chapter 2, and it is a matter sufficiently known per se. But to the reason to the contrary it can be responded in two ways: first by denying that truth always and rigorously expresses the relation of measured to measure, otherwise God could not be called true because he is not measured, even by his own science; therefore it seems to suffice any relation of conformity whether that be of measured to measure or conversely of measure to measured. But this response does not seem to be conformed to the common mode of thinking and speaking about truth; for all judge that the truth of cognition is in the intellect insofar as it is conformed to the thing understood and consequently is the relation of the measured or behaves in the mode of it.

3. Therefore it is responded second that practical cognition can be compared to the object in two ways, in one way in the aspect of cognition, in another way in the aspect of cause, either efficient or

exemplar, as is the idea of the artificer. And indeed in this posterior way practical cognition just as it is a cause, so it is the measure of its object, as it has the aspect of an effect of it and therefore as such it is not properly denominated true, but efficacious or sufficient to cause an effect in its genus; but in the prior way practical cognition is true; hence under that aspect it is compared to its object as measured to measure, because under that precise consideration it is not the cause of it but mere cognition, which, as such, is only intentional representation of the object and therefore has truth insofar as it is commensurated to it. This can also be declared in this way: for science as science, even if it be practical, abstracts from the existence of the object and is true, even if it effects or causes nothing; if therefore practical science is compared to the object according to itself and as it abstracts from existence, thus it is not the measure of it because it is not the cause of it as such; therefore such science is rather measured by the object considered according to its own nature and essence and through conformity to that has its truth. This can easily be persuaded both in artificial and in moral matters; for the science or art of building therefore dictates that a house is to be constructed in this proportion, figure, etc. because the perfection of the house according to itself and as if its nature demands it, considering the end to which it is ordered and the properties which it requires, as, for example, that it be useful, strong, beautiful. And dialectic, insofar as it imitates practical sciences, therefore dictates that a syllogism is to be constructed in such a mode and figure, because the nature of the syllogism demands this. Therefore according to itself and abstracting from existence, a thing made by art is not to be constructed as such because science or art dictates this, but rather science or art dictates this and proposes such an idea of such an artifact because it itself demands such perfection in order to its end. The same can be seen in moral matters, for the mean of temperance, for example, does not consist in such a thing because moral philosophy or prudence dictates it, but rather to the contrary, moral science dictates it because it is such in itself and requires such

proportion. And therefore I said in I-II that practical moral truth is not taken from right appetite as from a measure, but rather conversely it itself is the measure of right appetite. But the general reason is because practical science also insofar as it is science, rests on first principles known per se, which are principally taken from the definition of the object and its first property; but these according to themselves and abstracting from existence belong to the object from its intrinsic nature without causality of such science. Therefore the truth of this science as it is cognition, is measured from the object considered according to essential being. But because that same object as to existence is an effect of such science, according to that state it is measured by that science and in this way we say that a house is rightly constructed because it is according to the rules or idea of art.

4. You will say: just as abstractive science is compared to the object abstracting from existence, so intuitive science to an existing object; therefore just as that is measured by the object according to itself, so this by the existing object; therefore under no aspect is the object measured by science. It is responded by conceding the antecedent with the first consequence and denying the second, because practical science is not the cause of its existing object as it is intuitive cognition of it; for this is not properly science of which we treat but experience, nor is it properly and per se practical but mere cognition, because it is not active of the object but supposes it made. Therefore the same proper science which considers the object according to itself and as it abstracts from existence, applied by the will to work is the cause of it, and thus also is the measure of the work made and existing.

5. But there still remains a difficulty about the science of God; for it follows that the science of God, as true, is measured by its object. It is responded that the science of God can be compared either to God himself, or to creatures. With respect to himself it cannot according to reality have a measure, because it is not distinguished from himself or from his object; therefore it is above all measure and

true through itself, indeed it is truth itself; but according to reason it is so, for therefore God has true and adequate science of himself because he is in reality as he knows himself. Nor is this against the perfection or immensity of God, because this is not to be measurable properly or truly, but is rather to be such through himself and to be equal to himself; just as for God to be comprehensible by himself does not conflict with his perfection, but pertains to greater perfection. But if that science is compared to created things insofar as it is practical science and cause of them as they are existing, thus it is established that it is not measured by them, but is rather their measure and does not have truth from them, but rather they are true insofar as they are conformed to the divine ideas, as we will say immediately. But considering divine science only as it is simple intelligence of creatures according to essential being or possible or insofar as it is intuitive vision of existence, thus it seems that without inconvenience it can be conceded that also the truth of that science consists in conformity to those objects; for according to this precise consideration it is not the cause of such objects, but mere intuition and as if speculation, and therefore according to the same consideration it is not the case that the thing is of such essence because it is so known by God, but conversely, therefore it is so known because it is of such essence, nor could it be truly known otherwise. And similarly the saints and grave theologians say that it is not the case that a thing is future because God intuits it as future, but because it is future therefore God intuits it. Origen, book VII On the Epistle to the Romans, around those words of chapter 8: "Those whom he called, he also justified"; Jerome, Dialogue III against Pelagius, and On chapter 16 of Isaiah, 26 Jeremiah, 2 Ezekiel; Chrysostom, Homily LX on Matthew; Bede, book of Various Questions, question 13; Augustine signifies, book V of the City of God, chapter 20; many Scholastics, On I, distinction 38.

6. Nevertheless, so that we may speak properly and chastely, we ought not to say that divine science under these considerations is measured by these objects, both because God so has science of these

objects as not to receive it from them, but to have it from himself, and from the intrinsic and from the force of his essential perfection to have all rectitude and infallibility of it. Also because that science so attains these secondary objects as to have no true relation or real disposition to them, but God attains all those things in a more eminent way through the fact that he comprehends himself. Because therefore in the notion of measure and measured contrary imperfections can be indicated, therefore it cannot be said that the science of God is measured by these objects, even if it is not true without conformity with them.

SECTION VI

WHETHER THERE IS TRUTH EQUALLY IN DIVISION AS IN COMPOSITION

1. Since we have said that the truth of cognition is in a special way in composition and division, it will be worthwhile to explain whether it is equally in both or more in composition than in division. For this latter seems to be the case, because in composition when one thing is affirmed of another, the intellect knows the conformity of one with the other and therefore in that cognition objectively there is truth in the mode explained above; but truly in division the intellect rather knows that that concept which it denies of another thing does not have conjunction or conformity with it; therefore through that act it does not know truth but rather the negation of truth; therefore truth is not objectively in division as it is in composition. But to the contrary is the fact that Aristotle and St. Thomas and with them the other Doctors equally attribute truth to division as to composition. Likewise because it is as true that a thing is not what it is not as that it is what it is; therefore the intellect is as true in knowing or composing that negation as in composing this affirmation.

2. Therefore it must be said that truth is found as truly and properly in division as in composition. For a negative vocal proposition is as simply and properly true as an affirmative one; therefore the division which corresponds in the mind is as true as composition. Hence (arguing theologically) it is as much of faith that God is not corporeal as that he is eternal; therefore both judgments are equally certain; therefore also equally true although one is made by dividing, the other by composing.

3. But to the argument it is responded that truth (as I said above) is not objectively in composition and division such that it is formally and properly known through it, but only implicitly, because while one objective concept is compared to another, in exercised act the conformity between thing and concept is in some way known. Therefore just as in composition this conformity is known, so in division the difformity or disagreement of those objective concepts is known of which one is denied of the other, and consequently in exercised act the difformity between the formal concepts of those objects is known and also virtually the conformity is known which each of those concepts has with its object. For when the mind conceives that man is not lion, it also implicitly knows that the concept which it has of man does not agree with lion, but that a proper concept corresponds to each. And in this way also in division the cognition of truth or conformity is included not indeed of those extremes among themselves of which one is denied of the other, but of each of them with its concept; for the truth of that negation is founded in this. Or second and more briefly it can be said: just as to know conformity as it is is true, so also to know difformity as it is is true; and this itself is signified through division and known in exercised act, and therefore truth is most properly in division just as in composition.

SECTION VII

WHETHER THERE IS ANY TRUTH IN THINGS THAT IS A PROPERTY OF BEING

1. This question is principally intended in this disputation, for we have presented the rest in order to explain the truth of being. It seems, therefore, that it cannot be the case that any truth is a property of real being. First, indeed, from Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, at the end, saying that the true and the false are not in things but in the mind, and in this establishing the difference that good and evil are in things, but not the true and the false, which are only in the mind. Second, because the true adds either nothing above being, or only an extrinsic denomination; therefore it can in no way be a property of being. The consequence is proved, because if it adds nothing, it is nothing other than being itself and consequently is no more a property of it than being itself is a property of itself. But if it adds only an extrinsic denomination, this cannot suffice for the nature of a property of being; both because otherwise infinite properties of this kind could be multiplied, since infinite denominations of this kind can exist; and also because this denomination is common to non-beings or beings of reason; for just as gold is called true gold, so a relation of reason can be called a true being of reason and (as we were saying recently) so negation has truth just as affirmation does; therefore truth cannot be a property of real being (which we are discussing) by reason of this denomination. Finally, because otherwise falsity could also be called a property of real being; for just as being can be truly known, so also falsely; therefore just as it is denominated true from the former, so it can be denominated false from the latter.

2. The first antecedent of this reasoning is declared and proved; for when some being, for example, gold, is called true gold, such denomination can be or be understood in two ways. First, that it be entirely absolute and intrinsic, and in this way it can add nothing to such being, but only more fully explain its entity and reality, because in this way to be true gold is nothing other than not to be merely apparent or fictitious but to have the proper and real nature and essence of gold. But this is nothing other than to be gold; therefore to

be true gold, with regard to this denomination, adds nothing above being gold. And by the same reasoning, universally, to be a true real being expresses no other concept than to be a real being, that is, not fictitious nor chimerical. For this reason we said above that thing (res) adds nothing above real being, because it expresses nothing except having a fixed essence, which is nothing other than having a real essence and is the same as saying a true essence. And taking the denomination of the true in this sense, Augustine seems to have spoken in Book II of the Soliloquies, chapter 5, that the true is that which is, not that which seems, or that which is such as it seems; because, even if a thing is not seen nor has conformity with any knowledge, it is nonetheless true; in which he signifies that truth is not an extrinsic denomination. And in the same sense fits the definition of Avicenna saying: "The truth of each thing is the property of its being which has been established for it." For when he says it is a property, he does not take that word as it usually signifies a passion or some faculty, but signifies being proper, that is, not foreign nor alien, which adds nothing above being itself but can be explained in the manner of a relation of identity; for in this way a relation of property can be spoken of; for in this way each thing has that being which is its own or which has been established for it, and this itself is to have the truth of such being.

3. But in another way that denomination can be taken not as absolute and intrinsic, but as coming from elsewhere, and in this way it cannot be except an extrinsic denomination of the thing, namely, that it is truly enunciated or is enunciable. This St. Thomas seems to have understood, I, q. 16, a. 1, saying that the true names that toward which the intellect tends, and that it is in the intellect according as it is conformed to the thing understood, and is derived from the intellect to the thing understood, which is called true according as it has some order to the intellect. But it is clear that from the conformity of the intellect to the thing there results only an extrinsic denomination in the thing known. Hence in article 6 St. Thomas expressly says that all

created things are denominated true by one and the same truth, namely, the truth of the divine intellect, from which nevertheless they can only be extrinsically denominated. And in the solution to objection 2 he confirms this from Anselm, Book On Truth, chapter 11, saying that as time relates to temporal things, so truth relates to true things; which St. Thomas understands of one common time, from which it is clear that temporal things are only extrinsically denominated. Finally, it is evident by reason, because either it is true because it conforms to the intellect, or because the intellect conforms to it. The first cannot be said, because rather from the fact that the thing is or is not, the intellect is true; otherwise we would fall into the error of philosophers saying that nothing is true except what is understood. But if the second is said, it clearly follows that it is only an extrinsic denomination, because for the intellect to conform to the thing places nothing in the thing except only to be truly known. But beyond these two nothing else can be devised, because by the common consensus of all, all truth is taken from the conformity of intellect and thing. And it is confirmed, because falsity in things can be nothing except extrinsic denomination; therefore neither can truth; for of opposites the nature is the same or proportional. On the contrary, however, is the fact that, as Aristotle testifies, Metaphysics II, chapter 1, as each thing is, so also is it true; by which words he signifies that truth so accompanies being that according to the degree and nature of entity there is in each thing a degree of truth; therefore it is a sign that truth accompanies being as its property.

Whether Transcendental Truth Exists

4. In this matter it is established that the denomination of the true is customarily attributed to things; for thus we are accustomed to say that there is true gold so that we may distinguish it from the apparent, and a true man so that we may distinguish him from a painted one, and the true God so that we may separate him from false

ones, and in this way not only sacred and profane writings speak, but also all men universally. Hence it becomes entirely clear that the same appellation of the true can be attributed to any real being, either so that it may be separated from fictitious and imaginary being, or so that it may be judged to have the proper essence of such a thing in its species and nature; for regarding these two points the nature of this appellation is the same in all beings. And hence it is also manifest that the true under some aspect is an attribute of being and is convertible with it. But in order that it may be declared what sort of denomination this is, it is necessary before all else to explain what this truth is which is attributed to being, so that from this it may be established how it can be a property of it and be convertible with it. Therefore various modes of explaining truth can be devised.

The First Opinion Concerning What It Is, Disproved

5. The first is that transcendental truth signifies some real absolute property distinguished from being by reasoned reason (ratione ratiocinata). Thus some modern Thomists think, at I, q. 16, and they believe it to be the opinion of St. Thomas, q. 1 On Truth, a. 8; Capreolus, In I, dist. 19, q. 3, concl. 3; Soncinas, VI Metaphysics, q. 17; Javellus, tract. on Transcendentals, c. 5. It is proved, because truth is a real perfection; therefore it expresses a real nature, not a relative one; therefore an absolute one; and it is not a synonymous name signifying the same thing as entity; therefore it expresses a perfection at least distinguished by reason from entity. The first antecedent is clear, both because for a thing to be true is not something fictitious—indeed, this very thing seems to be excluded by the name of truth; and also because all things are true of themselves and not from the consideration of the intellect; and moreover because truth in God is a great perfection and that is the measure of created truth; and finally because since truth is a property of being, it cannot not be a real

perfection. That it is not relative will be easily proved below. That finally truth and entity are not the same as synonyms is established from the common mode of conceiving of all and from the diverse definitions by which their objective concepts are explained by us; it is therefore necessary that they be distinguished at least by reasoned reason. Indeed, according to the opinion of Scotus treated above when we were dealing with these properties in general, it would have to be said that they are distinguished formally from the nature of the thing.

6. But in this opinion and in all the following ones it should be observed that it is one thing to speak of the whole of that which truth includes in being, another thing indeed of that which truth adds above entity or (which is the same thing) the true above being. In the former way we admit that the truth of real beings expresses a real perfection, as the arguments made prove, and others by which we showed above that unity does not express mere negation, but entity under negation; for thus now it must be asserted that truth does not express only an extrinsic nature or one fabricated by the intellect, but is entity signified under some other aspect, either by adding something, which we are now investigating. In this sense, therefore, the said opinion is true, and truly St. Thomas, Capreolus, and the older Thomists intend nothing else, but the moderns seem to signify more.

7. In another way, therefore, it can be understood that truth adds to being, above the nature of essence or entity, an absolute and real property. And in this sense I judge the aforesaid opinion to be false. And first, if it is understood of a perfection distinguished from the nature of the thing, it can be sufficiently proved, both by the arguments made above against Scotus concerning the properties of being in general, and from what was said above concerning distinctions from the nature of the thing. For here there cannot intervene a real distinction of thing from thing, as all confess, because there is no foundation for feigning such a distinction; nor can there be a modal distinction, both because no indication of distinction

between such a mode and being can be devised—for they are entirely inseparable so that they can scarcely even be prescinded by the intellect, as I shall immediately say. And also because no thing is understood to be true through a superadded mode, but through its entity, which if it has, even if you separate every other mode, you will understand that a true thing remains either in the nature of being or in the nature of such being as is apt to be constituted by such entity. And this reasoning applied with proportion proves also that truth cannot add above entity some perfection distinguished by reasoned reason from entity; for if they are so distinguished that neither extreme is included in the precise concept of the other (for thus we speak), let truth be separated by reason from being and I argue concerning both extremes. Being thus prescinded is intelligible insofar as it is from itself, both because it is conceived by the intellect by a direct and proper concept, and also because, as much as each thing has of being, so much it has of intelligibility, as St. Thomas said elsewhere, I, q. 16, a. 3; therefore being in that precise concept includes every real perfection which is required for the nature of the true, because by this very fact that being is intelligible, it is true; for in this sense the true is said to be the object of the intellect, and because between every intelligible being and the intellect there can be conformity. But from the other extreme also an argument is taken; for either truth thus prescinded is understood to include real entity, and thus it is not prescinded in the said way, or it does not include it, and thus it will not express a real perfection. And St. Thomas signified all this, in the said I, q. 16, a. 3, ad 3, saying that although being can be apprehended without the nature of the true being apprehended, that is, including it expressly and formally, nevertheless on the contrary the true cannot be apprehended without the nature of being being apprehended, because being falls under the nature of the true; nor can being be apprehended without the nature of the true following upon that apprehension, that is, without that very being, however precisely conceived, being true and being able to be apprehended under the

nature of the true, even if no absolute perfection is added to it. And he adds an example saying: "And it is similar if we compare the intelligible to being; for being cannot be understood without being being intelligible, but nevertheless being can be understood such that its intelligibility is not understood; and similarly, understood being is true, but nevertheless in understanding being, the true is not understood."

8. Moreover, I argue secondly by inquiring what this absolute perfection is that the true adds above being; for it cannot be understood to be so absolute that it does not include even a transcendental respect or one according to being (secundum dici) (as they call it), as even the aforesaid authors confess from the common concept of all; for all conceive truth through conformity between thing and intellect or in order to it; nor could such an entirely absolute real nature, distinct from the nature of being, in which truth consists, be easily feigned or explained. But if this absolute nature is said to be with a transcendental respect or explained through the mode of a respect, that cannot be except in order to some intellect; but truth as explained through such a respect cannot be other than entity itself with the same respect; nor can it add above it an absolute real nature even distinguished by reason; therefore. The major is proved from the said definition of truth, which declares as it were its primary conception. For truth signifies some adequation and conformity; but not every conformity has the nature of truth—for equality between two things, and likeness, is some conformity, and it is not called truth; therefore truth expresses a special nature of conformity, which cannot be other than that which is taken or explained in order to the intellect. Hence the minor is proved, because this conformity to the intellect can be understood in two ways, namely, actual and aptitudinal. The actual can consist only in this, that the thing is such as it is actually understood; the aptitudinal indeed in this, that the thing is such that it can be understood by a true and proper concept of such a thing. But in neither of these ways is some real absolute perfection added above the

entity of the thing, because to be actually understood adds nothing to the entity of the thing understood as such; therefore neither can for the thing to be such as it is understood add to it an absolute real nature. Again, by this very fact that being is being or such being, if there is power in another to understand, it is apt to be adequated to a true concept; therefore it is not only superfluous, but also impossible that this actual or aptitudinal conformity should add to being some absolute perfection, even one distinguished by reason. Just as it is impossible that in whiteness being apt to be assimilated to another should express an absolute perfection added to the nature of whiteness, and much more impossible is it that actual likeness should add an absolute intrinsic nature to whiteness itself.

The Second Opinion with Various Interpretations is Examined

9. Because of these things, therefore, there can be a second opinion saying that truth adds to being a relation of conformity to the intellect; for this seems to be concluded by the reasoning just made against the preceding opinion. But in explaining this opinion various modes can be devised. One is that it be understood of a relation of actual conformity; for truth seems to signify actual conformity. Another is that it be understood of aptitudinal conformity, and in this way some say that transcendental truth is nothing other than the intelligibility of being, which intelligibility not only expresses an extrinsic denomination from the faculty which the intellective thing has for understanding every being, but on the part of the intelligible thing itself expresses some aptitude so that it may be able to be understood, which adds a relation to the intellect, to which, as much as is from itself, it can conform. Again, some understand this relation to be taken only in order to the divine intellect, because all things depend on that per se, but not on others; indeed, they are compared to those per accidens. Others think it should be taken in order to any

intellect whatsoever, because a thing is of itself intelligible by anyone and thus is of itself apt to conform to all, whence it can express the aforesaid relation to all, just as color insofar as it is visible expresses a relation to every sight, even if it does not depend on it. Finally, some think this relation to be real, since truth is something real and exists in things. Others want it to be a relation of reason, because it does not require the existence or distinction of extremes, which Durandus, Capreolus, Cajetan think, in the places cited and to be cited; and St. Thomas favors this, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 1. Others finally think that relation to be sometimes real, often however of reason, according to the capacity of the extremes, like Soncinas and Javellus, above; Ferrariensis, I Against the Gentiles, c. 60; and St. Thomas favors this, q. 1 On Truth, a. 2, and book I On Interpretation, lect. 5.

10. But so that we may understand what of truth or falsity can be in these modes of speaking, it must be supposed that this opinion (so that it may be distinct from others) should be understood of a proper relation which they call predicamental, if it is real, or similar to it, if it is of reason. For if relation is taken broadly for every transcendental relation or for any denomination whatsoever which arises from the consortium of several things, thus this opinion will in one sense coincide with the preceding one, in another sense indeed with that which we shall treat afterward.

11. A strict relation of reason is not required for transcendental truth. First, therefore, I think that the denomination is not taken from some relation of reason in the said property taken, because truth neither expresses such a relation, nor entity under such a relation. It is proved by the often repeated reasoning, because a property of real being cannot consist in the aforesaid relation, nor formally include it. Then, because such a relation exists only while it is considered or feigned; but the truth of things does not require such fiction; rather, as I was saying above, it has some repugnance with the very name of truth. Also God from eternity is true transcendentally according to the complete and exact nature of truth, and nevertheless

he neither feigns relations of reason, nor can he require them so that he may be and be called true God. Finally, this relation exists only through reflection and comparison of the intellect, before which both this being is true gold, for example, and is known to be such.

12. Real relation is not necessary for transcendental truth. This is proved in God. Second, it seems certain, speaking in general of transcendental truth, as it abstracts from created and uncreated being, that it cannot consist in or formally require a real relation to another, in order to which the denomination of the true is taken. It is clear, because in God transcendental truth cannot include such a relation, because either that truth is considered in God as God is, in which way we say the three persons are one true God; or it is considered in individual persons according to their proper relations, as we grant this to theologians. In the former way God has no real relation, because neither to something outside himself, as is established, nor to something within himself, because true divinity has no distinction in reality from all those things which are within God. Also, because that relation, if there is any, must be to the intellect; either therefore it is to the intellect as causing, and this has no place in true divinity, which has no cause; or it is to the intellect as understanding, and this cannot be a real relation ad intra, since it is of the same to itself. In the latter way also there cannot be a real relation. First, because in God there are no other real relations besides the relations which accompany the origins, in which no others can be founded. Then, because in the Father, for example, that relation of truth cannot be to the intellect as producing, because the person of the Father is not produced, nor as understanding, because it is a relation of the same to itself. Also in the Son, although he is a produced person, the truth of filiation cannot consist in a relation of conformity to the intellect as producing, or, which is the same, as having an idea or exemplar by which such a thing is produced, because the divine Word is not produced through an idea, but is the very image or exemplar naturally produced by the Father. Nor can it express a real relation of conformity to the intellect

as understanding, because thus also in the Word such a relation is of the same to itself. For although the Word is also understood by the Father and it also understands the Father, nevertheless as they understand each other mutually, they are not distinguished from the intellect and from the act by which they understand themselves. And the same reasoning applied with proportion has place in the Holy Spirit. In God, therefore, there is no real relation of conformity in which truth can consist; and consequently neither can the truth of being as it abstracts from created and uncreated require this real relation.

13. Third, even if we speak more restrictedly of created being and its transcendental truth, as those seem to speak who say that the truth of this being consists in conformity to the divine intellect as it contains in itself the exemplars or ideas of created beings, although (I say) we speak of this being, I do not think that this truth consists in any proper and predicamental real relation of such being to the divine idea. Which some prove, because that relation of conformity which is required for truth is common in these beings whether they exist or do not exist; therefore it cannot be a real relation. But this reasoning is not of great moment. First indeed, because perhaps it assumes something false; for as I was saying above, creatures considered only according to essential being do not have the truth of essence from conformity to the divine mind or idea; for man is not of such essence because he is so known by God, but rather is so known essentially because he is such essentially. Then, granted that relation, it will be said to be real with proportion taken; for in created being existing only in potency there is also truth only in potency; therefore in the same way there can be a real relation in potency; but in the same being actually existing, just as there is real truth in act, so also there can be a real relation in act. Otherwise, therefore, it can be proved that that relation is not real, because otherwise there would be a process to infinity in such a relation, for also that relation would have an idea, to which it would be conformable, and that through another relation,

and so to infinity; but this reasoning is common to almost all relations, especially those which are founded in unity, as are likeness, equality, and similar ones.

14. It is proved otherwise, therefore, because it is either a relation of likeness or a relation of effect to cause, which by another name is usually called of the measured to the measure. Not the first, because a relation of likeness properly is only that which is founded in formal unity or agreement; but between creature and the idea which it has in God there is no such formal agreement, but only intentional or ideal, just as between an intentional species and a visible object there is no proper relation of likeness, although there is intentional representation. Nor can the second be said, because the idea or exemplar of the artificer has no other immediate influx into the effect, besides that which the artificer has insofar as he is a perfect efficient cause, nor through another action except that by which he is efficient, because the exemplar, as such, has no other causality than to direct the action of the agent; therefore in the effect there results no other relation except that which follows from the force of the action of the agent, as agent; therefore it has no other real relation of conformity or dependence to the exemplar. But if you say that the effect depends on the exemplar as regards specification, but on the efficient as such as regards exercise, this very thing proves that in the effect there does not result a special relation to the exemplar, but only that which is to the efficient cause, because the causality and action by which the thing is made and is made in such a species is unique, and that distinction as regards exercise and specification in the present case is only according to reason and accommodation, not according to reality. Indeed, the exemplar is not compared to the efficient as a distinct cause, but as constituting it in its own way in first act for effecting; therefore neither does a multiple relation result in the effect, but only that which is of the effect to its efficient cause.

15. Perhaps it will be said that the argument indeed proves these relations not to be distinct, but nevertheless it is true that the

relation of the creature in its essence includes that it be a relation of conformity to the idea of the creator, just as the very action of the creator in its essence includes that it be from an idea. But whatever may be the case concerning such a real relation and whether it be distinct or not, I prove further that the nature of truth of created being cannot consist in it. First, by that general reasoning said above, that the properties of being cannot add to being a positive real mode, neither absolute nor respective. Second, because it is one thing for a relation[3] to follow from another, another thing indeed to constitute it formally; but that relation, if it exists, supposes the nature of truth in created being and follows it; therefore truth is not formally constituted by such a relation. The consequence is evident, because that which is formally constituted by some form cannot be supposed to that form. But the antecedent is clear first from the sensible example of artificial things; for a thing made by art according to an idea and the rules of art is not therefore rightly made and conformable to art because it has in itself some predicamental relation to art, but precisely because it has such figure, proportion, etc., as art requires, and thence afterward follows the relation, if it truly results. Hence if we prescind such a relation by the mind, or if perhaps the opinion is true which denies such resultant relations, nevertheless the artificial thing will be understood to be true in the genus of artifice; therefore the same is the case in the creature with respect to divine ideas; for it is compared to them as to an artificer. Then I explain in this way, because by nature the creature is prior to being produced by God than to being referred to him by the predicamental relation of the creature; therefore it is also a true creature or true created being by nature prior to being referred by the aforesaid relation; and similarly it is by nature prior a true man or true lion; therefore that relation is not included formally and intrinsically in the nature of truth. The antecedent is clear, because by nature the foundation is prior to the relation; but this relation is founded in the entity of the existing creature, and therefore supposes

[3] In ed. 1960 lineae male positae. (Castellote). Cf. BHF, t. II, p. 136.

it created and emanating from God. But the first consequence is clear, because created being from the force of that entity which it has from God, by nature prior to a predicamental relation resulting in it, not only is intelligible by the true concept of being but also is truly constituted in such or such a species of created being; therefore, with such a relation prescinded, it can be preunderstood to be true being and such being; therefore the true as true does not add the aforesaid relation above being.

16. This reasoning proceeds not only against those who say this relation is real, but also against those who say it is a relation of reason, if they speak of a formal and actual relation; otherwise if of a fundamental one, which is not so much a relation as a concomitance of several things or formal natures, or a denomination taken from such concomitance, as was declared above in the truth of knowledge. But the aforesaid reasoning proceeds chiefly concerning actual conformity to the divine idea; a fortiori, however, it proves concerning similar actual conformity to any other knowledge, because every other relation is posterior and more extrinsic. And it can also be applied to the aptitudinal relation by which a thing is said to be apt to be understood or to conform to an intellect having a proper or true concept of it; for this denomination truly does not add a real relation in the thing which is called intelligible, because it is only an aptitude to some extrinsic denomination, to which the object is compared as a term or matter about which knowledge is exercised. Also, because, as the arguments made prove, a thing is intelligible through itself and not through a superadded relation, as regards that which is required on its part; for on the part of the other there is required a faculty for understanding. Also, because the knowable as such does not express a real relation to knowledge, as all teach; and the same is the case with the visible with respect to sight. Finally, even if you feign that no intellect actually exists, the thing will be intelligible from itself and true. In whatever way, therefore, truth is explained, whether through

actual conformity or through aptitudinal, it cannot consist in a formal and proper relation.

The Third Opinion is Disproved

17. A third opinion can be devised, that transcendental truth adds above being only some negation. This opinion can indeed seem singular, because all authors suppose that the true expresses a positive denomination; nevertheless, if the things said above are considered, it will seem apparent, because it has been shown that truth does not add above being a positive absolute nature, nor even a relative one of thing or reason; therefore nothing remains that it can add except negation. It is confirmed from the common mode of declaring this truth; for as Aureolus argues, in Capreolus, In I, dist. 13, q. 3, in order that we may conceive and explain the truth of some thing, for example, that this is true gold, we do not have recourse to divine exemplars, nor to any other intellect, as is established from the very use of conceiving and speaking, but we declare it through negation; for we say that it is true gold which is not fictitious or merely apparent, but which has the proper nature of gold, which we gather from properties and effects. Hence this truth seems rather to be explained through the intrinsic principles of the thing, so that a true man is called such because he consists of the essential principles of man; but this adds nothing above the entity of the thing except the negation of fiction or appearance. Moreover, it is declared by a similar case; for just as to be the same (as we were saying above), although it is signified in the mode of the positive, nevertheless in reality adds nothing above being except negation, so it seems to happen in the true; for some thing is called true in such a nature of being, because it has the true nature or proper essential principles of that thing; but it is said to have true nature because it does not have a fictitious one, nor a foreign and apparent one, but that which is proper to such a thing; and thus the true God is spoken of so that he may be distinguished from false ones, and true

divinity so that it may be indicated that it is not fictitious, but that which is such from itself. Finally, in this way other transcendentals are explained by many; for thing (res), which signifies essence as real and fixed, is said to import the negation of imaginary or fictitious essence, and something (aliquid) the negation of nothing or the negation of identity. What wonder, therefore, if the true also is declared through negation, although it has the appearance of a positive property?

18. Therefore this mode of speaking seems not entirely improbable; nevertheless, because it appears novel, it is not to be proved by us; for the nature and definition of truth according to the common mode of conceiving of all who speak about truth, includes or connotes in some way a relation to the intellect or to a knowing power; and not in the mode of negation, as is evident per se; therefore in the mode of conformity, which is conceived as something positive. Then because rather the falsity of a thing is posited in negation, as will be said below, because it expresses the lack of perfection due to the truth of the thing; therefore truth does not add formally the negation of that lack of due perfection nor the negation of fictitious nature, but the proper and positive perfection of the thing. Finally, although these simple things are often explained by us through negation (which the adduced conjectures only prove), nevertheless they do not therefore formally signify such negation.

Fourth Opinion

19. There is therefore a fourth opinion, that this truth is only an extrinsic denomination. So thinks Cajetan, I, q. 16, a. 6, at the end, where he deals only with created things, which he says are true by extrinsic denomination either from divine truth, insofar as they are signs of it and imitate it, or from created speculative truth that is intellectually grasped, insofar as they are or can be the cause of it. His reasoning is that the true relates to cognition and things just as the healthy relates to the animal having health and to medicine, etc.; for

just as, if health were removed, which is formally in the animal, the remaining things would not be denominated healthy, so if the truth of cognition were removed, the remaining things would not be denominated true; therefore, just as the animal is called healthy by intrinsic denomination, while the others only by extrinsic denomination, so the intellect is what is formally and intrinsically denominated true, while other things only by extrinsic denomination, insofar as they are signs or causes of the truth of the intellect. However, Cajetan does not declare what should be said about the truth by which God is called true; perhaps he would say that even in Him it signifies an extrinsic denomination, not of a sign or cause, but that God is called true because He can cause true knowledge of Himself, either properly in other intellects or improperly and according to reason only with respect to His own intellect, insofar as He can through the mode of an object be to His own intellect the reason for forming about Himself a true concept of God.

20. But if you object that this very power of causing or of being a sufficient objective reason for such cognition is intrinsic to the being itself; likewise, that since God's cognition is most intrinsic to Him, no extrinsic denomination can be taken from it, it can be replied to the first part that this power or perfection is indeed intrinsic, but it is denominated true or has truth from the extrinsic; just as also in medicine the power of causing health is intrinsic, yet the notion of health in it is extrinsic. To the second part it will be said that, although the cognition by which God knows Himself is most intrinsic to Him and therefore intrinsically denominates Him as knowing, nevertheless the denomination of the known, as such, is per se and formally extrinsic and happens to occur to Him insofar as the form from which it is taken is within the thing that is denominated as known.

21. What seems to oppose the preceding opinion. This opinion is clear as to something, namely, that the true adds nothing above being except the accompaniment of something extrinsic, as we shall show below; but insofar as it says that things are denominated

true only by extrinsic denomination, this opinion seems difficult. First, because Aristotle in the cited place in II Metaph., text. 4, holds that some truth follows upon all beings, which also Thomas Aquinas teaches, I cont. Gent., c. 60, in the final argument, distinguishing a twofold truth, namely of the intellect and of the thing, and concerning the latter he expounds the definition of Avicenna, tract. I suae Metaph., c. 6, and tract. VIII, c. 6: "The truth of a thing is the property of the being of each thing, which has been established for it." And I, q. 16, a. 1, concerning the same truth he expounds the definition of Augustine, lib. De Vera religione, c. 36, saying: "Truth is the supreme likeness of a principle, which is without any dissimilitude"; and the definition of Anselm, dialog. De Verit. c. 12: "Truth is rectitude perceptible by the mind alone." In all of these it is signified that the truth of a thing is some intrinsic form and perfection of it. Hence Augustine above: "True things (he says) are true insofar as they are; but they are insofar as they are like the principal one." Hence he adds that truth is the form of true things just as likeness is the form of similar things. Furthermore, Thomas Aquinas, q. 1 De Verit., a. 4, although he seems to greatly favor Cajetan's opinion, nevertheless finally says: "although truth, according to which all things are called true, is less properly called truth, nevertheless a thing is denominated true from it as from an inherent form, and it is nothing other than entity adequated to the intellect." And he holds the same view ibid., a. 5 and 6. Therefore this truth is something intrinsic to things and not only an extrinsic denomination. This can be confirmed by reason, first, because a merely extrinsic denomination cannot properly be numbered among the properties of a thing; but truth is said by all to be a property of being; therefore it is not only an external denomination. The major premise is evident, because a property ought to belong intrinsically; but extrinsic denomination belongs accidentally and from the extrinsic. This is especially true of that denomination which is said to be taken only by analogy from proportion or relation to another; for no one would say that health as

such is a property of food or urine, or that risibility is a property of a flowering meadow, because these predicates belong to those subjects only quasi-metaphorically.

22. You will say: although these predicates are metaphorical as to the imposition of words, nevertheless they truly signify certain properties of those things to which they are attributed; and in this way health can be called a property of such food not as to formal health itself, but as to that which is intended to be declared by such a denomination of healthy. But on the contrary, for hence we rightly conclude at least that health is not a property of food distinct from that which is declared by such a metaphor; but if that were not a property but the essence of the food itself, certainly "healthy" would not signify a property but the essence of the food. So therefore in the present case, if the true is said of things only by analogy and extrinsic denomination from the truth of the intellect, I ask what is indicated or signified in the being itself by this metaphor or relation. For either the mere entity of the thing is indicated, and thus the true is not a property of being but only differs from it in that the true metaphorically signifies what being signifies properly; just as laughing is not in the meadow another perfection from that which is being green or flowering, but is the same metaphorically signified. Or by that analogous appellation of the true something diverse from entity is indicated in the being; and concerning this we inquire what it is and whether it is only an extrinsic denomination; for if it is so, it cannot be a property of being; but if it is something beyond extrinsic denomination, as to that the notion of the true will be intrinsic, whatever may be the case concerning the imposition of the word, whether it has been taken from the extrinsic.

23. And it is confirmed, because if truth were only an extrinsic denomination, it could belong to beings of reason just as much as to real beings, because such denominations taken from cognition can belong to beings of reason just as much as to real beings, such as being genera, species, being truly known, being signified, and

similar things. But if it is said that this is so formally, but the foundations of these denominations belong differently to real beings, against this I always urge the argument made, because this foundation in this denomination of the true is either something beyond being, or not; if it is something, I ask what that is, whether extrinsic or intrinsic, and the arguments made return; if it is not something, therefore the true as it is in things is not a property of being but being itself. A similar argument can be made, because it follows that what is a more perfect being is not a more perfect true thing with the truth of the thing, which is openly against Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas above, and against the common sense of all; for who would say that an angel is not a truer being in the notion of being than a man, or even that God is not truer than an angel? The consequence is evident, because in that denomination which is taken from the truth of the intellect, they cannot have inequality, because the idea that God has of man is as true as the idea He has of an angel, and there is as much conformity between those extremes as between these; and the cognition that God has of an angel is as true as that which He has of Himself.

Resolution of the Question

24. What transcendental truth says intrinsically. In this variety of opinions it is difficult to make a true judgment about truth, and perhaps the difficulty has arisen from the fact that we do not sufficiently distinguish in the use of these words that from which their imposition has been taken or transferred and that for signifying which they are imposed; for it could have happened and it is likely that every appellation of the true has drawn its origin from the truth of cognition, as I shall say more conveniently in the following section; nevertheless the name of the true does not signify in things only a denomination taken from the truth of cognition, but something else for signifying which that name has been imposed. Therefore, to declare this, I say first that transcendental truth intrinsically expresses

the real entity of the very thing that is denominated true, and beyond that it adds nothing intrinsic to it, neither absolute nor relative, neither from the nature of the thing nor distinguished by reason alone. This conclusion is sufficiently proved from what was said in the first opinion and is taken clearly from Thomas Aquinas, in the cited places, and q. 1 De Verit., a. 1. ad 6. and a. 8; Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrara and others cited above in the first opinion.

25. What transcendental truth connotes. I say secondly that transcendental truth signifies the entity of the thing by connoting cognition or a concept of the intellect to which such entity conforms or in which such a thing is represented, or can be represented as it is. This conclusion is also proved from what has been said by a sufficient[4] enumeration of parts. And I think, although authors speak in diverse ways, almost all have wanted to teach this same thing, and I explain it in this way. For I think this concept of true being is virtually comparative of one thing or nature to the proper concept of that thing which is said to be true; as, for example, to profess the mystery of the Eucharist we are accustomed to say that the consecrated host is the true body of Christ the Lord, where by true body we signify nothing other than that same body which is represented by the proper and true concept of the body of Christ. And similarly, to confess the mystery of the Incarnation, we say that God is a true man, that is, He has that nature which we truly conceive in the essential species of man. And hence Hervaeus said, Quodl. III, q. 1, a. 2 and 3, that this truth is the conformity of the thing, as it is in itself, to itself as objectively conceived; but Durandus, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, said on the contrary that this truth is the conformity of the thing according to objective being to itself according to real being; for both understood this truth to add nothing to the thing beyond the denomination arising from the conjunction and proportion or conformity between the intellect and the thing. But they declare by objective concept what we do by formal concept; however, because the objective concept adds nothing

[4] sufficienti, 1960; sufficiente, 1597, ed. Vivès. Cf. BHF, t. II, p. 144.

beyond the thing except the denomination of the term of the formal concept, therefore the conformity between the thing and the objective concept is not rightly explained, but rather between the thing and the formal concept or idea. And I think the same was meant by those who say that the true adds above being a relation of reason of the conformity of being to the intellect, as Thomas Aquinas signifies, In I, dist. 19, q. 5, a. 1; for this, to be true, is not to be understood of a proper and actual relation, but of that mutual connection of thing and concept and connotation of one as corresponding to the other, which because it is conceived by us through the mode of a relation, is usually called a relation of reason. Finally, in this sense that common definition of truth is easily applied to this truth, that it is conformity between intellect and thing; for that conformity is not understood to be some relation, as was explained above concerning the truth of cognition, but a denomination taken from the consortium of several things so related that such a one is as it is represented by another.

26. Augustine's saying is explained. I say thirdly that this transcendental truth can be explained both through the mode of aptitudinal conformity and through the mode of actual conformity, and in order to the divine intellect and to the created, and in the notion of the known and the knowing if we speak universally of true being, or in the notion of the caused and the cause or the measured and the measure, if the discourse is about created or artificial being. I declare each point, for first, that this truth can express actual conformity all admit, and from the very name of truth and conformity it seems to be established; for it signifies act more than aptitude. Likewise the truth of cognition expresses actual conformity and commensuration; therefore the same is proportionally true of the truth of the thing. But if you object with Augustine, lib. II Soliloquiorum, c. 5, saying that the true is not rightly said to be that which is as it appears to the knower, because according to this nothing would be true if no one knew, we shall reply that according to this denomination that definition is not to be rejected absolutely and

simply, if it is understood, as it ought to be understood, of a knower truly attaining the thing itself. Hence we also admit that conditional to be true; nevertheless just as the antecedent is impossible, at least with respect to the divine intellect, so also the consequent. Hence Thomas Aquinas, I, q. 16, a. 1, ad 1, treating this passage of Augustine, says it only excludes comparison to the created intellect.

27. Furthermore, that this truth can also be declared by aptitudinal conformity is taken from that same place of Augustine, where after those words: "True is what is as it appears to the knower," it is added: "If he wishes and is able to know." These words signify aptitude. More clearly Anselm, dialog. De Verit., c. 9, says that truth is rectitude perceptible by the mind alone. And Thomas Aquinas, in the cited q. 16, a. 5, says that truth is found in a thing according as it has being conformable to the intellect; and I cont. Gent., c. 60, explaining the definition of Avicenna: "The truth of a thing is the property of the being of each thing, which has been established for it," adds: "Insofar as such a thing is naturally fitted to make a true estimation of itself." And it is proved because every real being is naturally fitted to make a true estimation of itself, just as every intelligible being is said to be, whether it is a principle of cognition or only a term; for this aptitude abstracts from these modes of itself; therefore nothing prevents this from being able to be signified by the name of the true or of truth. And it is confirmed; for although it is impossible for there to be any being that is not actually truly conceived by some intellect, at least the divine, nevertheless even if the intellect should apprehend that impossible hypothesis as posited in reality, namely that every intellect, even the divine, should cease from actual conception of things, nevertheless there would still be truth in things, for both the composite of body and rational soul would be a true man and gold would be true gold, etc., either according to the truth of essence if we understand that existing things do not remain, or even according to existence, if we imagine that with actual cognition ceasing, existing things are still conserved by God operating through His power

executing; therefore this truth can be understood sufficiently by that aptitudinal conformity, even if there is no actual conformity. You will say that by a similar argument it can be proved that aptitudinal conformity is not necessary, for if another impossible hypothesis is imagined, namely, that a thing is neither understood nor can be understood by any intellect, and that it remains in its essence or existence, nevertheless each thing would be true in its essence; and yet then it would not be understood as apt for making a true estimation of itself, because there would be no one with whom it could make it; therefore even that aptitude is not of the notion of truth. It is replied first that this latter hypothesis involves a more direct and formal repugnancy with the proper notion of real entity, at least according to essence; for it is of its notion that it be possible, and consequently and much more that it be intelligible. Then, given that hypothesis, a thing could be called true fundamentally or non-repugnantly, but not positively and formally; because then there would be no possible truth of cognition, and consequently every denomination of the true would cease.

28. The truth of the thing is to be considered especially in order to the divine intellect. Furthermore, from these things it is easily established that this appellation or conformity is to be taken most properly and per se in order to the divine intellect, as Thomas Aquinas teaches, in the cited q. 16, a. 1, and in other places. First because conformity to this intellect is most per se in all things, in created things indeed because of the dependence they have from it; but in the uncreated being itself because of the intrinsic and essential identity with its intellect and actual intellection. Then because in the divine intellect there is the highest and infallible truth and the most perfect reason or representation of all things; therefore a thing is said to be true most of all when it can conform to the concept that God has of such a thing.

29. Secondarily in order to the created intellect. But that it can also be taken in order to the created intellect, although

secondarily, Thomas Aquinas expressly teaches, q. 1 de Verit., in the cited place. And it can easily be declared from what has been said; because this conformity which truth expresses can be understood not only of the actual, but also of the aptitudinal; but truly according to aptitude every being is naturally fitted to have a true estimation of itself in every intellect not only divine, but also created. Hence, if we wish to conceive this denomination through the mode of a relation, we shall understand that any being whatsoever has this relation of intelligibility not only to the divine intellect, but also to any created intellect. Likewise, because the created intellect is a certain participation of the divine intellect, to which it is naturally fitted to conform in understanding, if it truly understands; therefore, by this very fact that being is said to be true because it is conformable to the divine intellect, it will also be able to be said to be true because it is conformable to the created intellect truly understanding. Finally, this is proved by that argument, that we do not always know the truth of things through conformity to the divine idea but through the conception that we have of such a thing. And in this way we are accustomed to use the definition of such a thing or nature to prove that something is truly such; for a definition is nothing other than the explication of such a nature as it is conceived by us; therefore this truth can be taken not only from conformity to the divine intellect, but also to the created.

30. The conformity of truth in general is the conformity of the knowing and the known. But this is most true if this conformity is taken only in the notion of the knowing and the known, as it is necessary to take it if the discourse is about transcendental truth in its whole latitude. Because in God no other genus of conformity can be understood, since He is not a dependent or caused being, as is evident per se; nor can He properly be said to be measured in the notion of the true by any science, not only because on account of the supreme identity there cannot be a notion of measure there, but also because in that mode by which they can be distinguished and commensured by

reason, rather the essence of God is the true measure of His science than conversely; for God is not therefore a true God because He knows Himself to be such, but rather, because He is a true God, therefore He truly knows Himself to be such. Therefore transcendental truth taken in its whole latitude cannot express conformity to the intellect as to a cause or to a measure, but only as to a representer or knower, either in act or in aptitude. Therefore in this way such conformity, especially aptitudinal, can be taken in order to any intellect whatsoever so that God is said to be true because in any intellect He can generate a true concept of God, or because He really has in Himself that nature which any intellect truly conceiving God conceives in God. And the same for the same reason is true of created beings; for the same concept of truth can be applied to all proportionally; and what suffices for truth in God, if it can be found by participation in others, as it really can, will also suffice for their truth by participation.

31. Created beings conform to the divine intellect as to their maker. But it is added in the last part of the conclusion that there is found in created beings conformity to the divine intellect as to cause and exemplar, by reason of which such beings can be denominated true, because that too is true conformity to the intellect practically knowing and operating in its own mode. And for the same reason artificial beings that proceed from the human intellect have the same conformity with respect to it as to their exemplar or idea, and according to this they can also be called true. Indeed Thomas Aquinas holds that created beings are denominated true most of all from this conformity, because that belongs to them per se; but conformity to other intellects speculatively knowing is more extrinsic and per accidens. This has place especially in existing things and things actually created; for things according to essential being do not actually have an exemplar cause just as they do not have an efficient cause; they have it however in potency, and therefore if they are considered as they are possible, they per se require exemplars and ideas in the first

artificer which represent each thing to be such as it can be or nature postulates it to be made. And in this way all created things even according to essential being per se primarily postulate being in the divine intellect and having conformity with it, as with the first artificer from whom alone they can be brought to being. But God, since He is uncreated being, cannot have this relation to any intellect; nevertheless He can be said to have conformity per se with respect to His own intellect rather than others for another reason; because He per se and essentially postulates that He actually understand Himself and be not only intelligible but also actually intellected by Himself and be His own intellection. And thus the conclusion is proved as to all its parts.

32. But you will object: therefore the notion of transcendental truth is not one but multiple, because aptitudinal or actual conformity and speculative or practical conformity are very diverse. Secondly, it can be objected specifically because truth expresses the relation of the measured to the measure at least fundamentally; therefore the truth of things cannot be taken in order to the created intellect, whose cognition is not the measure of the truth of things, but is rather measured by them. Hence I argue thirdly, for cognition is true because it conforms to the things known; therefore conversely things cannot be said to be true through conformity to such cognition; because between these there is not a relation of mutual or similar comparison, such as there is between two similar things, but of dissimilar or non-mutual comparison, such as there is between measure and measured.

33. To the first point some do not think it inconvenient to concede the whole of what is inferred in the argument; because, since these are only certain denominations that are taken or explained through the mode of relations, it is not inconvenient for them to be multiplied from various sources and diverse considerations. Indeed, some also add that under one notion there are real respects, but under another notion respects of reason. This is at least concomitantly

probable, although it is not formally true. But perhaps it will be said better that all those respects are contained under one adequate respect, or are reduced to one, namely to that aptitude by which each thing is naturally fitted to confer a true estimation of itself; for it has this with respect to any intellect or cognition, and actual conformity adds nothing above this except denomination or coexistence of cognition. But if a relation results from this, when that cognition is practical and the cause of things, that presupposes truth rather than constitutes it, as was shown concerning the second opinion. To the second point it is replied that in rigor it is not necessary that being be said to be true in the notion of the measured by the cognition to which it conforms; otherwise God could not be called true being, as I was arguing above, because in the notion of being He has no measure neither according to the thing nor according to reason; and therefore, as was said more extensively in I, q. 14, the divine science is not compared to His essence and His being as practical, but as speculative only. Therefore only in the truth of speculative cognition does it hold true that the notion of the true is taken in the notion of the measured; for even divine practical science, as it is practical, is true, although as such it does not have the notion of the measured, but rather of the measure. Hence to the third point it is replied by denying the consequence; because the very notion of truth is not said in the same mode of cognition and of things; and therefore it is not inconvenient that according to diverse relations it belongs to cognition through conformity to things insofar as it represents them as they are, and to things in order to cognition insofar as they are apt so that in the notion of object they induce a true estimation of themselves.

34. Transcendental truth is not a mere extrinsic denomination. I say finally that this transcendental truth is not a mere extrinsic denomination, although it includes in some mode or connotes the conjunction of another thing whence it results. In this conclusion I differ from Cajetan's opinion, although perhaps there is not so much difference as explanation of his opinion. Therefore it is proved from

what has been said, because the truth of a thing intrinsically includes its entity; therefore it is not a mere extrinsic denomination. The antecedent is evident from the definitions of truth that Augustine, Anselm, and Avicenna give, and from others adduced above. Likewise, because for this cause fictitious beings are not true beings and are intelligible in a far different way than true beings; for the latter are naturally fitted to be apprehended and known as they are; but the former not at all, but it is necessary that they be clothed with some species or shadow of reality by artifice and force of the intellect. Likewise for this reason, the more a thing has of entity, the more it also has of this truth; and what is a more perfect being is said to be more intelligible of itself. Hence we can argue further; because being intelligible is not a mere extrinsic denomination; therefore neither is being true objectively or really. The antecedent is evident both from what has been said, that intelligibility follows the entity of the thing; and also because the object is naturally prior to the power, and is its reason; therefore some aptitude is presupposed in the object, by reason of which it is apt to terminate the act of the power, as, for example, in color and sound with respect to sight and hearing; therefore similarly in being insofar as it is intelligible there is understood not only an extrinsic faculty that has the power of understanding, although this is necessary, but also on the part of the being itself an intrinsic aptitude is presupposed, by reason of which it can terminate such an act. Furthermore, this is confirmed by what was adduced in favor of the first opinion and we shall add others in the following section.

Corollaries from the Above Resolution

35. How uncreated and created beings are true. And from these things it is understood first how being true belongs to every real being, whether created or uncreated; because every being is of itself apt to conform to the intellect; indeed there is no being that is not

actually conformed to some intellect, at least the divine. Whence it happens that this notion of the true belongs primarily to the first being, which is God; because He per se and essentially includes cognition and has with it the highest and necessary conformity; and because He is per se (so to speak) the reason of His truth and is the origin and measure of all truth that is found in creatures.

36. How the true is a property of being. Secondly, it is understood from what has been said how the true is a property of being. For it is called a property not as if it were a real property distinct from the nature of the thing from being, but in a broader way, only because it is a certain attribute that is convertible with being and is distinguished from it in some mode, at least according to reason or connotation. The first is established, because it has been shown that every being is true. It is also established from what has been said that everything true, in the mode in which it has been explained by us, is real being; because, although beings of reason, in the mode in which they are known, can be said to have conformity with the intellect, nevertheless, because they do not have intelligibility or entity of themselves in which that conformity is founded, therefore they do not have truth which is a property of being. Especially since it has been shown that this truth expresses entity itself as conformed. But the other part about distinction has also been sufficiently explained from what has been said. Nor do those things that we objected concerning Cajetan's third opinion proceed against it, because we do not assert that the denomination alone is a property, but entity itself conceived under such a notion. Whence it happens that through this attribute of the true no new perfection or real notion is explicated in being itself, but only the very notion of being itself is declared more fully through relation to cognition, in the mode that has been explained by us. And because this relation happens in some mode to being itself as such and is in some mode at least according to reason posterior to it (although it is always conjoined with it), therefore the true, which through this relation declares the nature of being, is called its attribute or property.

37. Aristotle's saying is explained. Thirdly, it is understood from what has been said in what sense it was said by Aristotle, at the end of lib. VI Metaph., that the true is not in things but in the mind; for he speaks of complex truth which is in the composition of the mind, and of another being or non-being which is signified by such a composition and is required for its truth. For because truth is in a special mode in the composition and division of the intellect, as I said above, therefore truth quasi by antonomasia or analogy is especially accustomed to be said of that truth which is in composition and division, which is equally found in negations and affirmations and does not per se require real being, but such as is signified by the composition.

SECTION VIII

WHETHER TRUTH IS PREDICATED PRIMARILY OF THE TRUTH OF COGNITION RATHER THAN OF THE TRUTH OF THINGS, AND IN WHAT MANNER

1. Reasons for doubt. We have said that truth is found both in things and in cognition; therefore it is necessary to explain in what order and manner it belongs to both, which will also contribute to a fuller explanation of the nature of transcendental truth. It seems, therefore, that truth belongs to things before it belongs to cognition. First, indeed, because the true is the object of the intellect; therefore truth is presupposed before every act of the intellect; therefore truth exists in things before it exists in cognition. Second, because the truth of things is more universal, since it is transcendental; therefore it is prior, because things that are more universal are prior by their nature. Indeed, since it has been said that the true is convertible with real being, and mental concepts themselves are real beings, they do not seem to be true for any other reason than insofar as they are beings;

therefore the truth of things is of itself more common and prior than the truth of cognition. On the contrary, however, all authorities hold that the true is something analogous, whose principal analogate is the truth of cognition, according to Aristotle, Metaphysics VI, at the end, saying that truth is formally and properly only in the intellect, but in things as in a cause, as he also says in Metaphysics IX, chapter 12. In words, however, it is said to exist as in a sign, insofar as they signify the true or false, as is said in Peri Hermeneias I, chapter 4.

Various Opinions

2. It is therefore the opinion of many that truth is found first and principally in cognition, secondarily however in things; indeed, that it exists intrinsically and formally in cognition alone, but in things causally or objectively. Thus, just as "healthy" is an analogue of attribution, which is said of only one analogate intrinsically and formally, but of others only by denomination from that one, so "true" is an analogue of attribution of exactly the same nature, which will be said formally of cognition because it is true, but of things only by denomination taken from the truth of cognition, insofar as they are the cause of that truth. Just as it is also said of the truth of speech only insofar as it is a sign of that truth. So thinks Cajetan, cited in the preceding section. And this seems to be taken from St. Thomas, Summa Theologica I, q. 16, a. 1, 3 and 6, and De Veritate q. 1, a. 3, and on the aforementioned passages of Aristotle. And it can be explained further from the very definition of truth as it applies to all these. For cognition is said to be true insofar as it conforms to the thing it represents, not as the thing itself is true, but as it is such as it is conceived in the mind and affirmed or denied, as St. Thomas noted, Summa Theologica I, q. 16, a. 1, ad 3. A thing, however, is said to be true insofar as it is conformable or able to conform to the true concept that some intellect has or can have of such a thing. Therefore it is a sign that the nature of truth is found per se in cognition, but in things only

by denomination from that truth, and that there is no common nature of truth for both. For by a similar reasoning we conclude that truth in words is found only analogically as in a sign, because they are not true except insofar as they signify true cognition. Finally, this seems to be sufficiently confirmed by the very manner of speaking and conceiving[5] of everyone; for everyone, speaking simply, attributes truth to the judgment of the intellect, but to things only in a qualified sense; and therefore we say simply that the intellect is true; but we do not say that other things are simply true, but with an addition: true gold or something similar.

3. Others, however, use a distinction. For things can be denominated true in two ways: in one way as the measure of cognition; in another way as measured by cognition. In the first way, things are said to be true as objects of speculative cognition, insofar as they either conform or are apt to conform to the truth of that cognition; because the object is the measure of such cognition, especially if it is the primary object of that cognition. I say this because of the cognition that God has of the essences of creatures, by which He is not measured, as I said above, because He does not regard them as His primary object, but as secondary objects eminently contained in the primary, by which that cognition is proximately quasi-measured. Indeed, Giles adds, Quodlibet IV, q. 7, that neither is the cognition that an angel has of the sun, for example, and other things of which it has innate species, properly measured by those objects, but by the divine ideas from which those species flowed, concerning which elsewhere; for now it is sufficient that such things are said to be true insofar as they can be adequated to the human intellect as its measure. In the latter way, however, all things are said to be true which flow from an intellectual exemplar or idea, and conform to it as to their measure. They say, therefore, that truth is said equally primarily of every adequation of the measured to the measure which is found between thing and intellect or cognition, whether that adequation be

[5] concipiendi, 1597, 1960; alit. add. veritatem. Cf. BHF, t. II, p. 156

of cognition or of the thing; but of the adequation of the measure to the measured, whether it be of cognition or of the thing, it is not truly and properly said to be truth, but at most it can be said through the aforementioned analogy of attribution. The foundation of this opinion is only that truth, as the name itself suggests, expresses a relation of the measured; for it expresses the conformity of the intellect to the thing; for what ought to conform to another in order to be true, regards that other as a measure.

4. According to this opinion it follows, first, that God in His nature as being is not true, but only in His nature as knowledge or as one who knows speculatively; because insofar as He is being, He has no measure of His truth and His being, nor does He conform to any intellect, even His own, as measured by it, as was said above. Unless one wishes to explain negatively that God is true, because He is not dissimilar to any measure or idea, as St. Thomas explained in a similar way, Summa Theologica I, q. 16, a. 5, ad 2. It follows, second, that divine knowledge as practical is not true, speaking simply, because as such it is not measured but is the measure of things. It follows, third, that the essences of creatures considered according to their essential being cannot be called true simply, but only through the aforementioned analogy, because they have no measure in their nature as essences. It follows, fourth, that, speaking absolutely, there is no order of prior and posterior between the truth of things and cognition, but between the truth of measure and measured; because the latter, whether it exists in things or in cognition, is said to be proper and formal truth; the former, however, both in things and in cognition, is said not to be truth, but only a relation of measure, which is sometimes called truth by analogy. And this opinion seems to be followed by many modern writers.

5. A third opinion can be that it is one thing to speak of the first origin or imposition of this word "true" or "truth," another thing to speak of the proper signification which it now has in fact. For in the first way, it is indeed true that by this word the truth of cognition, or of

composition and division, was first signified, because that is better known to us; nevertheless, that word has now been extended not by metaphorical transference, but by propriety, to signify the truth of things, which in the nature of truth can be more perfect than the truth of cognition. Just as theologians are accustomed to say that names of paternity or mercy or similar things were first imposed to signify these properties in creatures; then they were extended to signify similar properties of God, not by metaphor, but by the highest propriety and analogy, in which the first and principal analogate is God as having such properties. The foundation of this opinion is that the adequation of thing to intellect is as perfect and proper as the adequation of intellect to thing; therefore from this perspective nothing prevents the nature of truth from belonging equally to both. Again, that this adequation is by way of measure or measured seems to make no difference as to whether both ways can obtain the name and nature of truth; both because it is not proven by any sufficient reason that the nature of truth intrinsically expresses and requires the nature of the measured, nor is this gathered from the common definition of truth, but rather the contrary; for it is said to be conformity between thing and intellect; where nothing is said about conformity by way of measure or measured. Indeed, as St. Thomas noted in the places cited above, by the force of that definition, truth is not said to be conformity of intellect to thing more than conformity of thing to intellect. And also because that notion of measure and measured adds nothing in one extreme rather than in the other except either a denomination taken from some causality of that thing which is called the measure, to the thing which is called measured, or some transcendental order according to which one thing is ordered to another rather than conversely, as knowledge to the knowable rather than the knowable to knowledge. But these relations do not change the truth or property of adequation or conformity, which is required per se for the nature of truth. As, for example, if something made by art is compared to the intellect of the artificer from whom it proceeded, and to the intellect

of another who perfectly conceives the nature and idea of such a work, influencing nothing nor causing anything in it, certainly the artifact is equally conformable to one and the other intellect; therefore it is equally true with respect to both, even though to one it has the relation of an effect and not to the other.

6. And to this are added those things which we inferred as consequences from the second opinion; which, because they seem inconvenient per se, suggest that this difference does not pertain to the nature of truth formally and per se. But with this difference set aside, there is no reason why the nature of truth cannot belong to every adequation between thing and intellect, whether that adequation be between intellect and thing or between thing and intellect, and whether it be between measure with measured or between measured with measure, or between those things which have neither relation between themselves, as we were saying about the essences of creatures as such and about God's speculative knowledge of creatures. Indeed, neither does there seem to be a sufficient reason for analogy between the truth of thing and cognition, both because although the name of truth was first invented by us for cognition, it does not thereby become said analogically of the truth of things, as has been explained; and also because of those things which were proposed in the preceding section concerning Cajetan's opinion, by which it seems to be shown that the truth of things cannot consist in mere extrinsic and metaphorical denomination.

Resolution of the Question

7. The truth of composition and division is not transcendental. From these opinions we can take something that contributes to explaining this question. However, so that the resolution which seems truer to us may be understood, it must be noted that we said above that truth is found in a more special way in composition and division than in simple things, whether concepts or

things. But that special truth which is in the composition and division of the intellect is really not the transcendental truth of that act or judgment which is denominated true in composition and division. This is clear as follows: for transcendental truth, since it is in its way a proper passion of being, is immutable and inseparable from being; but that truth which is in composition is separable from it as far as its nature is concerned, because it is sometimes separated when, the same judgment remaining, the thing judged changes and begins to be otherwise than it is judged, although previously it had conformity with the judgment. But if sometimes this truth is immutable, it comes from the fact that the thing about which the judgment is made is immutable either simply, or as it falls under judgment.

8. In composition, along with its truth or falsity, transcendental truth always stands. And from this it is possible to understand that in this very judgment or act of composition and division, a twofold truth is found: one transcendental, another special, which we can call the truth of cognition or accidental truth, others call it formal. This is declared and proven as follows: when a judgment changes from true to false, it loses some truth and does not lose all truth, but necessarily retains some; therefore it had a twofold truth. The major premise is known per se, for falsity, since it is contrary to truth, excludes some truth from the act when it changes from true to false. The minor premise is clear, because the true is convertible with being, as we have said; but that judgment which changes from true to false nonetheless remains a real judgment and a real being; therefore it is necessary that it also remain true with transcendental truth. This consists in the fact that in the nature of judgment, that act of the intellect has the true essence and species of judgment and conformity with its proper concept or idea of intellectual judgment. This can be conveniently explained in a vocal proposition; for this enunciation, "every man is white," or another similar one, if you consider in it the conformity to the thing it signifies, does not have truth but falsity, and in this sense it is called not true but simply false; but if you consider in

it the definition or essence of a proposition and the conformity it has with the rules of dialectical art or with the idea of a proposition, it is understood to have its truth, as it were transcendental, according to which it can be said to be a true proposition, in the way that gold is called true gold and in the way that a syllogism will be called a true syllogism if the inference is good, even if it concludes something false.

9. The primeval signification of the word truth. Therefore, with this distinction established, I hold first that truth in its primeval signification was said of the truth of cognition which is found especially in composition and division. All the things adduced above prove this; for it is for this reason that Aristotle often said that truth is in the intellect or in composition and division. Also, for this reason, a judgment having this truth is called simply true. But if it lacks this truth, it is called simply false, even if it has transcendental truth in the way we have declared. Finally, the reason seems to be that such truth is better known to us and is more formally in our cognition, as has been explained in the preceding sections.

10. In its primeval signification, truth can extrinsically denominate both real beings and beings of reason. Second, I hold that things known can be called true by this truth of cognition through extrinsic analogy and denomination, but nevertheless according to this notion or denomination, the true is not taken when it is said to be a passion of being. The first part is proven from the things adduced among those referring to the first opinion and Cajetan's opinion treated in the second section. It is also declared by that example of "healthy"; for just as "healthy" is said both of what has health and of what causes and signifies it, so in the present case "true" can be said both of the judgment having this truth and of the vocal proposition signifying it and of the thing itself insofar as it causes or grounds it. Whence usage also confirms this; for we not only say that the judgment by which we believe God is triune and one is true, and similarly that the proposition by which we affirm this is true, but also that this very thing, that God is triune and one, is true; which truth

that thing has only as it exists objectively in the intellect, that is, insofar as it is known complexly and truly judged as it is; and of such truth or denomination of truth Aristotle also said that it is not in the thing but in the intellect. Whence this denomination of truth also applies to non-beings; for thus we say it is true both that a chimera is a fictitious being and that a man is not a horse. And from this the latter part is clear, that this denomination is not the truth which is a passion of being. And that reasoning also confirms this, that the true is the object of the intellect; for although some say that truth is only a condition of the object of the intellect, not antecedent but rather consequent to the act of the intellect, as can be seen in Toledo, De Anima III, q. 20, nevertheless in this way it would be said very improperly that the true is the object of the intellect; because the object of a passive power as such is presupposed to the act, and therefore those conditions which are proper to the object ought to be presupposed, not to follow; therefore the true, as it is said to be the object of the intellect, is not insofar as it is denominated by that very act, but according to some other notion according to which it can precede the act. Finally, those things by which it was proven above that transcendental truth does not consist in this extrinsic denomination alone confirm this.

11. The transference of the word truth. Third, therefore, I hold that from this truth of cognition this name of truth has been transferred to signify this property of any real being, which is conformity with the intellect, actually or potentially conceiving the thing under such a notion of real being. This is clear from what has been said and from sufficient enumeration. You will say that this denomination differs in nothing from that extrinsic denomination by which a thing is said to be true because it can ground or cause the truth of the intellect. It is answered by denying the consequence, because that denomination is taken precisely from extrinsic truth, as denominating its object or cause; but this truth of things is not taken from that denomination, but from the very entity of the thing as

having conformity to another. Therefore, just as cognition or judgment is said to be true because it conforms to the very being or non-being of the thing, yet it is not denominated true by the truth of the thing itself but by its own being, connoting at the same time the being of the object itself as it is represented through the judgment, so in the present case a thing is said to be true because it has being conformable or conformable to such a concept, which denomination is not taken extrinsically from the truth of the concept, but from intrinsic entity, as it is under a relation or quasi-relation to another. This is confirmed and declared first; for just as in relatives this white thing, for example, is said to be similar to another, not by extrinsic denomination from the similarity which is in the other, but because it has in itself a relation by which it tends toward the other, or because it has in itself such a quality as is in the other, so in the present case it can easily be understood that a thing is said to be true because of conformity with the intellect, although it is not denominated extrinsically from the truth of the intellect alone. Finally, if we mentally prescind the truth of cognition from the representation of the idea or concept, the thing would still be denominated true through conformity to the idea so representing; therefore this denomination is not taken formally from the very truth of the intellect.

12. By what analogy truth is said of the truth of cognition and of things. Whence I further conclude that "true," as it is said of the truth of composition or division, and of the truth of things or transcendental truth, is not properly said according to some analogy of attribution taken from some form which belongs intrinsically to some of the analogates, but extrinsically to others, because, as has been shown, such denomination does not intervene in the present case. Therefore this word seems to be said equivocally under these two notions or, at most, according to an analogy of proportionality. Because here also there does not seem to intervene one objective concept according to some common notion; for as we have explained, the nature of truth in composition and division is far different from

what it is in other things. Therefore only some proportional analogy can remain, which consists in this: that just as the truth of composition requires that conformity between the being of the thing and the judgment, so transcendental truth requires such entity of the thing that it can be adequated to its proper concept or idea, or intellectual representation of such a thing. But such analogy does not prevent transcendental truth from being able to be a property of being, because although the transference of the name is taken from that proportionality, it does not however formally signify that proportionality, but the property in which that proportionality can be considered. Just as in "healthy," besides the analogy of attribution declared above, another analogy of proportionality can be understood, according to which an apple in which nothing is corrupted is called healthy, because just as the health of an animal consists in the due proportion and disposition of humors, so an apple is called healthy because it has the due disposition of all its parts; and yet "healthy" under this signification signifies some property, or intrinsic perfection of the apple, namely, its integrity or incorruption. So therefore "true," although it has been transferred by some analogy of proportionality to signify the truth of things, can nevertheless signify a property of being itself.

13. But what we say about the truth of things must also be understood about the truth which is attributed to the senses or to simple concepts of the mind; indeed, also about the truth of composition itself, insofar as some notion of being is considered in it; for in all these, truth is of the same kind or nature as transcendental truth, and properly consists in the adequation of such a thing to the idea or relation which can be formed about it, although in sense or intellect it is sometimes explained through order to objects, because the object is like the form of the act or concept which takes its species from it. And often this transcendental truth is accustomed to be explained through intrinsic principles and especially through form, just as true paternity is said which is terminated to a true son begotten

by it, although the formal nature of truth, even in paternity itself, consists in adequation to the intellect.

Solutions to the Initial Doubts

14. Finally, from these things satisfaction has been given to the reasons for doubt posed at the beginning; for the first ones prove that transcendental truth according to itself is prior, but not that this word was first imposed to signify it. And this is also proven by the reasons made in the second place about the truth of cognition. But the question which is touched upon there about the true, how it is the object of the intellect, is not proper to this place, but is to be explained in the matter concerning the soul, although the exposition from what has been said is easier in the matter. For if there is discussion absolutely about the intellect, the true is not said to be its object otherwise than being is; for only by the name of truth is signified that aptitude or proportion which is in being, so that it can be understood; for insofar as it is such that it can have adequation with some concept, to that extent it can terminate the act of the intellect and be the object of it. Whence, conversely, the intellect then understands a thing when it forms that concept to which that thing can be adequated, and therefore it is said to understand it as true. And in this way truth is said to be a necessary condition in the object of the intellect, concerning which matter can be read Cajetan, Summa Theologica I, q. 16, a. 3, ad 3, and II-II, q. 1, a. 1; and Capreolus, In I, dist. 2, a. 1; Giles, Quodlibet IV, q. 20. But if there is discussion about the intellect as properly judging or as composing and dividing, thus the true is said to be the object of the intellect, because, in the way that truth is said to be in composition, the intellect never gives its assent except by knowing the truth or conformity of one thing or its concept to another in exercised act, knowing, I say, or at least thinking that it knows; and in this way it is said that the intellect always assents under the aspect of truth and that the true is the proper object of judgment or assent of the intellect.

DISPUTATION IX

ON FALSITY OR THE FALSE

Although falsity is not attributed to being as its property, nevertheless, because it is opposed to truth and there is one science of opposites, and one of them is more clearly manifested from the other, therefore we must briefly discuss falsity in this place, concerning which nearly the same things can be inquired as about truth; nevertheless, having presupposed what we have said about truth, everything can be comprehended in roughly one or two questions.

SECTION I

WHAT FALSITY IS AND WHERE IT EXISTS AND WHETHER IT IS A PROPERTY OF BEING

1. Falsity exists. First, that falsity is something and is found somewhere or at least that it is conceived by us in this manner, is evident from the common way of speaking about things and about statements and judgments of things; for we say that both a judgment or composition or division is false and speech likewise, and we also call certain things false, as we say that brass is false gold; but these denominations are taken from some form or quasi-form, and we investigate what this is. But so that this may be done more

conveniently, it is first necessary to declare whether this falsity is truly and properly attributed to things, in the same way as truth; and at the same time it must be explained whether it is truly and properly attributed to simple concepts of the intellect, and consequently also to acts of the senses, or whether it is properly found only in composition or division.

Various Opinions about What It is

2. The first opinion asserts that falsity is found no less properly in things or simple concepts than truth. Thus think some moderns on I D. Thomas, q. 17. And it is proved first from Aristotle, II de Anim., c. 7, saying that sense does not err concerning its proper sensible object, but concerning the common it can be deceived; therefore he supposes that there can be falsity in sense, at least regarding some acts or some objects of it, although all acts are simple; and lib. III, text. 161, limiting the previous statement, he says that sense either does not err concerning its proper sensible object or rarely; therefore he places falsity in it and says the same there about imagination. Whence D. Thomas, I, q. 17, a. 2, explains that what Aristotle says about sense not having false knowledge concerning proper sensible objects, should be understood per se and for the most part; for accidentally and in fewer cases, even in the knowledge of proper sensible objects, there can be falsity in sense. And the same argument can be taken from the part of the intellect, in whose simple cognition, by which it apprehends or knows what something is, falsity is denied, III de Anim., text. 21 and 51, and IX Metaph., text. 22, per se and for the most part; nevertheless accidentally and in fewer cases it is not repugnant for it to be found in it, as D. Thomas indicates there, and I cont. Gent., c. 59 and 60. Second, I argue by reason, because there is the same account of opposites; therefore, just as truth consists in conformity and adequation, so falsity consists in deformity; but, just as conformity is found not only between complex cognition and

the thing, but also between simple concepts and things, so deformity is found not only in composition or division, but also in simple things as well as concepts; therefore. The minor is proved, and first in simple cognition; for that very imperfection which is usually the root of deception and deformity in complex judgment, can be found in simple cognition, both of sense and intellect, namely, that the species of the object is imperfectly impressed; for this is the first root of all deception; for the power would be sufficient of itself, if the object were sufficiently applied and united through the species; but this root is common to both simple and composite operation. Indeed, all deception in composition usually comes from the fact that simple concepts are deformed from the things themselves; therefore deformity is found in these concepts and consequently also falsity.

3. Again, that falsity is also found in things, is evident especially in those which are made by art; for often they are deformed from their rule and idea; therefore under that aspect they have falsity. And the same is found in some natural effects which are called monsters or errors of nature; for they differ from the idea or rule which natural secondary causes ought to imitate and to which they should conform their effects. In what way also human action which deviates from divine rules is usually called a lie, Ps. 4: "Why do you love vanity and seek falsehood?" Just as conversely, operation conforming to prudence or divine rule is usually called truth, John 3: "He who does truth comes to the light." About which Paul, to Ephes., 4: "Doing truth in charity let us grow." And in this way D. Thomas philosophizes about conformity and deformity of things to the intellect, dict. q. 17, a. 1, indicating that this deformity is as much the proper falsity of things, as that conformity is truth.

4. But if you object, for it follows that falsity is to be placed among the properties of being just like truth, the consequence is denied, because not every being is false; but every being is true; for God can in no way be called false, neither in the notion of being, nor in the notion of God, or of any being in particular; indeed, not even all

created things can be called false, because those which are made by God, if they are made immediately by him, cannot differ from his art; but if they are made by him through secondary causes, although they can differ from one rule or divine idea to which secondary causes ought to conform in acting, nevertheless, insofar as they proceed from God himself, they cannot discord from that rule and idea through which God operates when he influences them, and in this way they have truth.

5. The second opinion denies that there is falsity in simple things, whether concepts or things, but only in composition and division, which is the view of Alber., II de Anim., tract. III, c. 5; and there Apollinar, q. 13; Aegid, Quodl. IV, q. 7; Ferrar., I cont. Gent., c. 59; Fonsec., IV Metaph., c. 2, q. 6, sect. 1. And this opinion is more consonant with Aristotle and D. Thomas, in the cited places, and seems to me also more true, if we speak of falsity in that rigor and propriety with which we spoke about truth in the preceding disputation.

What Falsity Attributed to Things is

6. In relation to the divine intellect there is no falsity in things. To explain this I say first that in things outside the intellect there is no proper and rigorous falsity, but things are called false through a certain metaphor and extrinsic denomination. This is proved, because, just as truth, so also falsity must be taken through relation to the intellect, which in things can be considered, as we said above, either in relation to the speculative intellect or in relation to the practical. Again that relation can be either of actual conformity or deformity, or only aptitudinal. And finally it can be considered either in relation to the divine intellect, or in relation to the created. But in none of these ways can proper falsity be attributed to things. Which I show briefly by going through each one. And first in relation to the divine intellect, as speculatively knowing all things, it is evident per se

that no thing can be called properly or improperly false, because the speculative knowledge which God has of all things, is necessarily most true and most proper; therefore things known in relation to this knowledge have no deformity at all, but the highest conformity. Second in relation to the same divine intellect, as practically knowing and operating, things cannot be called false, because either things are made by God, or not. Things not made by God are only either the supremely good thing which is God himself, who is above every measure and above every idea and outside all causality of the practical intellect, and therefore cannot have proper truth from this relation, much less falsity; or the supremely evil thing, which is fault insofar as it is fault (if however it should be called a thing); for this, just as it is not made by God, so neither does it have a proper idea in him, but rather there is in God an idea of goodness and honesty, from which fault differs; from which it has that it is true fault, because, just as its being, so also its truth consists in privation and defect. But fault is sometimes called falsity and deception, not so much in the notion of evil or fault as in the notion of good; for every sin has some notion of apparent good, under which it is usually called something false and deceptive; but it has that denomination not in relation to God, but in relation to man whom it deceives, just as we will immediately say about other false things. But other things, which are made by God, never discord from his art, or idea, because he is as powerful in executing, as he is wise in knowing.

7. Response to the objection. You will say: although this may be true concerning those things which God operates through himself, it is not so concerning those things which he effects through secondary causes; for then he accommodates his executing power to the activity of secondary causes, and therefore it can happen from this that effects do not match the idea of the artificer, as seems to occur in natural monsters. I respond that since those things do not happen by chance and fortuitously with respect to God, but from his true knowledge and will, it is necessary that even these things, insofar as

they are beings, do not discord from divine practical knowledge, because God wills to influence with unimpeded secondary causes toward accomplishing integral and perfect effects, just as he wills to influence with the same causes when impeded toward effecting monsters. Hence, just as when the best painter depicts a monster not from impotence but voluntarily, that monster is not said to discord from art, nor to be something false with respect to such a painter, so neither do natural monsters have falsity with respect to the supreme artificer God, because he knowingly and deliberately fabricates them insofar as they are beings. I always add this qualification, because if these things are considered insofar as there is privation or lack of some perfection in them, they are not made per se but per accidens, nor do they have a proper idea to which they conform, so that they might be called true or false with respect to it, but they have such defect insofar as they fall short of another more perfect idea; but this defect either is not from God, as in defects of guilt, or, if it is from him, as in evils of punishment, it is not contrary to his knowledge and intention or will, and therefore with respect to that there cannot be said to be falsity; but whether it can be so called with respect to the secondary cause, I shall say immediately.

8. No things are false in relation to the created speculative intellect. Third, if things are compared to the created speculative intellect, they cannot be intrinsically and properly denominated false. I show this as follows: either they would be denominated false from aptitudinal disconformity, or from actual disconformity; neither can be said; therefore. The minor premise is proved as to the former part, because every thing, as far as it is from itself, is apt to be known as it is, and to generate its own proper and adequate concept. But that some intellect is sometimes deceived in knowing them does not arise from them insofar as they are beings, but either from a defect of the unity of the intellect or from other impediments; therefore by reason of the aptitude which is in things to be understood, falsity does not belong to them, which will be made more apparent from the confirmation of the

other part. Therefore the other part of the minor premise is proved, first, by the reason touched upon in the preceding disputation, section 2, because if things falsely known by the created intellect had proper and intrinsic falsity from the fact that they discord from such an intellect, there would be no thing which could not be denominated false, because there is none which cannot be falsely known; therefore there would also be falsity in God, which is most absurd. Likewise, if a thing is false with respect to the intellect, therefore either with respect to the intellect forming a true and proper concept of such a thing; and this is not so, as is evident per se, because it does not discord from that; or with respect to the intellect truly conceiving another thing, as brass seems to be called false gold with respect to the intellect conceiving true gold; and in this way also gold can be called false brass with respect to the intellect forming a true concept of brass, and thus the same inconvenience returns which was brought above, that there is some falsity in all things. Finally, either a thing is said to be false in relation to a simple concept, or in relation to a complex concept. The first cannot be said, both because of the reasons stated, and because, as I shall show, there is not properly falsity in a simple concept alone; therefore much less will there be falsity in a thing speculatively known in relation to such a concept; and also because if a thing is compared to its own proper concept, with respect to that it will not be false but true; but if it is compared to the concept of another thing, through that concept it is not falsely known but rather ignored; therefore neither with respect to that can it be denominated false; but between these concepts no middle term can be devised while remaining in simple concepts; therefore through disconformity to those concepts, things do not have proper falsity. But if this denomination is taken in relation to composition and division, just as Aristotle said in Metaphysics VI, neither is truth in things, but only objectively in the intellect; much less therefore is falsity.

9. Natural beings are not false through relation to human praxis. Fourth, if created things are compared to the created intellect

knowing practically, thus natural things must be excluded first of all, which do not depend on any created intellect as from their artificer; and thus concerning all these things the conclusion is left proven that they have proper falsity with respect to no intellect. Hence I also infer that natural monsters do not have proper falsity, but imperfection or defect, and therefore they are usually denominated not so much false beings as imperfect or bad beings. This is proved because they are not denominated false with respect to the first universal cause, as we have said, nor also with respect to secondary causes, because those do not operate through intellect; but falsity must be taken in relation to some intellect. You will say that just as the work of nature is the work of intelligence, so these monsters can be said to be false with respect to the natural power of the cause, not taken precisely, but insofar as it ought to be subordinated to the idea of the first artificer, directing it to produce a perfect effect. I respond first that this denomination is both only extrinsic and metaphorical rather than proper, just as the work of nature is not properly and intrinsically the work of intelligence but extrinsically and metaphorically, or just as the hand is said to err when throwing an arrow when it does not hit the target; for error is not properly attributed to it, but only by metaphor. Then it is said that that imperfection of the effect does not arise from any defect of the intellect and therefore cannot properly be called falsity, but imperfection or badness, and thus these are usually called monsters or sins of nature, which words indicate badness rather than falsity.

10. Whether artificial things are false in relation to human craftsmen. Only artificial and moral things remain, to which the created intellect can be compared practically and as their cause. Therefore there is no doubt that artificial things sometimes discrepant from art. But this happens in two ways: in one way that they discrepant from the art which is in the artificer, or from the idea which he actually has conceived; in another way, that they discrepant from the art which he ought to have and which another good artificer has. When it happens in this latter way, the denomination of falsity does

not seem to have place properly, because then the thing made by art does not discord from the idea from which it proceeds; but to other more perfect ideas which are in other artificers, such a thing is not compared as to a practical principle, but as to speculative knowledge, and therefore with respect to those it does not have proper falsity according to what was said in the third point, and this is confirmed, for if someone simultaneously has ideas of perfect and imperfect craftsmanship, and willingly makes an imperfect thing conformable to the imperfect idea, he will not be said to err in operating, as he is an artificer, nor will the thing made be called false in the genus of artifice; therefore the same will be the case when he has only an imperfect idea and operates according to it. You will say that this artificer fails in art, either because having only an imperfect idea he wants to make a perfect effect conformable to his idea, which is manifest repugnance, or because he thinks that according to the true rules of art the thing ought to be perfected in this way. I respond that in one who operates thus there intervenes a speculative error rather than a practical one, or one preceding before the conception of the idea through which the thing is to be fabricated; and therefore the thing is not properly denominated false from that error, but at most metaphorically and very extrinsically. A sign of this is that if such a thing is made deliberately in that way for some end or will of the artificer, it will not be a false thing in any way, although it has the same conformity or disconformity with the idea in the thing. Likewise, because rules of art of this kind are often taken in relation to some end and supposing such matter or circumstances; but all these things do not vary the intrinsic artificial form of the thing nor the conformity which it has with the idea from which it immediately proceeds; therefore whenever a thing made by art is conformable to the idea from which it immediately proceeds, then there is no falsity in it, even if otherwise it is simply an imperfect thing with respect to other perfect ideas or if it is useless in relation to the intended end.

11. But when a thing made by art comes forth disconformed from the idea which is in the artificer as actually operating or from which it immediately proceeds, then falsity seems to be maximally in such an artificial thing; but still that cannot properly be called falsity, both because that defect in the effect does not proceed from imperfection or falsity of the intellect but from weakness of the executing power or another similar occurring impediment; and also because that artifice as such or insofar as it is made with that disconformity does not proceed from the idea but happens by chance; therefore it is not compared to that idea as to a cause and measure, so that it might be denominated false through conformity or disconformity to it. And this is confirmed, for that cognition or idea is not false through disconformity to that work, because it truly did not have that work as its object; therefore neither conversely can the work itself be denominated false in relation to such cognition, since it is neither the object nor the effect of it, as far as the imperfection according to which it discords from the idea is concerned. Therefore such an artifice will be called incongruous or bad in the genus of artifice, but not properly false. Just as dialecticians say that a consequence or inference which is not made according to the rules of art is indeed bad, but not false.

12. Whether moral things are false in relation to human agents. And the same discourse can be made concerning works of prudence or moral works; for those works which discord from the rules of prudence, although they are sometimes usually called practically false, as we said above from that verse of Psalm 4: "Why do you love vanity and seek falsehood?", nevertheless this is only insofar as they follow from some practically false dictate, which dictate pertains to the judgment of the intellect through composition and division. Hence the work is denominated false only extrinsically and by analogy from that dictate. Properly, however, there is not falsity in the work itself, but badness; for if it is compared to the dictate from which it actually proceeds, it is conformable to that dictate; because

that dictate is imprudent and erroneous; but if it is compared to that dictate by which such an act ought to be avoided or have rectitude insofar as it is a human act, with respect to that it is called not so much false as depraved, both because that duty of operating according to the dictate of prudence pertains not so much to the truth of things as to the honesty of morals; and especially because that work, insofar as it is really done, is not the object of that dictate, nor does it proceed from it. Hence finally this whole conclusion can be confirmed from Augustine, book II of the Soliloquies, chapter 8, saying: "If he says that the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false is nowhere." Saint Thomas, explaining these words in I, question 17, article 1, ad 1, says: "A thing compared to the intellect according to that which it is, is called true; according to that which it is not, it is called false; hence a true tragedian is a false Hector, as the same Augustine says in II Soliloquies, chapter 10." Therefore beings, insofar as they are beings, are not false; but if falsity is in some way attributed to them, it is only through a certain attribution and insofar as they are non-beings.

13. How many meanings the word "falsity" has and what they are. But it remains to be explained what this analogous denomination is. In this matter it must be briefly said with Saint Thomas, in the aforementioned question 17, article 1, that a thing is denominated false per se in various ways. The first and most usual is on account of similarity to a true thing, by reason of which it provides us with an occasion of falsity, so that we think that to be which is not. In this way brass is called false gold not because of the dissimilarity alone which it has with the true idea or concept of gold; for lead or tin has greater dissimilarity, which are not denominated false gold; therefore it is because of the similarity and appearance of gold which it bears, by reason of which it is easily thought to be gold. And concerning this mode Aristotle said in Metaphysics V, chapter 29, that those things are called false which are by their nature apt to seem to be either what they are not, or such as they are not, like pictures and dreams; and Augustine said in book II of the Soliloquies, chapter 6, that we call

those things false which we apprehend as probable. Second, something is called false because it is the object of a false enunciation, which object nevertheless is only objectively in the intellect. Thus Aristotle above, who adds that there is latitude in false things of this kind; for some are also impossible, like the diameter being commensurable with the side; others are only false, like Peter running if he is at rest. And in this mode an idol is called a false God, because it is the object of the false opinion that an idol is God. In this sense Paul said in Romans 1 that an idol is a lie; and in I Corinthians 8, he said an idol is nothing. A third mode can be when a thing is called false because it is not adequate or conformable to art. Saint Thomas posited this mode, and says it has place only in things made by human art; nevertheless Aristotle omitted that mode, and to me (as I said) it seems very improper and little used in the common way of speaking; nevertheless such metaphorical denomination is not repugnant, so that because a thing is called true when it is conformable to art, it is called false when it is not conformable; although this itself is more suitable to it insofar as it has something of non-being, than as it has being.

On the Falsity of Simple Concepts

14. In any simple cognition there is falsity metaphorically. I say second: in simple concepts or acts of knowing, whether of intellect or of sense, there is not proper falsity or deception, but it is attributed to them by metaphor just as to things themselves. This conclusion is from Aristotle, book III of On the Soul, chapter 6, and more extensively book IX of the Metaphysics, chapter 12; and it follows from the preceding, because simple concepts are equivalent to things in truth, as is clear from what was said in the preceding disputation; therefore also in falsity; for the reason is the same, and the whole discourse made in the preceding conclusion can easily be applied here. Second, the same can be proved by the reason extensively treated in

the preceding disputation, section 2, because if there could be falsity properly in a simple concept on account of disconformity to some things, there would be no simple concept which would not be false with respect to some things, because there is no concept which does not have disconformity with some things, especially in creatures; but the consequent is absurd, as I showed there. Third, hence the reason can be declared a priori, because falsity is concerned with the same things with which truth is concerned; for they are opposites; but truth is concerned with cognition and the thing which is its object; therefore falsity also ought to be concerned with cognition and the thing which is its object; hence, although cognition has disagreement with a thing which is not its object, that cannot be denominated falsity but will be (so to speak) a certain disparate relationship, as can be seen also in the composition and division of the intellect. Hence therefore an argument is constructed; for simple apprehension or cognition cannot have disconformity with the thing which is its object, although it can be disconformed to other things; therefore there cannot be falsity in it. The minor premise is declared in this way, because since the relationship of this cognition to the object is simple or through simple representation, it cannot be disconformed to the thing as to an object represented, because either such a thing is represented through such an act of cognition or not. If it is not represented, it is not an object and thus with respect to it such an act will not be false. But if it is represented through that act, there will be conformity between them because it is necessary that the representing and the represented have agreement among themselves; therefore also with respect to that object such an act will not be false; therefore with respect to no object can such an act have falsity.

15. You will say that such an act can represent a thing, but not as it is; and therefore it can be false with respect to its object. I respond that in a simple act or representation this involves repugnance, because in this mode of representing one thing is not attributed to another, nor is one objective concept attributed to another, but simply

some thing is represented; therefore either it is represented as it is, or it is not that thing which is represented, and consequently it is repugnant for it to be an object and not to be represented as it is. Just as a sensible image simply representing some person, it is necessary that it represent that person as he is; or if in some respect it does not represent him as he is, in that respect it is not his image and therefore cannot be called properly speaking a false image, but imperfect, or diminished, or not an image. Hence, when we call some image false, falsity truly exists in our attribution or composition, because we attribute such an image to one whom it does not represent, thinking it to be his image, and thus that falsity is only objectively in the intellect, or denominatively from an act of the intellect; therefore in the same way we must judge concerning simple concepts or acts of knowing, which are related just like simple images.

16. And Saint Thomas taught this clearly in the aforementioned question 17, article 1 and 3, if it is read attentively and the solutions of the arguments are joined with the doctrine of the article. For although he says that the sense is deceived concerning the common sensible or per accidens and similarly the intellect can be deceived per accidens in the simple apprehension of the quiddity of a thing, which Aristotle also taught in the cited places, nevertheless he does not understand that falsity properly taken is found in the simple apprehension itself, but that there is in these apprehensions an occasion of error and deception and hence they are called false. Just as Aristotle said that pictures and dreams are called false, because the imagination which they effect is not of a being. Therefore there is no doubt that sometimes the sense (and the same is proportionally true of the intellect) apprehends an external thing otherwise than it exists in reality. From this it happens that it apprehends not so much that thing as another in place of it, and therefore we say it is not properly deceived because it does not attribute its apprehension to a thing existing in itself, but simply apprehends that object represented to itself. Hence, just as the imagination apprehending a golden mountain

is not deceived because it does not compose nor does it attribute this to a thing, so neither is the sense deceived; nevertheless, because the external sense is moved by an external object and apprehends it through the mode of intuition and thus through the mode of something present and existing, therefore when it apprehends a thing which truly is not, or not in the way that it is, it is said to be deceived, because it discrepant from that thing which it seems to have as an object, although truly its apprehension is not terminated to that thing or to such a mode of it, and therefore there is not proper falsity in it but a certain imperfection, which is the occasion of falsity. Hence Aristotle says above: "Vision does not err in saying there is color, but what that is which is colored, or where," that is, it errs concerning the subject which is affected with color; but it is clear that vision does not have error in itself formally but causally or occasionally, because it does not judge per se concerning the subject of color; therefore there is not proper and per se falsity in these simple acts, and thus also the authors cited above feel.

On the Falsity of Composition & Division

17. Falsity is properly in composition and division. I say third that falsity is properly found in the composition and division of the intellect. This is the common and received opinion of Aristotle, Saint Thomas and others, in the places cited. And it follows from sufficient enumeration from what has been said, because falsity is not in things, nor in simple concepts; therefore it is necessary that it be at least in composition and division; because neither can another member be devised nor can it be nowhere in its own way, because other things are denominated false by metaphor and analogy; therefore through relationship or imitation of something which is properly called false; but this is nothing other than the composition and division of the intellect. The reason a priori is taken from what has been said, because in such composition or division there can be found properly

disconformity between cognition and the thing which is its object; therefore also falsity. The antecedent is clear, because when the intellect composes those things which are not joined in reality, it has as its adequate object the union or conjunction of one extreme with another. Hence it also embraces the extremes themselves in the actual object, one as matter or subject with which it compares another and judges it to have conjunction with that, and consequently in the act exercised it judges the concept of one to have conformity with the other; therefore when there is not that conjunction or conformity between those extremes which the intellect judges, the judgment discords from its object; therefore there is proper and rigorous falsity in it. You will say: truth and falsity are in composition and division as in the one knowing, as we said above with Saint Thomas; but truly when the intellect composes a predicate with a subject which are not composed in reality, it in no way knows falsity; indeed it composes and judges thus because it thinks that to be true; therefore either there is not properly falsity in such composition or what we said above is false. I respond that neither follows, because, as was also declared above, truth and falsity are not so said to be in the intellect through composition and division as in the one knowing because it is necessary that they be directly and formally known by the composition itself or division, which includes special repugnance with respect to falsity; because then there is falsity in composition or division when the intellect is deceived; but it is deceived because it thinks to be true what is false; hence it is necessary that it ignore the falsity which it has; for unless it ignored it, it would not have it, and therefore error is usually called ignorance of a bad disposition. Therefore falsity is said to be in composition and division as in the one knowing, not because falsity itself as falsity is directly known; but because one thing is known as conjoined or conformable to another, which is really rather disjoined and disconformed, and therefore in the act exercised there is known that which is disconformed and false, namely, this being that which in reality is not or not being what is.

Certain Conclusions from What Has Been Said

18. And hence is understood first the difference between simple concepts and the judgment of composition and division; for a simple concept, insofar as it directly and positively tends toward the object apprehended and known through it, only represents that and does not say or positively represent that it is so in reality or that it is not (I speak of human acts); hence, if it happens to have some disconformity with the thing as it is in itself, it is rather through the mode of negation than through the mode of positive repugnance, namely, because it does not represent that which is but something else. Hence also it happens that it does not properly discord from the object which it represents and toward which it directly tends. But truly judgment discords positively from its object, because it judges either to have what it does not have or not to have what it has, and therefore proper falsity is found in composition and division, but not in simple conception. And therefore theologians, although they feel that there could not be error or false assent in the intellect of Christ or of the Blessed Virgin, nevertheless they do not think it inconvenient that through the senses they could have apprehended things otherwise than they are in themselves, because this is not proper deception nor falsity, nor an indecorous imperfection; especially since through the wisdom of the intellect they could correct the senses, lest they induce deception. And the same is probable concerning Adam and men existing in the state of original justice, if it had endured.

19. What falsity is when taken strictly. Second, it is gathered from what has been said what falsity is; for if we speak of it in all propriety, it signifies that disagreement or inadequation which is between the judgment of the intellect composing and dividing and the thing itself as it is in itself. Nevertheless this inadequation does not signify some proper real relation or relation of reason, as is clear a fortiori from those things which have been said concerning truth. Nor

does it seem to signify mere extrinsic denomination, because falsity is an intrinsic imperfection of the intellect. Nor privation alone, both because falsity is distinguished from ignorance in this respect; and also because an act can become false from true without real privation of some perfection, because it becomes false without real change of itself, as was said above. Therefore this falsity seems to include both a positive relation or comparison of one to another, which is made through composition and division, and moreover to connote the object as being otherwise. For thus truth and falsity, which are opposites, are understood to have opposite reasons. Hence this falsity is to be explained in the same proportion by which the opposite truth was declared by us above. But truly falsity improperly spoken, which is attributed to things or simple concepts, is only extrinsic denomination, either of a sign, or of a cause, or occasion, or object of false judgment, or certainly sometimes it signifies some negation of agreement between some thing and some simple concept, which rather consists in the lack of perfection or perfect and integral adequation than in direct and opposite disagreement and therefore does not deserve the name of proper falsity; all of which are sufficiently clear from what we have said.

20. And according to these things it is to be understood what Augustine says in book LXXXIII of Questions, question 32: "Whoever understands any thing otherwise than that thing is, is deceived." For it happens in two ways to understand or conceive a thing otherwise than it is, namely positively and negatively. I call it positive when a thing is conceived otherwise, attributing to it an alien concept or removing a proper one, which is done by false composition and division. But I call it negative when, although the intellect conceives a thing otherwise, that is, not according to the mode which the thing has but according to another, nevertheless it does not attribute to it either that mode or any alien concept, which happens in imperfect simple conception; but it is clear that this latter mode does not suffice for deception or falsity. Therefore Augustine speaks in the

former mode and in the same sense it is to be understood what he adds: "And everyone who is deceived does not understand that in which he is deceived. Whoever therefore understands any thing otherwise than it is, does not understand it"; for propositions of this kind are true, although they are not convertible; for every error is ignorance, but not every ignorance is error; and thus every falsity includes the lack of some understanding, although the lack of understanding does not suffice for falsity.

21. Third, it is gathered from what has been said that falsity or the false is said analogically of composition and division and of simple concepts and things. This is sufficiently clear from what has been said, because it has been shown that it is found properly only in composition and division, but in other things through extrinsic denomination and metaphor. Only this difference between truth and falsity is to be noted in this matter; for although we have also said concerning truth that under a certain consideration it is said first of complex truth and analogically of signs or causes of it insofar as they are precisely denominated from it, which we now teach in the same way concerning falsity, nevertheless under another consideration we admitted that proper truth is found in things and concepts, which we deny concerning falsity. But the reason for this difference is that between the intellect and things which are presented to it there can be, indeed there ought to be, positive conformity in the relation of representing and represented, in which simple truth consists, but there cannot be proper disconformity between the object and the act, because by the very fact that it is not represented it ceases to be an object; but the negation of agreement and conformity between cognition and a thing which is not its object does not have the nature of falsity, although it is sometimes so named because the thing has some similarity or proximity to the object and seems to be represented otherwise than it is in itself.

22. How falsity is opposed to truth. Finally, it is understood from what has been said what the opposition is between truth and

falsity, for Saint Thomas, in the aforementioned question 17, article 4, says they are opposed contrarily: "Because each (he says) is something positive and they are repugnant to each other." Which he confirms by the authority of Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, text 27, saying that the false is from the fact that it is judged to be what is not, or not to be what is. From this it is understood that Saint Thomas speaks of the true and false properly said, as they are in composition and division; for the false improperly or metaphorically is not opposed to the true except either negatively or privatively, or as the imperfect to the perfect or as the apparent to the existing, according to the various denominations of the false explained above. And it must be added further that even in the composition of the intellect, in order that the true and false be opposed contrarily, they must be concerned with the same thing and according to the same respect; otherwise if they are compared to diverse things, it happens not only that the true and false are not contraries, but also that they agree in the same thing at least at diverse times, just as Aristotle said, and it was explained above, that the same proposition can be changed from true to false from a change of itself without change of the object. And the reason is clear, because truth or falsity includes two things, namely, the judgment or estimation of the intellect and such coexistence or connotation of the object; and therefore from the change of either, truth or falsity can be changed. And by the very fact that the judgment is compared to diverse things or to the same thing for diverse times, it is not entirely the same truth which is discerned in it and therefore it is not wonderful that it does not preserve proper absolute opposition to falsity but only quasi-relative opposition. Therefore in order that the true and false be opposed contrarily, it is necessary that they be taken with respect to entirely the same object; for then opposition arises, not from the relation alone or quasi-relation, but from the very acts of the intellect having opposite relationships to such an object, insofar as one is through the mode of assent, the other through the mode of dissent and therefore then there is proper contrariety between such acts, just

as Aristotle said that opinions concerning contradictories are contraries among themselves.

23. Question. Response. But someone will ask here in passing whether, just as the same judgment can be true and false at diverse times with respect to an object being otherwise, so it can be simultaneously true and false with respect to diverse objects. For some affirm this because there seems to be similar reason in the aforesaid cases and because, although the true and false are not relatives in rigor, nevertheless they imitate them; but in relatives it happens that the same thing is simultaneously similar and dissimilar with respect to diverse things; and Saint Thomas is cited for this opinion in I, question 17, article 3. But neither does Saint Thomas teach this there, nor is it true, as is clear from the inconvenience brought above, that almost every cognition would be simultaneously false and true just as the same quality is almost always similar and dissimilar with respect to diverse things. Likewise otherwise a subcontrary proposition would be simultaneously true and false with respect to diverse things. But the reason is that the truth of a judgment is not to be weighed according to one or another part of the object, but according to the whole adequate object. And if with respect to that it has conformity, it is simply true and in no way false; but if it lacks the aforesaid conformity, it will be false and in no way true; but it cannot happen that with respect to the adequate object it simultaneously has conformity and disconformity; and therefore truth and falsity cannot be found simultaneously in the same act with respect to its object.

24. You will say: therefore in the truth and falsity of propositions there is no more or less, because if every truth is sincere truth and excludes all falsity, none can be greater; therefore one enunciation will not be truer than another, and the same will be true of falsity. But the consequent is against Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, chapter 4, at the end, and against the sense and way of speaking of all. I respond by simply denying the inference, because one of opposites is not always said to be greater or less on account of greater and lesser

admixture of the contrary. For one proposition is more certain than another, although neither has anything of doubt or fear, as was touched upon above in disputation I, section 5. Therefore I confess that all true propositions are equal as regards the lack of falsity; likewise it is true that they have a certain equality in proportional conformity to their objects, because that consists (so to speak) in the indivisible and therefore does not admit of more or less in this respect. Nevertheless one proposition is called truer than another, because it is more immutable and has more infallible conformity with its object. Likewise by reason of foundation it can be called truer because it is founded on truer being; conversely a proposition is called more false because it is more impossible and because it recedes more from the true; thus it is said to be more false that a thousand are equal to two than that four are, although they are equal in the lack of truth.

SECTION II

WHAT IS THE ORIGIN OF FALSITY

1. I suppose first of all that our discourse concerns falsity properly so-called, which, as we have said, is found in composition and division, for concerning falsity as it is attributed to other things, there is either no difficulty because it is only an extrinsic or metaphorical denomination, which, if it exists by reason of a sign, as in words, arises from their improper use; but if it exists by reason of a cause or occasion of falsity, it arises from some similarity or proportion, which will also be diverse for diverse things according to their truth and nature, as can easily be considered by induction; or certainly if that falsity consists in some imperfection, since we consider it to have the character of malice rather than of falsity, there is no reason why we should declare its root in this place, although it can be suggested in a few words and referred to its proper places. For if that falsity is in natural things, as in monsters of nature, the root of it is commonly on the part of matter or from a defect of the power of the

proximate agent, to which is also reduced the concurrence of contrary agents impeding each other, as is treated more extensively in Physics II. But if that falsity is in artificial things, it comes from the same causes with due proportion, namely, from a defect of matter, or from a defect of the executing power, or certainly from a defect of the art itself, or of its direction, as is evident in itself and is treated in the same book II of Physics. But if this falsity is attributed to human moral acts, the proximate root of it is the freedom of the will which does not have intrinsic or necessary conformity with its rule, with some defect of the intellect concurring at the same time. What this is and how it is necessary, we shall touch upon below, while disputing about free efficient causes, and moral philosophers and theologians dispute about it more extensively. If finally this falsity is attributed to the senses or to other simple cognitions, it seems to come proximately from some defect of the intentional species impressed on the external senses, as St. Thomas signifies, I, q. 17, a. 2 and 3. For since every interior apprehension is born from the exterior, defect in simple interior apprehension, properly speaking, arises from a defect of exterior sensation; but since the faculty of sensing is in itself the same and indifferent, but is constituted in act and proximately determined through the species, from the imperfection of the species arises the defect of sensation. But this defect of species can consist either in some imperfection of its entity, or in the mode by which it is impressed or in mixture with other species. Hence sometimes it comes from imperfection or distance of the object, sometimes from some indisposition of the medium, but sometimes from injury to the organ, as is disputed more extensively in On the Soul II. Hence these things are sufficient concerning this falsity.

2. Secondly I suppose that, as far as concerns us, this question has place only in human cognition; for it is certain that falsity can in no way fall into divine cognition, not only because that cognition is most simple, but especially because it is most perfect, infinite, and entirely immutable and eternal. But concerning angelic cognition, it

does not pertain to us to dispute whether intelligences can, in some things which they do not perfectly know from their nature, such as supernatural or contingent things, compose and divide and in this way incur error, or whether even without formal composition they can sometimes properly be deceived about some objects; for this disputation is proper to theologians and therefore it also belongs to them to declare the root of that falsity, if perhaps it can be found in angels from their nature, or now in evil ones; therefore we speak only of falsity in human cognition.

3. Thirdly I suppose that the root of this falsity can be investigated both theologically and philosophically. For in the former way the theologian will say that the root of all error and falsity in men is original sin; for if that had not intervened, men would be preserved immune from all error through original justice. Nevertheless let us omit this cause both because it does not now concern us, and also because it is not a cause properly inducing into falsity, but removing what prohibits. For as the more proven and almost certain opinion of theologians holds, original sin did not induce into men any positive entity which would either lead them to deception, or pour darkness into their senses or intellects. Therefore it only deprived them of the justice which would repel all falsity. Hence this itself supposes there to be in human nature, if it is not prevented or guarded by an extrinsic gift, a sufficient principle or occasion of falsity, and this is what can be inquired into philosophically, whether it is some internal principle existing in man himself, or something external which can lead man into falsity.

4. Fourthly it must be considered that composition and division can be found either in apprehensive conception alone, prescinding from judgment, or in conception which is simultaneously judicative; but we said in the preceding that complex truth is properly found in judicative composition; hence the same must be said about falsity, for contraries are of the same genus. Hence no one is considered to be deceived or to err until he judges, however much he

may apprehend false compositions. Since however that apprehension which is made without judgment is regularly made through concepts of words rather than of things, as I said above, just as there is falsity in the composition of words as in a sign, so it can be admitted in that apprehension, although it is there as it were materially, that is, not as in one affirming or uttering something false, but as in a sign which according to itself signifies something false. Just as there is falsity in this proposition: "There is no God," whether written or materially uttered by one who reports: "The fool has said in his heart: There is no God"; and therefore concerning such falsity the same account holds as concerning falsity which is in vocal composition, as in a sign. But if apprehension is made through concepts of things, it can scarcely be understood how proper apprehensive composition is made without some judgment; because such composition includes cognition not only of the extremes, but also of their conjunction among themselves; indeed the composition is consummated in this latter; but as long as there is no judgment, there is no cognition of such conjunction; therefore neither can there be true composition through concepts of things, stopping at apprehension alone, but there will be only either conception by the mode of simple apprehension, not only of the extremes, but also of their union, or some complexion by the mode of questioning rather than by the mode of enunciation, and thus there cannot be the falsity of which we are treating unless some judicative composition is mixed in there, because that apprehended proposition is judged either possible or uncertain. As theologians say that doubt in faith is heretical, because, although it does not have judicative composition that some proposition of faith is false, nevertheless while it apprehends the matter as doubtful, it judges the matter to be uncertain and this itself is against faith and heretical. Therefore it only remains to speak of the falsity of judgment.

Resolution of the Question

5. It is therefore to be noted fifthly that man can acquire cognition or judge about things in a twofold way, namely, by discovery (inventio) and by teaching or learning (doctrina seu disciplina); and by either way he can arrive at true and false judgment. But there is a difference, for judgment which is acquired by discovery alone is always founded on the things themselves, as they are represented to the knower; but judgment through teaching is sometimes done in this way, sometimes however it relies on the authority of the speaker or teacher alone, so that sometimes teaching only conducts itself as proposing and applying objects and means of judging, but sometimes it is the whole reason of the judgment. When therefore judgment is of this latter mode, so that it relies on the authority of the speaker alone, it is easy to find the root of falsity in it, for as regards specification (so to speak) it comes from the imperfection of the speaker or teacher, because namely he can either be deceived or lie, and therefore such origin is always some human authority or rather created authority, so that we may also include the angelic, which if it is not otherwise confirmed by uncreated truth, can also be a cause of falsity. But as regards exercise, the proper cause is the will of the man himself judging, which is universal in every false judgment even if it is acquired through discovery.

6. This comes from a difference to be noted between truth and falsity, for the intellect can be necessitated to truth, but to falsity it cannot, speaking simply and absolutely, and therefore as regards exercise it can never incur false judgment except through free motion of the will, for, necessity being excluded, the intellect cannot be determined to judgment except through the will, since it is not itself free. But the reason for that difference is that the intellect is not determined from necessity to judgment except through evidence of the thing known, as experience itself teaches and reason, because without evidence the object is not perfectly applied to the power, so as to draw it to itself from necessity and determine it; but evidence cannot produce false judgment, because it is founded on the thing

itself known as it is in itself or must necessarily be resolved into some principles known per se and manifest. And hence it also happens that truth is far more immutable than falsity; for false judgment is changeable from itself, or rather the intellect whenever it utters false judgment, can be changed and bear true judgment; but true judgment, if it is perfect, is from itself in some way immutable even in creatures; for although it can be changed simply, because it can cease to be, nevertheless as far as it is from itself, it does not permit change into false judgment, by reason of evidence; for we speak of this judgment; for if the judgment is free, however much it may be true, the intellect can be changed from it into false judgment, as much as is from the force of that, from the efficacy of the will.

7. You will say: sometimes the intellect can be necessitated by an extrinsic cause, as by God, or by an angel, who, if he is evil, can so propose something false that the intellect cannot dissent. And it is confirmed, for evidence itself is sometimes only apparent; therefore then it can be concerned with the false and yet necessitate the intellect no less than if it were true. It is answered that God can indeed bring necessity to the intellect, even in those things which are not evident; but this mode of operating is beyond or above the nature of the intellect, according to which we now speak only. But supposing that miracle, the true and sound doctrine of theologians teaches that God cannot induce the intellect to the false, because this is no less repugnant to his goodness than to lie. Hence it can in no way happen that the first origin of falsity is referred to God in a special way inducing or operating it. But as regards the angel, it must be said that an angel cannot by natural power immediately change the intellect to judgment or secondary act; for this is proper to God, its author. Hence much less can an evil angel necessitate the intellect to false assent, but at most it can induce to false assent by suggestion and persuasion in the manner of teaching; nevertheless man can always dissent from it, or at least not assent, if he wills.

8. To that finally about apparent evidence, it is answered that evidence can be called apparent in two ways. First, because it is truly not such in any order, but from some error or precipitation of the intellect it is estimated to be such. Second, because in the natural order it is indeed sufficient evidence, nevertheless with some supernatural work intervening it can fail from truth. In this latter way we confess that there can be some apparent evidence, especially when it is abstractive, as in the human intellect; such can seem to a pagan, when he judges a consecrated host to be bread. Nevertheless this evidence, as much as it is from itself, does not incline to the false but to the true, and when it is concerned with the actual existence of some thing which is not seen in itself but is inferred from another, it always has a tacit condition, namely, that this is so as much as is from the power of nature or from natural causes, or unless God makes some supernatural change in things. And thus it does not simply necessitate the intellect, but from the supposition that it is established that no such change has been made by God; therefore this evidence per se is never the origin of falsity, but by reason of some defect which it has adjoined, of which kind is unbelief or at least ignorance of supernatural work. But in the former way there is no apparent evidence which would simply necessitate the intellect; because those two things plainly contradict each other. But sometimes it is so called by exaggeration and precipitation which is more in words than in interior judgment. Sometimes however this evidence is called from some supposition which is evidence of the consequence, not of the consequent, and therefore it is not repugnant in this way for the intellect to be necessitated to the false, because that is not necessity simply but from supposition, nor does falsity arise from evidence, but from some other prior error which must be voluntary and free as regards exercise in judgment itself.

9. Therefore falsity that is actual or exercised through actual judgment always has proximate origin in human will, although as regards specification (so to speak) or as regards motive it arises from

created authority or from imperfection of it in the aforesaid mode of judging. But if it is further inquired whence falsity comes in him who testifies to it, it is answered that he can testify to falsity in two ways, first, without his own error, but knowing that what he testifies is false, which is proper and formal mendacity, and then its origin is malice or freedom of will. In another way this can come from prior error of the speaker himself or of the teacher teaching, whose error could further come from another's teaching and false testimony; lest however we proceed to infinity in this genus, it is necessary to stop at some error committed or acquired by the way of discovery by someone, who seeking truth has lapsed into error thinking he has found the truth. And in this way for the most part false opinions are mixed with true ones in human disciplines.

10. Sixthly finally it must be said that the origin of this falsity, which is mixed in the cognition of things themselves without extrinsic authority, arises radically from the fact that man does not conceive things through their proper species and as they are in themselves; but this comes from the fact that he does not conceive and apprehend things immediately, but through species received by the ministry of the senses; for hence it happens that often from imperfect apprehension of sense arises imperfect apprehension of intellect and from imperfect apprehension false judgment; for in this way we sometimes judge something to be an animal which is not. Sometimes however, with perfect apprehension existing in sense and in intellect about an object sensible per se, falsity can happen in the intellect from inept composition of simple concepts; because their conjunction among themselves is not always known through its proper species or sufficiently represented; and the same thing happens from bad inference. And finally the whole reason of this defect is that man does not attain evident cognition of truth; for every cognition which is not of this kind and is taken from things themselves, is of itself exposed to falsity. But that it is actually false comes as it were contingently and accidentally from the fact that the thing is otherwise than it is judged;

for per se this can never come from the intention of the one assenting, because he cannot tend to the false qua false.

SECTION III
WHENCE ARISES THE DIFFICULTY OF ATTAINING TRUTH

1. This doubt is connected to the preceding one and therefore must be expedited in this place, and Aristotle touched upon it in Metaphysics II, c. 1; and in book IV, c. 5 and following, he disputes extensively against those who think it not only difficult, but also impossible to attain sincere truth. If they understood this collectively, as theologians say, and by natural powers, they would not be disapproved; nevertheless, because they felt that man can attain truth in no thing at all, as it is in the thing itself, and therefore there is nothing true among men except what appears, therefore they erred greatly, as Aristotle demonstrates there at length. Therefore, with that error passed over, something must be said briefly about the difficulty which is ours in the cognition of things.

Various Opinions

2. There are therefore three opinions about this matter. The first refers the whole difficulty of attaining truth to the imperfection of our intellect. Scotus, Major, Antonius Andreas, and others hold this in the cited place. And Aristotle seems to favor them greatly, in the cited place, saying: "Since difficulty happens in two ways, the cause of it is situated not in things, but in us." But the reason is that all things are of themselves cognizable, nor is there any difficulty in them if there is power in the knower. And thus all things are known by God with equal facility, because there is most sufficient power on his part for all things; angels also most easily know all those things to which the

perfection of their intellectual power can extend. But if they cannot know some things or can know them with difficulty, it is only because their intellective power is inferior to those things; therefore in us too all difficulty comes from our imperfection.

3. The second opinion on the contrary holds that this whole difficulty is situated in things themselves, which Fonseca reports from Heraclitus. And it can be declared and persuaded thus, because our intellect therefore suffers difficulty in attaining truths because it does not have proper species of things through which it may know them, but that it does not have these does not come from itself, because, as much as is from itself, it is in potency to all, but it comes from the things themselves which are not productive of proper species in our intellect; therefore from the part of the things themselves comes this difficulty. The matter is clear from examples, for material substance therefore cannot be known by us, because it cannot impress a species of itself either in sense or in intellect; which does not come from our part but from the part of the substance itself, and the same is true of parts of substance, and in accidents which are not sensible per se. But the same is also true in spiritual substances, at least created ones, that we may omit God; for they do not have efficacy for changing our intellect and impressing a species of themselves on it; therefore from the inefficacy of the things themselves comes this difficulty.

4. The third opinion is middle, that some things are perfect and superior to man, but others imperfect and inferior, and that man suffers difficulty in knowing all things but from diverse causes. Therefore with respect to superior things (this opinion says) the whole difficulty arises from our imperfection and not from things, for those, as much as is from themselves, are maximally intelligible. And about these Aristotle seems to have spoken maximally, in the cited place, where he adds that common reason: "As the eye of the owl to the light of the sun, so our mind is related to the most manifest things of nature." From which that common distinction of truths had its origin, for some are known per se in themselves, which are not so

known to us, others on the contrary. But with respect to inferior things the difficulty of knowing them arises from themselves; for in our intellect there is indeed sufficient power; nevertheless, because they themselves are imperfect and little intelligible, therefore we know them with difficulty. The matter is declared by an example in sight; for it cannot see the light of the sun because of its own imperfection, not the sun's; but it cannot see the most tenuous light or some minimal object because of the imperfection of the object itself, because it is most inefficacious for changing the power. And this is the opinion of St. Thomas, Averroes, Alexander, Albert the Great, in the cited place of Metaphysics, whom the rest, both Thomists and Averroists, follow.

5. But if you ask in which order of those things certain things should be placed which seem to be middle, like elements and other natural things, some respond that they are comprehended in neither of those orders, nor is it necessary because the proposed question does not pertain to these things in that man suffers no difficulty in recognizing them, but most easily recognizes them. Thus Fonseca thinks, Metaphysics II, c. 1, q. 1, sect. 2. For he thinks this question does not concern the difficulty which is in exact and distinct cognition of things, for in this way it is established that it is most difficult to attain perfect cognition even of these sensible things, but he says the question is about confused and simple cognition of things, which with respect to our order is prior to distinct cognition. Because otherwise (he says) it would have to be said that species of natural things are most difficult for us to know; because, since they are composite, their distinct cognition depends on cognition of principles and thus is more difficult. Hence he infers that motion and time are not rightly numbered by St. Thomas and others among things of the second order, which are known with difficulty because of their imperfection; because as regards whether they are and by simple and confused cognition nothing is more easily known than time and motion, although to explain what they are is most difficult, as Augustine said in Confessions XI, c. 14.

6. Nevertheless this opinion does not seem right to me; for it is against the mind of all authors of this third opinion, as is clear from this very example of motion and time just adduced. Next, because it is proven by no reason that there is discourse here about confused and not distinct cognition, in which especially is found the difficulty of attaining truth and the occasion of erring is multiple, whose cause and root philosophers especially investigate. Moreover, because otherwise they would not have taken that distinction from the perfection or imperfection of things, but from the fact that things are more or less sensible, or more or less conjoined with sensibles; for therefore we more easily perceive by confused and simple cognition colors, first qualities and similar things, because they are sensible per se primarily. Then magnitude, and other common sensibles per se secondarily, among which motion is contained and consequently time. After these, sensibles per accidens which are really conjoined with sensibles per se, and therefore among these it is easier to know the whole than the parts, because it is more sensible, and among wholes themselves, those which are closer to the senses. And by similar proportion, in that way by which things separated from sensible matter are knowable to us, those are more easily known which have greater and more intrinsic conjunction with sensibles. And therefore God is more easily known than angels by that genus of cognition, and among angels those who are movers of orbs, than others.

7. Therefore we are treating not only of confused cognition but simply of the difficulty of attaining truth and the facility of erring, and therefore material things are also held to be comprehended in the second order, as Javellus noted, Metaphysics II, q. 2, because they are intelligible not actually but only potentially. For which reason also those qualities sensible per se, as regards their essence and nature, are known with difficulty. Indeed even the rational soul itself, which seems to be maximally proportioned and adequate to itself, knows itself with the greatest difficulty because it is the material form of the body, in which it in some way falls short of the perfection of things

actually intelligible. Nor does that reason that species of natural things would be most difficult to know stand against this. For either they are compared to other species of things simple or less composite, or to principles of which they consist; in the former way the consequence must be denied, because the difficulty of knowing, neither according to itself nor as regards us, arises from greater composition with respect to other things which in no way enter such composition, because they are compared to those things entirely per accidens. But in the latter way the inference must be conceded, which is no inconvenience as is evident per se. For what is it strange that cognition of a thing should depend on cognition of principles? Hence the comparison of the present question, to be rightly made, ought not to be made between those things of which one includes the other, but between distinct things, and thus almost all the aforesaid authors speak.

8. A fourth opinion can be devised, that the aforesaid difficulty comes from both sides, namely, from things and from us, which, to be probable, ought to speak only of created things. For in God no reason can be devised from his part on account of which he would be difficult to know; none (I say) which pertains to defect or limitation; for thus we speak. Because otherwise it is certain that God, on account of his infinite perfection, cannot be exactly known by created intellect, much less by human; indeed not even as he is in himself can he be seen naturally; nevertheless, insofar as this impossibility comes from impotence, in this way we say it is not referred to God, but to defect of power of the creature. And in the same sense this opinion says that in all other things the difficulty of knowing comes partly from the things themselves, partly from us. For that about immaterial and perfect things this comes maximally from our part from our imperfection the first and third cited opinions confess, and it is evident per se. But that something from the part should also be attributed to the imperfection of the things themselves, is proved by the reason made in the second opinion. Which is moreover declared in this way, because among material qualities, those

which cannot impress a species of themselves in their way on the senses, are called insensible, not only from defect of the senses but from their own nature, and at the same time also from defect of power which they have for effecting a species of themselves and (so to speak) for manifesting themselves; but also created things however immaterial, are inept for manifesting themselves (so to speak) intellectually and for producing a species of themselves; therefore from this part also defect is to be attributed to them. It is confirmed, for cognition arises from two principles, namely power and object; therefore, if both object and power are inefficacious for cognition, the difficulty of knowing will come no less from defect of object than from defect of power, since the efficacy of both is necessary; but in the present case not only is our power inefficacious, but also the things themselves to be known are inefficacious either to communicate a species of themselves, or to concur through themselves to cognition of themselves; therefore.

9. You will say: by these arguments it would be proved that not only in our intellect conjoined to body, but also separated, indeed even in intelligences themselves, there is natural difficulty or ineptitude for being known, because also in other separated intellects they cannot produce a species of themselves nor manifest themselves to them in any way. It is answered first that this is uncertain; for it is probable that one intelligence, as much as is from itself, can objectively manifest itself to others and impress a species of itself on them. But if they do not now effect this, it is because all have from the beginning species of all substances infused per se; but with respect to our intellect, especially when it is in the body, they do not have such efficacy. Second it is said, with that antecedent being conceded, that it follows correctly indeed, as much as is from the efficacy of such objects, that even for intelligences themselves the cognition of other intelligences is difficult, indeed even impossible; nevertheless it is not difficult for them simply and absolutely, because, although they cannot

take species from objects, they nevertheless have another natural way by which they obtain them as due to themselves.

10. And hence it is easily proved that also concerning things of inferior order the difficulty of attaining truth arises not only from the imperfection of things, as the second and third opinions asserted, but also from our imperfection, as the first teaches. For that the imperfection of things is the cause, the reasons made about immaterial things prove a fortiori, because material things are much more inept for manifesting themselves to the intellect and changing it than spiritual things; and the more imperfect those things are and the less they have of entity, the less apt they are for the aforesaid effect. Also, because in order that they can be understood, it is necessary that they be elevated to a superior order and become in some way immaterial, at least in representative or virtual being, which they have in the intelligible species; therefore it is a sign that they themselves according to themselves are imperfect in the genus of intelligibles and consequently from their part there is great difficulty in understanding them and finding truth; and this difficulty is greater the less perfect entity these things have in their order and the less representable through proper species. But that this difficulty also arises from our imperfection, besides what was adduced in Scotus's opinion, is declared from what was just said, because, if our intellect were perfect, it would have some natural way by which it could obtain proper species of these things, even if the things themselves were inept for providing them; therefore, that our intellect by no reason or natural way can obtain them, is its imperfection; therefore this difficulty is also to be attributed to it. And it is confirmed because this whole difficulty arises for the most part from the fact that our intellect conjoined to body depends in its act on phantasms, whose sign is that separated from body it will be able to know more things and more easily, even about these things which are imperfect and seem to be less intelligible; but this is the imperfection of our intellect; therefore it is always the cause or (so to speak) concause of this difficulty. It is added

that theologians teach that man cannot by natural light find all truths or avoid all errors, even in natural and speculative things, but with God's help he can do both; therefore it is a sign that this difficulty or rather impossibility, arises from the limitation of our intellect and the dependence which it has on the senses.

Resolution of the Question

11. In this matter I think the third opinion, which is St. Thomas's, is simply true, provided the first is not entirely excluded; for the second is improbable, but the fourth is less probable in part, although it touches truth in many things. Therefore that this difficulty arises in some way from our imperfection with respect to all things, the reasons adduced in the first and fourth opinions prove, which as regards this are convincing; nor do I think St. Thomas excluded this cause, but in certain things he added another. Hence it is also true further that with respect to inferior things this difficulty is increased or simultaneously arises from their imperfection, which the reasons of the third and fourth opinions also prove and experience itself sufficiently teaches; for we know certain most imperfect things with the greatest difficulty, while we know certain more perfect things more easily; therefore it is a sign that this difficulty arises from the imperfection of the things themselves. Nor could Scotus or other authors of the first opinion deny this or, if they deny this, they are false. But the account is not the same as regards this concerning perfect and immaterial things, which St. Thomas also intends, and in this the fourth opinion is deficient because those things are of themselves most apt to be understood.

12. But the objection made about the production of species must be dissolved in this way: for first, if we hold that those substances are productive of species representing themselves in the intellects of others, consequently it must be said that they do not do this regarding the human intellect, especially conjoined to body, not coming from

their inefficacy but because it is not capable of such species, especially for that state; for if in the state of separation it can receive them, also those actually intelligible objects will be able to impress them according to the capacity of the patient. But if we hold that these substances cannot impress species of themselves, it must be said first that this does not properly come from their imperfection but rather from a certain perfection, although limited and finite. Just as, that one immaterial substance cannot produce one similar to itself, is not properly from imperfection, since some less perfect things can do this, but from perfection, by reason of which they have that they cannot be produced except by creation; thus therefore in the present case, although those substances are actually intelligible, nevertheless, because they are finite substances they cannot be immediate principles for effecting accidents in other subjects. Or certainly, because per se they regard intellects entirely abstracted from matter, which by their nature postulate that they be in first act from the beginning, therefore such substances from themselves indeed are actually intelligible as proportioned terminative objects of intellection, which suppose first act in the intelligent being, but do not confer it. Hence if some intellect is in pure potency with respect to those things, it is to be attributed to its imperfection that it lacks first act, not however to imperfection of the object. Or second it can be said, that just as to substances, insofar as they are intelligent, first act or species by which they may be able to understand is owed, so to the same insofar as they are intelligible, it is owed that their species be communicated to other substances of the same order. Hence that our intellect, while it is conjoined to body, cannot obtain species of them, is not properly from their impotence; but it is from its imperfection, because in that state it cannot use such species. Hence as soon as it is separated from body it receives them accommodated to its capacity, which it can use thenceforward.

13. Therefore it remains that this difficulty arises from the disproportion which is between our intellect and intelligible objects;

but this disproportion is founded in both extremes, namely, intellect and object; nevertheless not in the same way; for with respect to inferior things it is founded in their imperfection, joined to the imperfection of the intellect not having power to attain (so to speak) the minimal intelligibility of such things; but in superior things it is founded in excess of perfection, which our imperfection cannot sufficiently grasp, and thus it happens that in almost all things it is difficult for us to find truth. It is also added that in individual things and questions truth is one, but falsity is multiple, because truth can be departed from in many ways, and many things can have apparent similarity of some thing which really are not. And hence it also happens that the discovery of truth is difficult, but the lapse into falsity easier and more frequent.

DISPUTATION X

ON THE GOOD OR TRANSCENDENTAL GOODNESS

This is the last simple property that is attributed to being, concerning which we first suppose that goodness exists; for this is so certain and self-evident that it needs no proof. For Scripture says that God saw goodness in the creatures produced by him, Genesis 1; and Aristotle said that the good is that which all things desire, Ethics I, c. 1. Hence, just as it is certain and known by experience that there is in things a natural inclination or appetite toward something, so it is also known that there is good or goodness in things. This being established, therefore, we must explain what goodness is and how manifold it is, and which of these is a property of being and how it is related to being itself.

SECTION I

WHAT THE GOOD OR GOODNESS IS

1. Since "good" is a connotative or denominative name, here we do not inquire what that is which is denominated good; for it is certain that this, speaking generally, is being, which by nature or reason precedes the good, as was said above and will be more evident

from what follows. Rather, we inquire what is that form or notion from which a thing is denominated good. In explaining this, there is the same variety of opinions as in the other properties of being.

2. The first opinion says that goodness does not express some real notion, but only a relation of reason of the fittingness of one thing to another. This opinion is indicated by Capreolus, In II, dist. 34, q. 1, and is explained in this way. For goodness, as is evident from the very word and from the common way of conceiving, does not add to being some privative notion, because privation rather expresses a lack of perfection or goodness; it therefore expresses a positive notion. Again, it does not formally express the very notion of entity, both because these two are conceived and explained by us through diverse concepts and definitions, and also because otherwise goodness would not be a property of being, but rather those words would be synonymous. Nor can goodness include entity in its concept and add something to it, because a property does not intrinsically include in its concept the nature or essence of its subject. It is therefore necessary that goodness express something superadded to being; but this cannot be something real, because, as was shown at length above concerning the properties of being in general, nothing real can be added to real being as such, not only from the nature of the thing, but not even by reason as distinct, which would be its property. Likewise, because such a notion can be neither absolute nor a real relation, as we will prove below; therefore good can only add above being something of reason, which can only be the aforesaid relation of fittingness. This reasoning seems to be that of St. Thomas, q. 1 De Verit., a. 1, and q. 21, a. 1. And it can be confirmed because good and desirable are the same in reality, although by these names the same relation is not signified; for "desirable" expresses a formal denomination from appetite, or a relation to it; but "good" does not formally express this, but that which on the part of the object is the foundation of such denomination or relation, on account of which this causal statement is true: Because it is good, it is desirable. But everything is desired on account of the

fittingness it has with the one desiring; for each one loves what is fitting; therefore the notion of good consists in this notion of fittingness; but this notion of fittingness is nothing but a relation, as the very word suggests; and it can be explained because the same thing as regards all absolute features is fitting to this one, unfitting to that one, as heat is fitting to fire and unfitting to water; therefore fittingness consists in relation; and not a real one, as we will show, therefore one of reason.

Goodness is Not a Relation of Reason

3. But nevertheless this opinion has been refuted in principle above on two points. First, that it denies that these properties of being include in their formal and intrinsic concept entity, which we showed to be false both generally and in the particulars treated above, and in the present case it seems more manifest. For that which does not include entity is nothing; but who would conceive goodness to be nothing, when it draws appetite and is said to have the notion of final cause and is the very perfection of the thing, either complete or partial, as we will explain? Hence St. Thomas, I, q. 48, a. 5, says that good consists per se and principally in perfection; but perfection cannot be understood without entity. Hence Augustine, lib. 1 De Doct. Christiana, c. 32, says that insofar as we are, we are good. The second point is that a relation of reason is a property of being; for speaking properly of a relation of reason insofar as it expresses something feigned by the mind and as it were added to things, we showed this to be false, and in the present case it is also evidently clear. First, because, as Aristotle teaches, Metaphysics VI, at the end, good is in things, and in this he distinguishes it from the true; it is therefore not formally only a relation of reason. Then because, as St. Thomas treats from Augustine, lib. De natura boni, c. 3, I, q. 5, a. 5, good consists in measure, form, and order, which we will also explain below; but these are not feigned by the intellect, but exist in things

themselves; therefore neither is the notion of good. Also, because this is the difference between true good and apparent good, that apparent good is only feigned and apprehended by the intellect, but true good subsists in the thing itself and is presupposed before any fiction of the intellect; hence it is said of God: He saw all things that he had made and they were very good; but he did not see in them a relation of reason; therefore goodness does not consist in a feigned relation nor is this required for it.

4. But there are those who say that although some relations of reason are such as depend on the fiction and thought of the intellect, like relations of genus or species, others are in things themselves without thought of the intellect, like the relation of creator or lord in God. But these either speak equivocally about relations or involve a contradiction in words. For how are they in things themselves before the work of reason, if they are said to be relations of reason? Or in what do they differ from real relations, if they are subjectively in things and not only objectively in the intellect? Nor are those denominations of creator or lord, insofar as they are understood to precede the thought of the intellect, taken from relations of reason, concerning which elsewhere. Add that, however this relation may be feigned, the notion of goodness cannot consist in it, which will be more evident from what we will say about real relation. But the foundation of this opinion proves at most that good, besides the whole intrinsic entity of the thing, connotes something else extrinsic or a denomination taken from the association of several things, especially when one thing is said to be good for another, as we will declare below.

Goodness is Not a Real Relation

5. The second opinion holds that the notion of goodness consists in some real relation superadded to being. This opinion is to be established and declared, taking the principle proved against the preceding opinion, that goodness ought to consist in some real

notion; for this cannot be merely absolute, as the argument sufficiently proves, that the same thing is good with respect to one and bad with respect to another; it will therefore be a real relation. This opinion is attributed to Durandus, In II, dist. 34, q. 1. But since Durandus in other things also denies proper real relations, his mind in the present case is different, as we will see below. But whoever holds this opinion, it is manifestly false. This can be shown here by applying proportionally the same arguments by which we proved this about truth. First, because God is good from eternity with transcendental goodness common to the three persons, and yet in him there is no real relation common to the three persons. Second, because heat, wherever it exists, has all its goodness, even if fire does not exist nor any other subject to which heat would be fitting; therefore even then it does not have a real relation of fittingness; therefore goodness does not consist in this relation. Third, even when heat exists in fire or justice in man, it is not good on account of a real relation, for by the very fact that such a form through its absolute entity informs such a subject, it is good and its perfection, prescinding from any arising relation either according to real duration, if indeed there is no such relation, or according to understanding and the order of nature; for such extremes are prior by nature according to their absolute entities and perfections than any relation arises between them. Fourth, because either that real relation expresses perfection and real entity, or not. If it does not express (as many think) some real perfection, how can it be the goodness of some thing since goodness expresses perfection? But if it does express perfection, therefore also goodness; it therefore expresses a real relation of fittingness and that relation will be its goodness; and thus we will proceed to infinity, which is a common argument against relations. Or if that relation is fitting and good without such a relation of fittingness, the same can very easily be understood in any absolute form or thing.

Section I

Goodness Expresses Nothing Absolute in the Thing Distinct from Entity

6. The third opinion is that goodness expresses a certain absolute and real property superadded to being and formally distinct from it by the nature of the thing, which opinion is attributed to Scotus, In I, dist. 3, q. 3 and other places, which were treated above; and one may see in Capreolus, In II, dist. 34, q. 1. And it can be proved by sufficient enumeration from what was said, because goodness must be something real; and it cannot be a relation; therefore it ought to be absolute. And that it may be a property, it must be distinguished in the thing in some way. But against this opinion proceed all the things that were said in general about the properties of being and in particular about unity and truth. And besides, that it may be more clearly understood to be false in the present case, we can distinguish that some being is said to be good in two ways: in one way absolutely and in itself, namely, because it is good in itself, in which way God is said to be good or man good. In another way something is said to be good because it is good for another, in which way virtue is said to be good because it makes the one having it good, and thus St. Thomas says, q. 21 De Verit., a. 1, that good expresses the notion of what perfects another. Concerning this distinction we will say more immediately. Therefore, a thing that is said to be good for another cannot be denominated good from some real and absolute mode distinct by nature from its entity, because such a thing precisely conceived in its entity is, by reason of that entity, fitting to that for which it is said to be good, as health through itself and not by reason of some superadded mode is fitting to the animal; and virtue or knowledge precisely from the fact that it is virtue and knowledge is fitting to man; it is therefore entirely fictitious to posit in such forms superadded modes by which they would be good; for let us prescind through the intellect such a mode and consider in knowledge only its essence, and we will find it fitting and very proportioned to the human intellect. And similarly a

form precisely from the fact that it is a form is good and fitting to matter, and so concerning others. Add that here also that argument has place which can be asked about that superadded mode whether it is fitting to another or not; for if it is not fitting, how can a form affected by that mode be fitting by reason of it? But if that mode is also fitting through itself (lest we proceed further and to infinity), a form also from the force of its essence or ultimate difference will be able to be fitting through itself.

7. And hence it is easily understood that in a thing that is said to be good in itself and absolutely, that mode is also fictitious. For either a thing is said to be good essentially or accidentally, in which way a studious man is said to be good. In this latter way goodness is indeed something distinct from the very thing that is denominated good, as health is distinct from the healthy and beauty from the beautiful; hence sometimes it is a mode of the thing so affected, like figure, sometimes however it is an entity added to another being to perfect it, like knowledge is added to the intellect. Nevertheless, this is not the goodness that we now consider, because such goodness with respect to that entity to which it happens is not an intrinsic property of being but is a certain accident of it; hence it is not transcendental goodness, but can be called formal or material goodness, or objective, or another similar, according to the various relations of fittingness that one thing can have to another. Unless perhaps that goodness is considered with respect to the very thing or form that is said to be good for another, concerning which we have already spoken; or with respect to the whole constituted by it, in which way it is an intrinsic part of its entity, just as form is an intrinsic part of the composite and can be called a certain good, or its goodness, and thus it already pertains to the essential goodness of that composite as such. Concerning this therefore it is also evident that it cannot add an intrinsic and absolute mode distinct by nature from the entity of the thing, because the goodness of the whole is nothing but what arises from the goodness of the parts; but it has been shown that the

goodness of the form does not add anything intrinsic beyond the form and consequently neither does the goodness of matter beyond matter, nor the goodness of union beyond union; therefore neither does the goodness of the composite add any distinct property beyond the whole entity of the composite as such. And it is declared by applying the argument made; for, prescinding from that property, there remain in that composite the whole goodness of matter and form united among themselves; therefore also the goodness of the composite. But if neither in composite being does goodness add that mode nor even in simple being that is ordered to composing another, it is evidently inferred that also in simple substances substantial, or essential, or transcendental goodness adds nothing intrinsic to their entity; for there is the same or greater reason, because these beings are both simpler and more perfect.

8. And hence a fortiori is refuted the opinion that Soncinas reports, IV Metaph., q. 19, which asserted that this transcendental goodness is a certain accident truly and properly pertaining to the predicament of quality. This is evidently false, both because a transcendent predicate cannot be limited to one genus, and also because each thing is good through itself, which is not only most certain in God, but also in other beings, from the reasoning made. For the soul, for example, precisely by reason of its substance has some perfection and is good and fitting to man and desirable by him; and the same is true in quantity and in qualities themselves; for in individual species there is proper goodness and perfection; hence goodness does not constitute a proper genus or species of quality, otherwise one quality would be good through another, which is ridiculous, especially since the same quality can be good for one and bad for another.

Goodness Absolutely does Not Consist in the Real Perfection of Being

9. Therefore there is a fourth opinion that goodness expresses nothing other than the intrinsic perfection of the thing, which is absolute in absolute things and relative in relative things. Hence it seems to follow that good is nothing other than being itself insofar as it has some perfection in itself. This opinion is attributed to Hervaeus, Quodl. III, q. 2; there however he rather holds that goodness expresses entity insofar as it is perfective of another, or insofar as it is ordered to the perfection of another, than as it has some perfection in itself, concerning which sense I will speak below. Otherwise therefore this opinion can be explained, that the goodness of each thing is that perfection by which each thing is perfect in its entity; hence if it be being simply, it will be having in itself so much perfection by reason of which it will also be in itself a certain good; but if it be being in a qualified sense or being of being, like a part of a whole or accident of a subject, thus it will be good of that whose being it is; and by reason of the entitative perfection that it has, it will be called in itself a certain good; but by that reason according to which that perfection is either instituted or apt to perfect another, it will be called good of another. Hence, just as an accident by the same entity is in itself being and being of another, so by the same perfection it is in itself, that is, intrinsically a certain good and good of another. Thus therefore it is correctly understood and explained that goodness in each thing is nothing besides the perfection of each.

10. But the proof of this opinion thus expounded can be taken first from what was said, by sufficient enumeration; because goodness is not a relation of reason nor real, nor something absolute added to being; therefore nothing else remains that it can be except the perfection of the thing. Then because good and perfect are the same, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 5, a. 1, 3 and 5, and we will declare below; therefore also goodness and perfection are the same; for good and perfect are the same not only materially but also formally, because each thing is good insofar as it is perfect. Finally, in this way the notion of goodness can easily be conceived and declared, and there is no

reason that compels adding anything else, nor can what that would be easily be explained or understood; therefore it is a sign that the notion of goodness consists in this.

11. But although this opinion seems per se easy and perspicuous and declares the matter for the most part, nevertheless it does not do so completely, and therefore something else must be added on account of two things. First, because according to this exposition, good is not a property of real being, but its essence. Hence good and being would rather be converted as synonyms than as subject and property. The consequence is clear, because nothing is more essential to real being than to have some perfection, and until something is conceived as being of some perfection, it is not conceived as real being; hence in this sense, if there is some difference between these two names, it will be rather in etymology than in the thing signified, because being is taken from the act of being, but good from the perfection that the act of being formally and necessarily includes. The second is the argument proposed above, that the same thing is said to be good for one and bad for another, although it includes the same perfection.

Goodness adds to Being the Notion of Fittingness

12. It must therefore be said that good can only add above being the notion of fittingness, which is not properly a relation, but only connotes in another such a nature having natural inclination, capacity, or conjunction with such perfection; hence goodness expresses the very perfection of the thing, connoting the aforesaid fittingness or denotation arising from the coexistence of several things. Durandus intends this conclusion, in the place cited, and it can be proved first by sufficient enumeration from all the things said against the other opinions and because nothing else can be devised, those being excluded. Second, because the things that were adduced in favor

of the last opinion undoubtedly prove that perfection is included in the concept of goodness; and the same also confirm the things that were said against the first opinion, because goodness cannot not include entity and consequently perfection. Again, the things that were objected against the last opinion are excellently saved by positing the aforesaid connotation; for that suffices that there be some distinction of reason founded in things between good and being, so that good can be attributed to being as a property and not be synonymous with it, because formally it is one thing to be or to have entity, but another thing by reason of entity to always have some fittingness that the notion of good declares. Then, this suffices that the same thing, retaining the same perfection, be good for one and bad for another; for when it is said to be good for one, besides the perfection of that which is said to be good, there is connoted in the other to which it is said to be good an inclination or connatural capacity of the other; but in the other, to which it is said to be bad, there is connoted a lack of such capacity or inclination, or rather a contrary inclination; therefore in this way all the things that are found in goodness are saved without any other relation joined, as was also said in a similar way about truth. Finally, this can be declared by induction in all goods; for honest good according to everyone's opinion expresses good that is per se fitting to rational nature as such; likewise, delectable good is nothing other than good having fittingness with sensible nature, as Cajetan treats at length, I-II, q. 32, a. 1, explaining how this is not a relation, but the very thing as accommodated to such a nature, which can express nothing other than mutual connection of things and fundamental proportion; and the same is found in its own way in useful good, which only expresses good apt and accommodated to the intended end. Therefore the fittingness that good expresses is correctly declared in the aforesaid way.

13. Objection. Only one difficulty remains, because in this way the notion of good is not adequately but only partially explained: for, as I was saying above, good is usually predicated of things in two

ways, namely, either because a thing is good in itself, or because it is good for another, which division is taken from Augustine, VIII de Trinit., c. 3, and from St. Thomas, In II, dist. 27, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1, q. 1 De Virtut., a. 2, ad 1, and I-II, q. 26, a. 4, where he also adds that what is good in itself is good absolutely and simply; but what is good for another is only good in a qualified sense. In this sense the same St. Thomas is accustomed to say that an accident is not good as having goodness, but because it contributes to the goodness of the subject, as may be seen in III, q. 11, a. 5, ad 3; and I-II, q. 55, a. 4, ad 1, he says that virtues are not so much certain goods as certain goodnesses, which is said not because they do not have perfection in themselves, but because they have it accommodated to perfecting another. Just as accidents are said to be beings of being rather than beings, because each thing has as much goodness as it has being, as the same St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 18, a. 1. Scotus has the same distinction of good according to itself or with respect to another, Quodl., XVIII. But truly the aforesaid notion of good, as explained by us, only applies to a thing as it is said to be good for another; for under this notion it is excellently explained that for a thing to be good expresses the perfection of such a thing connoting in another capacity, inclination, or other similar connection; but this cannot apply to that goodness by which a thing is said to be good in itself, because this goodness is said entirely absolutely and without any respect to another, even fundamental or according to denomination; therefore in that way the adequate nor principal notion of good is not explained.

14. Response. To this difficulty it can be responded, first, that we here describe goodness which is a property of being; but good is only a property of being insofar as it expresses fittingness to another or insofar as it is good for another; for in this way good is distinguished in some way from being and applies to every being, even the most perfect; for God, who is supremely good, is also good for others, for God clearly seen is the supreme objective good of rational creature, and the divine Word is the greatest good of Christ's humanity. But

good taken absolutely, namely, insofar as it is good in itself, does not seem to pertain to a property of being but rather to its essence or entity, as I was arguing above, because good in this way is the same as perfect, as St. Thomas often says, I, q. 5; but perfect is included in the essential concept of real being, because being cannot be conceived with entity without being conceived with essential perfection, both because being itself is perfection, and also because essential perfection belongs to being per se primarily, and in this it differs from accidental perfection, whether it be extrinsic or intrinsic in the manner of a proper property. Hence through this essential perfection each thing is constituted in a certain grade of being, and through the same beings are distinguished among themselves and ordered. For thus (as we were saying above) being is first distinguished into infinite and finite according to essential perfection; therefore such essential perfection does not add anything above being and essence; therefore good under this notion does not seem properly to be a property of being but being itself. And in this way Scotus said, Quodl. 6, that the magnitude of essential perfection is not other than essence even in creatures. Which all the rest teach. And this can be explained by a similar example from the things we were saying above about truth, namely, that insofar as it expresses an absolute notion of true entity, that is, not feigned but established, as such it does not express a property of being, but only declares the very notion of real being, and therefore is only a property as it connotes in some way fittingness to the intellect; thus therefore it seems to be said about good, proportion being preserved.

15. How good and perfect are compared. This response will become more probable if it is exactly understood how the notion of good and the notion of perfect are related; for Aristotle says, Metaphysics V, c. 16, that perfect is said to be that beyond which it is not possible to take any part, or that which lacks nothing. In this sense not every good is perfect, as is evident per se, nor is every being perfect, although it is good; for a boy is being and man, yet not perfect; and a man having perfect quantity, but not qualities or habits

consonant with his nature, although he is good in some way, is nevertheless not perfect. Therefore in this sense perfect is said not of any good whatsoever, but of that which is consummated in every respect, which is good simply. But in another way perfect can be said of whatever under some notion of being has perfection simply necessary and essential, in which way a boy can be said to be a perfect man as regards essence, and similarly theologians say that remiss charity, although it is said to be imperfect with respect to intense charity, is nevertheless simply and as regards essence perfect, as John says, 1 Canon., c. 2: Whoever keeps his word, truly in this the charity of God is perfect. And in this way good and perfect are converted, indeed they are entirely the same insofar as good expresses that which is good in itself or which has goodness, that is, perfection due to itself; but this is nothing other than to have essence or entity due to itself; therefore good under this notion expresses nothing other essentially and formally than being; for to be perfect charity in the said way is nothing other in reality than to be charity, and so concerning others. Indeed, even to be perfect in the prior way or good simply is nothing other than to be being having the whole entity that is required for its completion.

16. And in this way St. Thomas is to be understood when he is accustomed to say (as may be seen, I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1) that being simply and in a qualified sense are compared among themselves differently in creatures than good simply and in a qualified sense; for a thing has that it be being simply through substantial being, but in a qualified sense through accidental being; but it has that it be good in a qualified sense through substantial being, but simply through accidental being. But this last must be understood not precisely of accidental being, but as conjoined to substantial being; for a man would not be good through accidental virtues unless man were presupposed and consequently substantially and naturally good. Hence in those words "in a qualified sense" and "simply" there seems to be equivocation; for when they are said of being they seem to be

said of substance and accident precisely compared; but when they are said of good, they are said of created substance either taken solitarily or as affected by dispositions and faculties connatural to it. Whence it happens that although there is diversity in the mode of speaking, nevertheless in reality there seems to be no difference, because also the goodness or perfection that accident confers, if it is precisely compared to that goodness that substance confers, is in a qualified sense. For thus universally it is true what we related above from St. Thomas, that each thing has as much goodness as it has being, and what we also related from Augustine, that insofar as we are, we are good.

17. And thus finally it happens that good said absolutely is nothing other than being itself, in which way things are said to be naturally good or perfect, if they are consummated in their entity, and man is said to be morally good, if he has moral virtues or perfections, which are nothing but certain real forms and entities; thus also God is said to be supremely good and perfect by reason of his entity, even if he is compared to nothing else, and so concerning others. This doctrine and response thus expounded is therefore probable and presents a certain clarity and facility, and Henry indicated it, in the place cited above.

18. Nevertheless, on account of the use of words, another response can be employed. For although the prior response has truth in this, that good under that notion does not differ in reality from being, nevertheless they can be distinguished by reason, which suffices that good be assigned as a property of being in the manner of other transcendentals. Therefore, as regards the imposition or signification of the name, it must be noted that being is only said from being or entity, as we expounded above; but perfect more clearly expresses the perfection of being, in which it includes a certain negation, or at least its meaning cannot be explained by us without it, namely, that nothing is lacking to it according to that notion according to which it is said to be perfect. But good expresses some fittingness by reason of which a

thing has that it be desirable; for good is said through some order to appetite, as St. Thomas taught, I, q. 5, a. 1, from that of Aristotle, Ethics I: Good is what all things desire, and this will be explained more immediately. Hence it is necessary that even those things that are said to be good absolutely and according to themselves be so denominated because they have perfection fitting and desirable to themselves, and thus it also happens that good in this way formally signifies perfection existing in such a thing, connoting in the same thing capacity, inclination, or natural connection with such perfection. This is more clearly evident when such perfection is distinct from the very thing that is denominated good by it; for when a man is said to be good by reason of virtue, virtue is formally signified not in any way whatsoever, but as a certain goodness, in which is imported not only the perfection of virtue, but also the fittingness that it has with human nature, connoting on the part of nature itself capacity or propensity to such perfection. But in those things in which there is no distinction between perfection and the thing that is said to be perfect, this fittingness or connotation seems more difficult to explain; nevertheless it must be said that, although in reality there is no distinction, it is nevertheless conceived and signified by us in the manner of distinct things, that is, through the mode of denominating form and denominated thing, and therefore that form is signified as perfection accommodated to that in which it exists, in which is computed its natural connection with such form, and thus such good is distinguished from being, at least by reason.

How Good and Desirable are Compared

19. From the things that have been said about the notion of good, one can understand how good and desirable are related. For some think that the same thing is signified formally and synonymously by these words, and consequently they say that good adds above being a respect to the desirable, which St. Thomas seems to favor, in the said

q. 5, I, a. 1, saying: The notion of good consists in this, that something be desirable; and a. 3, ad 1, he says expressly: Good does not add anything above being, but only the notion of the desirable; and a. 4, ad 1: Good (he says) regards appetite. He has similar things I, q. 16, a. 1 and 3, and lib. I cont. Gent., c. 4, rat. 3; Aristotle favors this, Ethics I, c. 1, defining good as what all things desire. And it can be confirmed by taking a proportional argument from the things that were said about the true; for good is compared to appetite just as true is compared to intellect; but true adds above being only conformity to intellect; therefore good adds only fittingness to appetite. Others distinguish between good and desirable, like Cajetan, I, q. 5, a. 5, where he says that desirable is taken in two ways, namely, fundamentally and formally. In the prior way he says good and desirable are the same, and thus he expounds St. Thomas there; for the proximate reason on account of which a thing has that it can move appetite is its goodness that it has with respect to the one desiring, in which is included not only the entity and perfection of the thing according to itself, but as it has some fittingness with the one desiring. But in the latter way he says good is distinguished from desirable at least by reason or denomination, because desirable as such imports a respect to appetite and extrinsic denomination proceeding from it, or arising from fittingness and proportion between good and appetite; therefore desirable formally explains something that good as such does not express, by reason of which this causal statement is true: because a thing is good, therefore it is desirable; just as this causal statement is also true: because a thing is bright and colored, therefore it is visible; for thus desirable is compared to good as visible is compared to bright. Hence St. Thomas, Ethics I, c. 1, declaring that description of Aristotle: Good is what all things desire, says it is taken a posteriori, because the notion of desirable is posterior to the notion of good. And this opinion is true, which Capreolus had taught earlier, In I, dist. 2, q. 3, and later Ferrara, I cont. Gent., c. 3.

20. The distinction between good and true. From this it is understood that good is related to appetite differently than true is related to intellect; for the transcendental true (about which we are speaking) includes in its formal nature and denomination some conformity to the intellect; but good formally does not include conformity to appetite in its formal nature and denomination, although this follows upon the nature of good. Hence the formal nature of transcendental truth is not properly presupposed in the object so that it may be formally attained by the intellect, but it is a denomination taken from the proportion or conformity between the object itself and the power or its act, and therefore that truth is usually said to be a condition that follows upon or accompanies the object of the intellect rather than formally constituting it; but goodness is presupposed in the object of appetite and is the formal principle of attaining it; appetibility, however, expresses a denomination taken from the proportion of such an object with such a power; hence it does not express the formal nature of the object, but a concomitant condition.

21. How good is related to the nature of end. From these considerations it is also evident how the nature of end is compared to good. For St. Thomas says, I, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1, that good, since it has the nature of the appetible, implies the relationship of final cause. And in the same sense he says, I cont. Gent., c. 38, rat. 3, that good has the nature of end, namely, in the way that it has the nature of the appetible. For indeed if the relationship and denomination of end is taken formally, that is not of the nature of good, but can follow upon it, for end as such expresses the nature of cause in relation to means or to some action which is done for the sake of the end, which relationship good does not express, but only the nature of what is fitting. But if end is taken fundamentally, thus it is attributed to good, by which principle of goodness the end has the power of causing in a final manner. This, however, must be understood of good simply speaking, such as is good per se; for if good is taken in its entire breadth, it encompasses not

only the end but also the means, as will be evident from the following section.

SECTION II
THE MANIFOLD NATURE OF GOOD

1. First division. Before we treat how good is a property of being, it is proper to clarify some divisions of the good, so that it may be better established what notion of good is attributed to being. And first indeed, good is commonly divided into true good and merely apparent good. True good is said to be that which is such as it is judged and known to be; apparent good, however, is that which is judged to be good but is not so in reality. But this division applies to good in the same way that it can be attributed to any being or notion of being; for there is true gold and apparent gold, and so with other things. However, this division is commonly declared with particular reference to the good, because since the proper causality of good is to move and attract appetite, apparent or supposed good accomplishes this almost equally with true good, because since it is applied to move appetite through cognition, it moves as much as it is judged or supposed to be good, even though it may not actually be such. Therefore, concerning merely apparent or supposed good, there is nothing for us to say, because its nature consists only in this: that it is supposed to be such as true good commonly is, although it is not really such. Hence, as many as are true goods, so many can exist through false supposition, because in every genus of goods, error and false supposition can be found.

2. Second division. Second, good can be divided into that which is good in itself and that which is good for something else. Concerning this division, quite many things have been said in the preceding section, where we indicated that although the notion of good which is a property of being can be accommodated to each being insofar as it has perfection suitable to itself, nevertheless it is found

more clearly in any being insofar as it is suitable and consonant with something else. It is also added that this notion of good for another supposes or includes the notion of good in itself; for nothing is good for another properly and strictly except what is good in itself and has perfection suitable to another. I said properly and strictly, because sometimes the absence of some form is considered good for something, although it formally confers no perfection to it or has any in itself; nevertheless, privation is not properly good, but is sometimes so denominated because it deprives of an unsuitable form and under that aspect is appetible. Therefore, good for another supposes good in itself, and therefore other divisions of good seem chiefly to concern that which is good for another, and will be explained by us in that context; nevertheless, we shall simultaneously clarify those which will pertain to being insofar as it is good in itself.

The Division into Honorable, Useful, & Pleasant Good is Explained

3. Third and principally, good is commonly divided into honorable, delectable, and useful. St. Thomas presents this division in I, q. 5, a. 6, and II-II, q. 145, a. 3, and he takes it from Ambrose, lib. I Offic., c. 9 and 10, where he suggests it rather obscurely; Aristotle taught it more clearly in II Ethics, c. 3, and lib. VIII, c. 2, where he calls the honorable absolutely good, distinguishing it from the pleasant and useful. St. Thomas notes there that this division was chiefly given concerning human good, but can nevertheless be accommodated to good in general or according to itself. Therefore, it will first be clarified by us in human good, in which these notions of good are found properly and without metaphor; then we shall see how it can be applied to good as such. It must be presupposed that the discourse concerns man insofar as he is man, that is, insofar as he uses reason, both because reason is the supreme rule of every good suitable to man, reason (I say) either natural, if man is considered only philosophically,

or illuminated by divine light, if he is considered theologically; and also because the proper and formal notions of these goods, especially of the honorable and useful, cannot be discerned except through reason.

4. In how many ways something is suitable to another. Since therefore good is the same as suitable, something can be suitable to man in two ways: in one way through itself, because namely that perfection which it has in itself is from itself consonant and suitable to man. This can happen in two ways: first, that it is suitable in order to the delight which such good brings with it, and this is delectable good. Second, without order to delight, but only because it per se befits or is suitable to man as such, and this is honorable good. In another way, something is suitable not through itself, but only by reason of another good which can be obtained through it or by means of it, because namely, although considered in itself it brings no delight nor per se befits or is suitable to man, nevertheless, as it can contribute to obtaining another good, it is considered suitable, and this is useful good. And thus it is established both that those three members are contained under the notion of good and that they are in some way distinct among themselves, at least by formal reason conceived or by relation; for in reality or subject it is not always necessary that they be distinguished; for it is established that the same thing, for example, love or devotion toward God, is both honorable and pleasant and useful.

5. Finally, it is easily understood from the said explanation that those members exhaust the division, because neither between good per se or in order to another can a middle term be found, since these are opposed immediately and as if by contradiction; nor besides good suitable on account of delight or without it, but only on account of itself, can another member be conceived, since these members are also distinguished as if by contradiction or immediate negation, because every good which is per se suitable with the reason of delight set aside (praecisa ratione delectationis) is reputed honorable. I say

with delight set aside, because these members should be distinguished by abstractive precision rather than negative abstraction, if they are compared to the thing which is denominated good, because for a thing to be honorable it is not necessary that it be pleasant or useful, but only that it have some reason of suitability on account of which it is lovable, even if it is neither pleasant nor useful, and so concerning the rest. Hence formally and as if conditionally these members can be distinguished, even by negative abstraction; for it is of the nature of the honorable as honorable that for its notion and suitability sufficient to move right appetite, it does not require delight or utility, whether it has them joined in reality or not; for even if it did not have them, it would be sufficiently good and suitable and perfect in its order; and the same is proportionally true of the rest. And in this way the aforesaid division seems sufficiently explained.

Various Difficulties Concerning the Aforesaid Division

6. First difficulty concerning honorable good. But so that it may be declared more exactly, some arising difficulties must be briefly treated. The first is how honorable good is said to be suitable per se. For either it is said to be suitable per se as a form almost consenting with the nature of man insofar as he is rational, in the way that heat is suitable per se to fire, and thus it follows that the very powers of intellect and will are honorable goods, which is contrary to Augustine, lib. II De Lib. Arb., c. 19, where, distinguishing all goods of man into greatest, middle, and lowest, he places the powers of the soul in the middle order, because we can use them badly, although nevertheless the greatest goods seem to be those which are honorable. Then it follows that God is not an honorable good for man, because he is not suitable to him per se in the manner of a form. It also follows that the action of giving alms is not an honorable good, because it is not some form suitable per se to man. Or honorable good is said to be suitable

per se not as a form, but as an operation befitting man, and thus first the same inconvenience follows concerning God. And further it follows that virtues, especially infused ones, are not honorable goods because they are not operations of man, which is plainly false and contrary to Augustine in the cited place. Or honorable good is said to be suitable per se objectively, because, namely, it is good lovable per se, which reason is more universal; for it can apply both to operation, both internal and external, and to any form whatsoever and to God himself. But neither in this way are all the difficulties mentioned avoided, because it follows that the powers of the soul are to be counted among honorable goods; indeed, even health and other goods of the body, which are lovable per se. And besides, another difficulty arises, because this reason, namely that some object is lovable per se without order to delight, cannot be the first reason of good which is found in such object, because it supposes a reason of good on account of which such object is lovable per se. Just as in the preceding section we said that the reason of appetible supposes the reason of good and suitable; for therefore a thing is appetible, because it is good and suitable; but it is the same to be good lovable per se as to be appetible per se; therefore this cannot be the first reason in which honorable good consists.

7. Second difficulty concerning delectable good. The second difficulty is concerning delectable good, how it has a peculiar and proper reason of good appetible in itself and per se; for either by delectable good must be understood the object around which delight is concerned, or the delight which is born from such object. If the first is said, it follows that this good is not more good per se and in itself than useful good. This is proved because it is not good because it has delight in itself, which is a thing distinct from it, but because it is apt to generate delight, which seems to be a certain utility consisting in relation to delight itself, by reason of which such object is lovable. Just as food, for example, if it is loved because it confers health, is said to be loved as useful good for health; therefore, if it is loved insofar as it

brings delight, it will be loved as useful for delight; therefore delectable good taken in this way is not good per se and in itself, nor does it differ formally from useful good, but only materially, or as a particular from a universal. If however delight itself is said to be delectable good, as St. Thomas indicates in the cited place in the first part, it is indeed true that delight is a certain act suitable per se and consonant with the nature or appetite which is delighted; nevertheless no reason appears why this peculiar suitability of such act should be distinguished from others and constitute its own peculiar reason of good more than the suitability which any other act has with the faculty of operating, such as the intellection of truth with intellect and the vision of a beautiful object with sight. And besides, the reason of delectable good does not seem to be able to consist primarily in delight itself; for delight is concerned with some good as good, since it is rest of appetite, which does not rest except in good attained; therefore delight supposes in the object a reason of good prior to delight and which is such in itself and not through order to delight; for the good around which we are delighted is not therefore good because it delights, but rather therefore delights because it is good; therefore delight supposes in the object suitability and goodness distinct from delight itself. Concerning that, therefore, I inquire whether it constitutes delectable good or not; for if it constitutes it, therefore delight itself is not the first delectable good; indeed, it does not seem to have similar suitability or reason of good, because when we are delighted, for example, in the vision of a beautiful thing, the suitability of vision is of far different reason from the suitability of delight, although vision is the object of that delight. But if that goodness or suitability which is in the object of delight does not constitute delectable good, there will now be another good distinct from the three enumerated.

8. Third difficulty concerning useful good. The third difficulty can be concerning useful good, how it is denied to be good in itself and in this is distinguished from the rest; for useful good, although it

is useful to another thing distinct from itself, nevertheless has in itself its own utility which consists in some virtue or efficacy of providing that thing for which it is useful. Perhaps it will be said that the goodness of a useful thing does not consist in utility itself, but in the suitability and appetibility which such utility has with respect to man, and consequently it will be said that useful good does not have this suitability from itself, but from the end for which it is useful. Against this, however, it is argued that although the suitability of useful good supposes the suitability of that thing for which it is useful and is perhaps derived from it, nevertheless, with that supposed, truly the useful good itself insofar as it has relation to such thing, has in itself proper suitability by reason of which it is good and lovable; therefore in this there is no formal difference between useful good and other goods; for even honorable good or delectable good can sometimes take its reason from relation to something extrinsic. Indeed, honorable good is sometimes such from conformity to extrinsic law, or at least from suitability which results in it with such law supposed. Hence it also happens that some useful good has no other suitability or goodness except that of honesty; as, for example, bodily affliction insofar as it is useful for satisfying God, has no other goodness except honest goodness; and by the same reason, a means which is only useful for taking delight has no suitability or goodness except some participation of that delight; therefore useful good is not rightly distinguished from others.

9. Fourth concerning the same. And hence arises the fourth difficulty, why useful good is not distinguished into two; for such is useful good, as is that to which it is ordered; therefore, just as good lovable per se is one honorable and another delectable, so good from utility to another, one is honorable, another truly delectable.

10. Last difficulty concerning the sufficiency of the division. The last difficulty is because the aforesaid division seems insufficient; for besides the said reasons of good there seems to be another which can be distinguished or abstracted from those; for there are certain

goods lovable per se, not because they delight, nor because they are honorable, but precisely because they perfect nature, such as health, knowledge, bodily integrity, and being itself and living; for even if we abstract in mind all delight, these are goods and lovable, as is evident per se; and similarly, although we abstract all reasons of virtue, these are lovable as connatural goods and on account of them others can be loved as useful, with honesty set aside. A sign of this is that sometimes they are sought through honorable means, sometimes through base ones, not on account of delight but on account of natural suitability alone; therefore there is given some reason of good distinct from those three.

The First Difficulty is Resolved

11. To satisfy the first difficulty and to clarify what honorable good properly is, it must be noted that honorable good can be said or taken in two ways. In one way, in order to human and moral actions insofar as they can be regulated by right and prudent reason, and in this way honorable good is said to be that which per se and from itself befits man or a person using reason, as is taken from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 145, a. 1, and following. In this suitability no commodity is considered which through such good increases to that person with respect to whom it is said to be good of this kind; for this, although it often intervenes, nevertheless is not per se and formally necessary for honesty, but that decency and proportion which is found between such good and the nature which directs its operations by right reason suffices. Just as giving alms is honorable, because it is per se consonant with rational nature, even if by impossibility man so operating would take no utility or commodity thence except the very fact of operating rightly. In which way also with respect to God it is said to be suitable and honorable to communicate himself, to benefit and have mercy, not because it is commodious to him, but because it is per se decent and proportioned to his goodness. Therefore honorable good

explained in this way expresses a peculiar reason of suitability and on the part of the thing which is said to be honorable includes its perfection, with all conditions either physical or moral necessary for the aforesaid suitability with rational nature.

12. However, this good is commonly explained through suitability to the dictate of right reason; for that good is honorable which right reason dictates should be done or loved, etc. Nevertheless, if this saying is understood concerning right reason insofar as it expresses judgment or cognition of what is expedient to do, thus honesty does not consist in conformity to the dictate of reason nor is that the first rule or first reason of such honesty. For good is not therefore honorable because right reason judges it to be such, but conversely, because the good itself is truly and in reality such, therefore it is judged to be such by right and true reason. And therefore as to us, right judgment is the rule of honorable good, because it manifests it to us; nevertheless according to itself that judgment supposes proper suitability from which honorable good has that it is such; but we say this to be to rational nature insofar as it is such and has such properties or attributes. But if the dictate of reason is taken not formally but as if radically, thus it is well and a priori said that honorable good is that which is conformable to reason, that is, which is conformable to rational nature, which is therefore born to judge this to be done or desired by itself.

13. However, honorable good taken in this way can be distinguished into honorable act, habit, and object; for there are acts formally good and honorable, as are acts of virtues, especially of the will, and to these correspond habits of virtues, which are deservedly counted among the greatest and most honorable goods, because they most befit man using reason; and to these acts or habits are supposed honorable objects; for from these acts and habits take their honesty, as St. Thomas signifies, I-II, q. 19, a. 1, ad 3, where this matter is more broadly disputed, and q. 20, a. 1, ad 2, and q. 2 de Malo, a. 3, in corp., et ad 8. For an honorable act as such is not concerned except around

honorable good; hence it is necessary that it suppose such goodness in that, for an act of will does not confer goodness on its object, but rather is founded in it, and therefore St. Thomas above calls this honesty primordial goodness.

14. And from these things response is made to that whole first difficulty, insofar as it regards honorable good taken in this rigor and propriety. For we concede that this good is not limited to operation, or habit, or form, but applies to every thing which is honestly and according to right reason appetible by man. We concede then that this good is not therefore such because it is suitable per se to the will or appetite of man in the nature of appetible object; for, as the argument there made rightly proves, this reason of per se appetible formally taken supposes suitability with rational nature, by reason of which such good is per se appetible to it.

15. But in another way honorable good can be taken, not in order to morals, but in order to nature, and it is that which per se perfects nature and is commodious to it even with the reason of virtue set aside, as is health, integrity, and life itself which sometimes it is base to love or protect, even if from itself it seems most suitable to nature. And this good the ancient philosophers seem to have called good of nature, which they distinguished from honorable good which they called per se decent, as is gathered from Cicero, lib. III and IV de Finib. Nevertheless, because this good of nature is suitable per se and lovable, therefore it is thus considered that natural appetite is compared to this good just as rational appetite to good per se decent, and by this reason in order to nature this good is comprehended under honorable good. It is also added that this reason of good is sufficient that it be honestly desired, if some impediment does not intervene from elsewhere, because since right reason is that by which man ought to be ruled or governed, it pertains to it to propose both those things which are commodious and consonant to nature, unless something else obstructs or some greater inconvenience follows. Therefore in this way of speaking about honorable good, it must be conceded that the

powers of the soul are certain honorable goods, not indeed in that way in which virtues are, which we cannot use badly as we can the powers themselves, on account of which these are said by Augustine to be greatest goods, those however middle goods, but for that reason by which goods pertaining to the integrity and complement of nature are suitable per se and as far as is from them, rightly lovable. And in this way being itself, living, and knowing are honorable. And not only inherent goods, but also extrinsic things which sometimes are suitable per se, at least as objects of vital acts, are counted among these honorable goods, and thus also the first difficulty is resolved as far as it can pertain to this good, concerning which we shall say more in the solution of the last difficulty.

The Second Difficulty is Treated

16. Concerning the second difficulty, two things must be distinguished which are touched upon there, namely delight and the object of delight, and concerning both it must be said that they are good suitable from themselves in some way and appetible per se. And indeed concerning delight itself, this is per se manifest; for it is an act which from itself very much invites and draws appetite, which is a sign that it has from itself great proportion with it. Concerning the object of delight, however, it is proved, because the object of delight is good; therefore delight supposes in that object goodness, because acts of the soul do not constitute their objects but suppose them; therefore the object of delight is not good and suitable because it is the object of delight, but on the contrary, because it is good and suitable, therefore it can be the object of delight. It is therefore good and appetible from itself and not through denomination or relation to delight alone, although perhaps the etymology of the name or imposition is taken thence. Hence therefore it is established, whether delectable good is taken for delight itself, or for the object or that good which delights, or (which is probable) for both in the manner of one, namely, for rest in

such thing, just as beatitude is sometimes taken objectively, sometimes formally, sometimes for the whole beatitude which embraces both in the manner of one, in whichever (I say) of these ways delectable good is taken, it is deservedly said to be good per se and not only by extrinsic relation or denomination, in which it is rightly distinguished from useful good.

17. Again, the goodness or suitability of delight itself is easily distinguished from the goodness or suitability of honesty, whether moral or natural; for the suitability of delight consists only in that sweetness and vital rest (so to speak) which appetite has in good attained, whether it has other conformity with reason or rational nature or not; for these are accidental to the reason of delight as such. And on account of this cause delectable good, at least by reason of delight, is deservedly distinguished from honorable good both moral and natural, both because it has peculiar suitability, as I said; and also because it has peculiar power of moving appetite, from which it happens that sometimes it moves not only against reason, but also against the commodity of nature.

18. But truly concerning the goodness of the delectable object which is supposed in it so that it causes delight, it is not easy to judge what it is and how it is distinguished from honesty either moral or natural. And the reason of the difficulty is because delight is concerning suitable good both attained and present, as is taken from Aristotle, I Rhetor., c. 10; and St. Thomas extensively, I-II, q. 31, a. 1 and following. But suitable good, whose attainment is supposed to delight, is nothing other than good suitable to nature or to spiritual nature, if the delight is spiritual, or to corporeal nature, if it is sensible; but good suitable to nature is nothing other than honorable good, either moral, if it is so suitable to rational nature as such that it per se befits, or natural, if it is only per se commodious to nature, as pertaining to its perfection; therefore delight does not suppose delectable good as delectable; indeed, this rather seems to be extrinsic denomination from delight itself in potency, just as visible from vision,

but it supposes only suitable good to the one desiring concerning whose attainment he is delighted. And this is confirmed by examples; for when a sick person is delighted concerning health attained, he considers no other reason of good so that he is delighted except that commodity which health brings to his nature; therefore in health as it is object of delight, there is no other goodness besides the natural suitability of health with human nature. In similar manner, the beatific vision or God clearly seen and possessed, is the object of perfect joy for no other reason except because he is good most proportioned and suitable to human nature; therefore universally, delectable good fundamentally (so to speak) and insofar as it is intrinsically supposed to delight itself on the part of the object, is nothing other than good suitable per se to nature and thus honorable, either moral or natural.

19. To this it can be responded in two ways. First, by conceding the whole discourse made and consequently saying that delectable good is not distinguished from good suitable per se to nature except insofar as it includes delight, which is considered in such good as the proper reason moving to appetite for it. Which seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 6, and I-II, q. 32, a. 1, ad 3, where he says that operations are delectable insofar as they are connatural and proportioned to the one operating; and in that whole question he suggests the same; and Cajetan signifies the same in those things which he notes around that first article. From which it must be said consequently that delectable good insofar as it is said to be good and lovable per se, intrinsically includes delight itself, whether delight alone is apprehended as such good suitable per se on account of that which it is, that is, on account of that sweetness which it formally confers, or whether this whole, namely such object as it has delight adjoined, is apprehended in the manner of one object which is called delectable good, whose form as it were is delight itself. Hence Aristotle, X Ethics, c. 2, says that pleasure is expetible per se, and makes any good more expetible, if it is added to it. In which words he indicates that delight indeed supposes good; but that it added to it

makes it more appetible, because namely it constitutes it pleasant and delectable; therefore such good is completed by delight itself and is as if formally constituted. And St. Thomas signified this very thing, I, q. 5, a. 6, when he teaches that delectable good terminates appetite by reason of delight which is rest in the thing desired.

20. And he adds there, in the solution to the second, that those things are properly said to be delectable goods which have no other reason of appetibility, when otherwise they are both noxious and dishonorable. These words favor the said opinion, insofar as it is said in them that delight is the whole reason of desiring delectable good as such; but in that which is said in them that there can be given a thing in which there is no other appetible reason besides delight, they seem to contradict the things said above; hence they seem false on account of the reason made above, that delight results from good attained and therefore it is necessary that it suppose another prior reason of good, by reason of which it is appetible; therefore there cannot be given a thing which brings delight and nevertheless has no other reason of appetible besides delight. But it can be said that St. Thomas did not intend to exclude from such thing every reason of suitability prior to delight in which delight is founded, but wanted to indicate that sometimes it happens that this suitability is such that, with delight set aside, it does not make the thing simply appetible, because it is noxious or dishonorable. According to this way of speaking, therefore, to the second difficulty it must be conceded that that thing or operation which is the object of delight, although it has another prior reason of good, nevertheless is not delectable good except for that reason alone by which it has delight adjoined. Nor does it hence happen that this good is confused with useful good or has only extrinsic reason of good in the way that useful good does, because the thing is compared to delight which follows from it as its object, and therefore from both one delectable good intrinsically and appetible per se is considered to be constituted.

21. Another mode of responding can be that in the object of delight there is always found a certain special fitness by reason of which it can be the object of delight and be properly and intrinsically denominated a delectable good, and that this fitness is distinct and can be separated or abstracted from the proper fitness of honesty, both moral and natural. For, as Cajetan well treats in I-II, q. 32, a. 1, the object of delight is a thing or operation apprehended as fitting; it is not necessary, however, that this fitness be in some way honest or advantageous to nature, but it suffices that it be proportioned to taste, for example, or to another sense or faculty. There seems therefore to be in these delectable objects a certain special mode of fitness sufficient to constitute a special notion of good, which seems to be comprehended under delight, whenever delight is said to be the entire reason of appetibility in the delectable good as such. And thus this mode of speaking is favored by St. Thomas, in the words cited above from I, q. 3, a. 6, ad 2.

22. But (to confess the truth) this latter mode of speaking can neither be sufficiently founded nor explained, because it cannot be understood what that special fitness might be beyond that which is in the good constitution of nature or in the being or operating proportioned to nature. This is taken from Aristotle, VII Ethics, c. 12 and 13, and book X, c. 4 and 5, and I Rhetoric, c. 10, at the end, where in this sense he says that pleasure is an affection entirely and sensibly proceeding into nature at once, as St. Thomas expounds and treats in I-II, q. 31, a. 1, and q. 32, a. 1, and Cajetan there. Also, because delight tends toward the same good and fitting thing toward which love or desire tends; for it differs from them only because it tends toward that good as present and attained; but with respect to love or desire, setting aside delight, no other reason of fitness is understood beyond that which pertains to moral or natural honesty, or at least it is most certain that love and desire can be directly carried toward such fitness or toward good under such a notion; therefore it is equally certain that delight does not require another reason of fitness in its object;

therefore to devise or feign that fitness as prior to delight itself has neither foundation nor can be sufficiently explained. For that some delights arise from the peculiar fitness of the object with some faculty, as with taste or touch, this is nothing else than either because that quality which is perceived by sense and produces delight is an object connatural and per se fitting to such a faculty, or because the operation to which such delight follows is similarly a natural perfection proportioned to the power. And thus always this kind of reason of good which is presupposed on the part of the object for delight is referred back to the good per se fitting to nature. The first response therefore is more solid and through it sufficient answer is made to the second difficulty placed above.

The Third Difficulty is Resolved Along with the Fourth

23. To the third difficulty concerning the useful good, some concede that the useful good has its own proper and intrinsic goodness by reason of which it is appetible in itself, although not for its own sake. For these two things are different; for the means is truly loved in itself, that is, it terminates the movement of love in itself; hence it is necessary that it have in itself useful goodness, distinct from the goodness of the end, by reason of which it can terminate the affection of love or choice; yet it is not loved for its own sake, because that goodness is not absolute, but respective to the end or on account of the end, and because the end is the first cause of loving the means or useful good. Whence it happens that according to this opinion the useful good is not distinguished from the rest by the fact that it is good only by the extrinsic goodness of the end, but because it has all its goodness in order to the end. And this opinion can be confirmed because it is repugnant to be good and to be good by another's goodness; for good is the same as perfect; but no thing is perfected by extrinsic denomination alone from another's perfection; but the useful

good is truly good; therefore it is not good by denomination alone from the goodness of the end, but has in itself its own proper goodness. But this opinion is false, as we shall say more extensively below when disputing about the final cause. And it is against St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 6, especially in the solution ad 2, where he says thus: "Useful things are said to be those which have in themselves something from which they are desired, but they are desired only as they are leading to another, as the taking of bitter medicine."

24. Rightly therefore, among proposing the third difficulty, it was responded that it is one thing to speak of utility as it signifies the power which is in the useful good toward the effect for which it is said to be useful, and another thing to speak of that utility in order to the one desiring to whom such a useful good is useful. In the first way it is true that utility can be some virtue and intrinsic perfection of the useful good itself, which perfection indeed compared to the very good which is denominated useful is fitting to it, not as a useful good, but as a good per se proportioned and connatural to it; as in medicine, for example, which is useful for health because it has the power of expelling some humor, it is clear that that power is some intrinsic property of such medicine, which with respect to it is not useful but per se fitting and appetible to it; but with respect to man that power can be called the utility which is in such a thing in order to such an end. But truly all this utility compared to man and considered per se alone, will not be found good, fitting, or appetible to him, but is only judged fitting insofar as health itself, or the diminution or expulsion of such humor is fitting. Hence, if man does not now need such purgation for health, that virtue of the medicine is not fitting to man; if however he needs it, it is judged fitting only on account of health. Therefore the whole virtue, although intrinsic to the medicine, is not of itself fitting to man nor appetible to him, but only insofar as it is somehow informed and denominated by the goodness of the end; therefore the goodness and fitness, which is in the useful good formally taken, as it is useful, is not intrinsically in it completely and

formally; but it is in it as it were materially the utility itself or active power of another thing; but formally the fitness and the whole reason of appetibility is the goodness of the end. An argument for this is also that the useful good, as useful, does not excite nor draw or move the appetite to itself; otherwise the means as means would have the causality of the end, which is false; but the end is what moves the will to desire the means or useful good; hence, although the will tends toward the useful thing as toward a material object and in this way the useful good is said to terminate the movement of the will in itself, nevertheless formally that movement is also terminated toward the end, because it is the whole reason of tending toward the means, and therefore in the useful good intrinsic and formal goodness is not required to determine such an act.

25. To the fourth difficulty therefore it is responded by denying that the useful good as such has of itself proper fitness with respect to the one desiring, by reason of which it is good and appetible to him, but it has this from the end not only as from a radical and remote cause, but as from a formal and proximate cause, because it not only has its fitness and goodness through relation to the end, but it has that from the end itself as from an extrinsic form and reason on account of which it is lovable. And in this the useful good differs properly from the honest and delectable. Wherefore, if sometimes there is some useful good which of itself has proper fitness with nature or right reason, under that notion it is not useful but honest and lovable per se. Hence, that among useful goods some can be honest, others delectable, happens only materially insofar as these notions of good can be joined in the same thing, indeed can even denominate each other; for both honesty and delight can be useful for the salvation of either soul or body, and utility itself can be honest. Formally however these notions are diverse and the notion of useful good is found in the same proportion, whether the utility be toward delight or toward honesty or toward another advantage of nature, and therefore

it was not necessary to distinguish the useful good into various members.

The Fifth Difficulty is Resolved

26. The fifth difficulty is resolved from what has been said. For we have distinguished the honest good in order to virtue or the rule of right reason, which is the same as what is per se decent and consonant with right reason, and the good in order to nature, which is per se fitting and advantageous to it. If therefore the honest good is taken in the first way, we confess that it is not an adequate member of this division, not only with respect to lower things which do not use reason, but neither with respect to man himself, who (as the argument proves) can love some good as per se fitting to himself not on account of honesty nor on account of delight, but only on account of the conservation or advantage of his nature. But truly the honest good taken in the latter way, thus it is an adequate member of that division which St. Thomas declared in this way above, where he says that honest good is called all that which is desired as ultimately terminating the movement of appetite, like a certain thing toward which the appetite tends per se.

27. The natural honest good is diffused through all beings. The useful good is found in all things. Only knowing beings are properly capable of delectable good. And hence it is understood first in what way this division has place in good in general as it abstracts from human good, in what way also its members are found in other things besides man. For the natural honest good is properly found in lower things, not only in sentient but also in inanimate things; for in all is found some perfection which per se terminates animal or natural appetite, as is being itself or being conserved which every thing desires. Whence it happens that in any thing also the useful good can properly be found through relation to this good of nature; for thus the swallow gathers straws for building a nest, which action is good for no

other reason than because it is useful; and downward motion with respect to a stone is compared as a useful good, because it does not per se pertain to its perfection, but only so that it may be constituted in its proper place. But the delectable good is properly found in knowing things, more perfectly indeed in those using reason than in those only sensing; truly and properly however in both; but to things lacking knowledge it can be attributed only by metaphor and a certain analogy, insofar as each thing has rest in its proper good attained; because however that rest is not through a proper act but through the mere absence of motion, therefore it cannot have a proper and special notion of good. Wherefore, when this division is given concerning good in general, the meaning is not that all these three goods are found in individual things, but that such notions of goods are simply given in things or beings; and conversely all notions of goods found in any beings are sufficiently comprehended under the three aforesaid. Whether however these three notions of good can only be apprehended and discerned by the intellect or can also be known by sense and how, does not belong to this place, but is to be treated in the science of the soul. Let St. Thomas be read, I, q. 78, a. 4, q. 81, a. 2; and Cajetan there, and I-II, q. 40, a. 3.

28. Whether the division of good into the aforesaid members is analogical and by what analogy. Secondly, it is gathered from what has been said what kind the aforesaid division is; for St. Thomas, in the cited place, ad tertium, absolutely says that good is not divided into these three as univocal but as analogical, which is said first of the honest good, then of the delectable, lastly of the useful. But if we speak of proper and rigorous analogy by which one thing is said to be such by denomination from another, thus there is true analogy between the useful good and the rest, because the useful good is not good except by denomination from another, which is good and fitting per se. And this proves a certain argument made above, that no thing is good by extrinsic denomination; for this is true of good absolutely, not however of good in a qualified sense and analogically; for nothing

prevents such good from being constituted by denomination from extrinsic goodness. But in this way there does not seem to be proper analogy between the delectable and honest good; for the delectable good of itself and per se is good absolutely, not by denomination from the honest good, but from its own extrinsic conformity and goodness, of which it is a sign; for when all true or supposed honesty is removed, if some delight remains, that is per se good and lovable; therefore it is not denominated good by analogy to the honest.

29. Wherefore it can be said first that this analogy is not equal in both goods, but in the useful good it is proper, in the delectable however it is taken more broadly to indicate that it is an imperfect good in comparison to the honest good, not however that it is not good absolutely and simply, since of itself and without relation to another it has that from which it is desired; just as conversely, pain which is opposed to delight is evil absolutely, although it is not the greatest evil, and thus in Scripture the evil of punishment is called evil absolutely. Or it can be said otherwise that in both goods, useful and delectable, there is analogy, not however of the same kind; for in the useful good there is analogy of attribution, taken from an extrinsic form, such as is in healthy as it is said of medicine; for thus medicine is said to be good or useful as it is said to be healthy. But in the delectable good analogy can be preserved, not indeed through extrinsic denomination, as the reason made above proves, but through the intrinsic relation of one to another, such as is found in accident with respect to substance. For thus the delectable good intrinsically presupposes another good per se fitting, in which the appetite rests through delight; and from its nature delight is instituted only for this, that it be like a certain beauty and as it were a certain seasoning of another superior good. And therefore it is an imperfect order to desire operation on account of delight, resting in it, when rather delight ought to be loved on account of operation, as it is instituted. Especially however with respect to man the delectable good, which does not have honesty joined to it, cannot be considered good absolutely,

because it both deprives of a greater good and does not lead to the good of man absolutely, which is to live according to reason, as St. Thomas said in a similar case. And in this sense the Fathers sometimes say that nothing is good except virtue, as is evident from Jerome on Isaiah 11; and Ambrose, I De Officiis, c. 9.

30. What is natural good and what is moral good. Thirdly, from what has been said is understood another division of good into natural good and moral good, which, although it can be understood concerning good in general, because delectable and useful good also can be either natural or moral, is properly usually given concerning honest good, taken generally, which can be the ultimate terminus of appetite as per se fitting. Therefore moral good is the same as honest good taken more strictly for that which per se befits and is consonant with rational nature as such; but natural good is that which per se is fitting to any nature whatsoever. You will say that according to this description moral good is also natural good, because rational nature is a certain nature, and moral good is consonant to it by way of form or operation. It is responded, first, that nature can be taken as only signifying the essence of a thing and in this sense it is true that every good can be called natural insofar as it is fitting to some nature, or insofar as it has the perfection which its nature demands, and in this way proceeds the objection made. But otherwise nature is taken as signifying not only the essence of a thing, but also the mode of operating or desiring from the impulse of nature alone and a certain necessity; and in order to nature taken in this way natural operation is usually distinguished from free or moral operation; and in the same sense is given the division of good into moral and natural; for the goodness and perfection of a thing is especially known from operation or sometimes even consummated through it, and therefore according to diverse modes of operating the division of good into natural and moral is taken. Therefore natural good is said to be that which is consonant with any nature whatsoever, according to that which it naturally is or can naturally operate; but moral good is that which is

consonant with a thing as it operates freely; for custom (mos), from which moral is said, consists in free operation, as is evident.

31. Although therefore natural good and moral good agree in this, that both are per se fitting to some thing or nature (for this notion cannot be excluded from that good which is per se and absolutely such), they differ however because natural good precisely regards nature as such, or as naturally operating; but moral good regards it as elevated to the mode of operating freely, which most properly belongs to it as it is rational, and therefore moral good is said to be consonant with rational nature as such, both in degree and in mode of operating. Hence it happens that moral good consists especially in free operation; but it belongs in its own way also to its proper object insofar as it is honest, and to the virtue which is its principle. As Aristotle said, II Ethics, c. 6, that virtue is what makes the one having it good, and renders his work good. But what in all these things is moral goodness insofar as it is moral, or what this denomination adds to goodness itself, belongs not to this place, but to moral philosophy, and is treated by theologians in I-II, q. 18.

32. Fourthly, other divisions of good can easily be explained from what has been said, which are rather material on the part of things which are denominated good, than formal on the part of goodness itself or fitness. Thus good is divided into transcendental good and good of the genus of quality, by St. Thomas, q. 9 De Potentia, a. 7, ad 5. For this division is not given according to diverse formal notions of good, but according to the same more or less contracted. For transcendental good speaks in general of the perfection of a thing that is fitting, especially that which each thing has through its entity, as will be explained in the following section. But good of the genus of quality speaks of the perfection which a thing has through some quality fitting to its nature, in which way good of the genus of quantity could also be distinguished; but it is more usually attributed to quality, because the perfection of a creature is usually consummated by qualities.

33. What are goods of body, soul, and fortune. What are laudable and honorable good. Again good is usually divided into good of body and soul and extrinsic good, which is usually called the good of fortune, as is evident from Aristotle, I Ethics, c. 8, who again, c. 12, distinguishes good into laudable and honorable. This division seems to be taken a posteriori from the effect and as it were reward of goodness and does not seem to exhaust all goods; for delectable good of itself is neither honorable nor laudable, except insofar as it is either useful, or is joined with honesty or accompanies it and helps toward it. Therefore honest good is properly honorable insofar as it is desirable for its own sake; but laudable, as Aristotle wants above, good is said as it is referred to another. Hence it is commonly said that useful goods are laudable, which seems to be understood with a certain precision; for those as such are only laudable; but others are also honorable; for honest good is also worthy of praise, not however of praise alone, but also of honor; therefore both goods are laudable, but one is also honorable, and thus the division is to be understood.

34. What is good absolutely and what is good in a qualified sense. Moreover good is usually divided into good absolutely and good in a qualified sense. This division can be understood in various ways; for first it can be applied to the three members placed above; of which honest good, as we said, is good absolutely; but the others only in a qualified sense. Secondly it can be attributed to transcendental good, insofar as it is said absolutely of being as it is good in itself. And this in two ways; one is, that those members be referred to the whole breadth of being and good as such, in which sense good absolutely will be said to be that which contains in itself the whole goodness and perfection of being; but good in a qualified sense is that which is good only in part. And in this way God alone is good absolutely; but every creature is good only in a qualified sense. In which way can be understood that of Mark 10: "No one is good except God alone," who alone for this reason is also said to be the highest good. And in this sense this division coincides with another which theologians use from

Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 1 and 4, and Augustine, VIII De Trinitate, c. 3, and Boethius, I De Hebdomadibus, c. 2, dividing good into good by essence and by participation. For good by essence is good absolutely; for it is the very essence of goodness, which into all other things according to the capacity of each sends forth rays of goodness, as Dionysius says; hence in itself it essentially includes whatever can pertain to the notion of good and perfect, which is proper to God, and therefore he alone both is good by essence and good absolutely and supremely, but others are good in a qualified sense and by participation.

35. Another sense of that division is that the members be not referred to the whole breadth of being, but to a determinate genus or species, and in this way the division can be applied to all genera or species of beings, and good absolutely will be said to be that being which has every perfection due to it in its order; but good in a qualified sense will be that which has some perfection due to it and something is lacking to it. And in this way a created substance is not good absolutely, unless it be affected with due accidents; nor is an accident good absolutely unless it have the due intensity, or another similar perfection. And in this way Dionysius said above: "Good is from integral cause, but evil from any defect whatsoever."

36. What perfection is absolutely simple and what is in a qualified sense. Thirdly it can be understood that in that partition good is divided as it is fitting to another, and it can also be referred either to being as such or to a determinate being. In the first sense that division nearly coincides with another which theologians hand down, dividing perfection into perfection absolutely simple and perfection in a qualified sense, with Anselm, in Monologion, c. 14. Therefore good or perfection is said absolutely to be that which in an individual being is better itself than not itself, that is, which in the genus of being speaks such perfection that it excludes no greater or equal perfection. But perfection in a qualified sense or in a certain genus is that which, although it brings some goodness, nevertheless is incompatible with

another greater or equal or has some imperfection mixed in, as are all the perfections of creatures as they are in them. But in the latter sense the division will be able to be applied in nearly the same proportion to any genus of beings; for to each thing that is good absolutely which brings some goodness to it and does not exclude a greater or equal; thus it is good for fire to be hot and for man to be temperate; but if it brings some goodness, yet excludes a greater of which that thing would be capable, it will not be good absolutely but in a qualified sense; thus to be black, although in itself it is some good to a man having it, is not however good absolutely, because it excludes being white, which is better for man. But in this sense, absolutely and in a qualified sense are only distinguished as more and less perfect, in which sense also sensible goods are said to be in a qualified sense with respect to spiritual goods and temporal goods with respect to eternal goods.

SECTION III

WHAT GOOD IS THAT WHICH CONVERTS WITH BEING AS ITS PROPERTY

1. Reasons for doubt. The reason for the difficulty is that good is taken either for that which has goodness or perfection in itself, or for that which is suitable to another; but in neither way does good seem to convert with being as its property; therefore. The minor is proved regarding the first part concerning good taken absolutely, first, because real relations are beings and yet according to the opinion of many they are not good, because they have no perfection. Second, because mathematical things are true things and yet, as Aristotle testifies in Metaphysics III, they are not good. Third, because prime matter is in some way being and yet it is not good, because just as it does not have actuality, so neither does it have perfection. Fourth, the essences of created things are in some way real beings since they are

not nothing, and yet they are not good because, apart from existence, they do not have perfection, whence they are not appetible except in order to being. Fifth, we can add that there are many things that lack the mode and order due to their nature, which therefore cannot be called good since good consists in mode, species, and order, as Augustine says in On the Nature of the Good, chapters 3 and 4. The other part of the minor is proved first from all the things adduced, because what does not have perfection in itself cannot be good to another, as relation, for example, if it does not signify perfection in itself, will be able to confer nothing to the goodness of that in which it inheres. Second, we can object to the contrary because good, insofar as it is said to be suitable in this way, can be said not only of beings but also of non-beings, as in Matthew 26, it is said of Judas: "It would have been good for him if that man had not been born"; therefore, not being or not being born, insofar as it can be suitable for preventing greater evils, is called good by Christ. And in moral matters, not only fulfilling a precept, but also not doing what is prohibited, is considered good and suitable to man; therefore good under this aspect cannot be a property of being, since it extends more widely than being. And it is finally confirmed, for goodness which is a property of being is only one in one being; but the suitability of one being to another is not one but manifold and of different aspects; therefore this goodness does not convert with being as its property.

2. The opinion of some. The distinction given above about good must be presupposed, insofar as it is said absolutely of a thing as it is good in itself or as it is said to be good to another or with respect to another. For concerning these there are various opinions. Some indeed think that transcendental good, insofar as it is a property of being, is taken in the latter way under the aspect of being suitable to another, which Hervaeus, Capreolus, and Durandus hold above, yet they do not declare how good as such converts with being. And therefore others reject this opinion because of the arguments suggested above, who consequently hold that good under the latter

acceptance is more than transcendental, because it transcends not only beings, but also non-beings. Whence it happens that according to this opinion there is a twofold good: one that is a property of being in the fourth way; another that is a property in the second way, because it belongs to every being, but not to being alone.

Resolution of the Question

3. Good is always founded in being. Nevertheless, I think it should be said that good properly speaking always presupposes or includes being or is founded in being, and therefore good under any of the aforesaid aspects cannot extend more widely than being. This conclusion is taken from Aristotle, Ethics I, chapter 6, saying that good is divided through all categories, just as being; and from St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 5, where he says that the notion of being is prior to the notion of good. And this same thing he wished to signify in q. 21 On Truth, a. 2, when he said that transcendental good is founded in being. And the reason is that good, whether it signifies that which is good in itself or that which is good to another, includes perfection intrinsically in its concept, for good and perfect are the same; but true perfection cannot be understood without entity, for what does not have entity is nothing. But how can that which is nothing be said to include perfection? Moreover, concerning that which is good in itself, no one doubts, because of the reason given, that it ought to be being; but from this it is rightly gathered that also that which is truly good to another ought to be being; therefore good under both aspects includes the notion of being, and cannot belong to anything that is not being. The minor is declared first, because what does not have perfection in itself cannot be the perfection of something. Second, because good as suitable refers to an order to existence; for nothing is considered suitable except as existing or in order to existing; but what exists or can exist is being; therefore good as suitable includes or presupposes being. Third, because those things that are reputed

suitable to something, when they are not beings but rather privations or negations of beings, are not really good and in the way they are sometimes called good, insofar as they are appetible, they are also said to be beings in some way; therefore the account of both is equal. The minor is declared regarding the first part, because what is called suitable as a privation is not really good but the lack of some evil, if it rests precisely in privation; but the lack of evil as such is not goodness unless something else is added. Just as also in moral matters it is one thing to decline from evil, another to do good, and not acting evilly is not virtue or good unless it includes a positive will not to act evilly. So therefore it is in natural things; for lacking heat is not properly good for water, but is the lack of evil or the unsuitable, and a certain condition necessary so that it can have its goodness and perfection. Therefore, if suitability is taken in this breadth, goodness and suitability are not the same, even as goodness is said of that which is good to another; but goodness signifies entity or perfection as suitable to something and therefore, what is suitable only by way of privation is not really good, or (to prove the other part of the minor), if such privations suitable to things can be called good, in the same way they can be called beings. For, as we noted above from the doctrine of Aristotle and St. Thomas, being is sometimes said of what really has being, sometimes of what can truly be predicated by way of being, as it is said that man is blind or blindness is in man. Because of this shadow of being, therefore, it happens that such a being, if it is suitable to something, is called good to it; therefore good always maintains proportion to being, and is not extended more universally than that.

4. Good and being mutually entail each other. I say second: every true being is good in itself or has some goodness suitable to it; and thus it happens that good said absolutely converts with being. Concerning this conclusion, the error of the Manicheans and Priscillianists can be mentioned; for they said that there are certain creatures evil from themselves and procreated from a certain supremely evil principle, as Nicephorus relates at length in History VI,

chapter 31; and Eusebius, book VII, chapter 28; and more fully Augustine, tome VI, book On Heresies, heresy 46, and in innumerable works against the Manicheans; and St. Thomas, I, q. 48 and 49, and III Against the Gentiles, chapters 7 and 8; and Pope Leo, epistle 93, to Turibius, specially against the Priscillianists defines. The same Council of Braga I, chapters 7 and 8; and from divine Scripture it can easily be convinced; for in Genesis 1, of individual divine works it is said: "And God saw that it was good"; but of all together it is added: "God saw all that he had made and it was very good." Ecclesiastes 3: "He has made everything good in its time." I Timothy 4: "Every creature of God is good." The reason for the conclusion is that every real being necessarily has some perfection by which it is constituted in its being, which in the thing is nothing other than that very entity by which it is perfected; for the very entity of the thing or the form, matter, or nature by which the thing is constituted in its being, are called the perfections of the thing, because by them it is perfected in its being. Therefore, just as a real being cannot be understood that does not consist or is not constituted by its entity, so it cannot be understood without real perfection by which it is perfected; but perfection and goodness by which a thing is said to be good in itself are the same.

5. But this perfection in creatures can be either essential or intrinsic (under which I include being itself), or accidental. The former is inseparable from each being, if it is preserved in its actual being. The latter, however, can often be separated. Therefore, the denomination of good that necessarily belongs to every being is that which is taken from intrinsic and essential perfection; but insofar as it can be taken from accidental perfection (under this aspect including whatever is distinguished by nature from the essence of the thing and actual entity), thus it is not necessary that every created being be good, that is, affected with every perfection possible or due to it. And thus it happens that good taken in the former sense converts with being; for we have shown that every being is good, and nothing is truly good unless it truly is. It follows then that good taken under the same

aspect is in some way a property or attribute of being, because it both converts with it and in concept presupposes it, and is distinguished from it in some way according to the formal aspect conceived and signified by us. And therefore I said it is in some way a property because it is not a property in that rigor in which property requires some distinction from the nature of the thing from its subject, but only as it is said of any attribute distinguished in concept from that to which it is attributed, as was declared above in treating of properties.

6. Every being is suitable to another. Induction in all grades of beings. I say third: every being is also good with respect to something, that is, suitable to something; therefore also good taken under the aspect of suitability converts with being and is an attribute or property of it. The first part is proved first by induction; for first of all, every accidental being is good to some substance. Because, although it is sometimes not suitable to some subject, like heat to water, nevertheless an accident can never not refer to a habitability and aptitude to some subject which it affects well and suitably according to some aspect, either proper or common; for thus heat, although it is not good for water, is nevertheless good for fire and although it is not good for water, as water is, it is nevertheless good for water as it is a natural or material being. And an erroneous judgment of the intellect, although, as it is erroneous, it is not suitable to the intellect, nevertheless as it is a judgment or a certain representation of such an object, it is suitable to the intellect as it is in potency to second act and to intellectual representation, and the same is true of acts of the will, however much some of them seem to be intrinsically evil. Again, created substances composed of matter and form are so related that both matter is suitable to form and form to matter, and their union is likewise suitable to both, and consequently the whole itself is not only suitable to itself, but also to individual parts. Whence it happens that any part naturally seeks the conservation of the whole more than the conservation of itself, as St. Thomas noted, II-II, q. 26, a. 1. And this mode of suitability can be extended to every created substance, insofar

as it is composed in some way, either from nature and some mode or substantial term, or from itself and its accidents, by which it is good and suitable.

7. But in the most simple substance, which is God, this mode of suitability is not properly found within itself, which is understood to be of one thing to another in some way really distinct, but through supreme identity and simplicity God is suitable to himself and his nature is suitable to his person and personality to his very nature; but this suitability is rather according to that aspect by which he is rendered good and perfect in himself, than according to that by which he is said to be suitable to something. Although a theologian could doubt whether, supposing the Trinity of persons in God with unity in essence, one person can truly be said to be good to another or suitable to another, not only by reason of the essence in which they are most simply one, but also by reason of the properties in which they are distinguished. For it does not seem incongruous to concede that one person is a thing suitable to another, not as its formal perfection, but as a principle to what is principled or as a term can be said to be suitable to a relation or the existence of one relative can be said to be suitable to another correlative and the society of several persons can be considered suitable to individuals, in all of which no imperfection is denoted nor dependence, but only the necessary coexistence of three persons in one essence. But let us leave this to the theologians.

8. With respect to creatures, however, God is the supreme good most suitable to them, not as their formal goodness. In which way some erred thinking that all created things are good by divine goodness, which is manifestly false, because divine goodness cannot be a form inhering in creatures, or come into composition with them so as to constitute them formally good. Neither can creatures be or be said to be good by external denomination alone from the goodness of God, because just as they have in themselves proper being distinct from the being of God, although participated from it, so they have in themselves proper goodness and perfection distinct from divine

goodness, but flowing from it and participated. Therefore God is good suitable to all creatures in the genus of efficient and final cause; for from that good all goodness of creatures flows and depends and in the attainment of that good, or some imitation of it, the supreme perfection of creatures consists. And in this way Augustine said in On the Trinity VIII, chapter 3, that God is the good of every good. But on the contrary, creatures cannot be said to be suitable to God in the way that he is suitable to them, namely as good beneficial to them and communicating goodness to them; but nevertheless they can be said to be suitable to God as works befitting him and consonant with his goodness and wisdom; for thus we say that the heavens are a work worthy of God and suitable to him, just as we say that an image rightly painted is a work suitable to such an artist. In which sense that from Genesis could be explained: "God saw that it was good," that is, suitably disposed and fabricated as befitted such a creator.

9. And in this way it can easily be understood that one thing or substance, even supposedly distinct, is good suitable to another, which can also be observed in creatures; for one creature is suitable to another either because it contributes in some way to its being or to its perfection or beauty, or to communicating its goodness which it has participated from God, or to exercising its actions. Therefore no true and real being can be conceived that is not in some way suitable to something. Whence a general reason can be given, because every being is in itself good and perfect in some way; but every good is not only suitable to itself, but is also suitable to something either so that it communicates itself to it in some way, or at least so that it is made by it and ordered to the benefit of others or at least to the beauty of the universe and some complement. And for this reason there is no being that cannot fall under the object of the will as suitable to something or to some end. Thus therefore it is established that good also as it signifies the aspect of suitability converts with being, because we have shown that everything that is truly and positively suitable is being and conversely every true being is suitable in some way. And hence it is

finally concluded that good also under this aspect can be numbered among the properties of being insofar as it is a certain general attribute of being, which is not entirely synonymous with it, but connotes or includes something beyond the entity of the thing, as was declared in section 1.

10. Natural honest goodness chiefly constitutes transcendental good. I say fourth: transcendental good seems to be taken most potently from honest goodness not in the genus of morals but of nature. Although it can also be said abstractly and generally from goodness, as it abstracts from all. This is declared, for if being is said to be good in itself, that denomination is taken from the fact that it has in itself perfection suitable to it; but this suitability pertains to natural honesty, insofar as every such good is appetible per se at least by that whose good and perfection it is. Whence arose that axiom: "Good is lovable, to each its own." But it is quite probable that transcendental good is primarily taken from the habitude or denomination by which each being has in itself some perfection suitable to it. Thus therefore goodness honest in some way in the order of nature is a universal property of being from which transcendental good is denominated. But if being is said to be good insofar as it is suitable to another, thus every being seems to be per se suitable to something with which it has some natural proportion, either as cause with effect, or as effect with cause, or as part with whole, or whole with part, or in another similar way, and thus in every being some suitability can be found on account of which it is appetible per se with respect to something, which under that aspect is reduced to the honesty of nature. And therefore from this goodness the denomination of good and suitable, insofar as it is common to every being, seems to be taken, for it is most intrinsic and universal; but useful goodness properly taken is more extrinsic and only secundum quid; but delectable goodness is not so common to every being, but seems to be particular, if the speech is properly and not metaphorically about delight. From these things therefore the prior part of the

conclusion is sufficiently established. The posterior part is very easy, because if good is taken abstractly, when it is said of every being, the sense is not that every aspect of good, namely honest, useful and delectable, is found in any being, but simply the aspect of good; which will be true if at least some aspect of good is found in each being. Therefore transcendental good can be taken in that abstraction as a property of being assigned, although in particular it must be attributed to each being according to its proper mode and determinate aspect of goodness and suitability.

Whether Relation Signifies Perfection

11. The opinion of some. The view of some. To the reason for doubting posed at the beginning, it is answered by denying that good does not convert with being. But to the proof concerning the first part about good said absolutely, it must be said individually. In the first, the common difficulty about real relation is touched upon, whether it signifies perfection, which theologians are accustomed to dispute on the occasion of the mystery of the Trinity, since if relation as such signifies perfection, even divine relations will signify it; whence it will happen that some perfection is in one person that is not in another and more perfections in many persons than in one, and in the Trinity than in the essence, all of which oppose the equality of the divine persons. Because of this cause, therefore, many deny that relation, as relation is, signifies perfection or imperfection, but they say it is neutral in both ways. Thus Cajetan holds, In On Being and Essence, chapter 2, about the middle, where he supposes this as commonly received in the school of St. Thomas and Scotus. And St. Thomas indeed favors this, I, q. 42, a. 4, ad 2, where he holds that perfection as such signifies something absolute. I will speak of Scotus below; the same holds Cajetan, I, q. 28, a. 2, about ad 3; Capreolus, In I, dist. 1, q. 7, ad 3; Aureolus against the 1st conclusion; Durandus, In III, dist. 1, q. 3, n. 12; and Marsilius, In I, q. 32, a. 3. And omitting the theological

reason, this opinion can be founded, because it seems incredible that from the sole fact that another becomes white or black or changes place, I acquire or lose some perfection because I lose or acquire a relation of similarity, proximity and similar ones. But others use a distinction, because relation can be considered as to being in a subject and as such they say relation signifies perfection, or according to being to a term, and as to this they deny it signifies perfection, because being to, as to, posits nothing in the subject; whence it is common to relations of reason from itself, and this Capreolus signified saying that relation insofar as it is such does not signify perfection, because as such it posits nothing in that to which it is attributed.

12. But because the nature of relation must be disputed below in its proper place, now it must be briefly supposed that this question proceeds about true and real relations, which are true things or real modes of beings, not disputing now what relations are of this kind or how they are, which will be done in the aforesaid place. This therefore being supposed, I do not see how the difficulty proposed can be satisfied according to the superior opinions, unless by limiting the conclusion placed above, namely, that good converts with absolute being, but not with being as it is common to absolute and respective; or certainly, that although every being as it is distinguished from the mode of the thing signifies perfection, nevertheless the mode of the thing does not add special goodness or perfection. But these limitations can have neither foundation nor truth. And the prior indeed opposes Aristotle, Ethics I, chapter 6, saying that good is equally divided as being, and wanders through all predicaments; and expressly says: "Good is said both in substance and in quality and in that which is to something, etc.," where St. Thomas says that good converts with being which is divided into ten predicaments; and this is the sense of all who say that transcendental good is a property of being and converts with it; that therefore is not a limitation but a destruction of the received opinion.

13. Moreover, that real being signifies some perfection belongs to it not only because it is absolute being, but simply because it has true entity, which constitutes such a being as it ought to be, and in this consists that it is its perfection; and therefore Augustine said, book of 83 Questions, q. 24: "Everything that is, insofar as it is, is good"; and book III On Free Choice, chapter 15, he said: "Whatever is as it ought to be, is good"; and book I On Christian Doctrine, chapter 32, when he had said that God is he who supremely is, he says: "But other things that are, unless they can be from him, and are good insofar as they have received that they be"; and Boethius, book On the Hebdomads, chapter 2: "Whatever is (he says) in that it is, is good"; therefore goodness does not follow this or that mode of entity but the due entity of the thing; but it is supposed that relation has proper entity, through which it has such being as it ought to have; therefore also goodness.

14. Moreover, how can real being be understood without some real perfection? For, by what reason someone might have feigned that this can be understood in relative entity, although it is not found in absolute, someone will be able to feign the same in any accidental entity or even in any real mode, namely that it signifies no perfection, even if it is something real, which nevertheless to concede universally about all accidents or real modes is entirely false. Nor can a sufficient reason for difference be assigned between relation and other modes, if we suppose relation to be a true thing or real mode; for, although relation signifies order to a term, nevertheless according to all that it is, it affects the subject and inheres in it. Whence that distinction about relation according to being in, or according to being to, is of no help; for, if being to is true and real, it is necessary that it affect the subject which it refers to the term; whence, just as relation, even according to being to, posits something real in the subject, so it also posits something of goodness or perfection. Neither is it true that relation according to being to prescind from being in just as it does not prescind from being of being or accident, because that being in is

transcendent to all accidents and their modes, just as being itself to all beings and their modes. Neither also is it true that being to abstract from real and of reason except in voice only, for relation of reason just as it is not true relation, so it does not have being to, but is feigned to have or is so conceived as if it had.

15. True and real relation, as such, includes goodness and perfection. It must therefore be said that relation as relation is, just as it signifies proper entity or mode of entity, so it also signifies proper goodness or perfection, as Ockham and Gabriel well taught, In I, dist. 19, q. 1; and Gregory, q. 1, a. 1; and Durandus signifies, In II, dist. 34, q. 1, ad 3; nor does Scotus dissent, said Quodlibet V, for in his final words he leaves the matter doubtful and undecided, and In I, dist. 1, q. 2, argument 1, he proves from the testimony of Aristotle, from book I of Ethics, cited above, that relation has proper goodness, and in the solution he concedes it has goodness speaking commonly, but not perfect goodness which would constitute a special aspect of an enjoyable object, concerning which elsewhere. And indeed, if anyone considers the testimonies of Scripture and the Saints by which we proved that every created being is good, and the reason and mode by which we declared that goodness adequately belongs to being, he will plainly understand that it proceeds equally concerning any being that has some entity in itself, so that it is necessary that it have as much perfection in itself and be in itself some good, whatever it may be whether it is suitable to some other, besides itself or what is constituted through it insofar as it is such. This is confirmed and declared, for because of the same general expressions and reasons, the entity of the act of sin cannot be excepted, nor any real mode or difference of it from being, insofar as it is such, both made by God and good; therefore the same is true of any other positive aspect of being, however much it may be respective.

16. Whether divine relations signify perfection from their proper concept. The opinion of some is rejected. But to the theological difficulty some respond that, although created relation

signifies perfection from its proper concept and nature, nevertheless divine relation signifies no perfection from its proper concept. Which they say especially to avoid that inconvenience, that some perfection is in one person that is not in another. But they give the reason for the difference, because created relation signifies finite perfection; but uncreated relation cannot signify finite perfection, because this opposes divine perfection, nor can it signify infinite perfection from its proper nature, because this infinity can only belong by reason of essence. But it is strange that they consider it inconvenient that some divine thing signifies finite perfection from itself and do not consider it troublesome that the same divine thing signifies no perfection from itself, when nevertheless from its genus it is better to signify some perfection than none. I add that it can easily be understood that relation from its proper concept is infinite in the genus of paternity or filiation, etc., but is not infinite in the genus of being except by reason of the essence which it includes.

17. The view of others is refuted. Others give the reason for the difference, because created relation is distinguished from the nature of the thing from every thing and absolute perfection, and therefore it must bring with it its perfection. But divine relation is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from the absolute perfection of the divine nature, but with perfect identity and simplicity includes it in itself, and therefore it is not necessary that it bring perfection with it; and Gregory indicates this response above. Nevertheless, that reason does not satisfy me either; for although it rightly concludes that divine relation cannot signify perfection distinguished from the nature of the thing from essence, it does not conclude that it does not signify perfection distinguished in concept, namely, in that way in which it signifies entity. And as to this, no sufficient reason for difference can be assigned, why it would be of the nature of created entity that according to every positive aspect of it it signifies some perfection and this same thing would not belong with greater reason to uncreated entity, since this from its genus is better,

indeed necessary from the force of the common concept of real being as such. Whence the reason made about convertibility between being and good equally urges in divine relations as in created ones. For, if, as Aristotle said, good is equally divided as being, just as in God there are absolute and respective being, although not really but rationally distinct, so there will be absolute and respective goodness and perfection, not really but rationally distinct; therefore also divine relation from its proper concept will signify perfection. And it is declared in this way, for, if to regard a son by created relation is formally some perfection, how can it be understood that in the eternal Father there is no perfection in regarding the Son? But if it is formally perfection, it is necessary that it be relative, because it consists in habitude to a term; therefore that as such comes formally from relation and not from essence as essence, although these are not distinguished in reality.

18. Since uncreated relation signifies perfection, how the divine persons are equally perfect. Therefore I think it should be conceded that every real relation signifies proper goodness or perfection. Neither from this does it happen that the divine persons are unequal in perfection nor, speaking absolutely, that some perfection is in one that is not in others, because in individual persons there is the same infinite perfection in the genus of being formally or eminently including every perfection of all, both absolute and respective, both personal and essential. But about this more broadly, I, q. 28 and 42. To the other reason, that it seems incredible that a man is rendered more perfect because another becomes white, I respond that this is incredible insofar as it is incredible that a man acquires something of entity or some real mode distinguished from the nature of the thing from all that he had before, from the sole fact that another becomes white. Therefore, whoever believes this about entity, why will he say it is incredible about goodness or perfection? But whoever says that there are some relative denominations that beyond all the absolute things that are in one term or subject, connote nothing but

the coexistence of another extreme with these or those absolute conditions, whoever (I say) has been of this opinion, will rightly and consequently say that such relations signify no perfection beyond the absolute ones with some mutual denomination. But we do not speak about these relations or denominations but about true entities or respective modes, which truly and intrinsically are in some subject or supposit regarding another term; and this concerning the first difficulty.

Whether Mathematical Things As Such Are Perfect

19. The second and briefer difficulty was about mathematical things, which Aristotle denies to be good. Which St. Thomas dissolves, I, q. 5, a. 3, ad 4, and q. 21 On Truth, a. 2, ad 4, asserting that mathematical things indeed have goodness in themselves, but through mathematical science they are not considered insofar as they are good or suitable, but precisely and abstractly insofar as they have magnitude and according to it obtain some properties. Therefore Aristotle, who says about mathematical things that there is no goodness in them, speaks formally and precisely about them as they are under mathematical precision or abstraction. Whence it is the same as if he said that the mathematician does not consider in quantity the aspect of good or suitable, for quantity does not have the aspect of good or suitable except insofar as it exists or can exist in the nature of things or in sensible matter; and therefore he also prescind from the aspect of good and from the aspect of end and appetible, which Aristotle intends there. And, although Aristotle does not say that mathematical things are not good, but that in immobile things the nature of good is not found, and thence concludes that in mathematical things nothing is demonstrated through final cause, nevertheless by immobile things he understands whatever is abstracted from all motion and action, such as are mathematical beings.

20. Several objections are proposed. But you might object: for magnitudes also, as they exist under mathematical abstraction, are beings; for they are not abstracted from being, otherwise mathematicians would be dealing with beings of reason; therefore even as such they ought to have goodness. Likewise, if mere abstraction from sensible matter were sufficient for things so abstracted not to be called good, then even universal things abstracted from singulars would not be good. The consequence is clear, because just as mathematical things do not subsist as so abstracted, so neither do other universal things, and thus it would result that all things, insofar as they fall under science, would not be good. Likewise, if mathematical things are not good because they are abstracted from motion, then even immaterial things and all those which are considered in metaphysics would not be good as such, because they are much more abstracted from motion.

21. The proposed objections are answered. To the first, some respond that mathematical things as such, that is, as they are considered and abstracted in that science, are not true beings because they cannot exist as such. But this is not correctly stated, because whatever is considered by the mathematician is a true and absolute being and is considered as such. Nor is it necessary that it be able to exist in the way it is considered; otherwise neither would universals be true beings. It is therefore sufficient that things which are considered abstractly can truly exist. Especially because, although quantity cannot naturally exist except in sensible matter, yet absolutely it does not involve contradiction that it be separate; therefore through that abstraction the true nature of being is not excluded either from the thing considered according to itself, or as it falls under such consideration. But it is otherwise with the nature of the good, for although this is not excluded from the things themselves, nevertheless it is prescinded from such a science or such consideration under such abstraction. Therefore St. Thomas correctly responds in the above form by denying the consequence, because the nature of being is the

first of all; but the nature of the good, in the way it is distinct, is posterior and therefore the mathematical sciences can, although they do not abstract from entity, prescind from goodness.

22. To the second it is responded that there is not an equal or similar reason concerning the abstraction of universals; for mathematical things are not said to abstract from goodness because they are abstracted from inferiors, nor because they cannot exist as so abstracted, but because they are prescinded from every order to motion or action, and consequently from every notion of the fitting or appetible; but other universal natures, although they are considered abstracted from singulars, are nonetheless considered with order to motion or action, which takes its primary origin from the end, as Aristotle testifies. Whence it happens that things considered in other sciences have in singulars all the conditions which pertain to the nature of the good or to the nature of the end, which indeed are considered by such sciences, though not in the singular but in the universal. But mathematical things, neither in the universal nor in the singular, consider in the things which are their objects those conditions or relations which pertain to the nature of the good or the fitting.

23. To the third it is responded first, although in other things from abstraction from physical motion, abstraction from goodness is not correctly inferred, nevertheless in mathematical things Aristotle inferred this, because since these things are not capable of other motion or action, while they are abstracted from this motion they are abstracted from all action and from the causality of the end and thus from the nature of the good. Or it can be said that intelligences and other things which are considered in metaphysics, although they are abstracted from material and physical motion, are not however abstracted from metaphorical motion, by which the end moves. Whence below, book XII, chapter 7, Aristotle said that the first mover moves other intelligences, as beloved and desired, which pertains to the nature of end and good.

Section III

Whether Prime Matter is Good

24. In what sense matter is said not to be good simply. The third difficulty was about prime matter, concerning which those who think that it does not have proper being nor proper actual entity would perhaps say that it does not have proper goodness or at least does not have it from itself, but from form; for, since the good follows being and is founded in it, as we said above from Augustine, St. Thomas and Boethius, if matter does not have being except from form, neither will it be able to have goodness at least in act, but at most in potency; and thus St. Thomas speaks, I, q. 5, a. 3, ad 3, and q. 21 De Verit., a. 2, ad 3. But it must be said that matter from itself and from its intrinsic nature has proper goodness and perfection, as St. Thomas also noted, III cont. Gent., c. 20, because it has its own proper entity and nature distinct from the entity of form. Likewise because among prime matters one is more perfect than another; for the matter of celestial things is more perfect than that of these lower things; therefore there is some perfection in matter. Likewise because matter naturally appetites form as the complement of its perfection, and form also appetites matter; but neither is anything appetited unless it is good, nor does anything appetite the good unless it is good in some respect. Finally, although matter does not have existence except dependent on form, it has nevertheless proper and inseparable existence with intrinsic order and dependence on form; thus therefore it also has its own goodness, as Dionysius also taught, c. 4 De Divin. Nomin. But because matter from itself is simply imperfect in the genus of being and has being only by way of potency receptive of form, therefore compared to beings simply, it is said not to be good simply but in potency, which must be understood not of potency to any goodness however incomplete and potential (so to speak), but of potency to actual or complete goodness, which is through form; but

this potentiality to form is in the latitude of being some actuality, and thus also some goodness, though imperfect.

Whether Created Essences Are Perfect

25. Created essences existing are good. The fourth difficulty was about the essences of creatures, about which we can speak in two ways. First, as they are actually in the nature of things. Second, as they are in potency before they exist. In the first way it is certain that such essences are good by their intrinsic and essential goodness, which is especially clear if through their formal entity they are actual beings. But those who distinguish in reality itself the entity of essence even actual from the entity of existence, should consequently say that also in the entity of essence there is found proper transcendental goodness and perfection distinct from the very being of existence and separable from it, as many think about Christ's humanity, about which matter we shall speak below. But in the second way, speaking of essences of things not yet existing, some say that although they are beings, they are nevertheless not good, because the good is convertible with being in act, not with being in potency. Which St. Thomas signified, I, q. 5, a. 1, saying that the good is the same as the perfect; but each thing is perfect insofar as it is in act, because being is the actuality of every thing. The same he has I cont. Gent., c. 38, where Ferrara adds or declares that not only being actually existing, but also having order to existence, is good just as it is also appetible.

26. Created essences not existing, as they are beings only in potency, so also are they good. Therefore it must be said that in this also being and good are equated and reciprocated, for essences of non-existing things, just as they are not beings in act, so neither are they good in act; and just as they are in potency insofar as they can receive being, so also they are good in potency insofar as they can receive actual perfection and goodness. But as to the use of words, that is customarily called being even what does not exist, on account of

objective capacity of being; but it is not customarily called good simply unless what actually exists, and thus also nothing is appetited except in order to actual existence, that is, insofar as it has it or at least insofar as it is hoped to have it or is in some way apprehended with it, as is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 82, a. 3; and Cajetan noted, I, q. 5, a. 3, at the end. Whence also the divine will is properly said to love those creatures which it wills to be at some time; but possible creatures which it has decreed never to produce, it does not properly love, because it communicates no good in act to them; but that being in potency is not now in them any actual goodness. But if in some way God is said to take pleasure in them, this is either according to the being which they have in God himself or according to how they are denominated possible by God's omnipotence, which is rather to take pleasure in his omnipotence from which they have that even those things which are not are possible.

Whether Mode, Species & Order Are Necessary in Each Nature of the Good

27. The fifth difficulty is expedited from the above; for we have said that the good insofar as it is taken from proper entity and perfection, is convertible with being and in this way every being is good, not however as the good is taken in creatures from accidental perfection superadded to essence. Thus therefore, when the good is said to consist in mode, species and order, if it be understood of mode, beauty and composition or accidental order, thus it is true that not every created being has due mode, species and order; from which it follows only that not every created being is good simply, but not that it is not good in some way. But if those three things are taken more intrinsically and essentially, there is no thing which does not have a mode connatural to itself, for example, that it be substance or accident; and species, that is, form or species due to itself, and ordered to its proper end. And thus the good also which includes these three

things, is convertible with being. Therefore, lest there be equivocation in the word by which something is called good simply, it must be noted that it can be taken simply either as adding something to the good itself transcendentally so that the good simply is said to be that to which nothing is lacking for the consummate perfection due to it and in this sense it is not necessary that every created being be good simply; or that word simply can be taken otherwise to signify that which absolutely and without addition can be called good, and in this sense we say that each thing is good simply just as it is being simply; and in the same proportion has mode, species and order due to its nature, as St. Thomas declares more broadly, d. q. 5, a. 5.

DISPUTATION XI

ON EVIL

Since good and evil are opposites, as is evident from the terms themselves and as Aristotle testifies in the Post-Predicaments, chapter on Opposites, it has seemed necessary to append this disputation to the preceding one so that by comparing the natures of both, namely good and evil, each may be better and more easily understood. Philosophers, however, dispute little about evil; theologians much more, especially St. Thomas, both in the Disputed Questions and in I, q. 48 and 49, and also in other places, namely, what evil is and of how many kinds, how much and in what way it is opposed to good, what causes or effects it has, which we shall here briefly embrace and at the same time declare why evil is not numbered among the properties of being.

SECTION I

WHETHER EVIL IS SOMETHING IN THINGS, AND OF HOW MANY KINDS IT IS

1. Evil exists in things. That evil in some way exists in things and sometimes denominates them as evil is evident from the common understanding and speech of all, which is also frequent in the divine

Scriptures: Ecclesiasticus 11: "Good and evil, life and death, poverty and honor are from God"; and chapter 39: "He tested good and evil in all things." Isaiah 5: "Woe to those who call evil good, and good evil." Matthew 6: "Deliver us from evil." Which we would say in vain about God, if there were no evils, as Augustine rightly says in book I against Julian, chapter 3. What this evil is, however, and how it exists in things, is obscure and placed in controversy. The question concerns evil as to its formal aspect from which evil is denominated, for as to its material aspect or as to the thing which is denominated evil, it is established that any thing can be evil which lacks due perfection, as we shall see.

The Ancient Error about Evil is Refuted

2. There was therefore an ancient error that evil is the positive nature of certain things which were thought to be entirely evil and to have proceeded from some supremely evil principle. This was the error of the Manicheans and Priscillianists, as was touched upon in the preceding disputation, section 3. And St. Thomas attributes the same to the Pythagoreans in I, q. 49, a. 1, ad 1; and it is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics I, chapter 5, where he reports that the Pythagoreans placed good and evil among the first principles of things. Since sacred Scripture openly teaches that there is only one first principle of things, supremely good, and that all things made by it are good, as is evident from the testimonies cited in the preceding section, therefore among Christian philosophers it is certain that evil cannot be some positive thing which is entirely evil by its nature and according to itself, both because it cannot be good and entirely evil simply and according to itself (for it has been shown that any thing is good of itself), and also because a thing cannot be evil on account of natural perfection due to it; whatever is lacking to it of such perfection, or whatever it has adverse to it, cannot be connatural to it, since it is supposed to be opposed to due perfection; therefore no thing can be evil by its nature in itself.

What Evil is Defined

3. From this principle, however, the Fathers further inferred that evil formally or malice, from which some thing is denominated evil, is not some thing or positive form, nor is it mere negation, but is privation of perfection due in being. The reason for the first part is that every positive thing is good, as has been said. The reason for the second part is that a thing is not evil because it does not have more excellent perfection if it is not due to it; otherwise every creature would be evil because it does not have the perfection of the creator. And thus the third part remains, sufficiently confirmed by the sufficient enumeration of parts. And Dionysius confirms this extensively in chapter 4 of the Divine Names, where in this sense he says that evil is not existing, nor is it something, but is privation of proper and suitable perfection and goodness, and again he adds that evil is weakness of good, which comes to the same thing; and St. Basil in the Monastic Constitutions, chapter 3: "Vice," he says, "is nothing but the desertion of virtue"; and in the homily "That God is not the author of evils": "Depravity does not subsist," he says, "nor can we produce its essential substance (that is, real and positive); for privation of good is evil." Similarly Gregory of Nyssa, homily II on the Canticles: "There is no other substance of evil," he says, "than separation from good." And he has similar things in the Great Catechetical Oration, chapters 5, 6, and 7; Damascus, book II on the Faith, chapter 4, book IV, chapter 2: "Nothing," he says, "is evil except privation of good, as darkness is of light." Athanasius has the same opinion in the oration against the Idols; Nazianzus, oration 9, near the end, and oration 38; Epiphanius, heresies 24 and 66; Chrysostom, homily II on Acts, near the end; and Justin, questions 46 and 73 to the Gentiles, says that evil is nothing besides corruption and depravation and privation of good. And in the former question he proves ex professo that it is not a positive thing; in the latter he excellently

confirms that it is not mere negation. Among the Latin Fathers, however, the principal author and confirmer of this opinion is Augustine, book XI of the City of God, chapter 9: "No nature of evil exists, but loss of good has received the name of evil"; the same, book XII, from the beginning, and in the Enchiridion, chapter 11: "Things, insofar as they are certain natures, cannot be evil"; and chapter 24, dealing with sin, he says it is the first evil of rational creature, that is, the first privation of good; and in book LXXXIII of Questions, question 7, he says the name of evil is taken from privation of species. The same, book III of Confessions, chapter 7, and book VII, from chapter 5 to 16, and book I against the Adversaries of the Law and the Prophets, chapter 5, book I of True Religion, chapter 40, and the book on the Nature of Good against the Manicheans, and book II on the Morals of the Manicheans, and the book on Free Will, last chapter, where he disputes specifically about the evil of fault and says it is nothing and therefore is not from God, accommodating to this that from John 1: "Without him nothing was made," that is, sin. Ambrose, book on Isaac and the Soul, chapter 7: "What is malice," he says, "but lack of good?" Jerome has the same opinion on Matthew 27, Isaiah 18, Amos 3; Gregory, 36 Morals, chapter 24, alias 32, and book I on I Kings, chapter 14, near the beginning, where he speaks specially of the evil of fault. Also Fulgentius, on Faith to Peter, chapter 21; Anselm, book on the Concord of Foreknowledge and Free Will, chapter 1, at the end, and book I on the Conception of the Virgin, chapter 27, and ex professo, book on the Fall of the Devil, from chapter 7; Bernard, homily VI of Advent. And finally Leo the Pope favors this, epistle 93, chapter 6. And all theologians embrace this doctrine, especially St. Thomas, in the said question 48, I, and I-II, q. 54, a. 3, q. 71, a. 1, q. 72, a. 1, and q. 2 on Evil, a. 2, and 9, and others In II, dist. 34 and 35, and 40.

Difficulties Concerning the Above Resolution

4. Whether the evil of fault and punishment consist in something positive. Concerning this received doctrine, however, some difficulties occur. The first is that every evil is either of fault or of punishment; but both of these are something positive, even formally as to malice itself; therefore. The minor is proved as to the former part, both because in morals evil is contrarily opposed to good, as Aristotle testifies in the chapter on Opposites and Ethics II, chapter 8; and also because in an act, for example, of intemperance, the positive turning of the will toward a disordered object is contrary to reason, and thus evil; and finally because an act of vice is not evil only on account of privation of the opposite virtue, otherwise avarice would have the same malice as prodigality, because they are deprived of the same virtue of liberality; therefore it is evil by reason of its positive entity. As to the other part about the evil of punishment, it is proved by similar arguments, for pain is an evil of punishment and yet is something positive. Nor can it be said that pain is evil because it deprives of opposite pleasure, for although privation of pleasure is some evil, yet the existence of pain is a far greater evil and of another nature; therefore not only that privation, nor the positive only by reason of that privation, is evil, but also the positive itself. Hence even if we should imagine that pain does not exclude contrary delight, nevertheless the pain itself would be some evil; just as delectable good is positive, so evil that saddens or causes pain is positive. Also, if a thing, for example, sweet, is positively agreeable to taste, so a bitter thing is positively disagreeable. Also error in the intellect is a certain evil of punishment and without doubt is a far different evil from ignorance of privation; therefore it is positive evil by reason of positive relation to such an object.

5. The second difficulty is that it does not seem to be proved by any sufficient reason that evil formally consists in privation alone, because just as good is multiple, so also is evil opposed to good; although therefore there is no positive being in which some notion of good is not found, which alone the reasons adduced above seem to

prove, nevertheless some being could be positively evil by some kind of malice. For, as we were saying above that the same thing can be good according to various notions of good, namely honest and delectable, so it could happen that the same thing is good under one title and evil under another, although both notions are positive, for instance if it is honest and painful, or conversely if it is delectable and base.

6. The solution of the prior difficulties is rejected. Moral evil according to the mind of the Saints is situated in privation. Because of these things, some distinguish evil in the genus of nature and in the genus of morals; and they say that the former consists in privation, but the latter consists in positive form or difference. This was the opinion of some theologians, and Cajetan is considered to be the principal author of it, in I-II, q. 18, a. 5, q. 71, a. 5, and q. 27, a. 1, who nevertheless does not distinguish the evil of nature and of morals, but evil simply and moral evil. But, because this matter of moral evil, as such, pertains rather to the theologian or moral philosopher than to the metaphysician, it is not to be treated specially in this place. It is only to be said briefly that those distinctions are not correctly or consistently applied. First indeed because the holy Fathers, in the places cited, speak most especially of the evil of fault, which is moral evil, especially St. Augustine, and St. Thomas, whom Cajetan falsely brings to his opinion, from I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 2 and 3, and book III against the Gentiles, chapter 9, although in the former place he says that good and evil specify moral acts, nevertheless good per se, but evil insofar as it is removal of the due end; in the latter place, however, he expressly says: the evil which is a difference in morals is not something that is evil in itself, but insofar as it deprives of the order of reason, which is man's good. Second, because the reason of the Saints which is taken from the fact that God is the author of every good and nothing can be from him that is not good, proceeds especially concerning moral evil; for if it is positive, it is from God and consequently would rather be simply good than evil. Third, because, as

regards the prior distinction, there is the same reason for natural evil as for moral evil; for, just as in man there are given positive forms or qualities disagreeable to rational nature as such and therefore contrary to right reason which is the rule of those things that befit man, so in water, for example, there is given a positive quality disagreeable to it and contrary to its nature; hence, if water were capable of cognition, it would rightly judge that quality to be avoided by it; if therefore on account of that cause moral evil is said to be positive, some natural evil will also be positive; or, if this is not sufficient for natural evil to be positive, neither will it be sufficient in the moral.

7. The inept division of evil simply and moral. What pertains to Cajetan's words, it is scarcely understood what he meant by evil simply, or how the members of that partition are opposed. For if evil simply is called that which is absolutely and without any addition evil, none is more simply evil than moral evil; indeed in some way only that merits the name of evil, for the rest are in a certain respect evil by comparison with it. But if evil simply is called evil in common, as it abstracts from all differences of evils, evil is not correctly or sufficiently divided into evil simply and moral evil, just as animal would not be correctly divided into animal simply and rational, because on one side the divided itself coincides with one member of the division, and on the other, other members are omitted, which could be numbered. And furthermore it is not correctly understood how, if evil in common consists in privation, positive evil is directly contained under it, since privation cannot be of the essence of the positive. But if by evil simply is understood that evil which is purely evil and has nothing mixed with good, this especially cannot be said of the thing which is denominated evil or of the subject of malice; for thus there is no evil simply, but evil is always founded in good, as St. Thomas teaches from Dionysius and other Fathers and we shall declare below. It is necessary therefore that by reason of malice itself it is said that pure evil consists in privation. Hence it happens that moral evil can be called positive only for this reason, that besides malice it

includes something good and thus also what in it pertains formally to the notion of evil, will be only privation, since whatever is positive is rather an admixture of good than formally constituting evil. Nor will there be anything special in this in moral evil rather than in natural; for also heat with respect to water is not evil simply, that is, pure and having no admixture of good, because it is a positive form.

What Evil in Itself & Evil to Another are

8. Otherwise therefore we can distinguish concerning evil, as it is said of that which is evil in itself, and that which is evil to another; for we said above that something can be good in these two ways; in as many ways as one of opposites is said, the other can also be said. Therefore that which is said to be evil in itself can be denominated evil from privation alone; and in this way it is truly said that evil is formally placed in privation alone. And this is optimally proved by the reason insinuated above, that a thing cannot be called evil from positive perfection due to it, since the notion of good consists in this, that a thing has perfection due and fitting to it; therefore it is necessary that from privation alone of such perfection a thing is denominated evil in itself. And it is confirmed, for each positive thing has in itself its essence and its positive being; but both are good and fitting to it; and therefore there is nothing that does not seek its being and its essence; therefore nothing positive as such can be evil in itself. Speaking however of that which is evil to another, thus it can be granted that evil consists in the positive and is opposed to good not privatively, but contrarily, as pain is opposed to pleasure, vice to virtue, and so of others. And the reason is that not only privation but also positive form can be unfitting to some subject; but this notion of evil is the same as the notion of unfitting to something; just as therefore good under the notion of fitting to another says nothing other than perfection of one thing, connoting in another some condition, by reason of which such perfection is due or fitting to it, so evil opposed to this good formally

and precisely says nothing other than perfection of one thing, connoting in another some condition, by reason of which it has repugnance or unfittingness with such form; therefore just as that good consists in the positive, so also evil opposed to it.

9. According to this distinction therefore it must be said that the Fathers cited above speak of evil taken in the former way, namely, that which is evil in itself; for that is properly and simply evil. But what is denominated evil only because it is unfitting to another, when in itself it is good, is not simply evil, but only in a certain respect and as it were accidentally. The reasons and difficulties objected to the contrary proceed concerning the latter evil or the unfitting; for thus pain in itself is a certain good, but is unfitting to the animal; and similarly heat is good in itself simply, although it is unfitting to water; and the same is found in other natural evils or things unfitting to nature; and the same reason holds for moral evil, for the will to lie, as it is in itself a certain being, is some good; but it is unfitting to man using reason, and therefore is morally evil.

10. No substance is to be called positively evil. This distinction indeed is optimal and what is said in its former member is to be proved simply, but not what is in the latter. To make this clear, I infer first that no substance can properly and formally be denominated evil positively, but only privatively; because substance is not properly and formally evil to another; but in itself it can be denominated evil only by reason of some privation; therefore. The major is evident, because substance is per se, it is not a being of another. You will say this is true of integral and complete substance. It is answered that also matter and form, by this very fact that one is ordered to the other, are not the evil of it, but good, for both matter is fitting to the form which it serves, and any form is fitting to matter, although it may be unfitting to the opposite form or its composite; integral parts also are of themselves fitting to the composite and to the remaining parts; how however on account of disproportion some part can sometimes be unfitting, we shall say below. But I said properly and formally, because

by extrinsic denomination substance can be denominated evil, because it effects a form unfitting to something; in which way also God, insofar as he is the author of the evil of punishment, in that genus can be denominated or rather apprehended and esteemed evil, that is, unfitting; under which notion he can also be held in hatred by a disordered will; this however is not true malice, but denomination taken from external malice or unfittingness existing in another thing.

11. Every accident is good to some subject. Second, I infer from what is granted in that former member, that every accident by reason of its positive perfection is not only a certain good in itself but also is good and fitting to some subject. This is proved, because there is no accident to which it is not connatural to be in some subject, with which it either has natural connection or at least is ordered to it as its perfection; therefore it will be some good with respect to such a subject; therefore there is no positive thing which by reason of itself is evil or unfitting to all things.

12. No being is evil in itself by reason of something positive. And hence it seems to be concluded third that no thing can be evil to any subject by reason of the positive precisely taken. This can be proved from the doctrine given in the former member of the distinction posited. Because otherwise it is necessary to grant that some being is evil in itself by reason of some positive form; for if positive form as such is evil to some subject, therefore the composite of such a subject and such a form will be a certain evil being, since it is compacted from beings unfitting or not rightly cohering among themselves; therefore, either it must be confessed that some being is evil in itself by reason of positive form, or it must be denied that positive form, as such, and by force of its precise perfection is evil. Also a subject affected by such a form is evil or badly disposed; therefore both malice absolutely speaking is some positive form, and some thing is evil in itself not because it is deprived of some perfection, but rather because it is affected by some positive thing. The consequence is evident because malice seems to be nothing other than

that by which some subject is badly affected; hence, just as St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 5, ad 2, and I-II, q. 51, a. 4, ad 1, and III, q. 11, a. 5, ad 3, says that habits of virtues are not so much certain goods as certain goodnesses by which the will is well affected, which when affected by them is said to be good in itself, so that form which by reason of its positive badly affects some subject, could be called a certain malice, and the subject affected by it or the composite resulting from it would have to be called a certain being evil in itself by force of its positive affection or composition. Furthermore there is an optimal reason, because a form which is good in itself and speaks of perfection, cannot be evil to something by reason of its goodness precisely taken; therefore, in order that it may be considered evil and unfitting to something, it is necessary that something else intervene, which cannot be except some privation; for, if it is something positive, that also will speak of goodness and perfection; hence concerning it the same argument will return; therefore it is necessary that every malice be completed by some privation.

13. Which is finally declared by reason and examples taken from Dionysius and other Fathers, for in that which is called evil to another we can consider either that being which is called evil to another, or that which results from both; as, for example, it is evil for a man to have six fingers on his hand; if therefore the whole composite is considered, that is a hand consisting of six fingers, it can be called a certain evil as a monster or sin of nature. Nevertheless Dionysius says, in the said chapter 4 of the Divine Names, that such evil is constituted by privation which he calls inept composition of dissimilar things and defect of due and fitting proportion according to the institution of nature. So also Augustine, in the book on the Nature of Good, chapters 3 and 4, says that evil is nothing other than corruption of measure, or species, or natural order. Explaining this St. Thomas, I, q. 5, a. 5, ad 4, says that measure, species and order, insofar as they are such, are good, but are called evil insofar as they are either less than they ought to have been, or because they are not accommodated to

those things to which they ought to be accommodated, or because they are alien and incongruous. Thus therefore that monster is called evil insofar as it lacks due species and fitting proportion of parts, and thus is not evil by force of positive perfection. And the same is found in any being composed of parts which do not fit well together, which universally can be called monstrous.

14. The thing which is called evil to another is such by reason of something privative. And hence it further happens, if we consider that part of such a composite which is said to be unfitting or evil to another, as the sixth finger with respect to the human hand or heat with respect to water, that it does not have the notion of evil except by reason of some adjoined privation. For first unfittingness itself pertains to privation, just as in general contrariety, repugnance, dissimilarity and distinction include negation in their intrinsic concept. For contrariety includes incompossibility of opposite forms in the same subject; but incompossibility includes negation; thus therefore unfittingness speaks of disproportion or ineptitude for fitting union or composition. Then in that subject to which another thing or form is called evil, there is connoted lack of natural propensity or connection with such a thing. And finally in the very thing which is called evil to another, there is denoted lack of perfection fitting to such a subject, which, although with respect to the form considered absolutely it may seem to be a certain negation, nevertheless with respect to the subject it has the notion of privation, because it is lack of perfection due to it. And with respect to the form it can be called privation not simply but ex hypothesi, or in order to such an effect, because although absolutely such perfection is not due to such a form, nevertheless in order that it might fittingly inform such a subject, it would need that.

15. And in this way in morals, an act of intemperance is called evil to man insofar as it lacks the rectitude of temperance, and in natural things heat is evil to water insofar as it lacks the perfection of cold; and thus in general St. Thomas said, I, q. 5, a. 3, ad 2, that no

being is called evil insofar as it is being, but insofar as it lacks some being; and he holds the same in q. 3 On Power, a. 6, ad 12, and clearly and optimally explains it in q. 1 On Evil, a. 1, ad 1, saying that something is called evil in two ways, namely simply and in a certain respect. Simply, he says, evil is that which is evil according to itself, but this is what is deprived of some particular good which is from the debt of its perfection, as sickness is the evil of an animal; but in a certain respect it is said to be evil which is not evil according to itself, but of something, because it is not deprived of some good which is from the debt of its perfection, but which is from the debt of perfection of another thing, as in heat there is privation of perfection due to water, and therefore it is not evil in itself, but to water. Thus therefore every evil includes privation, but proportionately, for what is evil in itself includes lack of perfection due to itself; but what is evil to another, includes lack of perfection due to that to which it is evil.

16. Although therefore the distinction given concerning twofold evil, namely, that which is evil in itself or that which is evil to another, is good, concerning neither evil however is it to be granted that it consists in positive entity alone, but that it includes privation. Only a difference can be constituted, because when a thing is called evil in itself, there intervenes only the thing which is denominated evil and the privation from which it is thus denominated, which alone has the notion of evil formally or rather of malice; but truly, when a thing is called evil to another, there intervenes positive entity or form which, as it underlies some privation, is called evil to another thing or subject. Hence, not privation alone, but the form itself also, as it underlies it, has the notion of evil formally with respect to another subject, because it is truly a form badly affecting it; nevertheless however in the very form itself, insofar as it is evil to another, what is positive is as it were material, but privation is as it were formal, constituting the notion of evil with respect to another; for what with respect to one is form, can with respect to another be compared as subject or matter;

and thus it happens that in general the formal constitutive of evil consists in privation, as the holy Fathers taught.

Satisfaction is Given to the Difficulties Posited Above

17. To the first difficulty therefore and its first member concerning the evil of fault, it is answered that the evil of fault is properly the evil of man as he is rational and uses free will; and therefore it is not always spoken of from privation alone, but also from positive act, not however by reason of the positive alone, but insofar as it lacks due rectitude. This evil therefore by reason of the act which it includes, can be contrarily opposed to a good act or of virtue and the same proportionally holds for habits. And in the same way the very act is said to be contrary to reason because it lacks due rectitude; hence it is not only evil because it excludes from the subject the contrary act or good habit (which seems to be supposed in the arguments), but because it itself is unfitting to rational nature; but it is unfitting not on account of precise positive entity, but as sustaining lack of due rectitude, as has been said. And thus there can be specific diversity in evil of this kind, even if perhaps it does not exclude from the subject a form or virtue specifically diverse; because this malice, as I said, does not consist in privation of contrary form which is caused in the subject, but in privation of due rectitude, which is understood in the very act, which can be diverse according to the diversity of acts.

18. To the other member concerning the evil of punishment it must be said similarly that pain is not evil in itself, for it has its perfection and whatever is due to it in the latitude of such perfection; therefore pain is something evil as unfitting to man or animal. Hence it must be granted that it is not only evil causally, that is, because it excludes opposite delight, but also because it itself is unfitting and disproportionate to the animal, which the argument made there correctly proves. Nevertheless it is not unfitting by reason of positive

entity alone precisely taken, but because according to it, it includes lack of some perfection necessary so that it could be a form fitting and proportionate to man. And in the same way it must be answered to the other examples which are proposed in that difficulty.

19. The same thing as positive can be good, as including privation can be evil. To the second difficulty it is answered by granting that it is not repugnant for the same thing to be good and evil by diverse reasons; we deny however that both can be entirely positive, because a thing cannot be evil under that notion under which it is good; but under every positive notion precisely considered it is good, as we have shown; and therefore under which notion it is evil, it is not merely positive. And so, if there is discussion of a thing good or evil in itself, the same thing can indeed be good in itself essentially, but evil integrally or accidentally; the former however befits it insofar as it has essential perfection due to such a nature; but the latter insofar as it lacks due integrity or accidental perfection. But if there is discussion of a thing good in itself and evil to another, the former it has by reason of its proper nature and positive perfection, but the latter it has only by reason of some disproportion or unfittingness which it has with another thing, and thus by reason of some adjoined privation; and nearly the same holds, proportion being preserved, when the same thing is good to one and evil to another. But that it should be entirely evil in itself and good to something, cannot happen, both because no thing is entirely evil in itself, and because we showed above that nothing can be good to another, properly speaking, which is not good in itself.

How Good is Opposed to evil

20. And from these things it is easily evident how good and evil are opposed, for this also was sought in the difficulties posited. Therefore good and evil can either be compared formally according to goodness and malice, or only materially, as to the very things which

are denominated good and evil. Then in order that good and evil may be opposites, they must be compared with respect to the same thing as the nature of opposites requires; hence we were saying a little before that the same thing with respect to diverse things can be good and evil, in which there is neither material opposition, since the thing is the same, nor properly formal; for, although those notions of good and evil are diverse, they are nevertheless not opposite but disparate, like being similar to one and dissimilar to another. And concerning good and evil thus considered, what Augustine said in the Enchiridion, chapter 14, is true, that in good and evil the dialectical rule fails that contraries cannot be present in the same thing, because the same thing can be good and evil, although nevertheless good and evil are contraries or opposites. For he speaks of good and evil according to common notions, according to which they do not have perfect and complete opposition, unless they are taken particularly and with all required conditions.

21. Properly therefore comparing good and evil with respect to the same thing, in their formal notions they are opposed privatively, for good is the same as perfect as to that in which there is good; but evil is that which lacks due perfection; and good to something is that which is fitting to it, but evil is that which is unfitting. Hence it happens that they have opposite properties, for good of itself is appetible, for that is what all things seek; and therefore it has the causality of an end, or at least of a means; but evil of itself is not appetible, but rather turns appetite away from itself. Hence per se and as such it cannot have the nature of end or means, but only as it takes on some notion of good, for example, insofar as it can be considered useful for avoiding a greater evil. But truly, if things are compared which are denominated good and which are denominated evil, thus they are not properly opposed insofar as they are said to be good or evil in themselves, but insofar as with respect to another one is fitting, the other unfitting; for thus they mutually exclude each other, but not as they are good or evil in themselves. And in this way they can have

contrary opposition in themselves both in morals and in natural things, as was said above.

22. And thus Aristotle spoke in the chapter on Opposites concerning good and evil, not by reason of malice precisely, but by reason of act or quality which is denominated evil to another, just as true and false can be said to be contrarily opposed by reason of assents or judgments. So also Dionysius in chapter 4 of the Divine Names says that evil does not fight against good except by reason of some good, for according to itself it is impotent. And St. Thomas, III against the Gentiles, chapter 9: "Evil does not resist good positively except by reason of some goodness." The same, q. 1 On Evil, a. 1, 2, 3 and 4, and q. 3 On Power, a. 6, ad 11, and In II, dist. 40; hence such opposition is not always necessary, but sometimes privative opposition suffices, if that which is denominated evil is not positive being but privative, as blindness or sickness is a certain evil; sometimes however other repugnance between positive forms suffices, although it is not properly contrariety; for thus error and science are opposed as good and evil to man, although they are not properly contraries.

SECTION II

ON THE MANIFOLD NATURE OF EVIL

1. Evil in itself and evil to another. This question is easily determined from what has been said, for it concerns evil formally as evil; for the material division on the part of things does not fall under science. Evil is thus divided into that which is evil in itself, and that which is evil to another, which St. Thomas called evil simply and evil in a qualified sense; others call it evil absolutely or respectively, whose reasons are sufficiently explained from what has been said.

2. Evil to another as a natural entity, and as a free agent. Again, that which is evil to another can be divided into that which is unsuitable to another insofar as it is a natural thing, and that which is unsuitable to another insofar as it is a free being or agent, and in this

way evil is divided into natural and moral. Natural evil is every privation of natural good due to nature, or everything which by its nature is unsuitable to another nature. Moral evil, however, is that which is unsuitable to a free nature insofar as it is free. Hence natural evil is found in all things lacking reason and also extends to intellectual things, insofar as they have their own nature and require some natural perfection, of which they can be deprived without their consent or free cooperation; but moral evil is found only in a free nature as it is free, because, as we said above, morals properly consist in free actions. Hence, although moral evil is unsuitable to a rational nature as it is rational, and in this it can agree with some natural evil, it is nevertheless unsuitable to such a nature insofar as it has a particular mode of operation, namely with freedom, and in this it differs from natural evil.

What are the Evils of Guilt & Punishment

3. In what do the evil of guilt and punishment differ. And from this there seems to have arisen another celebrated division of evil into the evil of guilt and punishment, which St. Thomas presents in I, q. 48, a. 5 and 6, where he establishes the difference between these members as this: that the evil of guilt denotes a defect in action or in second act; but the evil of punishment denotes a defect in some form or integrity of a thing which pertains to first act. This exposition has difficulty, because neither does every defect of action pertain to the evil of guilt, as is clear from error or from the action of writing or painting badly, nor conversely is every guilt in second act, for original sin or habitual sin is evil of guilt and is not in action; and similarly not every defect in first act is punishment, for blindness, for example, is sometimes not punishment, but merely natural evil; nor is every punishment in the defect of first act, for error is also evil of punishment; indeed, guilt itself can be punishment of a prior guilt, as the same St. Thomas teaches in I-II, q. 87, a. 2, from that passage in

Romans 1: "Therefore God delivered them up to the desires of their heart."

4. But because this division pertains more to theologians and moral philosophers, it must be said briefly that this division is properly given concerning the evil of a rational creature, insofar as it is free or exercises its freedom, for in other things or actions there can be no guilt properly, since guilt signifies a moral act and consequently neither can there be punishment, because this denotes a relation to the guilt on account of which it is inflicted, as Augustine rightly said in I Retract., c. 9. When therefore it is said that the evil of guilt consists in a defect of action, it must be understood concerning free action insofar as it is free, whether this defect be the lack of free action due according to law or right reason, or be the lack of honesty or rectitude due to such action, that is, whether it be the omission of due action, or be action lacking due rectitude. For the actual use of freedom is only in action or voluntary lack of action, and therefore this evil of guilt is per se primarily in such action, because it is evil of a rational creature as free, that is, as using its freedom. Nor does it matter that objection was raised concerning original or habitual guilt, because these do not have the nature of guilt except through order to actual guilt through which they are voluntary. Hence, they participate in the nature of evil of guilt only quasi-mediately insofar as the defect of free action is considered to remain morally in them, and thus it happens that the evil of guilt, which is per se primarily and immediately such, consists in the defect of human or free second act as such. But the evil of punishment is said to be in the defect of first act, not because it cannot also be found in actions, but because it can be sufficiently preserved in any lack of due perfection, even by way of first act, or certainly because, just as the evil of guilt is radically and primarily in action, so the evil of punishment is radically and primarily in first act. For although it happens that natural action, that is, non-free action is defective, nevertheless that defect always comes from some prior imperfection and defect in first act or in the proximate cause. But if the

defect of action is not natural but voluntary, then it will either pertain to the evil of guilt or will have no nature of evil, because it will not be a defect of due perfection. Although one sin is said to be punishment of another, nevertheless not according to what is formally guilt in it, but according to some other reason and thus also that punishment is primarily in some thing which is related by way of first act with respect to guilt, such as the denial of some aid or permission of occasion of falling, which can be said to pertain to first act insofar as the removal of impediment is presupposed to action and is a condition required in first act.

5. Where the evils of guilt and punishment are situated. Thus therefore we can say briefly and clearly that the evil of guilt is disorder in free action or omission or lack of perfection due according to free action, but the evil of punishment is any other lack of due good contracted or inflicted on account of guilt. Whence it happens that this division comprehends all evils of rational nature because it can easily be reduced to contradictory members, because every evil which is outside free action as such will pertain to the evil of punishment. And although, setting aside divine providence, there could be understood in a rational creature some natural evil which would not be inflicted on account of guilt, which therefore would be neither guilt nor punishment, nevertheless from divine providence we believe that there is no defect of due perfection in a rational creature which is not guilt or has not drawn its origin from guilt, and therefore Augustine in the incomplete work on Genesis according to the letter, c. 1, says every evil is either sin or punishment of sin. Indeed, not only evil which is formally in man himself, but also that which is in irrational or inanimate things, if it results in some harm to man himself, pertains to the evil of punishment not with respect to the lower things, but of man himself on account of whose guilt it is inflicted or permitted.

6. Guilt as the root of moral evil of punishment. Whether the evil of guilt or punishment is more serious. And from this it is also clear how these two evils are compared among themselves, for,

speaking formally, the evil of guilt is the origin of the evil of punishment and its cause, not physical but moral; for just as merit is the cause of reward, so guilt is the cause of punishment. But if these two are compared in gravity or magnitude of evil, the evil of guilt is far greater than punishment, for guilt deprives man of due order to God; hence it results in offense and injury to God; but punishment as punishment does not have this from its nature, but stops at some detriment to a creature; but offense to God is a greater evil for man than any other detriment and therefore any evil of punishment should rather be sustained than evil of guilt be admitted. And for the same reason God can be the author of evil of punishment, but not of evil of guilt. But let us leave these matters to the theologians.

7. Shameful evil opposed to honest good. Distressing evil opposed to delightful good. Finally, according to the preceding division it is easy to divide evil by a partition opposite to that by which good is divided into honest, delightful and useful; for thus evil is either shameful which is opposed to the honest, and taken in propriety and rigor is nearly the same as the evil of guilt. Although guilt in rigor is said of moral action or omission which is sinful and renders man morally evil; but shameful evil insofar as it is adequately opposed to honest good, is said not only of actual or habitual guilt itself, but also of a shameful object and of a vicious habit, which is the principle of evil act, and is not properly guilt. Indeed, if honest good is taken more broadly for that which is lovable per se and consonant with nature and per se suitable, thus the evil opposed to it cannot properly be called shameful unless shameful is said of whatever deforms (so to speak) nature, but this evil will be called per se avoidable or worthy of hatred. But another evil is that opposed to the delightful which can commonly be called unpleasant and distressing, which must be explained in the same proportion as the good to which it is opposed. But to useful good there seems to be no evil properly so called opposed, because uselessness which can be considered in some thing in order to another which seems most to be opposed to useful

good, does not seem to be opposed by way of privation but of pure negation, and therefore does not have the proper nature of evil. This can be explained in this way, for a means or thing which is not useful for some end, either by its nature lacks that condition or property which is necessary for such utility; and thus for a thing to be useless for such an end is not privation but only negation, and thus is not evil. Or by its nature it requires such property and accidentally lacks it, and then that lack has the nature of evil with respect to that thing which is deprived of natural perfection; but that evil is not properly opposed to useful good, but to natural and per se suitable to such a thing; but the uselessness which arises from this in order to the end, is a certain negation. And perhaps for this reason this threefold division is not usually assigned in evil, but only twofold, namely, of guilt and punishment, shameful and unpleasant. But if someone wishes to find in means some nature of evil opposed to useful good as such, he can not improbably say that those things are called evil useless by a peculiar reason which, when they ought to be apt by their nature or institution for acquiring some end, have been made disproportionate by some accident. And let these suffice concerning the divisions of evil.

SECTION III

WHERE AND WHENCE EVIL EXISTS, OR WHAT CAUSES IT HAS

1. The delusion of the Manicheans. The Manicheans, as we have related above, posited a certain being that is supremely evil, existing as such by itself and having its origin from no other, which would be the first root and cause of all evils. For they thought that evil cannot arise from good, but only from evil. Hence, since one cannot proceed to infinity, they consequently judged that one must stop at some evil that exists by itself. But this heresy, besides having already

been refuted because no being is evil from the fact that it is such, contradicts other principles of faith and those known even by natural light, namely, just as there is but one God, so there is but one first principle and first cause of things, and there is only one uncreated being that is necessary by itself, and therefore all beings that are not God exist from God. It is therefore impossible for there to be any being that is supremely evil, existing by itself and unproduced, as Augustine confirms at length against the Manicheans, especially in his book On Faith against them from the beginning, and in his book On the Nature of the Good against them, chapters 40 and 41; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, q. 49, a. 3, and elsewhere frequently.

2. Every evil has some cause. From this foundation of faith, however, two certain conclusions are inferred. The first is that every evil has some cause. This is proven because it has been shown that no being is evil by itself; therefore, if there is evil, it must be such from some cause. Furthermore, because a thing is not evil except insofar as it falls short of the perfection due to it, but a thing never lacks due perfection except on account of some cause, either acting or at least impeding; therefore. And this will be more evident when we explain the causes of evil in particular, where we will also explain how Dionysius said in chapter 4 of On the Divine Names that evil has no cause, namely per se, or one that directly intends it.

3. The cause of evil is some good. Second, it is inferred from the stated principle that some good is the cause of evil, for every evil has a cause, as has been shown; therefore either that cause is some evil or some good; if good, we have what is intended; if evil, it is necessary that it also have a cause, about which the same question can be asked. Since, therefore, one cannot proceed to infinity, nor stop at some evil that has no cause, it will be necessary to stop at some good that is the cause of evil.

4. Now it remains to be explained how good is the cause of evil and in what genus evil can have a cause or require one, whether final or material, formal, or efficient.

What is the End of Evil

5. Medicinal evil is subject to orderly choice. I say first: evil formally, as evil, does not require a final cause; nevertheless, it can have one from the extrinsic intention of the agent. The first part is proven because evil, since it consists in privation and defect, is not intended per se in things, whence comes that axiom: No one operates intending evil; therefore, in order to exist, it does not require a final cause, but can follow beyond the intention of the agent. The second part is evident because an agent, especially one that is free and acting deliberately, can directly intend some evil for the sake of some end; for that which is evil in one genus can be useful, at least as removing an impediment to obtaining some end. To understand this more clearly, let us distinguish between the evil of fault and of punishment; and again in the evil of fault let us distinguish its permission from its effectuation or from the fault itself. Therefore, the evil of fault formally and as such (for thus we speak) not only does not require a final cause, but truly cannot rightly and ordinately have one, because it cannot be directly intended except by a depraved will, since it cannot be intended either as an end, since under that aspect it has no goodness, nor as a means, because evil things are not to be done so that good things may come; but a disordered will can intend this evil, indeed even malice itself, at least as a means and under some apparent and false aspect of good, as, for example, to take or inflict vengeance on another whom it hates or something similar. But it is otherwise with the permission of such evil of fault; for this can be intended ordinately and rightly and have a good end, because it is not evil in itself, but can be good. And in this way God permits evil for the sake of some good, both because such permission pertains to the beauty and variety of the universe, as Dionysius said in chapter 14 of On the Divine Names, and also because God knows how to elicit many goods from permitted evils, if they occur, as Augustine discusses at length in his Enchiridion,

chapter 27. But the evil of punishment not only as to permission, but also as to effectuation, can be intended per se and rightly for the sake of an honest end, namely, just vindication of fault; and in this way this evil, as such, can have a final cause, and thus God intends the evils of punishment of which he is the author. To this can also be referred the evil that can be called medicinal, which is sometimes inflicted to prevent a greater evil, as when an arm is cut off to preserve life; for that evil is then directly intended, not however as an end but as a means, and thus it then has its final cause from the intention of the agent. Thus, therefore, not only apparent good, but also true good, can be the final cause of some evil.

What is the Subjective Cause of Evil

6. I say second: evil, insofar as it is evil, has a material cause, which is always some good, which is usually expressed in other words, that evil as evil exists in good as in a subject. Thus speaks Augustine in his Enchiridion, chapters 13 and 14, where among other things he says that evil cannot exist except in good, because if it were pure evil, it would destroy itself, which Thomas Aquinas also teaches in Summa Theologica I, q. 48, a. 3. And the reason is that evil formally is neither a purely positive thing nor pure negation; it is therefore the privation of due perfection; therefore it requires a subject to which such perfection is due; therefore that subject must necessarily be some good in which evil or malice is understood to inhere. This last consequence is proven both because that subject must necessarily be some positive being, and consequently some good, and also because this very fact, namely, that such perfection is due to such a subject, of which evil deprives it, is sufficient sign and testimony that such a subject is good, because goodness and perfection cannot be due except to that thing which is good. And in this way Augustine, in his first book Against Julian, chapter 3, and in his Enchiridion, chapter 12, and frequently elsewhere, from the very evil that sometimes befalls nature or the will,

proves that nature or will itself is good; because it becomes evil when it is deprived of due goodness, and is not wholly destroyed, otherwise it would no longer be evil, but would not exist at all; therefore, in order to be evil, it is necessary that it be some nature deprived of due perfection.

7. Some objections. But someone will object, for evil formally is not a positive and real being; therefore it does not require, indeed it cannot properly be in a real subject; for a being of reason inheres in no subject; therefore it cannot be in good as in a subject or material cause. Hence Dionysius, in chapter 4 of On the Divine Names, toward the end, absolutely says that evil is not in those things that exist. Second, because evil destroys the good of which it is the evil; therefore it cannot be in that as in a subject; for no form destroys its own subject. Third, because otherwise corruption and death would not be evil, which is against the common sense of all; the consequence is evident, because corruption is not evil of that subject which remains under the corruption itself, that is, of prime matter, since that is indifferent to the form of the generated or corrupted thing; but if it is said to be evil of the corrupted thing, therefore it is no longer in that good of which it is the evil; therefore it is not necessary that that good remain under such evil. And this is confirmed, for otherwise the annihilation of a thing would not be evil of it, which seems incredible since it is most worthy of hatred and very troublesome and adverse to the appetite by which all things desire to exist.

8. They are resolved. To the first objection it is answered that evil formally or malice is in a subject by way of privation, of which Aristotle said it is a lack in an apt subject, which lack is said to exist in reality in exercised act, like corruption or removal, as Cajetan well explains in his commentary on Summa Theologica I, q. 48, a. 2. Where Thomas Aquinas, in his response to the second objection, says that evil is not a being insofar as it signifies the entitivity of a thing, but has such being as suffices for the truth of the proposition by which we say blindness is in the eye, which being does not signify placing

something in the eye, but rather removing. Therefore, in this way evil is said to be in good as in a subject, not as placing something in it, but rather as removing further perfection due to it. But when Dionysius says that evil is not in things, he understands that it is not as a true being placing something in them.

9. Not every evil destroys every good. To the second objection, it has already been said above that not every evil is opposed to every good, whence it is not necessary that evil destroy every good, but that to which it is formally opposed, not however that which it presupposes in the subject; as darkness destroys the goodness of light, but not the perfection of air. You will say: often evil diminishes the goodness of the subject because it not only removes the opposite perfection but also diminishes the capacity or aptitude for such perfection; as sin both formally excludes good act and diminishes promptitude for doing similar acts; therefore evil can be increased or multiplied to such a degree that it wholly destroys the goodness of the subject; therefore it does not always presuppose it. It is answered that a twofold capacity of the subject for good can be understood. One is superadded to it and distinct from it, as is a habit in a power or a convenient temperament of qualities in an organ. The other is a capacity wholly intrinsic to the faculty or subject which in reality is not distinguished from its entity, but only by reason. Again, capacity for good can be diminished in two ways. First by subtraction and real diminution of goodness, in which way the good of water is diminished when its coldness is diminished. In another way by the addition of impediments, in which way the capacity of matter for the form of fire can be said to be diminished by excessive humidity. Therefore, the first capacity, distinct from the power, can be diminished by subtraction and properly in itself, whence it can also be totally removed by contrary evil, which is not inconvenient, because that capacity is not the proper subject of such evil, but rather is a form or disposition opposed to it. But the second capacity is not diminished by subtraction because, since it is not a thing distinct from the subject,

just as the subject is not diminished in its entity, so neither is such capacity, but it is only said to be diminished in the second way and would more properly be said to be impeded, and therefore it can never be consumed or wholly removed. And because the subject of evil is good according to this intrinsic capacity for its own perfection, therefore the total good that is in its subject can never be destroyed by evil. And by this reasoning, although sins are said to diminish the capacity of the will for operating well, they can never wholly consume it, even if they are multiplied to infinity, as Thomas Aquinas teaches more broadly in Summa Theologica I-II, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2. Just as also the radical capacity of matter for one form cannot be removed, even if dispositions to the opposite form grow infinitely.

10. You will say: sometimes an inconvenient form wholly destroys its own subject if it grows too much, as heat destroys water; therefore evil also will be able to destroy wholly the goodness of its subject. I answer by denying the antecedent rigorously; for a form never corrupts its own proper subject to which it inheres, although it can be a disposition to the corruption of the subject which it denominates. This response proceeds according to the opinion asserting that heat inheres in prime matter. According to the opposite opinion, however, it must be said that heat which truly inheres does not destroy that formally, although it disposes accidentally to its corruption, not proximately, but remotely; for in the instant in which water is corrupted, new heat is introduced according to this opinion, which no longer inheres in water but in fire, and by that or rather by the form of fire water is formally corrupted. Thus, therefore, evil never destroys the subject in which it exists; but if sometimes it accidentally disposes to its corruption, it consequently also disposes to the destruction of itself, so that it never remains without a good subject.

11. How death is evil and to what subject. Annihilation is evil of nothing. Hence to the third objection I respond that death or corruption can be considered in two ways. In one way, as it is in becoming through the alterations and dispositions that precede the

instant of death, and in this way it is easily understood to have the character of evil with respect to the subject that is gradually corrupted, against which the argument does not proceed. In another way death can be considered as it is in the instant in which the thing is destroyed; and thus I concede (whatever others may think) that death properly and rigorously is not evil of that thing which is destroyed through it, because of the argument made. Hence Thomas Aquinas, in his Questions on Power, q. 5, a. 3, ad 14, concedes that annihilation is not evil, because it does not leave behind a good in which it might be founded; which Augustine also holds in his Enchiridion, chapters 12 and 13, where he proves at length that when nature is wholly destroyed, no evil remains. But this corruption or destruction of a thing is usually called evil, speaking broadly, because it is the total removal of good, which is sufficient reason for it to be hated or fled.

Whether Evil Has a Formal Cause

12. I say third: evil does not have a proper and intrinsic formal cause, beyond itself or its own malice, but it can have a formal cause that is in some way remote and extrinsic. This is declared and proven because, since evil formally consists in privation, privation itself is its form; but of privation itself there is no other form by which it is constituted, as is evident per se. But it often happens that the privation of one form follows upon another positive form, not through effectuation, but from the force of formal causality alone; in the way that privation of cold follows upon the information of heat produced in water, and thus heat inhering in water, according to true philosophy, not effectively but formally expels cold, and thus that heat can rightly be called the formal cause of the privation of cold, which privation is evil of the water. Therefore, in this way there can be given a formal cause of evil which I call extrinsic and remote, because it is not properly and intrinsically constituting the evil itself, but only is the form upon which such evil follows.

What is the Efficient Cause of Evil

13. That evil follows upon the perfect causality of an agent. I say fourth: evil always has some efficient cause, not however per se but per accidens and beyond the primary and intrinsic intention of the agent. The first part is evident from what we said at the beginning of the section, for the character of evil does not belong to a being per se and from within; therefore from without; therefore through some efficiency or efficient cause; for nothing can come from without that does not proceed from some other efficient cause. But to declare the second part, it should be noted that evil can happen to things in three ways. In the first way through the perfect efficiency of an acting cause, as when a perfect efficient cause introduces a form by its power, but upon that form follows the privation of another form which has the character of evil; and in this way fire is an efficient cause of evil in water, namely the privation of cold, and God is the cause of every natural evil or punishment, which occurs or is made in this way, because he both institutes the causes that effect this evil and cooperates with them. But it is evident that this efficiency is not per se but per accidens, because the intention of the agent is not to destroy another, but to communicate its own being; but it happens that the non-being of another follows from this, because it is incompatible with the other. But if someone should wish to say that this evil, although it is not intended for its own sake, is nevertheless intended for the sake of something else in some way, that is, as a means and necessary disposition to introducing another good, whoever says this (I say) will not err greatly. And therefore I said that this effectuation of evil is beyond the primary intention of the agent, which per se is not toward evil, but toward good. But I added that the discourse is about the intrinsic intention of the agent, that is, about that which it has from the force of its action; for, if it is a free agent, it can directly and per se intend the evil of another for the sake of another end, as we said

above about the evil of punishment, which God directly intends, given the evil of fault; but this intention is extrinsic to that action through which such evil is made.

14. Some evil arises from the imperfection of the cause. An objection is met. In the second way it happens that evil follows upon the action of an efficient cause from the imperfection or defect of such a cause. And this happens when the evil itself is mixed with the very action or effect or form introduced and intended by the efficient cause itself[6]; thus lameness is a certain evil in the nature of progressive motion, which follows in action from a defect of the principal or instrumental motive power, and then it is also evident that evil is beyond the intention of the agent, indeed it does not follow upon that insofar as it is acting, but insofar as it is deficient. You will say: although comparing that malice of action to the positive power and efficiency of the cause, it is per accidens, nevertheless comparing it to the imperfection of the cause it will be per se from that, according to that rule: Just as affirmation is the per se cause of affirmation, so negation of negation. It is answered that from this at most it is concluded that evil as evil has a per se deficient cause, which as such is rather a non-efficient cause than an efficient one, which comes to the same thing; for that malice is conjoined per accidens with efficiency as such, although it follows per se from the defect and imperfection of the cause. This consequence is called per se either in relation to moral reasoning, as I will explain immediately, or certainly according to a certain accommodation and attribution, given the necessary consequence of one from the other; for properly and physically privation does not influence privation nor defect defect; but because defective action follows from a defective cause, therefore the perfection of the effect is attributed per se to the perfection of the cause, but the defect to the imperfection.

15. The malice of an effect does not necessarily suppose malice in the cause. Someone will say again: therefore this evil in

[6] efficienti, 1960; efficiente, 1597, 1605, 1861. Cf. BHF, t. II, p. 308.

action or in effect always presupposes evil in the cause. But the consequent seems false, for concerning that malice of the cause I ask whether it has another cause or not; if it does not have one, therefore there is given an evil that has no cause, which we showed above cannot happen; but if it has a cause, either that will also have a defect and thus the same question will return about it and thus one will proceed to infinity, or one must stop at a cause which, since it has no malice or defect, is the cause of defective action and effect. The consequent is against what has been said and against reason; for since every cause acts upon something similar or proportionate to itself, why will a good cause having no malice produce an evil and defective effect? I answer by denying absolutely the first consequence; for it is not necessary that the malice of an effect always presuppose malice in the cause, because, for whatever reason the cause is prevented from acting according to the total perfection due to the action or effect, the action will be able to be defective and evil in its genus. But a cause can so operate or be impeded, even if no malice properly taken is presupposed in it, although this mode of acting always presupposes some imperfection which is not always proper malice or privation of due perfection, but only the negation of greater perfection, naturally consequent upon the limited perfection of such a cause.

16. Whence effects of necessarily acting causes contract malice. To understand this more clearly, let us distinguish between naturally acting and free causes; for a cause that acts naturally, if it is perfect in itself and is not impeded, will act as much as it can and therefore will never commit a defect in action that has the character of natural evil; and this rightly convinces the reason made, because from a good cause acting as much as it can and not impeded, there is no source from which malice can result in action. Therefore, from a twofold cause such defect can happen in action. First from the fact that the cause itself is ill-disposed in itself, as if an eye, for example, is badly disposed; and then it is true that the malice of action presupposes malice in the cause, but it is not necessary to proceed to

infinity, because that malice of the cause can come from the action of another cause perfect in its genus, which while it intends to produce its own perfect effect consequently introduces in the eye some disposition inconvenient to it, according to the first mode placed above; or it could arise in the formation itself from some natural impediment, as I will now say. Therefore, second, this can come from some extrinsic impeding cause, whether this is material or efficient, or is in the patient itself, or in the mode[7]; for from the concurrence of such causes resisting and impeding each other, it happens that the action of one cause proceeds defectively and monstrously, even if no natural evil properly taken precedes in the cause itself.

17. A bad effect always presupposes a defect in a necessary cause. Nor does the reason made proceed against this, because, although from a good cause qua good nothing proceeds but good and perfection, nevertheless because that cause can be prevented from acting according to its total perfection, it can happen from this that the effect does not receive the total perfection due to it, or that it does not receive it with the mode, species, and order accommodated to its nature, in which lack the character of evil consists. But although then the malice of the effect does not come from the malice of the cause, it nevertheless always presupposes in it some imperfection, at least negative, namely, a defect of power to overcome the impeding cause or the indisposition or resistance of matter. And thus it is easily understood whence this evil can occur in natural effects, so that it is not necessary either to proceed to infinity or to stop at some evil that has no cause; for one must stop at the natural imperfection of one cause, joined with the impediment of another; but this impediment can come from the natural course and order and power of natural causes. But that imperfection or inability to overcome an impediment does not require some cause, because it is mere negation intrinsically and necessarily conjoined with such a nature of a thing limited to such a grade and perfection of being by itself. Nor is it inconvenient that

[7] modo, 1861, 1960; medio, 1597, 1605. Cf. BHF, t. II, p. 310.

imperfection, which in a cause is merely negative and does not have the character of evil, should be the root and origin of privative imperfection having the character of evil in action or effect, because by reason of an intervening impediment it can happen per accidens that an effect is deprived of perfection due to it, because the cause is prevented from being able to act according to its total perfection.

18. The dominion of a free cause is the adequate origin of malice and defect in its action. But in a cause acting freely there is another proper mode of being deficient in its action, namely from the dominion it has over its own act without other extrinsic impediment. For by the very fact that it is free, it does not always act as much as it can and should; and therefore from the same root it can make a sinful action without other impediment. And hence it also happens that evil coming from a free cause, which is properly moral evil or of fault, does not necessarily presuppose in the cause another similar evil; otherwise we could not stop at the first evil of fault coming from such a cause, which is impossible. Indeed, it is not necessary that this first evil of fault presuppose in the cause some prior evil that is not of fault but of another genus, namely of nature; for as I said, it can come from the sole freedom of the creature; but freedom is not evil, but rather good. Especially because, according to the doctrine handed down above from Augustine, every evil of a rational creature is either of fault or of punishment; but the evil of punishment as a whole presupposes some evil of fault; therefore the evil of fault, if it is first, cannot presuppose other evil. Nevertheless, it presupposes some intrinsic and connatural imperfection of the creature, which is to be mutable and defective, which, formally speaking, it does not have from another cause, but from itself, from the fact that it is from nothing and of limited and finite perfection in its order; for from this limitation it has both that it is not the rule of its own operations to itself but needs a superior rule, and also that it is not joined per se and infallibly to its rule, but can fall away from it. But this natural imperfection, although it is not evil (for it is not privation, but mere negation), can nevertheless be the origin

of moral evil, because joined with freedom, from the force of that imperfection without other extrinsic impediment, a mutable will can not act the whole that it can and should, or act not as it can and should, but in another more imperfect way.

19. Evil in an effect sometimes from the sole lack of influx of a cause. In the third way it happens that evil follows without any positive efficiency from the sole subtraction of efficiency or of influx of due goodness. For since evil consists in privation, per se it does not require positive influx in order to exist in its own way, for every positive influx is terminated per se primarily to a positive form or thing; but this, per se speaking, is not necessary for privation; therefore, for evil to follow, it is sufficient that good due to some subject is not made or not conserved, the subject being conserved with the same aptitude and (so to speak) right to such good. And in moral matters indeed this can happen from the sole dominion of free power over its own action. Although the question is controversial whether there can be given pure moral evil without any action, which is usually called pure omission, concerning which we need not discuss; for it is sufficient for the matter we are treating that this evil from the force of its being does not require action, whatever may be the case whether on account of the notion of the voluntary an act is necessary. But truly in natural things, because a cause cannot suspend action from itself, but only because either the patient is removed or it itself is distant or some other impediment intervenes, which does not happen without some positive action, therefore although evil coming from a natural cause per se and formally often comes from the sole lack of action, nevertheless that always follows upon some other action or change; as although darkness follows in air from the sole non-illumination of the sun, nevertheless this lack of illumination follows upon the motion of the illuminating body or of another body. Therefore, in this way privation in which evil consists can happen; and then the same judgment is almost the same about this mode of effecting evil as about the first; for this evil follows per accidens from

the action of another cause, not because the action itself is defective, but because the term of such action is incompossible with the action of another cause or with some condition required for it.

20. Hence it is inferred that when it is said that evil has an efficient cause, either it must be understood of a cause that is either positive or privative, because privation is referred to the positive, as Thomas Aquinas said in a similar case in Summa Theologica I-II, q. 71, a. 6, ad 1; or certainly, if it is understood of a cause acting positively, it must be verified with proportion; for in natural things some natural action always precedes, upon which follows or to which is joined the privation that is evil; but in moral things, if we speak morally, the action of the will always also intervenes, which malice accompanies, or at least that action or virtual will is necessary, although perhaps metaphysically speaking it is not repugnant for such evil to exist without formal action.

How Evil is From the First Cause

21. And from these things it is sufficiently evident what is the proximate and particular efficient cause of evil; but how evil is also from the first and most universal cause, which is God, remains to be briefly explained. But effects of secondary causes are attributed to God in two ways, namely, either mediately, because he gave the power of acting to secondary causes, or immediately because he concurs with them and proximately influences their actions and effects. Again, we have from what has been said that evil follows from a proximate cause in two ways, namely, either from the force of its activity and positive perfection, or only from the lack of perfection or action. It must therefore be said that God is the cause of evil in the aforesaid two ways, which follows from the force of perfect activity of some cause. This is evident, because God both gave that power or activity and concurs with it to that perfect action upon which the evil of another follows. But God effects this evil just as the proximate cause does in

this respect, that he causes it not per se and directly but consequently and per accidens, because the evil itself, since it is privative, is not otherwise makeable. This is to be understood as to physical action; for as to the intention of the agent, since God is an agent through intellect, he can directly intend the evil itself for the sake of some good. And in this way God is the cause of any merely natural evil, according to that text, "God kills and makes alive," 1 Samuel 2:6. He is also and especially the cause of the evil of punishment, in which way it is said: "There is no evil in the city that the Lord has not done," Amos 3:6. But what is sometimes said, that God did not make death, Wisdom 1:13, is understood that he did not intend or will it from his primary intention, but somehow compelled by human fault, which being presupposed, he truly makes death, and wills it as punishment for fault. Therefore, not only through secondary causes, but also immediately through himself can God effect this evil, because it requires no defect in the immediate cause, but can come from sole perfect efficacy.

22. But truly that evil which follows from the lack of perfection or action of a proximate cause does not per se require God's influx, nor is it necessarily conjoined with God's action as such, and therefore it is not necessary that it be attributed to God. This is proven because this evil does not follow from the perfection or activity of the proximate cause, but from imperfection and lack; therefore it does not follow from what the cause has from God, but from what it has from itself or rather because it lacks perfection not due to it from itself. Again, a secondary cause does not need God's concurrence insofar as it does not act, but insofar as it acts something; therefore this evil per se has no source from which it should be attributed to God either mediately or immediately. And by this reasoning the evil of fault is not referred back to God; for according to faith God is not the author of sin. Indeed, no malice of action coming from a defect of proximate power can be attributed to God, as is, for example, lameness, which Thomas Aquinas teaches in Summa Theologica I, q. 49, a. 2.

23. But in this there is a difference to be noted between the evil of fault and others, that in the evil of fault the imperfection that is necessarily presupposed in the cause belongs to it from itself and in no way from without, and on account of the special condition and freedom of such a cause it can be the origin of the evil of fault without extrinsic impediment. Hence it happens that the first and sufficient root of such evil, as such, is the proximate cause itself without the intervention of the first. But truly in other evils of natural actions the imperfection that is presupposed in the cause, if it is merely natural and negative, cannot be the root of defective action unless some extrinsic impediment intervenes, as has been said above, which impediment always comes from some motion or positive effect of which God can be the cause, and from this part the root of such evil can be referred back to God. Again, if the imperfection of the cause is preternatural to it and consequently having the character of some evil in it, such defect always comes from some other natural action or motion, which it is necessary to be from God. And in this way every natural evil can finally be referred back to God, not insofar as it comes from a defect that is not from God, but insofar as it comes from some effect or action that is from God. Hence in the stated example of lameness, although the defect of that motion is not in that action from the force of emanation that it has from God, but from a weak or defective leg, nevertheless because this defect of the leg can be made by God, or by a secondary cause operating perfectly or intending its effect, therefore lameness itself can finally be reduced to the first cause, which cannot have place in the evil of fault.

24. There is also added another difference, that the evil of fault on account of its turpitude cannot be intended or willed by God, but only permitted; but the remaining evils, from whatever source they come, if they do not include fault, can be directly willed and intended by God, because they do not have turpitude repugnant to his supreme goodness; and therefore God cannot be the cause of the evil of fault alone, but he can be of others. And hence it is also that evil

coming from the sole lack of action, if it is moral, cannot be either from God alone or from him as primary cause and root, but from the defectible freedom of the creature. But if such evil is merely natural, it can be either from God alone suspending the total action by which he alone conserves good, or from God as first cause and root, as if a secondary cause omits to act only because God suspends his concurrence.

SECTION IV
WHY EVIL IS NOT NUMBERED AMONG THE ATTRIBUTES OF BEING

1. The reason for the difficulty. The reason for doubt can be that evil, as is clear from what has been said thus far, is distinguished by reason from being, and is attributed to it and denominates it; why therefore is it not numbered among the properties of being? For the fact that good is also its property does not prevent this, since being can be good and evil according to different aspects. Nor does it prevent this that it signifies privation; for even the one formally signifies negation and nonetheless is one of the principal properties of being. Finally, it does not prevent this that not every being appears to be evil, because, although no being is in itself absolutely evil, that is, defective, nevertheless every being, even God himself, is evil to something, that is, inconvenient; therefore this suffices so that evil in general ought to have been numbered among the properties of being.

2. The conclusion by which the doubt is resolved. Nevertheless, it must be said that evil is rightly not numbered among the attributes of being. Several reasons for this matter can be given, but those which have been touched upon in the course of argument can suffice. First, evil as evil does not formally signify something pertaining to the nature of being, but rather a tendency (so to speak) toward non-being or defect and weakness of being; therefore such a

nature cannot constitute a peculiar attribute of being as being, but rather could be attributed to some being insofar as it is defectible. Hence there is no similar reason regarding unity, both because unity does not signify mere negation, but entity under negation, whereas malice is sufficiently preserved in mere privation; and also because through that negation which the one includes, we circumscribe the integrity which being has in itself, and consequently its entity; but through the privation which evil signifies, we do not declare entity, nor do we circumscribe something pertaining to the constitution of being itself, but rather we explain a defect of entity, which can sometimes be in some being.

3. Being here exceeds evil, by which it is exceeded there. Second, it follows from this that evil is not reciprocal with being, so that even for this reason it cannot be its attribute. It is not reciprocal, both on the part of evil itself which extends more widely than being, and on the part of being itself which extends more widely than evil in another respect. The first is evident, because, since malice does not include entity in its concept, but is sufficiently preserved in the privation of entity, it does not require a real being for the proper denomination of evil; for the very privation of due perfection is not only malice, but is truly and properly called a certain evil; for, in the way that it is conceived through the mode of being (although it is not true being), it is also conceived and denominated as a certain evil, although it is not conceived as being in itself evil but as the evil of that of which it is the privation. In the same way also in moral matters, pure omission, if it were truly and properly sin, would be evil of man. The second is evident because not every being is truly and properly evil, which indeed is most certain concerning God, for neither does he have in himself any defect from which he could be called evil, nor is he truly and absolutely inconvenient to any being, but most convenient, indeed simply necessary for the good and perfection of any other being. But if he is sometimes apprehended as inconvenient, this is either falsely apprehended, or can only be attributed to God in a

qualified sense and through a certain extrinsic denomination by reason of some effect inconvenient to man which he causes in him; but this extrinsic denomination neither properly constitutes evil nor can pertain to the properties of being. And not only in God, but also in many created beings, integral goodness can be found without any malice. For although outside God there is no created being which cannot be subject to some evil, evil (I say) either moral, if it is a created and intellectual supposit, or at least natural, or penal, nevertheless it can be communicated to many created beings that they have no malice properly, but all the perfection due to them, as happens in the blessed angels, to whom this is peculiar that they have never been subject to any evil nor will they ever be. For even blessed men, although they now lack all evil in perpetuity, nevertheless at some time they were subject to some evil, if not of guilt, which is rare, at least of punishment, which no one has escaped. But in the remaining beings, only celestial bodies seem free from all natural evil, insofar as they are incorruptible and entirely free from foreign impressions. But it must be considered that all these things are to be understood concerning evil properly taken insofar as it formally signifies the proper privation of due goodness; for, if we speak more generally of evil, so that it signifies the mere negation of some goodness and perfection simply, thus indeed every being outside God can be called evil in some way, in which sense that could be understood: "No one is good except God alone." Nevertheless, that acceptance of evil is most improper, as is evident from what has been said above; for on account of the mere negation of perfection not due, a being can be called either negatively imperfect or less perfect, but not however evil. Nor is God alone called good because all other things are evil, but because he alone is good through essence, or by antonomasia or analogy. I add moreover that in the way that a created being is called evil in that impropriety or rather imperfect, it does not have this from the nature of being but because it is from nothing.

4. The heavens endowed with integral natural good. Evil inheres in being only accidentally. A third reason can be taken from what has been said because the properties of being ought to follow being itself intrinsically and per se; but evil is not so related to being, but belongs to it entirely accidentally and extrinsically. For this reason we proved above that evil is not without some cause, because it signifies a defect contrary to what is due to nature, which does not occur without an extrinsic cause. Therefore evil comes to that being in which it inheres, not from itself but extrinsically and accidentally; therefore it cannot pertain to the properties of being. And although it sometimes happens from the intrinsic nature of two beings that one is inconvenient to the other, and consequently its evil, as in moral matters some acts are said to be intrinsically evil, nevertheless this itself is very much accidental to the nature of being and peculiar to certain beings having some repugnance or disproportion among themselves. For these reasons therefore evil ought not to have been listed among the natures of being.

DISPUTATION XII

ON THE CAUSES OF BEING IN GENERAL

After having discussed the essential nature and properties of being insofar as it is being, before we descend to its divisions, it is necessary to dispute precisely about its causes. For although the natural philosopher disputes about causes, he does so in too restricted and imperfect a manner, insofar as the notion of cause is exercised in physical matter or with some motion or physical change; but the notion of cause is more universal and abstract; for in itself it abstracts from matter both sensible and intelligible; and therefore its proper consideration belongs to the metaphysician. First, indeed, insofar as the very notion of cause or causality (as they say) participates in some degree of being; concerning which it is necessary to declare what it is and in what manner it exists. Second, because causality itself is like a certain property of being as such; for there is no being that does not participate in some notion of cause. Third, because it belongs to science to consider the causes of its object. Although not every being comprehended under the object of this science has a true and proper cause, for God has no cause, nevertheless all other things besides Him have a cause; and in them not only determinate or particular notions of being, but also the very notion of being itself is caused per se and properly, so that it is true to say that being qua being has a cause specifically, even if not reduplicatively. This is especially so because it

belongs to the same doctrine to contemplate the notion of cause and effect; but there is no being that is not either an effect or a cause. It is added that, although God does not have a true and real cause, certain of His aspects are conceived by us as if they were causes of others, for the better declaration of which it will also be useful to know beforehand the true natures of causing. For these reasons, therefore, the consideration of causes belongs to the metaphysician. Concerning these we shall first say a few things in common about the nature of cause and its members; then more extensively about each individually; finally we shall compare them among themselves and with effects in various ways.

SECTION I

WHETHER CAUSE AND PRINCIPLE ARE ENTIRELY THE SAME.

1. That there is such a thing as cause is most widely known. We do not inquire whether cause exists, because nothing is more self-evident; but to investigate what it is, we conveniently take our beginning from the notion of principle, since every cause is a principle and can and should be defined through that as through a genus or in place of a genus. The reason for doubt in the proposed question is therefore taken from various sayings of Aristotle, for sometimes he signifies that cause and principle are entirely the same and are said reciprocally. For in Metaphysics IV, chapter 2, he says that cause and principle are related to each other just as being and one; but being and one are convertible with each other, as was said above. Likewise in Metaphysics V, chapter 1, where he enumerates various modes of principle, he concludes thus at the end: "But causes are spoken of in just as many ways, for all causes are principles." Again, when in Physics I he had numbered privation among the principles of natural things, in Metaphysics XII, chapter 2, he calls it a cause; therefore he thinks that

cause and principle are the same; and this opinion is favored by the manner of speaking of some Greek Fathers, who also call the Father the cause of the Son in divine matters because He is His principle; and similarly the Father and Son the cause of the Holy Spirit, which is an indication that among the Greeks cause is the same as principle[8]. This was signified by those Fathers when the Council of Florence explained it in the final session. The reason can be that principle expresses a relation to what is principled just as cause to effect; but what is principled seems to be the same as what is effected.

2. But sometimes Aristotle seems to signify that cause extends more widely than principle; for he says in book V of Generation of Animals, chapter 7, that it is of the nature of principle that it itself is indeed the cause of many things, but that there is no superior cause of it; but it is not of the nature of cause that it not have a superior cause; therefore, according to Aristotle's opinion, principle is something more restricted than cause. Hence also in Physics I, chapter 5, he says it is of the nature of principles that they are not from themselves, nor from others, but others are from them; but it is not of the nature of cause that it not be from principles and causes; therefore cause extends more widely than principle. Finally, from elsewhere it appears manifest that principle is something more general than cause; for every cause is a principle, as we have related from Aristotle; yet not every principle can be called a cause; for privation, according to Aristotle's testimony, is a principle of generation, but not a cause, and dawn is a principle of day and not a cause. And among theologians it is sound and received doctrine that in the divine persons one is the principle of another, but not the cause, as is clear from St. Thomas, I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 1.

Various Modes of Principles & Their Order

[8] Ex modo loquendi Patrum Graecorum; Damasc., lib. 1 De Fide, c. 6 et 9, ac. 11; Athanas., in Actis Nicenae Synodi; Nazian., Orat. 29 de dogmate et Constitutione Episcop., et Orat. 35, quae est I de Filio et 3 de Theologia.

3. Complex principle or of knowledge what. To explain this question, we must begin from the name and nature of principle; but since, as Damascene says in Dialogue against the Manichees, at the beginning, the word principle is equivocal, that is, analogous, it will be better to enumerate its various significations which Damascene reviews there, and earlier Aristotle in Metaphysics V, chapter 1. So that certain things may be handed down by us according to some definite method, we can first distinguish a twofold principle: one of things, another of knowledge or science; which is otherwise customarily distinguished into incomplex and complex principles; for the principle of a thing is incomplex, but of knowledge complex. For although principles of knowing are frequently taken from principles of things, nevertheless they are not proximately principles of science except insofar as complex principles flow from them. And in this way Aristotle says above: "The suppositions of demonstrations are called principles"; and in Sophistical Refutations II, final chapter, he says that in principles of knowing we must especially insist, because when these are known it is easy to know those things which follow. But about these complex principles nothing more needs to be said by us, for what is necessary for this doctrine has been handed down in disputations I and III; the rest indeed belongs to the books of the Posterior Analytics. But the denomination of principle, which is attributed to these, belongs to some genus of causality or to some relation from those which we shall immediately enumerate; for, because knowledge is a certain thing, the principle of knowledge is called such according to some relation, in which it agrees with other principles of things.

4. Therefore a principle of a thing can be called such either solely by reason of order and any connection whatsoever, or by reason of intrinsic relation. In the former way Aristotle seems to have spoken in the Poetics, somewhat from the beginning: "We say that is a principle which is not necessarily after another, and after which

something is naturally apt to be or to come to be." But this appellation under this aspect is manifold. For first, in every action or business, that from which it is begun is called a principle, which is sometimes arbitrary or casual, sometimes owed to the thing itself or at least more fitting so that it may be done suitably, either considering the nature of the thing which is done, or sometimes considering the knowledge of the one operating. And in this way in the order of transmitted science Aristotle says above that what is better known to us can be called the principle of doctrine, because science is suitably begun from there. Second, in succession or temporal order, dawn is called the principle of day, because day begins from there. Third, in order of place, one who sits first is called the principle of the others, and that place also from which a spring arises is customarily called its principle. Fourth, Damascene adds that it is also customary to speak thus on account of order of dignity, as: "The king," he says, "is the principle of those over whom he rules"; although this can pertain to causality, as Aristotle signifies. Finally, whatever is presupposed to another can be called its principle, as a foundation is called the principle of a house and unity the principle of number. And in every thing which has extension or latitude, the first part or first extreme which is supposed to others, can be called the principle of the whole or of the remaining parts. Hence this acceptance or denomination of principle is very broad and can be multiplied in various ways, so that it cannot be reduced to a certain and scientific notion, because it is an almost equivocal denomination.

5. What principle more strictly accepted signifies. In another way therefore and more philosophically, something is called a principle by reason of some relation per se between itself and that of which it is the principle, so that from it something per se arises in some way. This can happen in two ways. First, through positive influx and communication of its own being; which mode with respect to created things is always with dependence and causality, as we shall explain; wherefore such a principle, philosophically speaking, always takes on the nature of cause. Only in the divine persons is a principle

found with true influx and communication of proper being without causality; but why this is so, we shall try to explain in the following section. Hence this kind of principle, insofar as it includes the nature of cause, can be divided into as many members as cause has. For there are certain principles intrinsically constituting a thing; others indeed are extrinsic, which influence being into a thing and remain outside it, like end and efficient cause, about which we must speak later.

6. How privation is said to be a principle of natural things. Second, something can arise from another per se, as from a principle, not through positive influx, but only on account of necessary and per se relation to another. In this way privation is numbered among the principles of natural things by Aristotle, which seems to have a certain middle nature between the two modes of principles declared. For that former one is very broad and is founded only in any order of priority, nor does it require per se relation, but can be found in any kind of composition or succession; but privation is said to be a principle of natural generation in a more perfect way and more intrinsically. But the other mode of principle through influx is more perfect than can suit privation, because privation, since it is not a true thing, cannot have proper influx into the thing which comes to be or into its generation; and much less can it intrinsically compose the thing generated. It is therefore called a principle on account of the intrinsic relation of generation to it; for, because generation is essentially a passage from non-being to being, therefore it per se presupposes privation and is made from it as from a necessary terminus per se; for this reason, therefore, privation is said to be a principle of natural things, not indeed of their constitution in actual being, but of generation.

7. How form is differently a principle of generation, differently of the thing generated. How matter is a principle of generation. Indeed (to say this in passing) even form, as it is a principle of generation, is far differently a principle than as it is a principle of the thing generated and of its constitution; for of the thing

itself it is a principle through influx and formal causality, as we shall declare below; but of generation it cannot be a principle in this way, because it itself cannot be the proper cause of that generation through which it comes to be, so as to truly influence it, unless perhaps it be reduced to final cause, for the end of generation is the introduction of form; or even to extrinsic formal cause insofar as generation takes its species from the form toward which it tends; which causalities are very improper with respect to such form, as will be clear later. And therefore this notion of principle by which form is called a principle of generation properly belongs to this last mode; for generation per se and intrinsically intends form as the formal terminus toward which it tends, which is sufficient for it to be called a principle of generation. But it is otherwise with matter, because this also with respect to generation has some influx and causality, although different from that which it has concerning the constitution of a natural thing; for into this natural thing matter influences by intrinsically constituting it through itself; but into generation not so, but only by sustaining and receiving it. And let these things be said by occasion about these principles, because the name of principle of natural things is customarily accommodated to them by antonomasia. Finally, to this last denomination of principle can be reduced some examples posited in the first and general denomination, insofar as in them can be found an order per se and intrinsically necessary; for thus a point can be called per se a principle of a line; and the first degree, of a whole quality; and a foundation, of a house; although in these such a mode of principle per se is always reduced to some kind of influx or causality.

Being Prior, How Common to Every Principle

8. From this enumeration of principles it can be gathered, first, that it is common to every principle that it be in some way prior to what is principled; for the very name of principle suggests this. Indeed Aristotle, in the cited place of Metaphysics V, gathers that it is

common to every principle to be first, which is something greater than being prior; for this only expresses precedence to what is principled, but that expresses negation of what is prior. But it must be considered that something is called a principle simply in some genus or under some aspect which is so a principle that it is not principled under that aspect; for if it be principled by another in that series, it will not be a principle simply in that order, but only in a qualified sense with respect to something; for example, a point is then properly a principle of a line when before it no point and consequently no part of the line has preceded; but a point continuing the parts of a line can only relatively be called a principle of subsequent parts, since it is the terminus of preceding ones. This can be considered more clearly in time; for absolutely only that instant is a principle of time, before which instant no time has preceded, but immediately follows; but an intermediate instant will not be called simply a principle of time, but only relatively or under some determinate aspect, namely, the principle of a day or year. And the Saints seem to allude to this propriety of words[9] when they say that the eternal Father is the principle, fountain and origin of the whole deity. For they do not speak thus because the Father is the principle of the divine nature itself, because according to the Catholic faith the divine nature has no principle, because it proceeds from no one, otherwise it would be distinguished from Him; hence just as this expression is condemned, "the essence generates," so also "the essence is generated," or "proceeds." They therefore call the Father the principle of divinity, because in that degree or order (so to speak) of divine persons He alone is so the principle of the other persons subsisting in divinity that He has no principle; and therefore He is called the principle of divinity, that is, of all communication of divinity. But the Son, because

[9] Concil. Tolet. VI et XI, in princ.; Dyonis., c. 1 de Caelest. Hierarch.; et III de Divin. nominib., c. Damnamus, de Summa Trinit. Et Fide cathol.; Nazianz., orat. 29; Atnanas., orat in illud dictum, Deus de Deo; Aug. IV de Trinit., c. 20

He has a principle, cannot be called absolutely the principle of divinity; but He is truly called the principle of the Holy Spirit, or of the communication of divinity through the mode of spiration, because under that aspect He has no principle. Thus therefore it is of the nature of every principle that it be prior to that of which it is the principle; but if it be absolutely and simply a principle in some order, it will also be first in that order.

9. Whether form is prior to generation. You will say: form is a principle of generation of a natural thing and yet is in no way prior to generation, since it is the formal terminus of it. Likewise a theologian will object that in the divine persons no proper priority is found, although in them there is a most proper notion of principle. To the former part it is replied that form is prior to generation in the notion of terminus per se, to which generation is ordered, which is referred to priority in the order of intention. Nevertheless there will not be lacking one who says that form is also prior by nature in execution and in the genus of formal cause; but this is not rightly said with respect to generation, because, as I said, it is not the proper cause of it; therefore it is enough that there be a prior relation of generation to form for this to be a principle of that, whatever may be the case about proper causality with respect to it. You will say: therefore act can be called a principle of potency, because, although it is posterior in generation or time than potency, nevertheless it is the terminus which potency per se regards and from which it takes its species; hence it is prior by nature in the order of intention. It is replied first by conceding the consequence in that genus of specifying principle; for what is inconvenient in this? Then the reason is much greater concerning form with respect to generation, because form is so extrinsic to generation, that it has it connected inseparably and intimately and essentially, so that actual generation cannot be understood without form actually informing intervening there; but act is more extrinsic to potency.

10. The other part of the objection pertains more to theologians. Among whom there is a certain diversity perhaps rather in manner of speaking than in the thing itself. St. Thomas therefore, I, q. 42, a. 3, in the body, although he concedes that there is an order of origin among the divine persons, nevertheless denies simply that one is prior to another, because in the Trinity (he says) there is an order of nature without priority. And in the solution to the second he declares that there is neither priority of nature nor of intellect there, because those persons are both relative and subsist in one and the same nature; hence they cannot have priority on the part of nature since that is the same, nor on the part of relations since they are correlative and simultaneous by nature and intellect. Wherefore the same holy Doctor, in the said q. 33, a. 1, ad 3, so responds to the difficulty which we now treat as to seem to deny our assertion. For he says that although the name of principle is taken from priority, nevertheless it does not signify priority. For it is frequent that in a name one thing is what it signifies, but another is that from which it is imposed for signifying. Nor is St. Thomas contrary to himself when in I, q. 40, a. 4, he says that the producing person is prior to the produced person according to our mode of understanding. For there he speaks of our imperfect and confused mode of understanding. But in the other place he treats of perfect understanding which is owed to things themselves as they are in themselves. And thus Cajetan and the Thomists understand, and with them Durandus agrees in the thing itself, In I, dist. 9, q. 2, and dist. 20, q. 2. And this opinion is sufficiently probable, and that manner of speaking is cautious and safe; according to which opinion our assertion can be limited so as to be understood metaphysically, not theologically, that is, concerning the principle which natural light recognizes, not what faith alone reveals. Nevertheless Scotus, In I, dist. 12, q. 2, and dist. 28, final question, whom Gabriel follows, In I, dist. 9, q. 3, concedes that just as in the divine persons one is the principle of another, so it is prior not in duration, perfection or nature, but in origin only. For this priority does

not include imperfection, and is necessarily included in the very notion of producing principle. Both things are evident, because it only imports in the producing person that it have being without such origin, according to which another person proceeds from it; as the Father has being without generation, but the Son not except through generation; and both have being without spiration, but the Holy Spirit not except through it. This kind of priority cannot be found among correlatives in created things, because one relative as such does not proceed from another; but in divine things there is found procession of one correlative from another, insofar as they are such. And according to this opinion, our assertion is universally true; for if it is found true in the divine persons, much more so in created things. Nor is it surprising that just as the notion of principle in those persons is singular, so also the mode of priority is peculiar and of a far different nature from all those found in creatures. And this manner of speaking is also probable and in the thing itself (as I think) does not contradict St. Thomas, because he never expressly denied this kind of priority in the divine persons, but others which are found in creatures. He remained silent, however, and never used that expression, but called it an order of origin, not priority. And certainly not without reason, both because in divine matters the manner of speaking of the Fathers is to be imitated, among whom that expression is not found; and also because priority of origin is not of absolute priority, as it is found in the divine persons, because priority simply and without addition asserted seems to indicate some imperfection in the thing which is called posterior. Likewise because that is called absolutely prior which can either be or at least be exactly understood without another; but one divine person is compared to another in neither way. But what some add, that one divine person is prior to another in the order of natural enumeration, in the way we number the first, second and third person, this (I say) is not different from the preceding, for this mode of enumerating is founded only in priority of origin, hence in the thing itself it indicates no other kind of priority; but that mode of

enumerating declares very well this mode of priority of origin, if it be declared with fitting words and sound sense, is not entirely alien from the manner of speaking of the Church and the Doctors. Hence with that addition it can be accepted, and it is sufficient that it be universally true that every principle is in some way prior to that of which it is the principle; although this always remains singular in the Trinity, that while the notion of principle suits absolutely and simply to one person with respect to another, the notion of prior is attributed only with addition and limitation; for the former said absolutely indicates no imperfection in the other extreme, but the latter seems to indicate some. Priority of origin therefore explained in the said way, is enough that the true notion of principle be found in divine things; hence what Thomas says, that the name of principle is taken from priority, but does not signify it if by priority he understands absolute and positive priority which connotes imperfection in what is principled, is true; but if there be discourse of pure precedence as it were negative under that aspect under which something is called principle, thus not only is the name of principle taken from priority, but also signifies it and requires it with due proportion, as has been declared and is evident from Aristotle's definition and from all things adduced.

The Description of Principle in General Is Completed

11. Connection required between principle and what is principled. Second, it is inferred from what has been said that for the nature of principle it is not enough that it be prior to another, but it is necessary that between them there be some connection or consequence of one from the other which is denominated principle. This is evident from the common mode of conceiving among men, and is easily declared by induction. For a man born yesterday is not the principle of one who is born today, although he is prior to him; and in divine things, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son,

the Son could not be called His principle, even if He could be thought in some way prior by reason, namely, in that way in which the act of intellect is called prior to the act of will. Therefore some connection or consequence is necessary; and therefore according to various modes of such consequence, the denomination of principle is also various; for sometimes it arises from position, sometimes from intrinsic succession, sometimes from emanation, and so concerning others enumerated above. And Aristotle signified all this, in the said place of Metaphysics V, when he said that principle is the first from which something is, etc.; for that particle "from which" indicates the aforesaid connection or consequence. But this must be understood with proportion; for something can be a principle in act and in potency, and in both ways it requires a relation to another, which follows it either actually or potentially.

12. A certain general division of principle. What is intrinsic principle, what indeed extrinsic. And thus is concluded the description of principle in general and most confusedly taken, which St. Thomas hands down under these terms, I, q. 33, a. 1: "Principle is that from which something proceeds in any way whatsoever"; where that word "proceeds" is not to be taken strictly for true origin, but for any consequence or connection whatsoever, as we have spoken thus far; and to signify this St. Thomas perhaps added that particle "in any way whatsoever." And taken in this sense is that definition from the aforesaid place of Aristotle, saying that principle is that from which something is. For he seems to have deliberately abstained from a peculiar word signifying origin or another mode of emanation, so that through that particle "from which" he might embrace every mode of conjunction or consequence. But he adds for greater explanation that principle is that from which something is, or comes to be, or is known, so that simultaneously with the description he might explain a certain general division of principles; for to those three members just mentioned can be reduced all principles, especially those which are per se; for those which are per accidens can scarcely be reduced to a

certain method, except insofar as they are reduced to those which are per se. Thus therefore all principles are either principles of a thing in becoming, or principles of a thing in being, and to these two members are reduced all principles of things, because no other status can be understood in things except in becoming, or in being; and not always is the principle of effection the principle of constitution of a thing, as is evident in privation. But under the principle of what comes to be, is comprehended every principle of motion or operation as such, or of any successive thing, for all these have their being in becoming; but under the principle of what is, are included all principles of things which in some way have being (as they say) in accomplished being. But because also successive things and actions themselves are in some way, therefore more generally taking the word "is" it is customarily said by theologians that principle is that from which something is. And in the same way under these words could be comprehended the principle of knowledge, and indeed it is comprehended, if knowledge be considered insofar as it is a certain thing which comes to be or is; nevertheless Aristotle meritoriously added the third member about principles of knowledge, to signify that not always is the principle of knowledge the principle of the thing known, but often there are other principles of a thing in cognitive being from the principles of the same thing in being or becoming. But he did not add in particular the principle of loving, because this is none except either a principle of being or of knowing. And from these things it is sufficiently evident both the description, and also the division handed down by Aristotle, the division (I say) which is said to be trimembral. But after that division Aristotle subjoins another bimembral one saying that one principle is intrinsic, another extrinsic, which is a subdivision of the former members, as he himself indicates sufficiently clearly. And to that trimembral division he refers back all the acceptations of principle, which he had numbered above, and all others which can be devised. For he was not solicitous in enumerating all the significations of that word, which would be prolix and scarcely necessary, but those

which either were more usual or from which others could easily be known. And therefore I think it superfluous to inquire scrupulously about another sufficiency of that enumeration. But if anyone requires a copious disputation about that matter, let him read Fonseca, book V of Metaphysics, chapter 1, through seven questions, especially in the fourth.

The Analogy of Principle Is Declared

13. Third, it is inferred from what has been said that principle is not said in a merely equivocal way of all the members which are contained under it and numbered above, since not only the name but also some notion of the name is common to them. But it is customarily doubted whether it be univocal or analogous. To which it must be said briefly that it cannot be univocal. For three things can be considered in principle: one is the thing itself which is denominated principle; another is the proper relation according to being, which is conceived from principles to what is principled; the third is what is understood as the proximate reason of founding that relation, which is that consequence or emanation of what is principled from the principle. But in none of these do all those things which are called principles agree univocally. The first is evident, because not only uncreated being is denominated principle, but also created, nor only real being, but also being of reason; but these do not agree univocally in some proper and intrinsic notion; therefore. And the same reasoning can be made about the second; for also the relation of principle is common to created and uncreated, although philosophy does not acknowledge the latter. Likewise to real and rational relations. And from these the same can be concluded about the third: first indeed, because there is such variety in those natures or connections of principled things with principles that they scarcely agree among themselves except in name and some proportionality. Second, because when what is denominated principle is only a being

of reason, the reason of founding the relation of principle cannot be real; but in other things it is often true emanation and real procession. Again this is sometimes created, sometimes uncreated; therefore in these there is the same reason of analogy. Finally, because principles which are so denominated only on account of succession of time or order of position, or another similar accidental connection, are far distant from principles per se and especially from those which are such through true influx and causality. Nor does the unity of the description given oppose this analogy; for the terms of which it consists are so transcendental that they involve analogy in themselves. Nor does it oppose that principle is said almost always absolutely and without addition of any signification posited above; for this can happen either on account of clear and known proportionality, or because from the subject matter it is evident in what signification the word is taken, or certainly on account of some proper and intrinsic notion of principle, according to those things which we shall say below about the analogy of being.

14. The same with respect to diverse things is analogous both of attribution and of proportionality. Order of imposition of the word principle to its significations. But perhaps someone will ask what kind of analogy this is and of which significations principle is said primarily. About which matter the interpreters say much, in the said book V of Metaphysics, chapter 1. But I briefly think that this analogy is not one, but multiple with respect to diverse significations; for it is not repugnant that the same name primarily signifying some thing, be transferred to certain others through attribution, but to others through proportionality. As "healthy" primarily signifying animal, signifies medicine through attribution, but an apple integral and uncorrupted through proportionality. Thus therefore I think it should be said about the name of principle with respect to its significations. But it must be considered that it is one thing to speak of the first imposition of this word as it was made by men, another of the thing signified through it, as St. Thomas distinguishes in a similar case, I, q.

13, a. 6. In the former way I think this word was imposed to signify the principle of motion or time, for because earlier philosophers knew only corporeal things, in them they had first distinguished principle, middle and end; but these seem to be first known from motion or some action; and therefore it is likely that the name of principle was first imposed to signify the principle of motion or action, or that part of magnitude from which motion begins. And perhaps Aristotle signified this by enumerating this acceptation in the first place. Hence this word was derived through proportion or proportionality to other significations.

15. What principle signifies primarily, what secondarily. But truly as to the thing signified this word signifies more principally principles per se, than per accidens; and especially those which are principles through true and real influx, because in these there is much truer and more proper emanation of one from another and origin than the name of principle suggests. But this notion of principle joined with causality is with respect to creatures, and suits both God and creatures. And for this reason it can be said of God and creatures according to analogy of attribution; for example, to be an efficient principle is said analogically of God and creatures, not according to proportionality only, but on account of true and real agreement, analogous however and including attribution, as we shall generally explain below in the analogy of being to God and creatures. And the same can be said of final or exemplar principle. But how the common notion of principle is common to efficient, final and exemplar principle, pertains to the division of cause into these and other members, about which we shall speak below. But in God alone ad intra (which philosophy did not acknowledge) is found the true notion of positive and per se principle with true influx or production without causality, which is a higher and more wonderful notion of principle.

16. Concerning God, as He is the principle of God and creatures, how He is called principle. Hence it is deservedly customary for theologians to inquire whether principle in general, even said of

God Himself as He is the principle of creatures, or as one divine person is the principle of another, be univocal or analogous. Some think it is analogous and is said by priority of God according to emanations ad extra than ad intra, because creature proceeds from God not only according to person, but also according to nature and essence; and therefore there seems to be a greater notion of principle in God with respect to creatures than there is in the eternal Father with respect to the Son, whose person He produces, not His nature. And it is confirmed, because the notion of principle with respect to creatures is absolute and essential, but the other is relative and notional; but those which are essential, from their proper concepts seem more powerful and prior to the notional. It is confirmed secondly, because power simply in God is said by priority of the power of producing ad extra than ad intra; hence God is simply omnipotent through the power of operating ad extra, but not ad intra; otherwise the Holy Spirit would not be omnipotent, because He cannot produce ad intra. But the same reasoning applies to principle as to power, since principle is by reason of power. And thus Durandus thinks, In I, dist. 29, q. 1.

17. Others, however, find it fitting that the term is analogous and is said primarily of the principle ad intra rather than ad extra, both because the relation of the principle to creatures is rational (relatio rationis), while among the divine persons it is real, and also because a principle is that from which something exists; but a creature exists analogically with respect to the divine person proceeding, because the latter proceeds in uncreated being, the former in created being; therefore that procession is far more noble, even according to analogy; therefore also the notion of principle, which corresponds to it, is said primarily according to emanation ad intra rather than ad extra. And this opinion seems to be that of St. Thomas, I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 4, and a. 3. But in those places he does not deal with the name of principle, but with the name of father, concerning which there is a far different reasoning. But under the name of principle he expressly affirms this In

I, dist. 29, q. 1, a. 2, where Capreol., Alber., Richar. and others hold the same opinion.

18. The third opinion, however, can be that this name "principle" is univocal with respect to those two meanings; for it is not repugnant that the same name which is analogous with respect to many things should be univocal with respect to some, as is evident per se, and we shall say more extensively below when treating of the community of being and accident. That this is so in the present case regarding this part which we are discussing is proved because here there is no analogy of proportionality, nor of attribution. The first part is proved, both because otherwise God would be called the principle of creatures only by transference, not by property; and also because St. Thomas above expressly admits that there is one common notion of the origin of the procession of creatures from God, or of one divine person from another, which is for something to be from something, and thus also that there is one common notion of principle; but in analogy of proportionality there is not one common notion. The second part is proved because God, as he is called the first principle of creatures, is not referred to himself as he is the principle of persons; therefore there can be no analogy of attribution there. Likewise, because otherwise the Holy Spirit would be called the principle of creatures by attribution to the Father or to the Son, which seems quite absurd. Likewise because here ceases the reason for analogy of attribution which is wont to exist between God and creatures, namely that all being or all perfection of a creature is primarily in God and depends on him; here, however, one notion of principle is not caused by another nor depends on it; indeed, neither does the emanation of creatures per se depend on the emanations of the divine persons; because a multitude of persons was not per se necessary for production ad extra; therefore in the present case all reason for analogy of attribution ceases.

19. In this matter those three things seem to be distinguished which we distinguished above in every principle, namely, the relation

of the principle, the proximate reason of such a relation, and that which is named the principle. Regarding the first, there is no doubt that here there is analogy, because the relation of the principle of God to creatures is rational, but of the divine person producing to the one produced is real. And Scotus declares this sense expressly, dist. 29, q. 1. Indeed, this analogy either is not of attribution, but only of proportion, or at least, if it is of attribution, it is not according to a common concept, because here there is none applying to both a being of reason and a real being.

20. Regarding the second, I also think it more probable that the notion of actual principle is said analogically and more principally of God according to processions ad intra than ad extra, for the reasons adduced. This analogy is, however, of attribution, and not only of proportion, just as is the analogy of being and of other attributes which are said properly of God and creatures. For this analogy of principle is founded in the analogy which exists between creation and the processions of the divine persons in the notion of origin or emanation. Because if productions do not agree univocally in the common notion of production, neither can the notion of principle be univocal, especially since being in this way the actual principle of creatures does not belong to God except by extrinsic denomination from the emanation of the creature from him. That the notion of procession is analogous with respect to the created and uncreated, and that it is said primarily of uncreated procession, is proved first from the general rule of divine attributes, which are always said properly and primarily of God, as we shall prove below. This holds true not only in essential attributes, but also in personal ones; for "person" is said analogically of the created and uncreated; and "Father" or "Son" are said analogically of divine and human persons.

21. Second, because even in this consideration there is in some way a necessary dependence and natural precedence between origins that are outward and inward. For although creation on its own part does not per se require the Trinity of persons and consequently

neither the processions inward, nevertheless on the part of God it per se and necessarily requires them and depends upon them in its own way. This is both because every effecting per se depends upon the acting person; but in God there cannot be a person without production or procession inward. It is also because the production of creatures depends of itself upon intelligence and love; but there cannot be intelligence in God without the Word nor love without the Holy Spirit. And according to this consideration St. Thomas said, I, q. 45, a. 6, that the processions of persons are the reasons for the production of creatures; and in the response to the first he adds that the processions of divine persons are the cause of creation. And thus there remains solved the foundation which we brought forth in referring to the third opinion against this position. But the foundation of Durandus presents no obstacle; rather it declares that the processions of divine persons, since they are without any dependence or imperfection, are of such eminent character that they cannot univocally agree with created productions. Therefore, that in the produced person the essence is not produced but only communicated does not diminish the truth of production but rather pertains to its infinite perfection. Just as the fact that the eternal Father produces the Son not only similar in specific nature, but also of the same numerical nature, does not diminish the truth of generation, but pertains to its infinite perfection, as St. Thomas excellently noted, I, q. 41, a. 5, ad 1.

22. As for what pertains to the third point, that is, to that which is denominated principle, if it is taken entirely materially (so to speak), it is clear that there can be no analogy nor can there be anything prior to that which is denominated the first principle of creatures. Nor can there be anything more perfect than that which on the part of such a principle is the root and origin of such denomination; for its perfection is infinite. Indeed, even if we do not speak of that principle so materially, but formally, insofar as it is (so to speak) principle in potency, thus also I think the notion of principle cannot be said less properly or by posteriority of God as He is the

principle of creatures; and certain arguments made in the first and third opinion persuade this. And especially because this denomination is absolute, eternal and essential; for it is taken from the attribute of omnipotence; but the power of God in the notion of active or productive power is not analogically power, but primarily and principally. Therefore the notion of principle as it is taken precisely from that cannot be analogous.

23. The objection is satisfied. You will say: therefore power is not said analogically of the power of creating and of generating or breathing; but the consequent seems false, for such is the power as is the action or production; but production is analogous; therefore also power. I respond first by conceding that there is not such an analogy that is said by posteriority of the power of creating; because, as I said, the effective power of God cannot be analogically power, because it is not so named by any proportion or attribution; and because it is the first and most perfect power. Hence I add that either there is univocation in this respect, or if there is some analogy, as perhaps there is, productive power is said by priority of the power of creating, etc., rather than of generating, etc. The reason is that the formal notion of power, which signifies first act toward producing, is found in God with respect to creatures with all propriety and perfection; but with respect to internal origins, or proceeding divine persons, it is more according to our mode of conceiving than according to the thing itself. Because in reality it is not so much first act as ultimate act with respect to internal processions, as will be established more broadly below in treating of the knowledge, will and power of God. The reason is that the power of God with respect to creatures is toward a transient emanation really distinct and not necessarily flowing from such power; and therefore that is most properly power and first act with respect to such emanation; but truly the power of generating or breathing is according to immanent procession, which in reality cannot be only in potency but always in act, nor can it be in reality distinct from that which is conceived by us by way of power, as to its

absolute perfection, as is established from St. Thomas, 1, q. 41, a. 5; and therefore according to reality and truth, power is said more properly of the creative than of the generative, etc.

24. Whether generative and spirative principle are said univocally. How principle is said of God creating and operating from subject matter. Nor does it obstruct that origin or production is analogous, both because the power of God does not take its notion from relation to the extrinsic but from its essential and most absolute perfection; and also because it pertains to the excellence of divine power absolutely taken that it is neither necessarily conjoined to its action, nor can it have an action adequate to itself or of the same order; and thus it happens that the imperfection which production or dependence of creature essentially includes, not only does not diminish the perfection and propriety of the power of God for acting outside itself, but is also a manifest indication of its infinite perfection. On the contrary, however, the excellence of internal origins indicates the supreme and infinite perfection and propriety of the immanent acts of God and consequently in some way diminishes the propriety of power in first act, as has been declared. And let these things be said in passing for the sake of declaring exactly the analogy of principle. But that which is more theological is what is customarily asked, whether principle said within God of the generating and breathing is univocal or analogous; in which I think with Scotus, in the place cited above, that it is univocal just as relation or person is, nor in those things which are said with all propriety of divine persons do I understand analogy or attribution, since there is no dependence there, or imperfection, or priority of nature. Again it is customarily asked whether principle said outwardly of God as creating or operating from presupposed matter is analogous; which some seem to think; but I think it is univocal, because effecting is said univocally of creation and eduction, especially that which is done by God as by the first agent; but concerning these things, these are sufficient.

25. Principle extends more broadly than cause. Finally, from what has been said is gathered the response to the proposed question, on account of which we have said so much about principle, namely, that principle and cause are not entirely the same nor said reciprocally, but that principle is more common than cause. Thus St. Thomas teaches expressly, I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 1, taking the reason thence why in God one person is said to be the principle of another and not the cause. The same he has In I, dist. 29, a. 1, in corp., and ad 2, and de Potent., q. 10, a. 1, ad 9, and it is the common opinion. Which the reasons of doubting posited at the beginning in the third place rightly prove and from all things said about principle manifestly appears. For principle is also said of that which does not properly influence another, but cause by no means. Also hence it happens that principle pertains not only to real beings, but also to beings of reason or privation; but cause does not likewise. Therefore this conclusion is manifest comparing cause to principle in its entire generality; but if it is compared to principle truly and per se influencing some being in that of which it is the principle, the conclusion is also true, yet so difficult that it cannot be known by natural light, because such a mode of principle is found only in the mystery of the Trinity and therefore it is difficult to assign the distinction and reason, concerning which we will speak in the following section.

Arguments Are Solved

26. Whether Aristotle considered principle and cause the same. Various passages of Aristotle are examined for this. To the first testimony of Aristotle posited at the beginning, many respond through that dialectical rule that the truth of examples is not required; for in that place Aristotle placed principle and cause in passing and for the sake of example. But this is a harsh interpretation or rather a

modest concession of Aristotelian lapse. Others explain that the name cause is not taken there properly, but in the common way as it is said of any occasion or necessary condition. But this exposition also has a difficulty to be touched upon below, for the name of cause even taken commonly never extends as broadly as principle. Therefore it can be said that Aristotle says two things there about being and one. The first is that they are the same. The second is that they are convertible among themselves; therefore when Aristotle says "just as principle and cause," he does not compare them in the second, but in the first; for he intends to teach that being and one are the same in reality, but not in notion; and for this he introduces the example saying that they are related just as principle and cause, not as tunic and garment; hence, immediately after those words "principle and cause," he adds "but not as things which are said by one notion." Or if comparison is made in both, it need not be understood universally about principle and cause, but indefinitely, that sometimes principle and cause, although they mutually follow, differ in notion, for example, principle and efficient cause.

27. To the second testimony from V Metaph. some also respond that there too the name of cause is taken in a broad and common way. But this is openly against the mind of Aristotle, since he treats distinctly of principle and cause and expounds the significates of both philosophically and properly. Another exposition is that when Aristotle says cause is said in as many ways as principle, it is not to be understood positively but negatively, that is, cause is not said in other ways than those in which principle is said, although it is not necessary that it be said in all those ways. And indeed although the propriety of that phrase seems to oppose this exposition, nevertheless the reason which Aristotle subjoins seems to compel admission of it; for he adds: "Since all causes are principles." From which reason it would be most ineptly inferred that cause is said in all the ways in which principle is said; for it would be to argue from the superior to the inferior affirmatively; as if someone should conclude: Every substance is

being; therefore in as many ways as being is said, substance is said in just as many.

28. But Alexander of Hales indicates another exposition, namely, that principle is said in as many ways as cause is said, because every cause is a principle. So that after enumerating the significations of principle, Aristotle subjoined as it were a general rule, that principle is also said in all the ways in which cause is said, although not in those alone. And according to this sense the reasoning of Aristotle fits very well; yet it can scarcely be accommodated to the previous words. Another exposition is indicated by St. Thomas, namely, that the acceptations of principle enumerated there belong to cause in so many ways, although not under the same notion; for from cause motion begins and so concerning the others. According to which exposition the proof of Aristotle is to be led differently, namely, so that thence he may confirm that those acceptations have place in principle, because they also have place in cause, because every cause is a principle; thence however it does not follow that cause and principle are said reciprocally, because, although the acceptations enumerated there according to other notions can be accommodated to cause, nevertheless principle extends more broadly, because it is said in all those ways in which cause is said and according to the proper notion of cause; and besides it is said in other ways according to the general notion of principle.

29. To the third testimony from XII Metaph., where Aristotle calls privation a cause, the common and necessary exposition of all is that there he used the name of cause in the common way, as cause is said of whatever is required for another in any way.

30. But someone will say: therefore if we speak truly and with proportion, it must be confessed that principle and cause are said reciprocally, for if both are taken in their entire amplitude and analogy and common usage, they are convertible; but if cause is taken strictly and with all propriety, it is also convertible with principle taken in the same way. But if cause is taken properly and principle broadly and

therefore principle is said to be more general than cause, the comparison becomes improper; and by the same reason it could be said that cause extends more broadly than principle because if cause is taken broadly and principle properly, it will extend more broadly. I respond by denying both parts of the assumption; for comparing principle proper and per se to proper and per se cause, principle is more common, as appears theologically in the principles of divine processions and physically in privation. And taking both in their broadest signification, I also think that principle is something more common. For although cause thus taken comprehends more things which are not properly, truly and per se causes, nevertheless it comprehends nothing which is not contained under the general signification of principle; but principle embraces some things which are in no way called causes, even in common speech; for the firstborn is called the principle of children, but not the cause in any way.

31. Greek Fathers used the name of cause for principle. To the manner of speaking of the Greek Fathers it is responded that they used the name of cause more broadly than it can or ought to be used in Latin propriety; but in the thing itself they did not attribute the name of cause to divine persons inwardly, insofar as it properly expresses relation to effect, and in that indicates some imperfection; but only as it expresses the origin of one toward others.

32. Whether there is something principled in divine things and what is correlative to principle. To the argument, theologians deny that the principled is correlative to principle in divine things. Although therefore they say that the Father is the principle of the Son, they nevertheless deny that the Son is principled by the Father. Thus St. Thomas, I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 2, and others commonly. According to which manner of speaking, the correlative of principle will be that which is from another. Which opinion has been deservedly approved by Latin theologians out of reverence for the mystery of the Trinity and to remove the occasion of error; for "principled" seems to signify something made, as we argued above, or also indicates the same as

"initiated," and consequently indicates a beginning of being. But omitting that mystery and removing the envy of the word, if by the name of "principled" is signified only that which is correlative to principle, thus it is denied that the same is principled as caused or effected; but it signifies only that which is from another or which has a principle, not of duration (for this equivocation is also to be removed), but either of origin or of any other mode. And in this sense the Greeks are to be explained, who, as St. Thomas reports above, admit that the Son is principled by the Father.

33. Those things which prove cause broader than principle are solved. To the arguments made in the second place, by which it is proved that cause extends more broadly than principle, it is responded that Aristotle in the first testimony does not speak generally about principle, but about the first principle in some order, which has influence and causality. Concerning which principle he had said in the same place that although it is small in magnitude, it is great in faculty. And concerning this first principle he denies that it has a superior cause, namely in that order. For only the first principle absolutely and in the entire breadth of being has no cause. And in the same sense in I Phys. he places in the definition of principles of natural being that they are not from others, in that way, namely, in which natural being is from them, because those are first principles in that order. Concerning which principles as they are principles and their proper definition must be disputed in Philosophy; but as some of them are causes, concerning those it will be said below.

SECTION II

WHETHER THERE IS ANY COMMON NATURE OF CAUSE, AND WHAT KIND IT IS

1. From Aristotle we have no definition of cause in general; later philosophers have labored in assigning one, so that they might

better proceed from the common to the proper natures of individual causes while explaining what kind of agreement exists among causes themselves. However, it must be presupposed that our discussion concerns cause in act formally as it is cause; for just as we said above concerning principle, so also in cause three things can be considered: namely, the thing that causes, the causation itself (so to speak), and the relation that either follows or is conceived. Concerning this third member, nothing needs to be treated in this entire matter; for it has its own proper place below in the matter concerning relation. But we shall speak about the other two; first, however, about causation itself, through which a cause is formally constituted in act and from which the cause itself or the power of causing becomes known to us.

2. The first description of cause is rejected. The first definition, therefore, is customarily given as follows: A cause is that through which satisfaction is given to the interrogation by which we inquire why something is or comes to be. This can be taken from Aristotle, Physics II, chapter 7, where he proves the sufficiency of causes from the fact that through them satisfaction is given to all the modes by which we are accustomed to ask why a thing is; he signifies, therefore, that a cause is that through which satisfaction is given to the question "why." Hence it is clear that the expression "why" is not taken in that special mode in which it is customarily said of the final cause, but more generally so as to comprehend all causes. But this definition scarcely declares the thing at all; for it is equally obscure what that word "why" signifies, for if it is taken correctly, it only signifies the relation of the final cause and does not sufficiently declare even that, as we shall see later. If, however, it is taken more broadly, it comprehends various modes that are signified by those words: from which, through which, by which something is; whence only a common name is imposed, but the common nature is not explained. I add that this word in such generality can also comprehend principles that are not causes, as Christ said in John 6: "I live because of the Father," where not the relation of cause but only of principle is signified.

3. The second definition of cause is refuted. The second definition, and a very common one, is: A cause is that upon which something else follows. This is customarily referred to the book On Causes, where it is not found; and it rather seems to be taken from the definition of principle declared above from Aristotle, Metaphysics V. For what Aristotle placed first in the position of genus, in that definition of cause is put through a more transcendental term, namely, "that"; but the remaining particles, namely, "upon which something else," manifestly are equivalent to those words of Aristotle, "from which something." Finally, what Aristotle said disjunctively, "is, or comes to be, or is known," is rather confusedly comprehended under the single word "follows"; for in this word there cannot be signified mere consequence through inference, otherwise the definition would also apply to effects from which causes are inferred; it is necessary, therefore, that it signify generally any connection or consequence whatsoever. And from this very exposition the strongest argument is taken against the definition itself; because that definition is not so much of cause as of principle; whence it also applies to privation, for change follows from it, unless perhaps it be said that the word "follows" is to be understood through influence and dependence; in which sense the definition will indeed stand, but it will be very obscure.

Resolution of the Question

4. The genuine and adequate description of cause. The third definition is one that certain moderns especially put forward: A cause is that upon which something depends per se. This indeed, as far as the thing is concerned, is approved by me; however, I would more willingly describe it thus: A cause is a principle per se influencing being into another, for in place of the genus I think it more fitting to put that common name which more closely and immediately applies to the thing defined; but this is how principle is related to cause; for

being and that relative "that," which when posited absolutely is equivalent to it, is most remote. But through that particle, "per se influencing," privation is excluded, and every accidental cause, which do not per se confer or influence being into another. But that word "influences" must be taken not strictly, as it is specially customarily attributed to the efficient cause, but more generally insofar as it is equivalent to the word "giving" or "communicating" being to another. But some object against this part, that the material cause does not give being, but the formal; among the extrinsic causes, however, the final does not give being, but the efficient. But, although in a special mode it is attributed to those two causes to give being, to the form as completing proper and specific being, to the efficient truly as really influencing, nevertheless absolutely and under the common nature, matter also in its genus gives being, because the being of the effect depends upon it, and it gives its own entity by which the being of the effect is constituted; the final cause also, in the mode by which it moves, also influences being, as will be declared later.

5. But to declare this part of the definition more fully, it should be noted that if we were to treat philosophically only of natural causes and principles or those that can be known by natural light, the cause would seem to be sufficiently defined by those words and distinguished from all principles that are not true causes; because, however, our physics and metaphysics must serve theology, it is necessary to give such a definition of cause that does not apply to the eternal Father, as he is the principle of the Son, or to the Father and Son, as they are one principle of the Holy Spirit, and this is what creates difficulty for us, for the producing person seems to be a principle per se influencing being into another person, and thus the entire definition of cause seems to apply to it, although it is not a cause, as is clear from the received opinion of theologians.

Difficulty Taken from the Mystery of the Trinity

6. Therefore, to exclude this kind of principle per se giving being without causality, modern authors have used the word "depending," because one divine person so receives being from another that it does not depend upon it, because that which depends upon another must have an essence at least numerically diverse from that upon which it depends. But first it is necessary to explain what it is properly for one thing to depend upon another, or why diversity of essence is required for depending and the distinction of things that necessarily intervenes between the thing producing and the thing produced does not suffice; because no reason appears why the word "depending" should require greater distinction than "producing."[10] Likewise, one relative is properly said to depend upon another, because when the latter is posited the former is posited, and when the former is removed the latter is removed; and yet it is not necessary for relatives to have thus a distinct essence in number; for divine persons are correlative, although they are of the same essence. But if they are said to be of the same absolute essence, but to be distinguished in respective natures, and this is sufficient for correlative dependence, why will not the same suffice for the dependence of the produced upon the producer? For it is not produced insofar as it is the same with the producer, but insofar as it is distinguished from it; and as such it has distinct respective entity received from another; therefore according to that it truly depends upon another. Add that according to its proper respective nature the produced person has distinct personal and respective being from the producing person; and it cannot have that unless it is given by another; therefore in that it truly depends upon another. For what is it to depend upon another in some being, except not to have that from itself, but given and communicated from another, from whom it must always be given so that it can always be had?

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[10] producendi, 1960; procedendi alit. "Puede admitirse en absoluto la sustitución de la palabra producendi por procedendi, tal como aparece en algunas ediciones." Cf. BH F, t. II, p. 352.

7. What it is properly to depend upon another. Why produced divine persons do not depend upon the producer. Therefore, to explain this I said that a cause is that which influences being into another; for by these words the same thing is declared that is imported in the word "depending"; but it is signified by them that it is necessary for causality that the being that the cause per se first influences into the effect be caused by the cause itself, and consequently that it be being distinct from the proper being that the cause has in itself. Whence this is properly to depend in one's being upon another, namely, to have being distinct from that and participated or in some mode flowing from the being of that. But that this mode of dependence is found in all the causes that we experience can be shown briefly in every genus of causes. For matter and form influence being into the composite, indeed communicating themselves and their entities; however, the being of the composite, which arises from this, is distinct from the being both of the matter and of the form, and therefore it properly depends upon them, because each contributes its being to constituting that, and from this arises being distinct from each of them, which cannot be without them. This is established in the efficient cause (omitting for now the final, which has more obscure influence, concerning which we shall see below), for every thing that influences being into another through the mode of a principle per se and extrinsic, outside the mystery of the Trinity, gives that by effecting the very being that it communicates; and therefore it always gives being distinct from the proper being that it has in itself; and this is properly to cause and to effect. And conversely, then properly the produced thing depends in that genus of efficient cause, when the very being that it has from another through itself first received, flows from the being of another and cannot be without such influence. But in the processions of divine persons it does not happen thus, because that being that is per se first communicated through those productions is not other than the very being of the producing person, but is numerically the very same that is

in the producing person; and this is singular and admirable in those divine processions; and therefore thus one person proceeds from another, so that nevertheless it receives from it being altogether independent, because it receives numerically the very same being that is in the producing person.

8. An objection is met. Nor does it stand in the way that the relations themselves are distinct and have their own relative being distinct, because not relative being as such, but absolute and essential being is per se first communicated through those processions. For God proceeds from God, and the Father by begetting the Son primarily communicates to him his own nature; but the relation is required as a necessary property for constituting the distinct person; which is as it were material (so to speak) in every production. Just as in human generation what is per se first and formally intended is the communication of human nature and human being; but consequently personality is required. Therefore the nature of production is to be considered principally from the formal being per se first communicated. Whence the generation of Christ as man was truly human on account of the true being of human nature, even if the personality was of another nature. Thus therefore, because divine generation is such that the being that is per se first communicated through it is not flowing from another being and therefore neither dependent nor caused, but only communicated by the producing person, therefore that generation is not an effecting nor a causation (so to speak), but a production of far superior nature. It is added that the very relative being of those persons is such that it essentially includes the whole divine being, which is essentially independent, and therefore neither can the relative being itself be called dependent.

9. Even one created relative does not properly depend upon another. But in created relations it is sometimes said that one relation depends upon another, insofar as it cannot be without it. But this is improper and broad speech, because where there is dependence as we now properly speak, there is priority of nature; but mutual relations

are altogether similar, and less improperly will a created relation be said to depend upon its term, if it is supposed to be something absolute, because, the foundation and term being posited, the relation results. From which it happens that in created things much less can one relation be said to influence another, since one is not the cause, indeed not even the principle of another, but they only have necessary simultaneity or concomitance. But in divine things, although one relative proceeds from another, nevertheless not through dependence nor through the influence of diverse essential being, which is per se first communicated through such production.

10. Therefore, to declare this property of cause we said it is a principle that influences being, because it is necessary that the very being be caused and consequently essentially distinct from the being of the cause itself. To indicate this also, I deliberately added the particle "into another" and not "into someone" or "into another person," for "another" is not said absolutely and properly except of that which is diverse in essence. But that a cause includes this property and requires such a mode of influence, cannot be proved otherwise than from the common notion and use of this word, especially among the Latins. Likewise from the correlative, which is commonly considered to be effect, which word clearly indicates imperfection and dependence in that rigor which we have declared; wherefore it is certain that a produced divine person cannot be called an effect, otherwise it would also be called made, which is against faith, as is clear from the Creed. Finally, because from the thing itself, as it has been declared, it is established that that mode of influence or emanation which belongs to created effects with respect to all their causes, is of far different nature from the emanation of one divine person from another and has that mode of dependence which we have declared; therefore it can be signified by one common word, which comprehends the causes of created things and not the principles of divine persons; but such is this word "cause" and the concept that corresponds to it, which we explain through the said definition of

cause. Thus therefore it is true that it is of the nature of cause to be essentially diverse from its effect, and that the effect properly depends upon the cause; but both are indicated in that particle, as it has been declared by us, and through it the principle in divine things is excluded from the nature of cause.

Difficulty from the Mystery of the Incarnation

11. But another difficulty arises for us from another mystery of faith, namely the Incarnation; for to the divine Word as personally terminating humanity the entire definition of cause applies; and yet as such it is not a cause according to sound doctrine, since it can neither be a formal cause, because it is imperfect, nor efficient, because otherwise the Word would have efficiency ad extra not common to the Father and Holy Spirit. The major proposition is proved, because according to the common mode of speaking of theologians, the divine Word terminates the dependence of humanity; therefore the Word is that upon which that humanity depends. But if you say that it indeed depends upon it as upon a term, not as upon a cause, first the difficulty is not solved, indeed rather from this it is concluded that not everything upon which another depends is a cause, and then it is very obscure what it is to depend as upon a term. But this latter is not surprising, because the thing is very supernatural, which theologians explain as they can.[11] But the former clearly convinces that the definition of cause is better explained through a principle per se influencing being into another than through dependence, unless this particle is declared through the former. Therefore the Word, as terminating humanity, is not a principle per se influencing being into it, nor does humanity depend upon the Word in this mode as upon a principle influencing being into it, but only in the nature of a term,

[11] Vide dicta in I tom., III part., disp. VIII, sect. 3.

which is a certain necessary property, without which that humanity cannot exist.

12. How the divine Word with humanity concurs for the constitution of Christ. What causality terminating modes exercise with respect to the terminated. This response correctly satisfies as far as the dependence of humanity upon the Word;[12] nevertheless the difficulty still remains concerning the dependence of Christ, as he is a composite person. For I suppose from the true doctrine of theologians, indeed also of Councils and Fathers, that from the Word as terminating humanity and from humanity itself there arises the person of Christ as God-man per se one and wonderfully composite. Therefore that composite truly depends upon the Word as upon a certain intrinsic principle from which it consists; whence it is necessary that it influence being into it, communicating to it its personal being; from which with humanity results this composite person, which as such in some mode is distinguished from the Word taken nakedly. But the same response must be applied to this, for the Word does not otherwise concur for constituting that composite, than by terminating humanity; whence if in this it does not exercise some genus of causality, neither also by constituting that composite person does it have any nature of cause with respect to it. But the argument made proceeds not only in the said mystery, but can be accommodated to all extremes composing some composite, as is a point with respect to a line, and created subsistence with respect to a supposit, etc. Concerning all of these it must be said that they correctly prove to be reduced indeed to some genus of intrinsic cause, that is, formal or material; but in what mode and in what they sometimes fall short of the property of such causes and especially in the said mystery, depends upon those things that must be said concerning these causes in particular.

What Causality Is

[12] Lege quae diximus I tom., disp. VIII, sect. 1.

13. From what we have said concerning the nature of cause in general, it is gathered first what is that by which a cause is formally and proximately constituted in act in the being of cause, which is customarily called causation or causality in general; but this is nothing other than that influence or concurrence by which each cause in its genus actually influences being into the effect; but this concurrence must necessarily be something distinct in reality or from the nature of the thing from the relation of the cause itself, since that thing which is denominated cause can remain in reality without this actual influence; which is a certain sign of distinction from the nature of the thing, as has been seen in the foregoing. But this influence cannot be the mere predicamental relation of the cause to the effect; for this, whatever it may be, results from the very influence of the cause as terminated to the effect, in that mode, namely, by which it is customarily said that the relation arises when the foundation and term are posited; therefore that influence is something prior to the relation; and according to it also the cause is prior by nature to its effect, although according to the relation they are simultaneous by nature. Therefore that influence is something intermediate between the entity and the relation of the cause; but what that is and whether it is something in the cause itself or in the effect and whether it is some mode distinct from them or only a denomination taken from both, cannot be explained more distinctly here until we come to declaring the individual genera of causes. And the same is true of certain properties or conditions that seem to accompany the common nature of cause and are found in diverse modes in diverse causes, such as being prior by nature, being distinguished really or essentially from the effect, etc.

The Single Objective Concept of Cause

14. Second, it can be gathered from what has been said that the name "cause" is not merely equivocal, since not only the name, but

also some common nature of the name exists. But whether to this name according to that definition there corresponds one concept both formal and objective of cause in general, is in controversy; for some think that such a single concept does not correspond, because the modes by which effects depend upon causes in diverse genera of causes, are so primarily diverse that from them one common nature of dependence cannot be abstracted. But this is neither proved by them, nor does it seem to me very probable, for from every real agreement a common concept can be abstracted; but among causes there is not only some metaphorical proportionality, otherwise "cause" would not be said with propriety of all of them, but there is true and real agreement, as can also be confirmed from the given definition and its exposition; and from what we have said concerning the concept of being, many things here can be applied. Therefore there is no reason why one common concept of cause should be denied. But whether according to it there is univocation or some analogy will be better established after the division of cause has been given and the individual members and modes of causing have been explained; and therefore we shall omit that until we compare the causes themselves among themselves.

SECTION III

ON THE MULTIPLE TYPES OF CAUSE

1. That celebrated division of cause into four genera of causes is well known, namely material, formal, efficient, and final, which Aristotle presents in Metaphysics V, chapter 2, and Physics II, chapter 3 and following. The exposition of this division depends entirely upon the exact understanding of the individual members, which we shall pursue extensively throughout this entire treatise. Therefore, we shall now propose in general only those matters which can be questioned concerning this division, and we shall briefly resolve them. The first is whether all those members are truly and properly contained under

what is divided. The second is whether they are distinguished from one another and opposed to each other. The third is whether they sufficiently comprehend the whole of what is divided. The fourth is whether cause is divided proximately and immediately into those members, or whether some intermediate division can be conceived. The fifth is whether that division is lowest or atomic, or whether the individual members can be divided into others. The sixth is whether it is univocal or analogical.

The Four Proper Genera of Causes

2. The assertion is proved from experience. Concerning the first question, it must be said that all those members truly and properly participate in the nature of cause, and therefore cause is rightly divided into those four members. This assertion, besides the common consensus of all after Aristotle, is proved as follows. That those four are found in the things or effects which we experience can easily be demonstrated by supposing that something new comes to be in the nature of things, which is so evident from the perpetual succession, alteration, generation, and corruption of things that it would be superfluous to prove it with arguments. If, therefore, something comes to be anew, some other thing from which it comes to be is necessary, because the same thing cannot make itself, and this we call the efficient cause. This either produces its effect from nothing, or from some thing which it presupposes for its action. The former cannot be said universally, for experience shows that neither does an artisan make a statue except from wood or bronze, nor does fire heat except when something is supposed to it which receives heat, nor does it produce fire except from wood, tinder, or some similar thing. Indeed, this mode of acting is so proper to natural causes that philosophers who attended only to them took from this their axiom: From nothing, nothing comes to be. Therefore, that subject which is presupposed for the action of the efficient cause we call the material

cause. Moreover, it is necessary that the efficient cause introduce some thing into such a subject; otherwise it would effect nothing new, contrary to the stated hypothesis. Therefore, we call this the form, whatever it may be, concerning which we shall see later. Finally, since causes acting per se do not act rashly and by chance, as is established by the very experience of things, and especially in human actions, so that the matter is beyond controversy, it is necessary that besides those three there is also given an end on account of which the efficient cause operates. Therefore, these four members are found in things, whether all of them are found in individual effects or not, for this will be investigated later, since for the present it is sufficient that these are found in the universality of things.

3. Matter is truly cause. Form is properly cause. The efficient is truly cause. Whether the end is true cause. That each of these is a true cause can easily be proved concerning the material, formal, and efficient causes, for each of these manifestly influences some being. For matter is defined by Aristotle as that from which, as inherent, something comes to be. Where by the particle "from" taken with its proper meaning, matter is distinguished from other causes; by the particle "inherent," however, it is separated from privation and its proper influence is declared, by which matter and in general the subject exhibits itself so that from it the being of the whole may arise. Similarly, form exhibits itself so that from it as from an act the composite is constituted. Indeed, form is frequently wont to be defined as the intrinsic cause which gives being to a thing, for matter is as it were a certain beginning or foundation of being itself, while form consumes and completes it. On account of this, it is called the principle of quiddity by Aristotle in the cited places. Likewise, these are numbered among the intrinsic principles of a natural thing, or rather those two alone are the principles constituting a natural thing. They are, however, principles per se, since they are most necessary and essential, and give being in the manner that has been explained. Therefore, they are proper causes. Concerning the efficient cause, it is

also evident, because by its action it brings about that a thing has the being which it did not have before, and its action tends per se and directly to this. Therefore, the efficient is as it were the source and principle influencing being per se into the effect, which being of the effect is distinct from the being of the efficient. Therefore, the entire definition of cause most properly applies to the efficient. Concerning the end, however, there can be some reason for doubt, because no real being is presupposed in it by which it could cause. But because this must be discussed more extensively in its proper disputation, it is now briefly declared that although the end is last in execution, nevertheless it is first in intention, and under that aspect it truly has the nature of a principle. For it is the first thing that excites or moves the agent to acting. It is, however, a principle not fictitious but true and real, because it truly excites and moves. Hence, just as it has sufficient being by which it can exercise such a nature of principle, so also the nature of cause. That being, however, although it is in the mind, is not outside the latitude of real being, and therefore it can be sufficient being for such a nature of cause. Again, such a principle is not per accidens but per se. Indeed, from it the causality of the agent has that it tends per se and in an orderly fashion toward the effect, and in this way it influences being per se into it. Therefore, the definition of cause also truly and properly applies to the end.

4. First objection. The Stoics acknowledged only the efficient as true cause. Second objection. Against this opinion, however, one could object with Augustine, in the book of 83 Questions, in question 28, saying: "Every cause is efficient." This opinion seems to have been taken from Plato, in the dialogue On the Beautiful, or which is inscribed Hippias Major, where he signifies that cause and efficient are the same, and that the end cannot be called cause, which he confirms both because it is an effect and because it cannot be the cause of the efficient cause itself. That this was the common opinion of the Stoics, namely that only the efficient cause is true cause, Seneca reports in book VIII, epistle 66, where he also proves it himself: "Since if all

things without which an effect cannot be made are to be placed in the number of causes, more would have to be numbered, namely time, place, motion, etc., without which no effect occurs. Therefore, we must stop at the one efficient cause, while the rest are as it were aids to this cause or necessary conditions." It could be objected differently at the other extreme from Socrates in Plato's Phaedo, that only the end deserves the name of cause, for the entire cause of a thing is that on account of which it comes to be. All other things, however, are only conditions required for the thing to come to be. Hence, to the question "why does a thing exist or come to be," only the response through the final cause satisfies.

5. The first objection is resolved along with the difficult passage of Augustine. To the first objection, the passage of Augustine is difficult, for he denies there that it should be asked why God willed to create the world, because this is to seek the cause of God's will. But every cause is efficient, which cannot have a place in the divine will. Here Augustine seems plainly to confuse final cause with efficient cause, for he who asks why God willed to create the world does not seek an efficient cause but a final one. It must be said, however, that Augustine's meaning is that the cause why he willed to create the world should not be sought in such a way that some proper cause of God's will itself is thought to exist, because if the divine will had some such cause, it would have an efficient cause. Not because end and efficient are formally the same, but because nothing can have a proper extrinsic final cause without having an efficient one, either because the end itself does not cause without efficiency, as many hold, or because the end proximately moves the efficient to effecting. When Augustine says, therefore, that every cause is efficient, he speaks of extrinsic causality, which is never without the intervention of efficient cause. Nevertheless, Augustine does not intend to exclude that another genus of causing can be joined with that cause. Others respond more briefly that Augustine spoke strictly of cause, insofar as it expresses a relation to an effect also taken strictly and denominated from the verb

"to effect." But this can scarcely be accommodated to Augustine's discourse, for he who asks why God willed, etc., does not seek a cause taken so strictly.

6. Plato admitted as many genera of causes as Aristotle. The opinion of ancient philosophers on this matter. Why the name "cause" is used by antonomasia for the efficient. Concerning Plato, it is certain that he posited all the genera of causes which Aristotle posited and perhaps more, as we shall see later. And in the cited place he does not say that cause and efficient are the same, as is attributed to him, but on the contrary he says: "The efficient is nothing other than cause." This proposition cannot be simply converted, as is evident per se. From this, however, he does not infer that the end is not a cause, but he infers that what is made by an efficient cause is distinct from it, because a cause cannot effect itself. Concerning other philosophers, I think they differ from Aristotle in words rather than in reality. For they do not deny the necessity and concause of matter, or of form, or of end, but they differ in names. They rarely call matter something prerequisite; form, however, they think should rather be called an effect than a cause, because all causality terminates in it, or at most they call it part of a cause, as Seneca speaks above. The end, however, they call in some way a cause or rather a concause with the efficient, or something supervening on the efficient through the proposed medium or intention of the end, so that it can cause. Moreover, the efficient cause has an influence both more real and somehow more immediate to the effect itself than the end, and more known and somehow more proper than matter and form, and also prior to them. Therefore, the name "cause" is sometimes wont to be taken by antonomasia or even by reason of first imposition for the efficient cause. Nevertheless, considering the matter itself physically, there is no doubt that each of the said causes has a true and proper nature of cause, and in its genus total and entirely diverse, as we shall say in the second point. Therefore, Aristotle much better enumerated these distinctly under the common notion of cause.

7. Why place, time, and similar things are not causes. Nor does the reason adduced from Seneca pose any obstacle, for not all things without which an effect does not occur are numbered among causes, but only those which influence the effect per se. This place does not have, because it is something extrinsic; or if there is discussion of intrinsic "where," that is not presupposed but follows in the effect as a certain accident of it. And the same is true of time, for insofar as it is a common measure, it is extrinsic; insofar as it can be intrinsic, it is only the duration of the very motion by which a thing comes to be, when it comes to be successively. That motion, however, is not a cause, but is rather the very actual influence of the efficient cause successively, as will be explained below. But matter, although it is something prerequisite to the action of the agent, nevertheless at the very instant or time in which the agent acts, matter also influences the effect per se, and indeed also the very action of the agent, if it operates from it, as we shall see later. Form, however, although it is an effect of the agent or even of matter, is nevertheless a cause of the whole composite, completing its essence. And although it is a part of the composite, it is nevertheless in its genus a total cause of it, nor is there reason why it should be called part of a cause, because it is neither part of the agent nor of matter. But if it is called part of a cause with respect to the total causality necessary in every genus for an effect, in this way matter and efficient can also be called part of a cause. It is, however, an improper way of speaking, because all those do not compose one cause, but an aggregate or requisite number of causes. And the same is proportionally true of the end, for although it is required on the part of the agent so that its action is not done rashly but by design, it nevertheless has its own proper influence per se and diverse from the influence of the agent. What kind this is and whether it is always necessary, we shall say below.

8. The end is the more excellent cause in moral matters. Hence, to the other part of the objection, it is responded that Plato and Socrates in that place speak morally rather than physically. For in

moral matters, the end is in some way the total cause of actions or effects, not that other causes are excluded insofar as they are physically necessary, but that all others take from the end as it were the first reason of causing. Hence, the end can in some way be called the sole cause, because it is a cause in such a way that it does not have a prior cause or reason, while all others are causes in such a way that they have some prior cause or at least a prior reason of causing. I say this on account of the first efficient cause, which is God, which we shall explain below. But if force is applied to the expression "on account of which," it must be said that taken strictly it is accommodated only to the end, but more broadly it is also wont to be extended to all causes. Indeed, Aristotle above proves the aforesaid genera of causes from this, because through all of them the question "on account of which" is usually satisfied. For we say that man is mortal on account of matter, and lives on account of soul, etc.

The Mutual Distinction of the Four Causes

9. From these things it is easy to resolve the second point concerning the distinction of these causes. There can be discussion of distinction formally and precisely in the nature of cause, or of quasi-material or real distinction in the being of entity. The former distinction is what pertains to the present matter, which is certain to be found among these members. First, from Aristotle's testimony, because otherwise the division would be faulty. Second, by reason, because cause, as cause in act, is formally constituted through actual influence into the effect. But in those four members there are influences of diverse natures. Therefore. The minor is proved, because the influence of material and formal cause is intrinsic through internal composition, while the influence of efficient and final cause is extrinsic. Again, the influence of matter is through the mode of potency, while that of form is through the mode of act. Likewise, the influence of the efficient is through action or real change, while the

influence of the end is through intentional or metaphorical change. Therefore, all these causalities are formally distinct; they therefore constitute causes in act that are formally distinct. Hence also the reasons or powers of causing of these causes are distinct, for matter causes insofar as it is passive potency; the efficient, however, insofar as it has active potency into another; form, however, insofar as it has the power of actuating through itself; the end, however, insofar as it is good and through goodness has the power of alluring the effective agent, all of which will be explained more extensively in what follows, nor does any special difficulty occur here concerning this part.

10. The same thing can exercise the functions of diverse causes with respect to diverse effects. Concerning the real or material distinction of these causes, however, it can be doubted whether it always intervenes, or whether it can happen that the very same thing has several natures of causing from those enumerated. This can be asked either in relation to diverse effects or to the same one. In the former way, it must be said that real or material distinction is not necessary among the said causes, because it is not repugnant that the very same thing, in relation to diverse effects, has several causalities of diverse natures. For the same form is an end with respect to generation or alteration through which it comes to be, and is form with respect to matter and composite, and is an efficient principle with respect to action into another, and can be a material cause of its properties, as is the rational soul insofar as it is the subject of intellect or will. For these influences or causalities, however diverse in nature they may be with respect to diverse effects, do not have repugnance among themselves, nor is it repugnant that they proceed from the same thing. Because, just as the same thing is capable of diverse relations in relation to diverse things (for it is similar to one and dissimilar to another, the principle of one and the end of another), so it can participate in diverse respects of causing in relation to diverse effects. Finally, the a priori reason is that the same created thing can include in its entity act mixed with potency, and therefore it can be

compared to one thing through the mode of formal act, to another however through the mode of subject. But formal act, since it gives being to a thing, is usually at the same time the principle of acting on another, because operation follows being. And finally, because such act is some good, it can also be the principle of metaphorical motion. Thus, therefore, it is not repugnant that all these genera of causes come together in the same thing with respect to diverse things.

11. But if sometimes they are not conjoined in some thing, it is not from formal repugnance of such causalities in relation to diverse things, but from peculiar condition. And sometimes it comes from perfection, sometimes however from imperfection. For example, God can be efficient and final cause, but not material cause with respect to something, because he is pure act and has no passive potency. Nor can he exercise formal causality, because this requires incomplete and imperfect entity. And for the same reason, angelic substances cannot exercise formal causality. But because they are not pure acts, they can exercise material causality in some part, at least with respect to some accidents. And because they are not pure potency, they can have some nature of effecting and much more of finalizing. On the contrary, however, prime matter, although it can exercise material causality, nevertheless, because it is pure potency, participates neither in formal nor properly in effective causality. Nevertheless, because it is not so pure potency that it lacks some entity and actuality, it can have some final causality, by reason of which the soul appetites its body and any form appetites matter. But substantial form, although it can exercise formal, efficient, and final causality, cannot however exercise substantial material causality (so to speak), because it is not passive potency in the genus of substance. With respect to accidents, however, it can sometimes exercise this causality, which properly belongs to subsistent form, for that form which on account of its imperfection cannot subsist through itself is also not capable through itself of sustaining accidents. And in this way one can easily discourse through

accidental entities, insofar as they can participate in the aforesaid natures of causing.

12. With respect to the same thing, the same thing cannot undergo the functions of form and matter. Form and efficient with respect to the same cannot coincide. But if these causes are compared to one and the same effect, there is somewhat greater difficulty. And indeed in some cases there is clear repugnance, while in others, on the contrary, there is manifest possibility, and in some cases the matter is controversial and doubtful. Therefore, that the same thing in relation to the same is simultaneously material and formal cause is plainly repugnant, because these causalities require conditions formally opposed, such as being in potency and in formal act. Hence, if there is discussion of proper substantial form, it always requires real distinction from its material cause, and the same is true of accidental form which has its own proper entity. But because there are some accidental forms which are only modes of substance, such as local presence, or if there is anything else of this kind, in those, just as the nature of form is imperfect, so modal distinction suffices. Nevertheless, it is always necessary that formal and material cause with respect to the same composite be distinguished really or from the nature of the thing. Then it is also established that formal and efficient cause cannot be conjoined in the same thing with respect to the same effect, because form exercises formal causality in that in which it is, but efficient causality with respect to another form or composite. Therefore, form as informing either is presupposed to action as a principle of acting, or follows as an effect or formal term of action. Therefore, it cannot happen that formal and effective causality belong to the same form with respect to the same thing, for they include repugnant relations.

13. Whether form and end can flow together into the same entity. Again, it is also clear that final and formal causality can in some way come together in the same form with respect to the same thing, but in some way they cannot. For if they are compared to the same

subject or supposit, they can very well come together in the same thing, for the same form both is the end of matter and informs it, and the same beatific vision is both the form of the intellect and its end and beatitude. And the reason is that the very form, as informing, and its information is the good and perfection of the subject which it informs, and therefore it can be compared to it simultaneously in the nature of form and end. But if the comparison is made to the very composite which is constituted through the form, thus the same cannot be form and end with respect to the same thing, because the form is not the end of the composite, but rather the form is for the composite as for its end. But if they are compared to action or generation, also with respect to that, the same is form and end. In this sense Aristotle seems to have said, to be cited below, that end and form coincide in the same thing numerically. Under that respect, however, although form is properly the end of generation, it is not properly the formal cause of it, but only a principle, as I was saying in the preceding section.

14. Whether efficient and end are conjoined in the same thing. Whether matter admits some nature of end in its entity. Moreover, in nearly the same proportion we must speak of end and efficient, for according to one nature they can come together in the same thing, but not according to another. For a twofold end, as we shall see below, is usually distinguished, namely the end for the sake of which the action is done, or for whom or for whose sake and benefit it is done. As in healing, the end for the sake of which is health, but for whom is the very man for whom health is procured. The former end, therefore, cannot be the same thing as the efficient cause because it is its effect. But the latter end can very well be the same thing as the efficient cause, for often the efficient operates for its own sake. And in this way God is simultaneously the first efficient and ultimate end of his works. And according to these things, the common saying of Aristotle is easily understood, Physics II, chapter 7: "End and form coincide in the same numerically; but end and efficient not

numerically the same, but in species." For he speaks of the end for the sake of which, or which is formally intended and made through action, concerning which we have already said that it is distinguished from the agent as its effect, and therefore cannot be numerically the same as it. That it is the same in species happens in univocal agents, not in all, as Aristotle himself indicated. How, however, formal and final cause can be conjoined in the same thing numerically has already been explained. I add, however, that some nature of end can also be conjoined in the same thing numerically as the material cause, for the subject of accidents is both their material cause and end. For as I was saying, the proximate end of procuring health is man, and among other ends, form is introduced into matter for the sake of conserving the very matter. For because the nature of end is founded in goodness, which is transcendental and is found in part in every entity, therefore some nature of end can be conjoined with any other cause.

15. Whether the efficient can be the same as matter. Only the comparison of efficient with material cause remained, whether both natures can be conjoined in the same thing with respect to the same effect. And indeed, speaking of the material cause of natural substances, it is certain that material and efficient cause cannot be conjoined in the same thing in relation to such an effect, because matter cannot be the efficient principle of the form to be educed from it, and consequently not of the whole composite. But speaking of the material cause of accidents, there is greater doubt whether the same material cause can be efficient of the same accidents. This efficiency can be understood in two ways: one, through natural resultance, and speaking of this, there is no doubt that those causalities can be conjoined, and thus it is commonly said that the soul, for example, has triple causality in its natural powers, namely final, material, and efficient. And many think that this genus of activity is not repugnant even to prime matter in its own proper passion, which is quantity. The other efficiency is per se and through proper action, and concerning this there is greater difficulty. It coincides, however, with that question

whether everything that is moved is moved by another, or (which is the same) whether agent and patient are always distinguished, at least according to proximate principles of acting and receiving, which we shall treat later when disputing about efficient cause.

Whether the Division of Causes into Four Genera is Adequate

16. Instruments are to be placed under efficient, not material cause. Concerning the third point, whether these four genera sufficiently divide cause, various difficulties are usually proposed concerning instrumental, dispositive, and objective causes. But these and similar things have no difficulty, for instrumental cause is a certain species of efficient cause, as we shall see later. Nor can it be reduced to material cause with any foundation, as Philoponus falsely devised, Physics II, text 27, unless perhaps we speak of dispositions of matter, which are also wont to be called instruments. But unless those have efficiency, they are not truly instruments; if however they have efficiency, as such they are not dispositions nor do they pertain to material cause in any way, but to efficient cause, which they either aid or whose function they perform. But dispositive cause is commonly reduced to material cause, because it prepares matter for form. But this denomination seems to be only through a certain attribution, for if we speak with propriety, true disposition is a certain formal cause, for it does not dispose except by informing the subject. For heat, insofar as it is in wood, does not dispose to the form of fire except by formally heating the wood. I speak, however, of true and proper physical and positive disposition, for in the common way any removal of impediment is wont to be called disposition, or any necessary condition, such as application to acting or something similar. And in these there is no true causality, but only per accidens.

17. Of what genus of causality the object exercises with respect to potency and its act. I call objective cause the object with

respect to potency or act. In this object a twofold relation can be considered: one is of moving, the other of terminating. The former, with respect to cognitive potency, is efficient causality, whether the object is considered insofar as it moves by impressing a species, or insofar as it concurs to the act through the species. With respect to appetitive potency, however, it is final causality, either proper and formal, as in rational appetite, or material and imperfect, as in sensitive appetite, which we shall see later. Under the latter respect, however, some reduce the object to final cause, because potency and act tend toward it as toward an end. Nor does it matter that this relation is essential, because it is not repugnant that some thing is essentially ordered to its end. Others refer it to formal cause, insofar as the object gives species to the act, for whatever gives species has the nature of form. They say, however, that it is not intrinsic but extrinsic form. But I would more readily deny that the object under this aspect exercises any true genus of causality, but that of a purely specifying term, not through any true influence which constitutes a cause, but through the mere relation of another to itself. Nor did Aristotle ever make mention of that extrinsic formal cause, nor did he call the term of motion a cause of motion, although he said that motion takes its species from it. And the same is true of one relative with respect to another, or of the term of relation as such. Nor does St. Thomas speak otherwise, as can be seen in I-II, question 1, article 3. But these matters are easy and are almost about the mode of speaking.

18. Whether exemplar is a distinct genus of cause from those enumerated. The greatest difficulty in this point is concerning exemplar cause, which Plato adds to the four enumerated by Aristotle, as is clear from the Timaeus and Phaedo, and Seneca reports in the cited epistle 66. But concerning this matter, on account of its gravity, we shall institute a proper disputation. Now we briefly concede to Plato that the exemplar exercises true causality, which Aristotle did not ignore, for he, in enumerating form, also adds exemplar, and

therefore perhaps it is not necessary on account of it to increase the number, which we shall examine in the said place.

Whether the Aforesaid Division of Cause is Immediate

19. The division of cause into internal and external is higher than the aforesaid. The most immediate division of cause into real strictly and intentional. Concerning the fourth point, that division can seem immediate, because Aristotle proximately divided cause into those four members. But nevertheless it must be said that that division is not immediate, for conveniences among certain of these members can easily be conceived, by reason of which other prior divisions of cause into fewer members can be constituted. Thus, therefore, cause can first be divided into internal and external. Internal, again, into matter and form, concerning which there can be no doubt that they particularly agree in the mode of causing, for they give being to the effect by conferring upon it their very entity numerically and by internally composing it. But efficient and end cause in a far different way, and they agree in this, that they do not intrinsically compose the effect, and therefore they are commonly called extrinsic causes. Therefore, in the nature of cause, a common nature of matter and form can be abstracted which is not common to other causes, and conversely. Therefore, cause is rightly divided immediately into intrinsic and extrinsic, and then the former into material and formal, the latter into efficient and final. In another way also, another more immediate division of cause could be conceived, for the three other causes besides the final agree in this, that they confer to the being of the effect through real influence, and therefore they require real existence for their causalities, as we shall see later. But final cause influences intentionally, and therefore it can cause before it really exists in itself. Therefore, cause can rightly be divided immediately into real and intentional, taking that term "real" strictly in the first

member, for if it is taken in all its latitude and transcendence, it also applies to final cause. And again, real cause is divided into intrinsic, which is into matter and form, and extrinsic, which is efficient, and can be called extrinsic by a peculiar nature and as if by antonomasia. For although final cause, compared to formal and material, is also extrinsic, compared however to efficient, it is in some way intrinsic, for the relation to the end is more intrinsic to each thing, and in some cases it is also essential.

Whether the Four Causes are Atomic Members

20. Concerning the fifth point, few things can be said in this place until we treat of individual causes, and therefore it must be said briefly that this is not a division into the ultimate natures of cause, for under any of those members various divisions can be given. For material cause is partly pure potency, partly however is only potency in a certain respect. This is not only a material division (so to speak) according to the entity which is cause, but it is also formal in the nature of material cause. For it is of the formal nature of that that it be potency, and therefore according to the diverse nature of receptive potency there will be diverse nature of material cause. This diversity can also be attended to from the effects, for the former is the material cause of substance, the latter however of accidents. Hence the former can be called material cause simply, the latter however in a certain respect, taking these terms not from the entities of such causes, but from the relation to effects. For as to entity, the material cause of accidents can be a being simply or integral substance, but the material cause of substance can only be a being in a certain respect. Nevertheless, as to causation or the relation of cause, the latter causes being simply, the former in a certain respect. Again, the material cause of substance is divided into matter of corruptible or incorruptible substances. But the material cause of accidents can be divided either into corporeal and spiritual, or into proximate and remote, or into that

which is in itself an accident, or which is substance, either partial or integral, concerning all of which I shall speak in the next disputations. And in a proportional way, form can be divided into substantial and accidental, and each member is subdivided into various forms, according to the variety of composite substances and accidents. Likewise, efficient and final cause have very many divisions, which cannot be briefly reviewed here but in their proper disputations.

21. Why cause is not divided in its principal division into either the highest or lowest members. You might say: if cause can be divided immediately into fewer members and remotely into more, why did Aristotle deliver that quadrimembral division rather than others? It is answered that by the very fact that that division is intermediate between those extremes, it was more suitable for delivering a doctrinal division. Especially because those members have more distinct and better known natures and modes of causing. Add that Aristotle did not entirely omit, but sufficiently insinuated, both the conveniences of these causes among themselves and their divisions, as is clear from the cited places.

What Kind of Division is Given

22. In the sixth point, all authors, supposing rather than proving or disputing, teach that that division of cause is analogical, and for this reason they say that cause was not defined in common by Aristotle. Nevertheless, they do not sufficiently declare the mode or nature of this analogy, nor can it be declared by us until the natures of individual causes are exactly treated. Therefore, let us now suppose that opinion to be true from the authority of common opinion and from this general reason, that those modes of causes are common to causes of accidents and substances, which cannot be causes univocally, because they do not give being univocally, whence neither can the nature of effect be univocal in accident and substance. But I refer the more exact declaration of this analogy to the aforesaid place.

DISPUTATION XIII

ON THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF SUBSTANCE

I pass over the disputation concerning the material cause in general as it abstracts from the cause of substance or accident, since the most important nature of this cause is observed in prime matter; and if it is explained in that case, it will be easy to understand the rest with due proportion. Nor should we fear the criticism of some who think that the treatment of prime matter in no way pertains to the metaphysician, but only to the natural philosopher; for it has already been declared above in many respects, especially in the prooemial disputation, that this business belongs to the metaphysician. For although the natural philosopher treats of matter under his proper and special aspect as it is the principle of natural generation and as it is the cause or part of natural being, nevertheless the metaphysician, considering the common nature of material cause (which is proper to him), necessarily treats of the first cause of that genus, which is prime matter. Likewise, when treating of the essence of substance, he necessarily deals with matter insofar as it is part of the essence, as we shall see below when treating of material substance. Therefore, in this place we treat of matter under this consideration. And because the nature of causing cannot be understood without understanding the entity of matter, we shall investigate first whether matter exists, then

what kind of entity and essence it has, afterwards concerning its properties, and finally concerning its causality.

SECTION I

WHETHER IT IS EVIDENT BY NATURAL REASON THAT THERE EXISTS IN BEINGS A MATERIAL CAUSE OF SUBSTANCES, WHICH WE CALL PRIME MATTER

1. Various divisions of matter. Since prime matter includes two things, it is necessary before all else to explain the meaning of the term with regard to both parts. Matter, therefore, is usually divided into matter from which, in which, and about which. This division can be explained in various ways: first, so that it is not a division of things or matters, but of relations and functions of the same matter. For the same matter is said to be that from which, either in respect to the composite which consists of it, or in respect to the form which is educed from it. Hence in the former respect the body of man is matter from which, but not in the latter consideration, because the form of man is educed from the potency of matter. Hence in respect to such a form it will be called matter in which the form is introduced; so that the phrase "in which" expresses the relation of union, not of eduction. That phrase "in which" can also be taken abstractly, so as to include the relation to form as inhering in matter. In respect to the agent, however, the same matter will be called that about which the agent operates. According to this interpretation of the terms, therefore, no member of those mentioned is excluded from the present consideration; for we treat of matter according to itself, or insofar as in its adequate concept it includes all those relations; but whether those relations pertain to various causalities and are distinct by nature we shall see later. Matter about which is usually taken in another way, as it is distinguished from matter from which and in which according to real union and

inherence, and thus it properly expresses the relation to an agent acting with immanent action, and is nothing other than the object about which such an agent is engaged. This signification of matter is metaphysical, and is not relevant to the present discussion, because matter as such does not exercise material causality, but either efficient or final, as we touched upon above; therefore the discourse here is not about objective matter, but about subjective matter.

2. Again, matter from which is usually divided into transient and remaining. In the former way, wood, for example, will be called matter from which fire is made, and in that signification the phrase "from which" does not designate only the relation of material cause, but also includes the relation of the terminus from which, and in this respect that signification does not pertain to the present disputation. But remaining matter is the proper and internal material cause which remains in the composite or in the terminus of generation, contributing in its own way to the constitution of that thing. Finally, matter is usually divided into metaphysical and physical: metaphysical is genus in respect to difference; but that designation is only by analogy and proportion to physical matter, which is properly and simply the matter of which we treat here; concerning metaphysical matter, however, besides what we have said above when treating of universal unity, we shall add something in disputation XV, final section, when treating of metaphysical form.

3. Matter can be called first both by negation of the prior and by relation to the second; for since matter expresses the nature of subject, that will be called first which supposes no prior subject; and thus Aristotle, in Physics I, chapter 9, defined matter as the first subject from which something is made. But second matter will be called that which supposes a prior subject. And thus many call the substantial composite second matter in respect to accidents, because it is so the subject of accidents that it consists of a prior subject; and for a similar reason, those who admit several substantial forms in the same supposit call the composite, for example, of matter and the form of

corporeity, second matter in respect to the soul. Second matter is also often called matter disposed or affected with accidental dispositions, not because the composite itself of matter and accidents is the subject in which form is received, but only because the reception of such dispositions precedes in natural order and constitutes matter proximately capable of such form, whence it is properly called proximate matter. But Aristotle, in Metaphysics VIII, text 11, called proper or proximate matter the transient matter accommodated to the generation of a thing, as wine is the matter of vinegar, concerning which matter the Commentator says, in Physics II, comment 31, that it is matter of alteration, not of composition. Therefore, all second matter supposes first matter and adds some form or disposition.

Resolution of the Question

4. From the necessity of a first subject in any change, prime matter is inferred. And hence it is clear that if we speak of prime matter in general and as it were formally, that is, of the first subject of changes or forms, abstracting from the question of what such a subject is or what kind of form is received in it, it is as evident that prime matter exists as it is evident that there exist in things changes to various forms, because every change presupposes some subject, as has been proven above and is evident from experience. Therefore, either that subject presupposes another or it does not; if it does not presuppose another, that is first and we have what we intended. If however it presupposes another, I shall ask about that one; but it is evident that there cannot be an infinite regress; therefore it is necessary to stop at some first subject or prime matter. The minor proposition last assumed is demonstrated by Aristotle concerning all causes in book II; it is however in some way more evident in material cause, which is the intrinsic foundation of the whole composite; for a composite cannot be perceived by the intellect as standing by itself, one part of which rests on another and that again on another, without finally stopping at

something which underlies the others. Since therefore every natural composite exists by itself in such a way that according to its whole self it does not depend in the genus of material cause on some subject which is outside itself, it is necessary that within itself it have some subject which is first in respect to all other entities of which it consists and which are in a subject. Thus therefore it is evident that prime matter or a first subject exists in natural things.

5. From the continued vicissitude of things, matter is inferred. Second, it is principally proven, for it is evident that generable and corruptible things are so transmuted that some are generated from others reciprocally and mutually, at least mediately; therefore it is necessary that they agree in some common subject which remains in all of them, by reason of which they are capable of that mutual transmutation; therefore that subject is first, and thus the first material cause of such things. The antecedent is evident from experience; for the elements mutually act upon each other and one is converted into another, whether mediately or immediately, and mixed bodies are also generated from them and consequently are also resolved into them, and thus it happens that all sublunary things, as far as concerns the force of their nature and composition, are mutually transmutable. I say as far as concerns the force of their nature, because it can happen that some parts of elements are never transmuted because they are in hidden and most remote places, to which the actions of contrary agents do not reach.

6. The first consequence is proven first, because no natural transmutation can be made unless a common subject remains under both terms, both because otherwise the thing which is corrupted would perish entirely according to its whole self, and the other which begins to be would be made according to its whole self, and thus one would pass into nothing, the other would be made from nothing with no common thing remaining under both; therefore one would be annihilated, and another would be created, which is naturally impossible. And also because otherwise, the whole action of the

natural agent would be either impossible or irrelevant to the generation of things. The consequence is explained, because we can speak either of accidental alteration which we experience, which is evidently not made except in a subject and from a common subject which remains under both terms, because it is established by experience that this action is not made unless a subject is presupposed; for the accident which is made through that action cannot naturally exist except in a subject which sustains both the action and its formal terminus, from which subject the opposite form or privation is expelled; therefore a common subject is given in such action. Or we speak of that action or substantial transmutation which is made at the terminus of alteration in which the thing that perishes loses the being simply which it had before and another thing begins simply, as when fire is made from tow. And there too it is necessary that a common subject remain, otherwise the whole preceding alteration or heating of the tow would be irrelevant to the procreation of fire, because it would in no way contribute to that if it perished entirely along with its whole subject, but at most it could serve to evacuate the place or space into which the thing to be procreated could be introduced; but for this the destruction of the thing would be irrelevant; for local expulsion would suffice, which could be done by the introduction of another thing into that space, as happens in local motion.

7. Such destruction of a thing through alteration would also be impossible, because an accident cannot, properly speaking, destroy its subject, since it is sustained by that subject and receives being from it. Therefore either that subject is simple or composite; if it is simple, it can in no way be destroyed by action or by an accident which is made in it, because that is necessary so that such action or such accident can exist. If however that subject is composite of a prior subject and another form, it will indeed be able to be destroyed by reason of alteration and an accident introduced into it, not however per se, but per accidens by reason of another action and form consequent upon

the prior alteration; but this consequence cannot be understood unless the subsequent form is introduced into the same subject in which the prior one was, because otherwise there would be no cause why the union between the prior subject and its form should be dissolved; therefore this whole natural transmutation must necessarily be founded on some common subject which remains under both terms.

8. From certain special changes. And this same thing can be explained by induction made in certain transmutations; when an animal, for example, is nourished by food, either something of the food remains at the end of nutrition and is joined to the living substance, or the food is entirely destroyed and everything that is in it is destroyed by the action of the living thing. If nothing of the food remains, the whole action of the living thing is superfluous, and it can be helped by nothing from the food so as to grow or be strengthened from it, because nothing is strengthened or grows from what perishes in the food. If however something of the food remains, that cannot be except common matter or subject. The same argument can be taken from the visible and improper nutrition of fire; for it does not grow unless wood or something similar is supposed, nor is it conserved unless it is nourished by oil or similar matter; therefore this matter cannot be transient according to its whole self, otherwise it would be useless, and no reason could be given why it is necessary for such effects, nor could it be explained what it contributes to them; therefore that matter is in some way remaining under the form of the thing generated or nourished; therefore it remains according to some common subject.

9. This is finally confirmed, because otherwise the transmutation of things would not be corruption and generation but a certain transubstantiation, because the whole substance of one thing would perish and another whole substance would begin. Indeed, it would be more than transubstantiation, because there would be succession not only in total substances, but also in all their accidents;

because if no common subject remained, much less could the same accident naturally remain which depends on its subject in being and being conserved. But this kind of transmutation is alien to all philosophy and to all natural action; and besides the nature of annihilation and creation which it includes, as I said above, no reason can be conceived why those two things are so connected in the nature of things that for the production of one the destruction of the other is necessary and vice versa; therefore natural transmutation is not through total destruction and inception, but through transformation from some common subject. And to this tends almost the demonstration of Aristotle, that this transmutation is always made from contrary to contrary (including privatively opposed things under contraries) which have a common subject. Therefore it is evident that there exists a subject or common material cause.

10. From resolution to one first subject, matter is inferred. There remains to be proven the second principal consequence of the reasoning, by which we inferred that this matter is the first cause in its order and in that sense is most truly called prime matter; but this can be shown in no more evident way (whatever some may wish) than in the way touched upon above, namely, because there cannot be an infinite regress in proximate and remote subjects or in subjects and things subjected (so to speak), but it is necessary to stop at some subject which is not subjected, nor is it even composed of a part which is in a subject, because every such composite can finally be resolved into simple things, in which there must be something which is not at all in a subject. Nor does this reasoning suppose that in substantial forms of the same composite there is no infinite regress; for even if this too is evident, nevertheless if by impossibility infinite forms were imagined in the same composite, on the part of the potency receiving them it will be necessary to stop at some simple subject which is not in a subject; because the whole collection of such forms is in some subject; therefore that is simple, as we shall demonstrate more immediately; therefore we call this prime matter. Besides this,

however, that consequence can also be proven from the commonality of this subject; for since all these lower things are mutually transmuted immediately or at least mediately, as has been said, it is necessary that the subject which is supposed to these transmutations be first in the nature of subject or matter; for if it were consisting of another prior subject or matter, either that would also be transmutable, and thus it would not be the common subject of all transmutations, but that which would remain after its resolution; or it would not be transmutable, and thus not every corporeal being would be transmutable into any other, the opposite of which we supposed; but concerning this more extensively in section three.

11. What is inferred in all the premises. From all the things said, therefore, it is left proven generally that in every order of transmutations there must be given some first material cause; however, from what has been said it cannot be concluded that there exists true prime matter which is the material cause of some substance, unless something is added. Hence the reasonings made, formally taken, equally prove that there exists in each celestial body some first subject of the changes which are made in it; indeed also with the same proportion the same thing is proven concerning any spiritual substance insofar as it is capable of real change, whether local, or intellectual, or affective; for although that change is not corruptive but perfective, it nevertheless necessarily supposes some subject and therefore it is necessary that it be reduced to some first subject in its order, which can also be called the first material cause of that change, although it is not called prime matter according to the common use of this term; for it properly signifies the material principle of substantial transmutation or constitution. From this it also happens that, although things which are in some way transmuted have a material cause of their transmutation proportioned to themselves, nevertheless if the transmutation is not of one thing into another, from the force of transmutation it cannot be concluded that there exists some first common material cause of such things; as although angels have a first

subject of their changes and corporeal things likewise, nevertheless, because neither these can be transmuted into angels nor vice versa, it cannot be concluded from transmutation that there exists some first common subject of all those things. And the same reasoning applies to celestial and sublunary bodies, because neither can these pass into those, nor vice versa; indeed the same is true of the heavens themselves among each other, because they are not mutually transmutable, but each can only be accidentally changed in itself. This same thing is true a fortiori in created spiritual substances. In all these, therefore, it is only concluded that there exists one common subject of accidents among which change is made. But in these lower substances and bodies, since they are mutually transmutable, some common and first subject is rightly concluded. But in order that this subject be concluded to be the material cause of the very substance of such things, it is necessary to add that their mutual transmutation among themselves is according to substance and not only according to accidents, because if they were transmuted only in accidents, it would suffice that there exist in them a first subject of such accidents, whether that were a simple or composite substance, and whether it were of one nature in all or of diverse natures.

12. Not only accidental, but also substantial transmutation exists in things. To conclude therefore that prime matter exists, such as Aristotle posited, it remained to be proven that the transmutation of these lower bodies, which we experience, is not only accidental, but also substantial. This, however, besides experience, which seems sufficiently evident by itself, not only in elements and in inanimate mixed bodies, but much more in living things, animals, and in ourselves when we are generated and die, besides this experience (I say), must be proven by reason from the necessity of substantial forms distinct from accidents; for if these forms are given, it is necessary that there exist prime matter which is the subject of them and composes with them one integral substance, which is to be the material cause of substance. But that substantial forms are given must be proven below,

in disputation XV, and therefore now let it be supposed and only from that hypothesis let it be held as demonstrated that there exists true and proper prime matter in those things which are generated and corrupted; for the consequence is evident and lacking all difficulty; but the antecedent must be proven in the said place.

SECTION II
WHETHER THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF GENERABLE AND CORRUPTIBLE SUBSTANCES IS ONE OR MULTIPLE

1. In this section and the following, the opinions of the ancient philosophers must be briefly touched upon, which Aristotle treated at length in various places and refuted, especially in Metaphysics I, chapter 3 and following, and Physics I, from chapter 2, and On Generation I, chapter 1 and following, and On the Heavens III, chapter 7; and in Diogenes Laertius, in the lives of these philosophers the same things are read, and in Plato in the Theaetetus and Sophist, and Plotinus, book IX Enneads 2, and Theophrastus, in his Metaphysics, chapter 3; and Plutarch, book I On Opinions, chapter 3; and among the Fathers Augustine touched upon it, book VIII of the City of God, from the beginning; and Epiphanius, book III against Heresies, in 80; and Irenaeus, book II against Heresies, chapter 19; and Clement of Rome, book of Recognitions, and Clement of Alexandria, book I of Stromata; and Eusebius, XIV of Preparation for the Gospel, from the beginning; and Ambrose, book I of the Hexameron, chapter 2. Therefore we reduce the opinions of these philosophers to two headings: one, of those who posited several first material principles, concerning whom we shall treat here; another, of those who posited only one, but erred in assigning it, concerning whom we shall speak in the following section.

Disputation XIII

The Opinion of Those Establishing Infinite Material Principles

2. The first opinion, therefore, was that the material cause of all things is made up of indivisible corpuscles or atoms, which Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Metrodorus, and Anaxagoras posited to be infinite. Almost all of these thought that these corpuscles are similar among themselves and of the same nature, and compose various beings only according to the variety of position, figure, and order; and that the corruption of things is nothing other than the dissipation or disordering of atoms, while generation is their new composition. But Anaxagoras posited atoms partly similar, partly dissimilar, so that from similar ones homogeneous things would be made, from dissimilar ones dissimilar things, as in an organic body heterogeneous parts, for example, flesh from fleshly atoms, bone from bony atoms, and so concerning others. Again, some of them seem to have posited these atoms as entirely indivisible; and therefore, so that they could compose body, they said that body coalesces not only from them, but also from some vacuum or void; for if all those atoms were joined immediately and solidly, mass would never increase, as is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 4. But others do not seem to have posited them as mathematically indivisible, but only physically; according to which interpretation it is not necessary to interpose some void between the atoms themselves so that the magnitude of body might grow from them. Again, among these philosophers some posited no efficient cause of things besides these atoms, nor even a final cause, but that from their various concourse and perpetual agitation certain things are dissolved and others arise by chance; and therefore, as Aristotle reports[13], Epicurus said that these corpuscles have natural weight by which they are always carried. But others, like Anaxagoras, posited an efficient cause operating with intellect and will and composing various things from these corpuscles.

[13] In the places cited, and Metaphysics IV, chapter 1.

3. The proposed opinion is refuted. Absurdities following from the opinion asserting atoms as material cause. But this part pertains to disputations concerning efficient and final causes. Now, as regards what pertains to the present matter, these philosophers primarily did not recognize the true material cause which is potency physically receptive of some act; for those atoms are not in potency to receive some physical form, nor can they be called matter of the whole composite, except in the way that integral parts are called matter of the whole and stones and wood are called matter of a house. Whence it further happens that, according to that way of philosophizing, the forms of natural entities are only as it were artificial, namely certain figures arising from the various position and order of atoms. And thus there will be no true substantial generation and corruption, but only various coordination or disordering of atoms. And although Anaxagoras posits atoms of diverse natures, nevertheless it is necessary that he posit all of them confused and mixed in individual things, so that through their eduction one thing can be generated from another. And thus all things differ only in this, that some have certain atoms more patent or in exterior parts, others however more latent and in secret parts, which whole diversity is only in the position and coordination of atoms. Add that it cannot be understood how such various corpuscles having repugnant conditions are intimately conjoined in individual things. Nor is it less inexplicable how from any thing these latent corpuscles are brought to light, so that other things seem to be generated or rather composed.

4. That is also absurd in all these philosophers, that they posit an infinite multitude of these corpuscles; for they understand either that in individual natural entities there is an infinite multitude of these atoms, or only in the whole universe, but in individual bodies or parts of it there is a finite multitude. In the former sense it is entirely absurd; for infinite atoms could not compose some body without that body growing to infinite magnitude; for if atoms are not imagined as mathematically indivisible, but physically, each will have some

magnitude in which either all will be equal, because there is no reason for inequality, or at least a minimal atom can be assigned to which others are either equal or greater; therefore from such infinite atoms an actually infinite magnitude will necessarily be composed. If however atoms are mathematically indivisible, they cannot compose magnitude unless empty space is interposed, which space will be divisible and of some magnitude; from which it is similarly concluded that infinite atoms thus distant from each other necessarily make an infinite body, occupying or including infinite space, partly empty, partly filled with atoms. Nor can an instance be offered of infinite points existing in a line, for there no points are immediate, because the whole line is continuous; but in atoms it would be necessary, given any atom, that there be some proximately distant from it by some certain and definite distance, and so concerning the rest; therefore it would be necessary that those infinite corpuscles occupy infinite space in that way.

5. But in the latter sense that opinion is also improbable, and primarily against it proceed all the things which Aristotle wrote against the infinite magnitude of the world, Physics III, and On the Heavens I. Then it is evident that the whole sphere of generable and corruptible things is finite since it is terminated at the sphere of the moon; but to attribute composition from atoms even to the heavens and to extend them to infinity cannot be philosophical, because neither experience nor reason leads us to think thus. Finally, if any body of finite magnitude consists of only finite atoms, this fiction of atoms cannot suffice for the generations and corruptions of things, both because from the same thing various things can be generated almost to infinity; and also because it would be necessary that the magnitude of a body always be much diminished in any generation and corruption through the dissipation of atoms, when nevertheless it is established by experience that this does not always happen. Unless perhaps it is said that there is always made as it were a certain circulation of atoms, while interior ones are led to external parts, but

exterior ones are driven to intimate parts, and therefore the magnitude of the thing is not diminished. But this can be nothing more absurd; for hence it happens that in reality nothing is changed except according to place or appearance. And that induction and eduction of atoms is against experience; for when fire is generated from tow, generation is made not only in exterior parts, but intimately and in the whole magnitude; and when man dies, corruption is made in all parts both internal and external. Therefore this opinion is entirely absurd, and has no foundation which it is necessary to satisfy. For that principle on which both the philosophers cited and others were founded: From nothing, nothing is made, what true sense it has we shall explain below.

The Opinion of Those Positing Several Finite Material Principles

6. The preceding opinion is refuted. The second opinion also posits several principles, or several first material causes of generable things, but in a finite number. Thus thought Empedocles, who said that the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth, are four first material causes from which mixed bodies are generated, but they themselves do not have a prior cause or material principle. However, this opinion is false and can be evidently refuted; for primarily, although he touched upon the composition or generation of the mixed body from elements, he nevertheless did not consider the transmutation of elements among themselves, when nevertheless it is established that both air is converted into fire and water into earth and vice versa. Elements cannot be material principles of such transmutations, but some subject common to all of them. But if perhaps Empedocles thought that elements are not substantially transmuted, and therefore do not consist of matter and substantial form, but are certain entirely simple entities, subjected to accidents, against this we shall show below that it is no less certain that substantial forms of elements exist

than of other natural entities and consequently that they are truly and substantially transmuted among themselves. Then, even if we admitted that, there would be no foundation for multiplying matters or first substantial subjects, but it should rather be said that in all elements there is the same substantial subject, which affected with diverse accidents, is called a distinct element. And since that subject is also the material principle of mixed bodies, it happens that in reality and substantially there is only one first material cause of all things.

7. But if perhaps Empedocles said that the diversity of natural accidents which is observed in elements indicates essential distinction of substantial subjects, from this very thing an efficacious argument ad hominem is taken; when air is so transmuted by fire that it remains affected with the proper accidents of fire, not only is mutation made in accidents, but also in the substance itself; but it cannot be made in the whole substantial entity because of the reasons made in the preceding section concerning annihilation and creation; therefore it is necessary to confess that even in the elements themselves there is some subject prior to them and common to them, by reason of which they can be mutually transmuted; therefore they are not first material causes, but there is given another prior cause of which they consist. And hence it is also concluded that these elements are not the first material causes of mixed bodies, because in them themselves there is given matter prior to them, and this is also the material cause of mixed bodies, which remains in them and is informed by their forms; therefore that is the first cause in that order also of mixed bodies, especially because according to the true opinion elements do not remain formally in the mixed body, that is, according to their proper substantial forms, because the substantial form of the mixed body cannot fall (so to speak) upon the form of the element or inform matter as already informed by the form of the element; therefore elements according to their proper substances are not the permanent and proper material cause of mixed bodies, but the same matter which is the first material cause of the elements themselves is also that of mixed bodies.

Section II

Resolution of the Question

8. It must be said therefore that the prime matter or material cause of all sublunary things is only one. This is the common opinion of all philosophers whom we shall mention in what follows. And it is sufficiently proven by the reasoning now made against Empedocles and by the posterior discourse made in the preceding section. Where from the common and mutual transmutation of sublunary things we showed that there exists common matter; for that reasoning equally proves that the first subject which remains under all these transmutations is only one. Both because contrary principles from which generations and corruptions are made, must be occupied concerning the same thing. And also because that subject is of itself indifferent to any forms of corruptible things and their dispositions; therefore it does not require distinction or multiplication in itself, indeed it has no source from which to have it. And conversely every form of a generable thing of whatever species can be introduced into any part of this matter if it is conveniently disposed; therefore it is a sign that this matter according to itself is one and of the same nature and sufficient in its genus for causing all effects which can be materially caused in these things, if other causes necessary in other genera are applied or concur.

9. An objection is satisfied. It can only be objected that the material cause is intrinsic and essential; but these generable and corruptible things are essentially diverse; therefore one and the same matter cannot be in all of them. But this objection touches that question whether matter is part of the quiddity of material substances, which we shall treat below[14] in a more convenient place; now it is briefly responded that the essences of these material things are diverse and dissimilar as regards forms, but similar as regards prime matter.

[14] Disp. XXXVI, sect. 2.

Nor does this obstruct essential diversity in any way; for this does not exclude agreement and similarity in some part.

SECTION III

WHETHER THE FIRST AND UNIQUE MATERIAL CAUSE OF GENERABLE SUBSTANCES IS SOME SIMPLE BODY OR INTEGRAL SUBSTANCE

1. The ancient philosophers (as Aristotle and other authors cited in the preceding section report) who posited only one material principle of natural things, nearly all thought it to be some integral substance or simple body, such as Averroes considers the celestial body to be. Concerning that body or material cause, however, there was manifold opinion among them.

Opinions of the Philosophers Concerning One Material Principle

2. The first opinion asserted that this principle is water, whose author was Thales of Miletus; others, however, like Plutarch, think it is more ancient and drew its origin from Orpheus. The second opinion attributed this function to air, which Anaximenes and Diogenes of Apollonia taught, as Aristotle reports in Physics I, chapter 3, and Simplicius explains in the same place. The third opinion held that fire is such a cause, which Hippasus and Heraclitus taught, and the Stoics followed the same view, as found in Cicero's De Natura Deorum II. The fourth opinion could choose earth for this function, because it underlies all things and is like the common mother of all. Aristotle, however, in Metaphysics I, chapter 7, says this was the opinion of the common people, but that no philosopher inclined toward it because earth, on account of its excessive density and dryness, seems unsuited

to receive the forms or figures of other things. Nevertheless, Hesiod in his Theogony absolutely calls earth the material principle of all things, and Theodoretus reports in his book De Materia et mundo that Pherecydes held the same view. The fifth opinion attributed this function to none of the four elements, but to a certain imperceptible body that is intermediate either between water and air, as Aristotle reports in Metaphysics I, chapter 7, or between air and fire, as Anaximander held, who added that this intermediate body is infinite lest generation should ever fail. Against this infinity Aristotle argues elsewhere. It seems, moreover, that from this can be gathered that this philosopher did not posit this body as incorruptible, for otherwise there would be no reason why he should fear that it could be consumed by the succession of generations if it were finite, although it can scarcely be understood how he made it corruptible if he considered it to be simple and the common subject of generation.

3. The preceding opinions are judged. It would be lengthy and superfluous to relate the proper motives of all these philosophers, because they are both uncertain and bear no probability or verisimilitude, as will be evident from what we shall say incidentally. This, however, seems to have been common to all of them: that they thought nothing comes to be anew in an absolute sense, since nothing can come from nothing; and therefore they seem neither to have acknowledged substantial forms nor substantial generation and corruption. Indeed, many of them indicate that there are no accidental forms that are true beings, because they did not understand that any true thing could come to be anew, but they thought that all the change we experience consists in various modes of being of that thing which they thought to be the common matter. From this, some progressed further to the point of not saying that the material cause of all beings is one, but that all beings are one, not in number but in substance and essence. Although they spoke of something false and improbable, they nevertheless spoke consistently if they dealt only with generable bodies. For if these do not transmute substantially, nor differ through

substantial forms, but through accidents or diverse modes of being, in reality no material cause of substance is given, but only a simple substance is given which is not essentially different from itself, but is one thing having itself differently under diverse accidents.

4. And this was the opinion of Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Melissus, who in this sense said that all things are one being and whatever is besides that is non-being; for they did not count accidents or modes of that being among beings. And consequently they absolutely removed all generation or change from the midst, because they made that being ingenerable and incorruptible, and accidental changes, because they do not give being absolutely, they did not consider worthy of the absolute name of changes. There are those who interpret the opinion of these philosophers in other ways, namely, that by one being they understood one universe that encompasses all things, as Aristotle suggests in De Generatione I, chapter 8, and Simplicius in Physics I, chapter 2; or by one being they understood God, who alone truly is. For Aristotle reports in Metaphysics I, chapter 5, and Cicero in Academicae Quaestiones II, that Xenophanes called that one being God. And thus many grave authors think that these philosophers spoke through enigmas and concealed truth in figurative expressions; but that Aristotle attacked their opinions insofar as they seemed to be put forward in the very species and surface of the words. Concerning this matter can be read Thomas Aquinas, Metaphysics III, text 15; Philoponus and Simplicius, Physics I, chapter 2; Eugubinus, De Perenni Philosophia III, from chapter 5; Pico della Mirandola, De Examinatione Vanitatis VI, chapter 1; and Bessarion, in his books contra Calumniatorem Platonis. It matters little to us what these philosophers thought or what mysteries they concealed in their words. There is no doubt, however, that if they were ignorant of substantial forms, as they seem to have been ignorant since they made no mention of them, they could easily and quite consistently have fallen into that opinion as it has been explained by

us. Hence, by the proof and confirmation of substantial forms alone, both this opinion and the others are refuted.

5. The opinion asserting a form of corporeity coeval with matter. Nevertheless, there can be related here another opinion which many modern philosophers have followed, positing in prime matter a form of corporeity coeval with it and inseparable from it. For although with respect to such a form, its material cause is simple, that is, without essential and physical composition, nevertheless that common subject which remains under every transmutation and is the universal material cause of every generation and of every substantial form that comes to be through eduction and of every composite that is generated, that subject (I say) according to the aforesaid opinion is not simple but essentially composite, and is some body, neither mixed nor composed of elements, nor intermediate between them through their participation, but absolutely a body through the precision of all inferior forms. Avicenna held this opinion in Sufficientia I, chapter 2. Its foundation is that the subject of generation must be corporeal and extended, and consequently quantified; but it cannot be of this kind unless it has some substantial form. And Scotus and Henry have partially followed this opinion; for the former, in Sentences IV, distinction 11, question 3, article 2, thinks that such a form of corporeity or mixture (as he speaks) is necessary in all and only living things; the latter, however, in Quodlibet I, questions 2 and 3, and Quodlibet III, questions 13 and 14, considers that it should be admitted in man alone on account of the indivisibility of the rational soul. Hence these two authors do not posit this form as inseparable from matter, nor as per se necessary for the primary material causality of the subject of generation, but on account of other special causes; and therefore their opinion does not pertain to the present place.

Resolution of the Question

6. First conclusion. It must be said, therefore, first, that the material cause that is universal and first in its order is not any of the sensible bodies or elements that are affected by contrary qualities. This assertion is against the four opinions and is evident from what was said in the preceding section; for if these elements and all sensible bodies are substantially transmuted among themselves, none of them can be the first subject of transmutation; for the first subject, which is the first material cause we are seeking, is not transmuted nor does it depart from its substance; otherwise it would be resolved into another prior subject and thus it would not be first. Moreover, since generation occurs between contraries, it is necessary that the common subject of generation have none of the contraries naturally innate to it; otherwise it would either never be capable of the other contrary or would be corrupted by the rejection of that which is connatural to it, just as an element is destroyed when the quality necessary to it is removed. Since, therefore, individual elements are affected by proper qualities having contraries, none of them can be a suitable subject of generation; therefore neither can it be the first material cause of natural beings.

7. And from this arises a third reason, because there is no reason why this causality should be attributed to one element rather than to others, nor is there any reason why it should be more repugnant to all simultaneously than to any one of them; but it has been shown that it cannot belong to all; therefore it is not truly attributed to any. The first part of the major proposition is explained, because individual elements are simple bodies and each one is suited and instituted for the generation of mixed bodies, and none of them can be composed of others in any way; for each has proper qualities repugnant to others; therefore in all there is equal reason or repugnance that it could be the common matter of all generable things. For that in some there are certain conditions accommodated to the function of common matter, as there is, for example, in fire subtlety, by reason of which it can easily penetrate all things; in air,

that it is nearly the common place of all things and easily receives external impressions; in water, humidity joined with that density which seems proportioned to constitute the nourishment of all things; these conditions (I say) are irrelevant, both because they help more either with respect to the role of efficient cause or with respect to the role of transient matter than with respect to the proper and intrinsic role of material cause, and also because those conditions, just as they are accommodated to certain things, so they are repugnant to others; for the subtlety of fire has proportion with the matter of subtle things, but not with the matter of dense things, and so concerning the others. But the first material cause, since it is common to all, must be indifferent to all from itself.

8. The other part of the major proposition is proved, because all elements simultaneously cannot be common matter, because they are substantially transmuted among themselves; indeed, they cannot even compose a mixed body unless substantially transmuted; but this reason proves equally concerning each element taken by itself; therefore. Whence it is finally confirmed, because no element can be the matter of other elements, as seems self-evident, since they are repugnant to themselves. Nor can it, remaining in its nature, be the matter of any mixed body, since the form of the mixed body also conflicts with the form of the element; therefore no element can be the common matter of all natural things. And these reasons prove a fortiori concerning all mixed bodies, especially since they consist of elements, and therefore no one has hitherto attributed this causality to any mixed body.

9. Second conclusion. I say second: prime matter is not some body or complete and integral substance in the essence and species of substance. Matter can be understood to be such a substance in two ways. First, that it alone is the substance of all generable things and is only formed by their distinct accidents; and in this sense the assertion must be proved from the fact that natural things differ not only in accidents but also in substance and essence, as we argued in the

preceding section against Epicurus and others. Likewise, it must be rejected (and it amounts to nearly the same thing) from the truth of substantial forms, which we shall demonstrate in disputation XV. For with that truth supposed, it evidently follows that matter is not the whole substance of material things, and that these things differ not only in accidents but also in essence and substance, and are transmuted not only according to accidents but also according to substance. This is also sufficiently evident from experience itself; for when a thing is changed only in accidents, something remains in it as a vestige of its properties and operations, or at least, when contrary agents are removed, it is reduced to its state and nature; but we see that some things are so changed and destroyed that they completely lose their former properties and operations, nor do they ever return to them, even if all contrary action ceases, and conversely other things are so produced and generated that they remain constant in that being which they acquire as in their proper and connatural state and according to that have their proper and connatural operations and dispositions which they conserve as much as they can; if sometimes they are weakened or diminished by some contrary, as soon as the contrary action ceases they recover them from their proper and intrinsic nature; it is therefore a sign that things are corrupted and generated not only in sensible accidents but also in their proper substance. And in these ways both the fifth opinion recited above and that which asserted all things to be one in the sense explained are attacked.

10. In another way, therefore, someone could imagine that matter is an integral and complete substance in some species of substance and nevertheless is suited to receive further substantial forms and to be composed with them into various substances and essences of material things. And this sense is also improbable: for either matter would be a complete substance that is entirely simple, or it would be composed of some potency and substantial act. This latter cannot be said, first, because then not that whole composite, but the

potency from which it consists, would be the first material cause. It will perhaps be said that this is true with respect to that composite which is imagined to be ingenerable and incorruptible, but with respect to all generable beings or their generation, the first material cause is the whole composite. But against this it is objected, second, that such a composite is imagined without any foundation; for there is no indication or sensible sign of that form interposed between pure matter and other forms that are introduced through generation. Because that form has no sensible property by which it might be recognized; for the primary qualities per se follow from the form of elements, and temperaments composed from those qualities follow from the forms of mixed bodies; but all other qualities or properties that we experience suppose at least in the genus of material and dispositive cause the prior qualities; therefore there is no sensible or material indication of such a form. Whence it happens, third, that it is entirely superfluous, because there is no physical effect on account of which it is necessary, since it is not necessary for effecting, as it has no quality through which it might effect; besides, for each quality its proper form, to which it is connatural, suffices. Nor is it necessary for receiving, for that potency which is said to underlie such a form suffices for this; for why could it not also immediately be subjected to the form that is introduced through generation? And for the same reason, such a form is not necessary for conserving that potency whose act it is said to be, because the form that is introduced through generation also suffices for this. Therefore such a form is imagined superfluously and without foundation.

11. Fourth, there is added the impossibility of joining those two forms in the same potency or matter; for although it is in question whether a quasi-generic and specific form can simultaneously actuate matter, which we shall touch upon a little below, nevertheless that two specific forms should simultaneously be joined to actuate the same substantial potency is plainly impossible naturally, and nearly all authors agree on this. Because either those two forms would

immediately actuate matter, or one would be the act of the other, or of matter as informed through that one. The first cannot be said, especially according to that opinion, because otherwise the prior form would not necessarily be supposed for the posterior, nor would the composite of matter and such a form be the proximate potency and material cause of the subsequent form. The second also cannot be said, because a substantial form constituting an integral and complete substance has the role of ultimate act in the role of substantial and essential act, because it constitutes a certain ultimate species of substance; therefore it cannot be compared by way of substantial potency to a further form. Finally, the general reason is that one and the same substance cannot be essentially and per se constituted in two ultimate species; but through any form of those it is constituted in its proper and complete species of substance; therefore those two forms cannot simultaneously be joined in the same matter. Otherwise any substance, however complete, could be actuated by a further substantial form, because no greater reason can be given for one than for another. And to this also pertains that common reason that a form coming to a being already constituted in act does not make something one per se, but per accidens, from Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, text 49, and De Anima II, text 7; and therefore it cannot be a substantial form, but accidental, because a substantial form constitutes something one per se, not per accidens. And the reason is that a substantial form gives being absolutely and essentially, and therefore cannot suppose a thing constituted in being absolutely and in complete and consummated essence. But an accidental form gives being in a certain respect, which is accidentally added to the consummated essence. Therefore it is impossible for the subject that is the material cause of generable things and of substantial generation to be a complete substance constituted through its proper and specific form.

12. And these reasons prove equally efficaciously that that subject cannot be a simple substance integral and complete in the role and species of substance, because it would be impossible for such a

substance to be further actuated and completed by a substantial form. For if this is repugnant to a composite substance, much more to a simple one, which through itself is in complete and perfect act. For that repugnance does not arise from composition but from complete actuality in the role and essence of substance, which cannot be further actuated substantially and essentially within that genus; but this reason of repugnance has place in the same or greater degree in a simple substance, if it is supposed to be integral and complete in the genus of substance. And for this reason an immaterial substance cannot have the role of substantial potency toward a further form because it is a complete simple substance; and the same is true of the substance of heaven, if it is physically simple, as many want; for it is complete in a certain species of substance and therefore cannot be further substantially actuated; therefore prime matter, which can be substantially actuated and compose a being one per se with a substantial form, cannot be such a simple substance that is integral and complete in the genus of substance.

13. Third conclusion. I say third: the material cause of generable things is not a substance composed of substantial potency and some substantial form that is incomplete and quasi-generic. Nearly all authors commonly approve this assertion, against Avicenna, especially those who deny that there are multiple substantial forms in the same composite, such as Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, question 76, articles 3 and 4; Summa contra Gentiles II, chapter 58; and Metaphysics VII, lecture 12; whom the Thomists follow: Capreolus, Sentences II, distinction 15, question 1; Cajetan, in the cited place of the Summa I, and De Anima II, chapter 1; Ferrariensis, in the cited place of the Summa contra Gentiles; Soncinas, Metaphysics VIII, question 8; Javellus, question 4; Soto, Physics I, question 7; Astudillo, De Generatione I, question 1; and there Marsilius, question 6; and Albert of Saxony, question 5; and extensively Giles of Rome, De Pluralitate Formarum; and De Anima II, doubt 6. The same taught Philoponus, De Generatione I, in the

beginning; Themistius, Physics V, text 7; and Averroes, De Substantia Orbis; and Metaphysics I, text 17; and Physics I, texts 65 and 69. Indeed, even Avicenna, De Anima I, part 1, chapter 3, signifies that in corruption only matter remains; and Sufficientia I, chapter 3, doubts whether corporeity perishes in corruption, as he speaks. Aristotle also, De Generatione I, text 12, and in other places cited above, clearly indicates the same opinion. Various reasons are brought forward by the Doctors; two, however, seem to suffice, which can be taken proportionally from the proofs of the preceding assertion.

14. The first reason is that in nature there is no indication of such a form perpetually coeval and inseparable from matter, nor any effect on account of which it is necessary; therefore such a form is imagined without foundation or necessity. The antecedent is proved, because that form has no quality proper to it by which it might be known, nor can it be gathered from substantial transmutation; because from transmutation of this kind only can be gathered that some substantial subject of it is given. But that it is composite is neither necessary for the role of subject nor can it be inferred from any other indication. You will say that for the role of subject of physical mutation it is required that it be extended and divided from others; and for this it is necessary that it have some form because matter alone through itself is not capable of extension and division, for it is act that distinguishes; for this was the foundation of the contrary opinion. But this reason is of no moment because whether we think that quantity and extension by order of nature simply precede in prime matter for substantial generation, or whether we think they follow upon the form introduced through generation and affect the whole composite, in neither way is it necessary that the subject of generation be composite of matter and some form. Both parts are explained, for if quantity is supposed for the form to be induced through generation, it can easily be understood as inhering in the very entity of matter; for, as we shall show below, it has true and substantial entity.

15. And it is confirmed, for that composite that is imagined from matter and the form of corporeity is something incomplete and so potential that it naturally desires a further form, without which it either cannot be at all or at least cannot be in a connatural way. And nevertheless that composite is said to be a sufficient subject of quantity by nature prior to receiving a further form; therefore much better and more easily will all that capacity be attributed to the simple entity of matter, because no greater repugnance can be imagined in this regard in a simple entity than in that composite, nor will the actuality of such an entity, whatever it may be, be more repugnant with the union and composition per se of the ultimate substantial form than the actuality of that composite from matter and the form of corporeity; therefore according to this way of thinking, that form is not necessary. But it is less necessary if we think that quantity follows upon the form that is introduced through generation; for according to this opinion, quantity supposes by order of nature a substance composed of matter and proper form. Whence it must be said consequently according to that opinion that before the intrinsic instant of generation, during the whole time in which the previous alteration occurs, matter is supposed to be in itself extended and divided from others through quantity and the form of the thing to be corrupted; but in the instant of generation it is conserved as extended and divided through the form introduced and the quantity accompanying that in the same instant; therefore there is no natural effect, nor any sign by reason of which such a form or composition on the part of matter should be admitted.

16. The second reason is that such a form is incompossible in matter with subsequent forms. This, however, is commonly proved from that maxim that from two beings in act, one per se does not come to be; for the first substantial form constitutes a being in act absolutely and simply, because it gives being simply; therefore no supervening form can constitute a being one per se and simply. To this reason, however, it can be responded that it proceeds only concerning

a substantial form giving specific and ultimate being; for that which gives precisely generic being, although it has the role of act with respect to matter, is nevertheless compared as potency to the inferior form, and because it is of the same genus, it will be able to constitute something one per se with its act. For thus do the authors philosophize here concerning physical forms, just as we all reason concerning metaphysical differences, in which the subaltern difference is act, actuating the superior genus and constituting its proper species; which nevertheless is potency to the inferior difference, with which it composes something one per se metaphysically. Thus therefore it must be said according to the aforesaid opinion concerning physical forms. Hence, when it is said that every substantial form constitutes a being in act simply, it will be responded that this is true with proportion preserved; for a generic form constitutes a being in act in the generic grade, but a specific form in the specific grade. And with similar proportion that maxim will be distinguished: What comes to a being in act, comes accidentally.

17. No form can give a precise generic grade. Therefore, in order to radically attack that opinion, it must be proved by us that there can be no form that precisely gives generic being without also giving some specific being in that genus; for, with this proved, the discourse made proceeds excellently, because every substantial form constitutes a being in act simply and in some ultimate species of substance, and therefore it is impossible for a composite constituted through such a form to be further actuatable by a substantial form. But that assumption is proved first by induction, both in accidental forms and also in separate forms. For qualities also are conceived to give specific being, such as being white, and generic being, such as being colored, etc., and yet there is no accidental form that in reality precisely gives generic being and not some specific being. Similarly, in angels the generic role of spirit and the proper specific difference are given; but there cannot be, indeed cannot even be conceived, any separate form that is a spiritual substance and that in reality itself stops

at this precise and generic role; therefore by the same reason in substantial forms that are quasi-intermediate, there cannot be given a form that in reality precisely gives the generic grade; for no reason of diversity can be assigned. Whence I argue second from the proper role of form itself, because a form existing in reality cannot be understood that is not essentially constituted in some ultimate species of substantial form; but every form communicates to the composite its whole being and its whole essence; therefore it constitutes that in some ultimate species of composite substance. The consequence with the minor are evident, and can be explained excellently by the induction made in the first reason. But the major also seems most certain, because every substantial form has its proper entity distinct in reality from matter or other forms; therefore it is necessary to understand in that entity the ultimate and proper difference or reason through which it is essentially distinguished from other forms having diverse essence, with which it agrees in the common role of substantial form; therefore every substantial form is necessarily constituted according to its entity in some ultimate species of substantial form.

18. Prime matter of generable things claims for itself a stable and indivisible species. You will say: prime matter also has its proper substantial entity and nevertheless according to itself it is not constituted in some ultimate species but is only reduced to the genus of material substance, until it is determined through form to some particular role; therefore the same can be said of the common form coeval with matter. I respond that the assumption is false; for the prime matter of generable things of which we now treat is essentially constituted in some ultimate species of matter which it retains under every form, nor can it vary that but at most through superadded accidents it can be accommodated to this or that form. Because, however, that essence of matter, although in itself specific and ultimate, is such that it can really be communicated to several essentially diverse substances, therefore considered according to itself it is said to be reduced to generable material substance as such, and

not to some species of it. Whence it is incidentally gathered that the concept of generable substance as such is not generic by reason of matter, but by reason of the common grade or agreement in form.

19. You will press: matter, even if in its essence it has the ultimate specification of matter, is nevertheless common to many essentially diverse substances; therefore by parity of reason, although the form of corporeity in its entity and essential concept has some ultimate specification, it can nevertheless be common to many substances having further diverse essential reasons[15]. I respond that the reason is different, for the essence of matter is to be quasi the foundation of the integral substantial and composite nature, and therefore it is only a certain inchoate essence (so to speak) by way of potency and therefore from itself is indifferent so that it may be completed by various acts; but indeed form is the complement of substantial nature and essence, and therefore, by the very fact that it has a determinate and specific role of form, when joined to matter it completes with it the integral substantial nature and one constituted in some ultimate species of substance, and therefore it does not leave that nature indifferent to a further species. Therefore all who posit the form of corporeity in all or in some natural beings consequently say that that form is precisely constituted in the subaltern grade of corporeity without any essential contraction, which is really unintelligible.

20. And consequently they will also admit that the composite from matter and such a form, if it is conserved in reality without a further form, is an individual of the genus of corruptible body and is constituted in no ultimate species of it. But that it can be thus conserved by absolute power seems evident, speaking consequently, since the inferior forms are really distinguished from that composite, and it will be clear a fortiori from those things we shall say below concerning matter. But Scotus also thinks this is naturally possible, as, for example, in the death of a man or another similar case; for he

[15] essentiales, 1960; essentialiter, alit. "Así el sentido varía algo". Cf. BHF, t. 2, p. 413.

admits there substantial corruption without generation, and that a cadaver is nothing other than this individual body affected by these accidents and constituted in no inferior substantial species. But this consequent seems to me absurd and incredible per se; for this individual body cannot be conceived as existing per se without any specification any more than this spirit outside every species, or this colored thing really affected by this color and by no species of color. And the reason is touched upon above, because individual entity necessarily differs essentially from others and therefore it is necessary that it be constituted in itself in its proper essence not common to others. Whence it is confirmed, for from the said position it follows that the generic and specific role are really distinguished in one and the same thing because they are taken from really distinct forms; but the consequent is false as is clear from what was said above concerning universals and will also be explained in the following reasons.

21. Absurdities from the opinion asserting the form of corporeity. Worthy of note. The third reason is taken from the difference between essential physical and metaphysical composition, which to want to equate in this is the cause of error, since the one exists in things, the other in concepts. I argue therefore, for if there can be given a physical form that only confers the generic grade, therefore as many as are the generic and specific grades of material substances, so many substantial forms really distinct will have to be multiplied; the consequent is false; therefore. The consequence is proved by parity of reason; for what reason can be brought forward on account of which a certain generic grade is given through a proper form really distinct and not others? Especially since according to the opinion we are attacking, not only in things that seem to be elevated to a higher grade of bodies such as living things, but also in the lowest and inanimate bodies, the form giving the being of body is distinguished from the form giving the being of fire or stone or something similar; which contraction is with the minimal diversity that can be between some genus and substantial difference; if therefore that suffices for the real distinction

of forms, any suffices; whence there were not lacking philosophers who admitted that consequent; it is nevertheless not only false but also ridiculous. First, because it is clearly evident from the induction made above that for abstracting the concepts of genus, difference, and species, that real distinction of forms is not necessary, as is clear in angels and accidents. Second, because it follows that three souls must be multiplied in man, which is an entirely false opinion, as I suppose from the science concerning the soul. Indeed, even more will have to be multiplied, for in the grade of sensing some essential agreement can be abstracted between man and some perfect animals that is not common to all animals, and in the role of understanding a generic role common to man and angels can be abstracted, which is contracted to man through a proper difference. Whence it further follows that innumerable really distinct forms are to be asserted in individual composites, because generic and specific differences can be multiplied in various ways according to various agreements and differences that can easily be considered in things, and according to them various common or particular concepts can be abstracted. Therefore it is a great error in metaphysics and philosophy to distinguish real and physical forms on account of our confused or distinct mode of conceiving, from which the multiplication of genera and differences often arises. Otherwise it would be necessary to posit not one but two or three forms of corporeity: one of body in common, as it is genus to corruptible and incorruptible, simple or mixed; another of corruptible body or mixed body as such. All of which are ridiculous. Whence not only is it not necessary to multiply forms themselves on account of these operations of the mind, but it is also repugnant to them, because it is of the role of proper genus and proper difference that they express the same essence of the thing conceived in diverse ways.

22. Which is finally confirmed, because it is impossible to give a substantial form giving the specific grade of substance that does not also give that generic grade and formal effect which the distinct form of corporeity is imagined to give; therefore such a form is both

superfluous and impossible. The consequence is evident, because the same essential predicate and the same formal effect cannot belong to the same thing through two really distinct forms. But the antecedent is proved, because there cannot be given a substantial form that confers the specific grade that does not essentially include the common and generic role of substantial form informing matter; but this precise role suffices for constituting the form of corporeity; therefore the form of corporeity is not a special form but is any substantial form considered according to the common role of substantial form informing. The minor is proved (for the rest are clear), for from this precisely that some substance is understood to be composed of matter and substantial form, it is essentially corporeal substance or body of the category of substance; for from the force of such composition it is both essentially distinct from incorporeal substance and is capable of quantity or triple dimension, in which consists the role of corporeal substance. Whence the form of corporeity as such neither says nor requires that it itself be corporeal or extended, but only that it inform matter, by reason of which the composite resulting from it is capable of triple dimension; therefore no intermediate form is necessary or possible that gives the generic being of body, but any substantial form from the force of its generic role confers that.

23. From all that has been said the conclusion is inferred. It remains therefore from all that has been said that the first material cause of generable substances is not some integral substance, nor any body or composite of matter and form; and consequently for the generation of substances there is not supposed by way of subject in which generation is received some ingenerable and incorruptible body, but only prime matter, only (I say) as regards substance; for as regards accidents, what must be said we shall see later.

SECTION IV
WHETHER PRIME MATTER HAS SOME ACTUAL ENTITY THAT IS INGENERABLE AND INCORRUPTIBLE

1. Thus far we have explained what matter is not rather than what it is; now this second question must be investigated, because we cannot declare the causality of matter and the reason for its causing unless we first know what entity matter itself has.

Certain Points Are Established

2. Therefore, so that we may begin from those things which seem certain, first it appears indubitable that matter which is actually under form and composes corporeal substance with it has something of real and substantial entity and is really distinct from the entity of form. This entire assertion is taken from Aristotle, VIII Metaphysics, text 3, and XII Metaphysics, text 14, and II On the Soul, text 2, and other places, in which he divides substance into matter, form, and composite. But because matter is not a complete substance, therefore in I Physics, text 66 and 69, he says that matter is a being not as this something but as subject, and he explains its entity by analogy to the matter of artificial things, and in text 79 and following he says it comes closer to the nature of substance, and in book II Physics, text 10, he calls matter a certain nature. Similarly Plato in the Timaeus places matter under being and declares its nature extensively and excellently; sometimes nevertheless he calls matter non-being; in which he is criticized by Aristotle, because being non-being is more fitting to privation than to matter. But there is disagreement in word only; for it is called non-being, taking being by antonomasia for complete being, which is being simply; all interpreters of Aristotle also agree in this

assertion: Averroes, I Physics, text 66, and On the Substance of the Orb, chapter 1; Simplicius, I Physics, text 69; Philoponus, text 60; Themistius, text 61; and St. Thomas, question On Spiritual Creatures, article 1, says that prime matter is in the genus of substance; and from other places which I shall immediately cite, the same is gathered.

3. And the individual parts are briefly proven. The first indeed because matter is not altogether nothing; otherwise it would exercise no true and real function in nature, and when things which are corrupted are said to be resolved into matter, they would be reduced to nothing, and when they are produced from matter they would be made from nothing, and thus matter would serve nothing for generations and corruptions, nor for avoiding perpetual creation and annihilation of things; therefore matter is something of a thing; therefore it has this most especially when it is joined to form and composes the composite. Hence Augustine, XII Confessions, chapters 7 and 8, says that matter is created by God, not that it is nothing, but near to nothing, not no thing, but almost no thing. And it is certain from faith, and will also be proven below by reason, that matter is created by God, as is established from I, question 44, article 2, and question 46, article 1, to 3; but what is created receives something of real entity; otherwise it would remain as unfinished as before.

4. The Entity of Prime Matter Is Substantial. The second part is evidently proven from the fact that prime matter essentially composes substance, VIII Metaphysics, text 15, 16 and 36, and book IX, at the end, and will be treated more extensively below. But substance is not composed except from substances, at least incomplete ones. Also composite substance adds something of a thing beyond form, and that is not an accident; therefore it is something substantial. Finally, prime matter, in the mode in which it is being, is not in a subject; for this is most repugnant to it, since it is the first subject.

5. The last part is also clear, because matter is an entity really separable from any particular determinate form, which is sufficient for it to be distinct in the thing itself from form; but they are not

distinguished only modally; for substantial form is not a mode, but a true thing having proper entity; hence sometimes it can also be naturally conserved separate from matter, as the rational soul, and through absolute power any form can be conserved separately. Therefore matter is distinguished from form as thing from thing. And it is confirmed; for the composition of substance from matter and form is real and physical and not from thing and mode; therefore from two things. Finally, since matter is perpetual and prior to form, it is evident that it is really distinguished from form, supposing that form is not only some mode but true act and proper entity, which is also certain since it is a more perfect thing than matter, concerning which more will be said below extensively. But Soncinas, VII Metaphysics, question 19, although he concedes this part to be true, nevertheless adds that someone could defend that matter is not actually distinct from form, because it does not have distinct being. But, whatever may be the case concerning the being of existence, about which will be said immediately, nevertheless no one can deny that according to the entity of essence, the entity of matter is other than the entity of form, as the reasons made demonstrate.

The Point of Difficulty & the Opinion of Certain Thinkers

6. Therefore, with these things placed beyond controversy, the difficulty of this question is whether matter from itself has some actual entity. But that particle "from itself" can indicate the negation either of formal cause or of efficient cause, and the question must be treated in both senses, but especially in the former. For concerning the latter there is no controversy among Catholic philosophers, although some pagans have erred in it. But in the former sense many think that matter from itself has no actual entity, but entirely from form. This opinion seems to be that of St. Thomas, I, question 44, article 2, to 3, where he says that matter from itself is only in potency and therefore

cannot be created except under form; and he signifies the same in question 45, article 4, and question 66, article 1, where from that principle he concludes that matter cannot be without form; the same in question 4 On Power, article 1, and Quodlibet III, question 1, and often elsewhere; and thus the Thomists think, Cajetan, In On Being and Essence, chapter 5, question 8, and I, question 76, article 1; Ferrariensis, II Against the Gentiles, chapter 66; Soncinas, VII Metaphysics, question 17; Javellus, question 5; and Durandus holds the same, In II, distinction 12, question 2, and In IV, distinction 44, question 1. The foundation of this opinion is that matter is pure potency; therefore it cannot from itself have any act; therefore neither actual entity. The first consequence is proven, because act is opposed to potency, and when it is called pure potency, that addition includes the negation of all act. The second consequence is also proven because actual entity is some act; for it is being in act. But the antecedent is like a common axiom of all philosophers, and is taken from Aristotle, I Physics, text 69, where he says that matter from itself is related to natural things just as natural things from themselves are to artificial things, to which they are only in potency, and VII Metaphysics, chapter 3, he says that matter per se is neither what, nor anything of this sort. And I On Generation, chapter 3, he says the essence of matter consists in the very ability to be, and VIII Metaphysics, text 3, and book XI, chapter 2, and V Physics, text 8, he holds that matter is non-being in act, but only in potency. The Commentator also teaches the same in the same places, and therefore in the book On the Substance of the Orb, at the beginning, and II Physics, comment 12, he says that matter is substantiated through being able. Plato seems to have been in the same opinion in the Timaeus, and he proves this from the fact that the receptive ought to be devoid of all those things which it can receive.

7. Then the same antecedent is proven by reason, because if matter is not pure potency, therefore either it is composed of potency and act or it is some act. The first cannot be said, as is established from

the preceding section and because otherwise there would be another potency prior to matter itself. Again, if it is act, either informing act or subsisting act. Not the first, as is known per se, otherwise it would be the act of another subject and consequently there would be another subject prior to matter, which is repugnant to the nature of matter. Nor can the second be said either, first, because subsisting act is more perfect than informing act: hence if it is so subsisting that it cannot inform, it is always complete substance, for by this reason angelic substances are perfect and complete, because they are subsisting acts; and those who hold that the substance of heaven is simple say it is complete because it is an act subsisting per se. Finally, God himself, who is most perfect act, is subsisting act and not informing; therefore it is a sign that subsisting act from its nature is more perfect than informing act. But prime matter is most imperfect, and thus less perfect than any substantial form, which is informing act and not subsisting. And it is confirmed, for every act whether informing or subsisting per se has some operation, as is clear by running through all acts of this sort; but prime matter does not have proper action; therefore it is not act but pure potency.

Resolution of the Question

8. In order to respond to the question with all ambiguity of terms set aside, let us distinguish the question concerning the entity of essence and concerning the entity of existence; for it is very controversial how these two are distinguished in creatures. Therefore, it is certain that created matter has some real essence, otherwise it would not be a real being; but the essence of matter is not constituted intrinsically in its essential being through form; therefore through itself it has its own entity of essence of whatever sort. The minor is proven, because form does not constitute intrinsically any nature in its essential being except by composing it through the mode of act; but form does not compose the essence of matter, as is evident per se,

because matter is essentially a simple entity, just as form is, and the composite arises from both. Hence a second reason is taken; for every simple entity necessarily has through itself intrinsically, and not through another entity, its own essence, because the very nature of simple entity or essence consists in this; but matter is a simple essence; therefore. Third, matter is essentially an incomplete entity; therefore it is not constituted intrinsically through form. The consequence is clear because if it included form, nothing would be lacking to it for the nature of complete essence. Finally, from the very nature of pure potency this very thing is gathered; for if matter is created by God and existing in the composite, it would have its essential being intrinsically through form, it would include the act of form in its essential concept, not as extrinsic term or addition, but as intrinsic formal act constituting, and thus it would not be pure potency.

9. Matter Has Actual Essence Distinct from Form, but Dependent on It. Therefore I say first: prime matter from itself and not intrinsically from form has its own actual entity of essence, although it does not have it except with intrinsic relation to form. I speak in this assertion of the actual being of essence, so that I may agree in names and mode of speaking with the authors of the contrary opinion; although in this sense and as regards this part, I do not see how there can be diversity of opinions; for matter has its own actual essence concerning which (whatever may be the case about existence) all the said things will proceed, that essentially it is a simple entity, actualizable indeed through form, but not including form intrinsically in its essence. And therefore, with the same numerical entity of essence conserved, it can cast off one form and acquire another; therefore through that simple entity it has its own essential perfection, distinct from that which form confers; and similarly according to it, it has actual essential being; for every essence includes some being, at least essential. But if there is talk of potential being, as it is called from receptive potency and is distinguished from actuating act, thus it is

true that matter only indicates potential entity; nevertheless this does not exclude that in that entity of whatever sort it is intrinsically constituted in itself, and not through form.

10. Response to an Objection. But you will say these arguments correctly prove concerning potential essential being, but not actual. It is responded that if there is talk of being in objective potency or in the power of a cause, and of being in act opposed to this potency, thus not only will the reasons made proceed concerning potential being but maximally concerning actual being, because whether matter exists through entity distinct from itself or not, nevertheless it is certain that when it is actually joined to form, it has its own actual essence concerning which (whatever may be the case about existence) all the said things will proceed, that essentially it is a simple entity, actualizable indeed through form, but not including form intrinsically in its essence. And therefore, with the same numerical entity of essence conserved, it can cast off one form and acquire another; therefore through that simple entity it has its own essential perfection, distinct from that which form confers; and similarly according to it, it has actual essential being; for every essence includes some being, at least essential. But if there is talk of potential being, as it is called from receptive potency and is distinguished from actuating act, thus it is true that matter only indicates potential entity; nevertheless this does not exclude that in that entity of whatever sort it is intrinsically constituted in itself, and not through form.

11. But that matter does not have its own entity of essence without transcendental relation to form is proven because essentially it is potency, as will be shown below, and is clear from the definition of Aristotle saying that matter is the first subject, etc.; but every potency indicates intrinsic relation to its own act; but the proper act of matter is form; therefore matter has its own proper essence through itself with relation to form. But this relation is not per se primarily to this or that form but to form absolutely, and consequently to any generable form, or which can be united through generation, and therefore

although forms may vary in matter, the essential nature or relation of matter does not vary. Which is also a clear argument that matter does not have entity of essence from the information of form.

12. An Objection Is Resolved. But some object: for every essential being ought to be constituted in some certain species; but every species is through form; therefore no essential being can be fully constituted except through form. Hence St. Thomas, I, question 44, article 2, says that matter is contracted through form to a determinate species. To this it has been nearly responded in the above that matter of generable things is constituted in the ultimate species of matter, in which species it is not constituted through that form by which it is informed; for it always has the same under whatever form. But when it is said that form is what gives species, it is understood of complete and perfect species. And St. Thomas understands in the same sense that matter is contracted through form to a determinate species, as he clearly declares in the following words, saying: Just as the substance of some species is contracted to a determinate mode of being through an accident happening to it, as man is contracted through whiteness. This example is only adduced to declare that this determination of matter through form is not as regards the intrinsic essence of matter itself, but as regards the essence of the composite, which in some way happens to matter itself according to itself, insofar as the mode of existing of matter under this or that form is not of the essence of matter but variable in it. Hence St. Thomas in that same article openly supposes that matter from itself has some being beyond that which form gives; for from this he concludes that God is the cause of matter, because he is the cause of things not only according as they are such through accidental or substantial forms, but also according to everything that pertains to their being in whatever mode. And the same in I, question 14, article 11, to 3, he says that although matter recedes from the likeness of God according to its potentiality, nevertheless insofar as it has being in this way, it has some likeness of divine being; and question 3 On Truth, article 5, to 1, he says: although prime matter is

formless, nevertheless there is in it an imitation of the first form, however weak the being it may have, that nevertheless is an imitation of the first being.

13. I say second: prime matter also has in itself and per se entity or actuality of existence distinct from the existence of form, although it has it dependently on form. Henry holds the former part, Quodlibet I, question 10, and Quodlibet IV, question 16; Scotus, In II, distinction 12, question 1 and 2, and there Gregory, question 1; Gabriel and others, there. The foundation of this conclusion, with the preceding supposed, is that the being of existence adds no real thing or mode above the entity of essence, as actual and placed outside causes, because by the very fact that entity is conceived as actual outside causes, it is conceived as existing. This principle must be proven below extensively, disputation XXXIV. But from it evidently follows that matter just as it has actual entity of essence distinct from form, so it has its own proper being of existence, which it retains under any form. Hence it is confirmed: for matter has the same numerical actual entity under the form of the generated as it has under the form of the corrupted; therefore it also has the same numerical being by which it is constituted in such actual entity. But that being is of existence, as is proven in the cited place. It is confirmed second, for matter as it is presupposed to form and is the subject of generation, is not altogether nothing, otherwise generation would be made from nothing; therefore it is some created entity; therefore actual and existing entity, because creation is terminated only to actual and existing entity. Nor can it be a real subject unless it exists in the nature of things. Finally, such is the existence of a thing as is its actual essence; therefore just as the essence of corporeal substance is composed from partial essences of matter and form, so also the integral existence of the same substance is composed from partial existences of matter and form. This must be proven more extensively in the cited place; for it follows manifestly from the said principle, that existence and actual essence are distinguished not in reality, but in reason; therefore matter, as it is

actual entity really distinct from form, in its entity includes proper partial existence, also distinct in reality from the partial existence of form.

14. But that this existence of matter depends in some way on form and on its information, Scotus, Henry and Gregory seem to deny in the places cited above; but the contrary opinion, which we have placed in the second part of the assertion, is commonly received, because matter, although it has proper existence, that is nevertheless so imperfect that it cannot naturally be without the assistance of form; and this is called in the present the dependence of matter on form. But what sort this mode of dependence may be cannot be conveniently declared unless we first explain the causality of form; and there we shall also treat whether there is so great a dependence of matter on form that it can in no way be without it.

15. I say third: matter does not have from itself actual entity or existence without efficient cause, but it is necessary that it receive this being from another, namely from God. This assertion is most certain according to faith; according to philosophy, however, not all admit it to be demonstrable. Hence according to the opinion of Plato[16] matter is supposed for every action even of God and therefore is judged to be unmade, as Justin reports from the Fathers, in the oration Exhortation to the Gentiles; and Ambrose, book I Hexameron, chapter 1; and Athanasius, book On the Incarnation of the Word, at the beginning; and from philosophers Plutarch, book I On Opinions; Philoponus, I Physics, text 6; and Themistius, text 32. But concerning the opinion of Aristotle the matter is doubtful, which we shall treat below when dealing with efficient cause. But the assertion posited is sufficiently demonstrated from the fact that there can be only one being per se through essence and intrinsically necessary, as we shall show below in demonstrating the existence of God; but that being cannot be prime matter, unless we fall into the

[16] Vide Alcinoum, III lib. de Doct. Plat., c. 9; Bessar., lib. cont. Calum. Plat., c. 5.

error of those who said that prime matter is God, which St. Thomas rightly calls most foolish, I, question 3, article 8, and I Against the Gentiles, chapter 17; for there is no substantial being more distant from God than prime matter, nor anything more repugnant to God than that function for which matter is posited, which is to receive and to be passive potency, to be actuated and perfected; therefore matter is not being per se necessary and through essence; therefore it is not from itself actual entity, until it is made by another and receives existence. And it is confirmed, for to be being in act from itself and by force of essence alone is a great perfection, which the most perfect finite beings such as the heavens and angels do not have; indeed that alone is an indication of infinite perfection; since therefore matter is imperfect, this perfection cannot belong to it; but all these things must be treated more extensively below in the places cited.

Corollaries from the Above Doctrine

16. First. From this conclusion it follows first that matter was made through creation and could not have been made otherwise, and in this sense must be taken what Aristotle calls it ingenerable, I Physics, chapter 9; for if he understands that matter is altogether unfactible, he errs completely, as we have shown; therefore he ought to be understood that it is not producible in such a way, namely, through generation. This is evident, because matter, since it is the first subject, cannot be produced from a subject, otherwise it would suppose another subject prior, which is repugnant; therefore it cannot be made through generation; for that is made through generation which is made from a presupposed subject; therefore it remains that it can only be effected through creation, because it can only be made from nothing. You will say: this is repugnant to the axiom received by all philosophers: From nothing nothing is made. I respond this is only true with respect to natural agents, which are finite and only have the power of acting through form; but not with respect to God, who is of

infinite power and supreme actuality and the first and per se being, who is the first cause of all participated being insofar as it is such. But from this it is rightly concluded that only God can be the effecter of prime matter, because creation is proper to him, as will be shown below.

17. Second. Second, it is inferred from what has been said that the entity of matter is incorruptible, which can be demonstrated proportionally by the reason made above; for what can be corrupted can be resolved into underlying matter; but matter cannot be resolved into prior matter. Hence to be corrupted, if it is taken properly, belongs only to the composite of matter and form, whose union is dissoluble. But if it is extended to those things which are corrupted together (so to speak), thus it can also belong to form which depends on matter in its being, because it is so destroyed that at least its subject remains; but if the first subject also were destroyed, it would not be corruption, but annihilation. You will say that by this reason it is rightly proven that matter is not corruptible in the said property, but not that it cannot be altogether destroyed or lose being at the corruption of the composite; but it seems that it can be corrupted or destroyed in this way; for a natural agent is often powerful to expel one form and not to introduce another; therefore in this way it is powerful to destroy matter, since it cannot be conserved without form. I respond that form can never be expelled from matter naturally except through the introduction of another, whether this introduction is made by the proximate agent principally, or only instrumentally or dispositively; and this mode of generation and corruption is required by the very natural order of things. All of which must be declared ex professo in what follows. But from this it happens that matter cannot be naturally corrupted or destroyed according to its proper being, but only according to union to this or that form or according to privation of some form, as Aristotle said in the cited place; but God through his power could destroy matter, not by corrupting, but by annihilating, suspending the influence by which he conserves it, and the

concurrence by which he introduces form in it; but this is only through the extrinsic power of God; hence it does not prevent matter from being of itself perpetual and incorruptible.

SECTION V
WHETHER MATTER IS PURE POTENCY, AND IN WHAT SENSE THIS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED

1. The solution of the arguments which were posited against our opinion in the preceding section depends on the resolution of the present question; for it is not to be denied by us that matter is pure potency, since all philosophers seem to agree in that assertion; but the true sense of that expression must be explained.

Various Opinions

2. Therefore the disciples of St. Thomas commonly interpret that matter is called pure potency because neither from itself nor in itself does it have any existence except through form[17]. But truly Scotus, Henry and others cited above distinguish a twofold act, namely, formal and entitative, and they teach that matter from itself has entitative act, but not formal act, and consequently they say that matter is called pure potency in order to formal act, but not in order to entitative act.

3. But certain modern authors[18], although they do not dissent from Scotus in the matter, nevertheless do not approve the mode of speaking; for they confess that matter has proper existence, distinct

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[17] Capreol., In I, dist. 3, q. 3, a. 2, et In II, dist. 13, a., 3; Soncin. et Iavel., IX Metaph., q. 2, et locis sup. cit.

[18] Fonsec., lib. I Metaph., c. 7, q. 3, sect. 7 et 8: Conimbricenses, lib. III Phys., c. 9, q. 3, a. 1.

from the existence of form, and consequently they teach that matter is actually outside nothing; but they deny that it should be called entitative act, both for the reason made above, that it is neither informing act nor subsisting; and also because although matter has an act of existence proper to it, nevertheless it is not its existence, because in every creature existence is distinguished at least ex natura rei from essence.

4. Nevertheless, if the thing which those authors teach is not displeasing, I do not see why the mode of speaking could be displeasing, because neither does such a mode of speaking conflict with Aristotle, as we shall show, nor does it depart from the common and received use of terms. For in as many ways as potency is said, in so many can act also be said; but a thing is said to be in potency, either passive because it can receive act, or active because it can effect, or objective or logical because, although it is not, it is not repugnant to it to be; thus therefore a thing can be said to be act or in act, either with respect to receptive potency or to objective potency, omitting for now active potency which brings nothing to the present matter. Therefore prime matter, although it is pure receptive potency and thus in its essence includes no formal act, which is signified by that particle "pure," nevertheless after it has been created, it cannot be said to be in pure objective potency; therefore for this reason it is rightly said to be or to have entitative act.

5. Nor does it matter anything to this whether it is or is not its existence. First indeed, because when matter is called pure potency, it is not only denied that it is act, but also that it consists of act and potency; but if matter has proper existence, although we grant that it is not its existence, nevertheless we cannot deny that it consists of its essence and existence; therefore it includes act; for actual existence is the act of essence according to all and especially in that opinion; therefore matter cannot be called pure potency in order to entitative act. Then according to that opinion act is not sufficiently divided into formal and subsisting; for, besides these there is given an act of

existence, which is not subsisting, since it is received in essence, nor is it formal properly since it is not form, but it can be called the terminative act of essence; therefore, since matter insofar as it is distinguished in reality from form includes this act, it cannot be called pure potency in order to entitative act. Moreover, according to that opinion of the real distinction or ex natura rei of existence from actual essence, it cannot be denied that actual essence as it is co-distinguished from existence has some actuality which essence conceived in objective potency alone does not have; therefore actual essence itself, granted that it is not its existence, is some entitative act, that is, something other than pure objective potency; indeed, unless actual essence is so conceived, that opinion which distinguishes it from existence, as thing from thing or from real mode, cannot be understood.

6. Therefore, whatever we may think about the distinction of essence and existence, certainly matter as it is in reality distinct from form is some entitative act, nevertheless in a diverse way; for those who do not distinguish existence from essence ex natura rei but only in reason, will say that matter as it is actual entity is its very existence and actual essence, which in reality are the same. And because according to this opinion, the entitative act of a thing is nothing other than its existence or actual entity, therefore it is rightly concluded that matter is some entitative act. But according to the other opinion distinguishing existence from actual essence ex natura rei, and nevertheless admitting that prime matter has its proper existence which it retains under any form, it must be said that matter besides the act of form is both its actual essence and has moreover proper act of existence. But those who so posit real distinction between essence and existence that they deny that matter has proper existence beyond the existence which form brings, will consequently say that matter is pure potency in order to act, both formal and entitative or of existence; nevertheless they cannot deny that it is some actual entity in essential being. Although, because they themselves hold that the actuality of

essence depends entirely on distinct existence, for that reason they can say that matter, even if it has entity of essence in reality, nevertheless that is so potential that it is not capable of existence except through the mediation of form; and in this sense they can call it pure potency, even in order to entitative act.

7. Matter Existing in Reality Per Se Is Entitative Act. Since therefore we think that matter has its partial existence and existence is not distinguished a parte rei from actual essence but only by our mode of conceiving, we also judge it most true that matter as it is actual entity in reality, is also in reality some entitative act, and according to reason or our mode of conceiving it is composed of being and essence as from terminating act and quasi-objective potency. And both are sufficiently established from what was just said against the superior opinion. But I always speak of matter as it is actual entity, because if it is conceived according to that only which it has from itself with all efficiency excluded, thus it has no actuality in itself, but only is in the power of cause and from itself only has non-repugnance of being; nevertheless this is not proper to matter; for even form, indeed even every creature considered according to itself, is in this way in pure potency; therefore it is necessary to speak of matter as it is actual entity, or, which is the same, insofar as according to itself it has proper act of existing distinct from the act of form.

8. But in order to solve the difficulties touched on in the superior section and to explain the mode of speaking of philosophers and to remove all ambiguity of terms, I note that the name act can be taken in multiple ways; for sometimes it is said absolutely, sometimes respectively; for sometimes it is called act because it actuates something, in which way form is the act of matter. And this I call respective act, because it is the act of another. But sometimes it is called act, because in itself it is something actual and not potential, although it actuates nothing else, in which way God is called act, and this I call act said absolutely. Again, each of these acts can be subdivided; for actuating act is one thing physical and formal, as is

physical form; another is metaphysical act, which is multiple; for one is the act of essence, as difference; another of existence, as existence, and there can also be added the act or mode of subsistence. But act said absolutely, one is act simply, another secundum quid. The former is that act, which in the genus of being simply or of substance is so complete that it is neither constituted through physical act distinct from itself, nor is actuated through it, or needs it for existing. Or it can be explained otherwise: that being is said to be act simply which from the force of its actuality alone includes the formal perfection which other composite beings are wont to have through substantial informing act. Hence, although such absolute act is not actuating or informing act, nevertheless it can be said to be formal act in an eminent way, that is, having per se that complement of perfection which is wont to be conferred through informing act to those beings which are completed through composition. But act secundum quid will be called that being which has some actuality, insofar as it is actually outside nothing; it nevertheless has it incomplete and imperfect, because it is not so sufficient that it does not need another act, both so that it may be completed in the nature of being simply, and also so that it may exist.

Resolution of the Question

9. Matter Does Not Exclude Every Act. Therefore it must be said first that matter is not called pure potency with respect to every metaphysical act, that is, because it includes no metaphysical act; for this cannot be true. First, because prime matter in its essential concept can be understood as composed from genus and difference; as, for example, if matter of heaven and of these inferior things are distinguished specifically, this matter of generable things of which we now treat consists of the common genus of matter and proper difference, which can be taken from the order to the form of generable being; therefore this matter has its formal metaphysical act, by which

it is constituted in its essence. And it is confirmed, for matter by its nature has some perfection and transcendental goodness, as St. Thomas also taught, III Against the Gentiles, chapter 20. For it is certain that the composite of matter and form is something more perfect than form alone would be; therefore matter has some perfection, which it adds to the composite. Also matter itself is desirable and fitting not only as a means but per se, because by reason of its perfection it is fitting to this form or composite; therefore matter from its nature has some proper perfection; but perfection cannot be understood without some actuality, at least transcendental. Moreover matter has proper act of existence, as has been shown. Finally it has partial and proportioned act of subsistence; for it altogether needs this in order to be able to be the first subject; for the first subject underlies all things; but it is prior to subsist in itself than to underlie others. Concerning which matter we shall say more below in treating of subsistence. Therefore prime matter cannot be pure potency so as to exclude every metaphysical actuating act.

10. What act matter admits. I say second: matter is not such pure potency that it lacks some entitative act in a qualified sense. This assertion has been sufficiently declared and proven from what was said concerning Scotus's opinion. And it is sufficiently gathered from the nature of the first subject; for in the first subject a real passive potency is necessary, or rather it is essentially passive potency itself; but passive potency cannot be understood without some entitative actuality. For how can it be understood that something is truly and really receptive of another, unless it is something in itself? Hence the Commentator rightly says, in III De Caelo, comment 29, that every passive potentiality is founded in some actuality. And St. Thomas, in I, q. 45, a. 1, ad 1, says that matter is not said to be a being in potency in the way that a possible being is said to be in potency from the mere non-repugnance of terms; therefore he supposes that there is some being in act founding real passive potency, or rather that it is real passive potency in the genus of substance.

11. How matter is pure potency. I say third: matter is said to be pure potency with respect to informing or actuating act and with respect to act spoken of absolutely and simply. This is explained, for first matter is not actuating act, nor informing, as is evident from the nature of the first subject. Then in its intrinsic and essential concept it does not include informing physical act; for we have shown that it is a simple entity, which is also gathered from the nature of the first subject. Moreover, matter is such an entity that by itself alone it is not sufficient to exist without a substantial act perfecting and actuating it; hence from the force of its precise entity it includes no formal act formally or eminently, and therefore it is not act absolutely and simply. Finally, whatever entity is in first matter, all of it is for exercising the office of receptive potency of substantial form; for it is primarily and per se instituted for this, and therefore, as we said above, it includes in its essential nature a transcendental relation to form. From these things therefore it is established that it is rightly called pure potency in the genus of substance and is optimally explained in the aforesaid manner; for since matter is a simple entity and all of it is receptive potency, it is optimally called pure potency. But just as it is usually said that an exclusive expression does not exclude concomitance, so that expression "pure" does not exclude the entity and actuality in a qualified sense necessary for the nature of real potency, but it excludes first all other office except that of passive potency, and then it excludes the nature of complete act, or that which is spoken of simply and absolutely, and (which comes to the same thing) it excludes every formal act, both that which properly informs and that which simply constitutes perfect and complete act.

12. In what being potency and being in potency differ. Being act and being in act differ. But on account of the usage of words it should be considered that one thing is signified strictly when it is said that matter is pure potency, another if it is said to be in pure potency. For the first is simply true and has the legitimate sense explained; the second, however, is at minimum ambiguous; for being in pure potency

strictly signifies the privation of actual existence; hence it is only said of that which actually is nothing, but can be, which cannot be said of matter after it has been created or co-created. For although it is close to nothing, it is nevertheless not nothing, but a true thing, as we said above with Augustine. And in a similar way we can distinguish these expressions: to be in act, or to be act; for matter to be in act is simply true, because this signifies nothing other than that matter is in the nature of things and exists, which is true; just as it is true that matter is created, receives form, and composes a composite, all of which include existing; but for matter to be act is at minimum ambiguous; for it seems to signify absolutely that it is actuating act or certainly that it is act simply; and therefore this should not be admitted absolutely, but with some diminishing addition, namely, that it is imperfect entitative act and in a qualified sense.

13. Explaining the premises about the potency of matter as consonant with Aristotle. That this explanation of matter in the nature of pure potency is consonant with the sayings of Aristotle and other philosophers is evident. For in I Physics, text 69, comparing first matter to the matter of artifacts, he says that it is related to form and essence simply as wood is to a statue or the form of a statue. Hence he concludes that matter is something formless; but by these and similar sayings only every formal and complete act is excluded from matter, not entitative act, incomplete and as it were inchoate, without which real receptive potency cannot be. Then this is established from the definition of matter which he gives in I Physics, c. 9, text 82, saying that matter is the first subject from which something comes to be per se when it is present. For matter is said to be present in the thing generated, because through its entity it remains in the generated thing, composing it per se, and according to that entity Aristotle says there that matter is prior to the generated thing, and is ungenerable and incorruptible. And finally he says that matter is being per se, but non-being per accidens by reason of privation; therefore he does not exclude from matter all entitative actuality, but formal actuality,

toward which it is in potency. Finally, in VII Metaphysics, and in other places, when he says that matter is not quantum, nor quale, nor this something, he only excludes from the entity of matter composition from informing act and every formal act. Nor is anything else really necessary for the office and function of matter, as is evident from that argument which Plato also brings forward in the Timaeus, and from that of Aristotle in III De Caelo, c. 8, namely, because what is receptive of others ought not to have in act those things of which it is susceptible, but only in potency; but matter is susceptible of formal act and complete being; therefore with respect to these it is said to be pure potency, not with respect to its proper entity. Moreover, in the same sense Averroes said that matter is substantiated through being able, because it is such a substance that all of it is ordered to receiving and therefore is essentially incomplete and potential. And in the same way St. Thomas declares the potentiality of matter in q. de Spiritualibus creat., a. 1, citing Augustine, lib. I Genesis ad litteram, c. 14 and 15.

Arguments from the Preceding Section are Resolved

14. Matter metaphysically composed of act and potency, not physically. Through these things therefore sufficient response has been given to all the testimonies which in the preceding section were brought against our opinion. Indeed, the arguments also have been almost resolved; for they prove optimally that matter is pure potency, but not in any other sense than that which we have explained, which will appear more clearly by responding in form to the argument made there. For when it is said that matter is not composed of act and potency, we concede that this is true concerning proper physical act and potency, but metaphysically it must be conceded that matter is composed of act and potency proportionate to itself, that is, from genus and difference, essence and existence, incomplete nature and

subsistence. But when it is inferred that there would be potency prior to matter, it is responded that concerning physical potency this is inconvenient and plainly repugnant, but does not follow from what has been said, since we do not say that matter is composed of potency and physical act. If however there is discussion about metaphysical potency, thus it is true that matter in common is conceived as prior to this species of matter, and the essence of matter as prior to its existence, not insofar as it is a being in act but absolutely, and similarly the nature of matter in some genus to be prior to its partial subsistence. Nor however does it follow strictly that there is given in the thing itself some potency prior to matter, but that in matter itself there is given one nature prior to another; nevertheless always in that nature which is conceived as prior, the very potency of matter is included either confusedly as in the concept of matter in common, or as possible as in the precise concept of the essence of matter, or by way of partial nature only, with the partial mode of subsisting being set aside.

15. Whether every act is the principle of some operation. To the other part by which it is proved that matter is in no way act, we concede that it is not actuating or informing act, nor is it act simply consummated and perfect in itself. Which at most the arguments show by which it is there proved that matter is not subsisting act; it is not however proved that it is not incomplete and entitative act. Hence in this sense I deny that partial entity or subsisting act is more perfect than any informing act, because that very partial entity participates less in the nature of act than informing act. Then I deny that there cannot be given incomplete subsisting act; for the very essence of matter subsisting is by its own partial subsistence, and with that addition it can be called act in a qualified sense, that is, according to its entity, by which it is separated from nothing and from possible being. But all the other things which are adduced there proceed concerning completely subsisting act and including formal act by a simple and more excellent mode. And in the same sense it is true what is added

there in a certain confirmation, that every act is the principle of some operation; for this is true concerning formal act, whether informing or completely subsisting; it is not however necessary that it be universally true concerning every partial and entitative act, because it is not necessary that every entity be the principle of some operation properly and in the genus of efficient cause; for it can be instituted for exercising another genus of cause, and thus the entity of matter is for receiving, not for acting.

Objections Against the Superior Resolution

16. But there still remain to be solved some other objections which are usually made against the last assertion of this section. First, nothing has actuality except insofar as it is, and therefore being itself is the actuality of all things, as St. Thomas says, I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3; but matter does not have being except through form, as Avicenna says, lib. II of his Metaphysics, c. 2; and Boethius, lib. De Unitate et uno, says that all being in created things is from form; therefore. Second, because otherwise from matter and form there would not be made a per se one, because from two beings in act there is not made a per se one; therefore from subject and accident there is not made a per se one because the being of the subject is one thing, the being of the accident another. Third: matter is physically altogether simple; therefore either it is wholly act, or wholly potency, because simple entity cannot consist of physical act and potency. But it cannot be said that it is wholly act, since it is essentially potency; therefore it is altogether potency including nothing of act. Fourth, because pure act is so much act that it has nothing mixed of potentiality or receptive potency; therefore on the contrary pure potency is so much potency that it has nothing of actuality mixed in; for the nature of opposites is the same; and because pure potency ought to be maximally distant from pure act; but it would not be maximally distant if it included

something of actuality. Fifth, because if matter is something in act, therefore either substance or accident; not the second, as is evident per se; nor also the first, because it is potency toward substance; but what is potency toward something is not actually that very thing, for these two are repugnant. Last, because otherwise matter could be known per se and directly and by proper cognition, which philosophers seem commonly to deny with Aristotle and Plato in the places cited.

17. How every being is from form. The first and second objections are to be treated ex professo below, in the disputation concerning the essence and being of creatures; now briefly that principle "Every being is from form" can be explained in two ways. First, concerning specific and complete being. Second, that every being is from form either intrinsically giving and composing it, or at least terminating in some way its dependence, and in this way the very being of matter can be said to be from form insofar as it depends on it, as has been said. But the other axiom "From two beings in act there is not made a per se one" cannot be understood concerning any actual entities whatsoever; for rather it is impossible for a complete being per se and in act to be composed except from incomplete actual beings; for what is nothing, as we have often said[19], cannot really compose and especially a per se one being. Therefore it should be understood concerning beings complete in act in their genera; for these are neither per se ordered, nor rightly cohere for composing a per se one. But we do not say that matter is a being in act in this way, but rather we say that it is like a certain inchoation of being, which is naturally inclined and per se joined to form as completing integral being, as we will explain more broadly later.

18. To the third it is responded that matter is wholly potency and wholly act of the kind we have explained, not through composition of act with potency, but through identity and (so to speak) through intimate and transcendental inclusion; for not every

[19] Vide disp. IV, de Uno per se.

potency is opposed to every act, but with proportion; receptive potency therefore is not opposed to incomplete entitative act, but rather essentially includes it.

19. How pure potency is equated with pure act. To the fourth it is said first, just as pure act includes no receptive potency of another act, so pure potency includes no act actuating another, and as to this the proportion holds, but not as to entitative act. Hence if there is discussion about this, the consequence is denied, because it involves a repugnance that there be real receptive potency, however pure, without intimately including the actuality of being. On the contrary however it is not repugnant so to include the actuality of being that it involves no potentiality. For potentiality bespeaks imperfection; but it is not repugnant that there be given perfection so pure that it excludes every imperfection; but it is repugnant that there be given real pure imperfection without any perfection; for rather it would be nothing and pure negation of every perfection. Hence, just as theologians say that there is given supreme good which includes no evil, but not that there is given supreme evil which is such that it has no goodness or is founded in it, so, although there is given pure act which excludes every potency, nevertheless there cannot be given pure potency which excludes every actuality, even entitative and incomplete. But what was objected about the maximum distance between pure potency and pure act can first be resolved by denying that it is of the nature of pure potency that it be maximally distant from pure act; for the matter of heaven is pure potency and nevertheless does not maximally distance from pure act; for the matter of these inferior things is more distant, since it is more imperfect, and it is still uncertain whether there can be made another matter less perfect than this inferior one, and consequently more distant from the perfection of God. Accidents also are more distant from divine perfection than first matter. A twofold distance can also be distinguished: one can be called negative, such as is between being and nothing; the other positive from the part of each extreme. Therefore it is not of the nature of pure potency that it be

distant from God in the first way but in the second; and therefore, although we admit that pure potency is maximally distant from pure act, it does not follow that pure potency ought to include no actuality, because that distance is not maximum compared to the negative, but between positives; and therefore it requires some agreement between the extremes in entity, granted that agreement is minimal.

20. To the fifth it is responded that matter is substance, as Aristotle expressly teaches, VIII Metaphysics, from the beginning and often elsewhere. Hence matter is not potency toward the whole breadth of substance, but toward form and toward the being of the composite; but toward the substantial entity of matter it is not in potency, but is actually such entity. For it is repugnant that there be given real and receptive potency with respect to the whole genus and breadth of substance, as it comprehends complete and incomplete, because substance is prior to accident, and therefore such potency, since it is the first subject, cannot be accident but substance; nor can it be in potency toward itself; therefore neither can it be in potency toward the whole breadth of substance. In which there is great difference between substantial and accidental form, for the accidental presupposes being of a nobler genus, namely substance, and therefore it can happen that the subject or potency toward accident is not accident in any way, that is, neither complete nor incomplete; but substantial form does not presuppose being of a nobler genus, and therefore potency toward such form cannot not be some kind of substance, at least incomplete.

SECTION VI

HOW MATTER CAN BE KNOWN

1. Matter can by itself terminate direct cognition. God has an idea of matter. The final objection requires that we say a few things about the cognition or cognoscibility of matter. Concerning this, many things are said by authors; however, it must be briefly stated that

it is one thing to speak absolutely about the cognition of matter according to itself, and another thing indeed about the mode by which it can be known by us. In the former consideration, I concede that matter can be known by direct and proper cognition; for thus it is known both by God and by angels through a proper species or concept. Although theologians dispute whether God has a proper idea of matter and some seem to deny it with Plato in the Timaeus, nevertheless they cannot truly deny this, except perhaps regarding the mode of speaking. For Plato denied that matter was created by God, and therefore it is not surprising that he denied God an idea of matter, although it is not likely that he denied God proper cognition, at least speculative, of matter. But since according to true doctrine God is the creator of matter, he cannot entirely lack an idea of matter, since he operates all things through intellect and will. However, that idea is customarily said not to be proper, that is, adequate to matter itself, because God does not have another idea of the whole and of the parts, but through the idea of the composite he represents matter, as St. Thomas says, I, q. 15, a. 3, ad 3. This, however, does not prevent him from representing matter exactly, directly, and as it is in itself; whence Cajetan there admits a speculative account of matter, although not an idea. Albert, however, In I, dist. 35, a. 10, did not hesitate to concede even an idea of matter. In a similar way, an angel can be said to know matter directly and through a proper species, not because that species represents nothing else, for perhaps the same species that represents the whole composite is the principle of knowing matter, but because such a species represents matter according to its proper nature and leads directly into its cognition without any metaphor or analogy.

2. Matter cannot be comprehended without the form being known. You will say: matter cannot be known without form even by God or an angel; therefore it can never be known by proper cognition. Some respond by denying the antecedent; for since matter has its own absolute entity distinct from form, according to that it can be precisely conceived, either by a concept really distinct from others, as in an

angel, who can voluntarily contemplate matter alone, or at least by a concept distinct in reason, as in God, which Scotus holds in Prolog., q. 1, and In II, dist. 12, q. 1; and Themistius inclines to this, I Phys., text. 61; who speak absolutely about the cognition of matter. But it seems more probable that matter cannot be essentially and comprehensively conceived as it is in itself without form, at least as the term of the essential aptitude that matter has toward form, as authors more frequently teach and is taken from Aristotle, II Phys., c. 2, where he says that matter is among those things that are toward something, namely by a transcendental relation, as we declared above; but things of this kind cannot be known without their terms. Whence, with the antecedent admitted, the consequent is denied, because a proper concept is accommodated to each thing, and therefore if a thing is relative, then it is understood by a proper concept when it is conceived through relation to another. Nor does it follow from this that matter does not have in itself and from itself the proper actuality of its entity, but only that it does not have that without transcendental relation to form; for even conversely, form, as informing or as informative, cannot be conceived without respect to the matter of which it is the act.

3. If indeed we speak about the cognition of matter as regards us, in that cognition we can consider either the mode of inquiring and finding cognition of matter, or the term of this inquiry or the ultimate concept that we can form about matter. As to the first, it is true what Aristotle says, I Phys., c. 7, text. 69, and from him Damascene, in his Phys., c. 3, that matter is known by us through proportion or analogy to the matter of artificial things or to the subject of accidental changes; for we do not arrive at cognition of matter except through the way of change, as was declared above. But this does not arise from the fact that matter has no entity and actuality, but from the fact that substantial change is more hidden and cannot be sensed per se; and therefore it is not perceived by us except through order to accidental and sensible changes. Indeed, from this it also happens that substantial form is not known by us directly, but through sensible signs, as we

shall soon see. And for this reason Plato also said, in the Timaeus, that matter is known by spurious cognition, as Simplicius noted, I Phys., tex. 96.

4. What concept of matter we can form. As to the second, however, it must be said that we do indeed arrive at some proper concept of prime matter, yet not entirely distinct and as it is in itself but partly negative, partly confused. This whole assertion stands from the definition of matter handed down by Aristotle, namely, to be the first subject, etc.; for through that description we explain some objective concept; but that is proper to matter; just as the definition itself is. In that definition, however, subject is something confused and common; but it is truly added that it be first so that it is limited to matter: but first imports a negation of a prior subject. It is the same that we commonly declare the nature of matter through the notion of pure potency, for the notion of potency is confused and common; but truly the word "pure" expresses a negation of every form composing or constituting matter itself. But the reason is that we scarcely know simple things by proper concepts unless by adjoining some negation, wherefore here is the more frequent mode of declaring the nature of matter through the lack of form and complete actuality, etc. And thus Aristotle describes it, VII Metaph., text. 8, saying that matter is not quantum, nor quale, etc.; and therefore perhaps he said in the same book, text. 35, that matter is unknowable per se. Sometimes indeed, as St. Bonaventure noted, In II, dist. 3, a. 1, q. 2, we seem to declare the nature of matter through purely positive concepts, as if we should say it is an incomplete substance receptive of substantial form; but what is said to be incomplete imports a negation. And finally, we never declare the nature of matter unless we adjoin a negation of every formal act constituting it. And therefore Augustine said, lib. De Natura boni, c. 18, that matter can scarcely be thought through any species but through the privation of every species. And lib. XII Confess., c. 5, he says that we attempt to know matter by not knowing, or to not know by knowing. For just as shadows are seen by us when light is not seen,

so when we understand what is formless, which is to not know form, we know matter in some way[20]. And conversely, when we know something formed or composed with form, we do not know matter, or rather we know that it is not matter and we remove something, so that we may conceive matter alone. But this does not arise from the fact that matter has no entity, but from the fact that it has that entity so simple and potential and hidden under substantial and accidental forms, that it cannot be investigated or conceived by us in another way.

SECTION VII
WHAT MATTER CAUSES

1. We have explained the nature of matter and have incidentally touched upon all its causes, namely, the efficient, which is form or the composite, and in some way the formal, which is also form, about which we shall say more below. But it has no material cause besides itself, or its integral parts, since it is simple and the first subject. What remains therefore is that we declare its causality (which is chiefly intended in this section). Four things, however, can be desired in this causality, as in others: first, what matter causes; second, by what it causes or what is on its part the principal and proximate principle of causing; third, what is the necessary condition; fourth, what is the causality itself by which the cause is constituted in act.

Various Opinions

2. Concerning the first part, some say that the proper and unique effect of matter is the composite itself, which can be taken from the definition of matter, namely, the first subject from which something is made, etc. For properly only the composite is made. Likewise, matter is an intrinsic cause; but only to the composite is it

[20] Lege Aegidium, I Hexam., c. 3.

compared as an intrinsic cause. Likewise, matter is not the cause of form; therefore of the composite alone; the antecedent is clear because matter is not the principle of form; for Aristotle says, 1 Phys., that one principle is not from another. Finally, because matter has one causality; therefore also one caused thing or adequate effect. So holds Maior, In II, dist. 12, q. 2, citing Avicenna, VI suae Metaph., tract. 2, c. 4. Likewise Albert, II Phys., tract. 2, c. 1. Who however seems to speak equivocally; for he says that matter is not the cause of form except per accidens, because form is not made but the composite; whence he does not seem to deny that form is caused by matter in the way that it is made.

3. But others want form also to be the proper effect of matter, not indeed every form, but that which is educed from the potency of matter. This opinion seems common. For no one whom I have seen excludes the composite from the causality of matter. Although Averroes and others say that matter is not of the essence of the composite, which we shall dispute below in its proper place, they nevertheless do not deny that matter is the cause of the composite, nor can they deny it since it is evident that it consists of it. This second opinion therefore does not differ from the first as to this, but adds the causality of matter in form, which is educed from its potency. And it is proved as to this part, because such form depends on matter; therefore it is its effect. Likewise, this form is educed from the potency of matter; therefore matter contributes in its genus to the eduction of that; therefore it is the cause of that. From these reasons it seems to be concluded on the contrary that matter is not the cause of the rational form, because this neither depends on matter, nor is educed from its potency.

4. But Fonseca also judges this opinion insufficient, lib. V Metaph., c. 2, q. 1, sec. 2, whom the Coimbrans imitate, II Phys., c. 7, q. 8, a. 1; and therefore he adds that matter is the cause of every form, even the rational, namely as informing, and he says this is the general causality of matter. This opinion seems to be convinced by this reason

alone, that, although the substance or existence of form sometimes does not depend on matter, nevertheless the information of form always depends on matter as on its proper potency and subject; therefore form as informing depends on matter as on a material cause; it is therefore its effect. This can be confirmed, because the soul depends on matter as on the term of its being to which it has an essential relation, as St. Thomas speaks, q. de Anim., a. 1, ad 12. The rational soul also has in some way to depend on matter as to the beginning of its being, because being is not naturally due to it except in such matter on which it depends in union; therefore.

5. Besides these, however, we can add that matter is also the material cause of generation itself, which is distinct from form and from the composite by the nature of the thing. And it is proved because matter is the principle of generation, as Aristotle testifies, and it is a principle per se and on which generation essentially depends; it is therefore a true and proper cause of generation, for it influences it in its own way most properly.

6. How many and what are the effects of matter. From these things, therefore, there seem to be collected four effects of matter distinct by the nature of the thing, namely, the composite, the form, which is material, the union of form with matter, and the generation of the whole composite. For that all these things are caused by matter seems sufficiently proved. But that all those things are distinct, at least by the nature of the thing, can easily be shown. For form is distinguished from the composite as part from whole. But union is distinguished from form, at least as a mode distinct by the nature of the thing and separable from it, as is clear in the rational soul and the same could happen in other forms at least by absolute power, just as it happened in the quantity of the Eucharist, about which more below when treating of formal cause. But generation differs from all the said things as becoming from the thing made; whence in the thing itself it is separable from them, for when generation is completed and the action of the agent ceases, the form remains united to matter and

constituting the composite in actual being. Nor does it matter that when generation ceases, conservation takes its place by which the effect is conserved at least by the first cause, both because this is as it were per accidens to the proper nature and distinction of generation; for, although per impossibile we should understand the generated thing not to depend in being conserved on another cause but only in becoming on the generator, union, form and composite would remain with generation ceasing. And also because, although after generation, which is from the proximate cause, conservation succeeds, which is from the first cause alone, nevertheless the union of form with matter perseveres numerically the same, just as the form is also numerically the same and the composite the same; and this is sufficient that generation be understood to be a mode distinct by the nature of the thing from all those; therefore those four things which we showed to be caused by matter are distinct by the nature of the thing.

Resolution of the Question

7. Generation is rather a way to the effects of matter than one of them. But although these things are true in reality, nevertheless the adequate effect of matter is contained in the composite itself. This is caused by matter in a twofold way, namely, in becoming and in actual being; in becoming indeed insofar as matter is the cause of generation; for it does not cause that except insofar as it is a way to the composite or insofar as through it the composite depends in becoming on matter itself. Whence, although generation is caused by matter, nevertheless it is not so much caused as an effect as as a way to the effect; and therefore, although it is distinguished by the nature of the thing, it is not considered to increase the number of effects, because where there is one thing for the sake of another, there is only one. Just as with respect to the efficient cause, action is something distinct by the nature of the thing from the term, as heating from heat, and both are from the agent; for heating flows and is made by the one heating, yet

not properly as an effect, but as a way to the effect, and therefore it is not considered to be placed in number with the effect. But truly in actual being matter is the cause of the composite insofar as it composes it; but it does not compose it unless insofar as form is united to matter itself, sustaining the form itself if it is such that it needs that foundation. Therefore in this adequate effect, which is to compose the composite, is included the causality of matter with respect to form, either as informing, or even as existing according to the requirement of form. Indeed, these effects are so conjoined and as it were ordered to composing one adequate effect, that the causality of matter concerning them does not seem to be distinguished by the nature of the thing, but only by relation or precision or inadequate conception of our intellect, by reason of which we explain this causality by diverse formulas of speaking. For we say that form depends on matter as on a recipient or as on a co-part, but the composite as on a composing part; by which words we explain that there is one relation of matter to form and another of matter to the composite; with this however it stands that the mode of causality in which these relations are founded, is the same in reality. That this is so we shall show a little below, and consequently we shall also declare that speaking of actual causality, the causality of matter with respect to the composite in becoming is distinguished more among themselves from the causality of the same composite in actual being, than the causality with respect to the composite and form differs, taking both in becoming or both in actual being.

Judgment on Other Opinions

8. In execution the prior effect of matter is material form, in intention the whole composite. From which finally it is easy to recall all the opinions adduced to the truth. For the first considered the adequate and per se primarily intended effect of matter and therefore said it is the composite itself. Nevertheless it did not deny or could not

deny either the double nature and as it were state of the same composite, namely, in becoming and in actual being, or that matter is the cause of it in both ways, or that it is the true cause of generation and eduction, just as in general the mobile is the material cause of motion. Nor does that opinion deny that matter by composing the composite influences in its genus into form, at least as informing. Indeed, it seems to be said that by the order of nature and as it were by the way of origin, the causality of matter is proximately begun from here, because matter by receiving act composes the composite. But by the order of intention it primarily tends into the composite and is ultimately terminated to it, and therefore that is properly designated and named the effect of matter. Just as an agent is said properly to effect the composite, when nevertheless its causality also proximately concerns form, by educing it and uniting it to matter. With this understanding presupposed, there seems to be only disagreement about the name, whether matter should be said to cause form or not, as Maior also confesses, loc. cit., signifying that he does not dissent in reality; yet there is no reason why we should doubt in that locution, because the word "causing" is most ample, which is customarily attributed not only to the ultimate term of generation or composition, but also to action and to anything that truly depends on another.

9. Matter can be said to be the principle of form. Nor do the arguments of that opinion prove anything else; for the first two only prove that matter is primarily and per se the cause of the composite. To the third, however, it is responded that the same must be said about principle as about cause; for matter can also be called the principle of form, either because it is educed from its potency, or because it is united to it. But what Aristotle says, that one principle is not from another, must be understood either as to composition, because one is not composed from another, or as to effection simply and primarily intended by nature; for thus one principle is not made from another, but what consists of them. But the arguments of the other opinions are not to be solved, for they correctly prove some

causality of matter in all those things; yet they do not exclude that all that causality is included in the causality of the composite and is ordered to it. Only one could specially doubt about the union of the rational soul, how it depends on matter, since it is spiritual in itself; but about this union, what and what kind it is, will be treated ex professo below; now it is briefly said that union has such a mode of being from not only the material (so to speak) entity but from the formal nature of union that it essentially depends on the other extreme to which the union is made, and in that genus and mode in which union is made to it. Whence if it is made to a subject, it depends on that in the genus of material cause; if to a form, in the genus of formal cause; if to a subsistence, as on a pure term; in which way the union of humanity, although it is created, essentially depends on the uncreated Word; thus therefore the union of the rational soul, although it is spiritual in itself, can depend on matter as on a subject to which that form is united.

SECTION VIII

BY WHAT DOES MATTER CAUSE

1. The opinion of certain thinkers. Just as in created efficient causes it is customary to distinguish the principal principle of acting and the proximate principle and the necessary conditions for acting, so some think that all these things can and should be distinguished in the causality of matter. For they say that the principal reason for causing materially is the very essence of matter; for that is the first foundation and basis of all material causality and sustentation, and from it as such the composite essentially consists. However, they say that the proximate principle of this causality is the potency of matter; for through it proximately it receives form; for every act is proximately received in a potency proportioned to it; moreover, that potency is a property of matter itself given to it by nature for causing its effect, as the Commentator thinks, de Substantia orbis, c. 1, and I Phys., text.

70; and there Themistius, text. 69. Their reasoning is that every potency is founded in some entity and essence. Some indeed add that this potency by which matter proximately causes is its quantity, because prime matter considered precisely without quantity is not apt to be the subject of generation, because it is not extended, nor does it have parts; but through quantity it becomes apt, because it becomes extended.

2. What conditions some desire in matter in order that it may cause. Among the conditions required for this causality, some place the existence of matter, because for real causality and composition, real existence seems necessary. Others think that existence is not required, because it suffices for matter to cause through its essential being; but it does not have existence as a prerequisite, but only as consequent to form. Again, others require quantity as a necessary condition for the reason given above, because an agent cannot act except on an extended subject; therefore it presupposes quantity in the subject at least as a necessary condition. But others do not consider even this condition necessary, because they think that quantity follows form and depends entirely on it. Therefore they require no condition for the causality of matter except its entity and potency. There could also be mentioned here the opinion of those who require in matter a determination (sigillatio) by which matter, which is of itself indifferent to every form, is determined to this individual form rather than to others, because an indifferent cause, remaining indifferent, cannot cause a definite effect. Concerning this opinion, quite a lot has been said above when treating the principle of individuation.

The Potency of Matter, Undistinguished from Itself, is the Reason for its Causing

3. It must be said first that prime matter does not have two reasons for causing, one principal and another proximate, but that

through itself and through its entity it causes its effect in its genus both principally and proximately. This position is taken from St. Thomas, I Phys., text. 79, where he says that the potency of matter is not something added to matter beyond its substance and essence; and he has the same in I, q. 5, a. 3, ad 3, and q. 77, a. 1, ad 2, and I Cont. Gent., c. 43, and In I, dist. 3, q. 4, a. 1; and the Thomists commonly hold the same, Hervaeus, De Unit. formar., q. 16; Capreolus, In I, dist. 42, q. 1, ad argumenta Aureoli cont. 4 conclus.; Soncinas, VIII Metaph., q. 6; Henry, in Summ., a. 5, q. 8; and Averroes himself signified this, de Substant. orbis, when he said that matter is substantiated through possibility (posse). From this principle, therefore, the conclusion is proved in this way. Matter causes first and principally through its essence, but proximately and immediately through its potency; but the potency of matter is not other than its essence, neither really nor according to the nature of the thing; therefore in matter there is no proximate reason for causing other than the principal reason, but they are entirely the same. The consequence is evident, and the major premise is also beyond controversy; for, as regards the first part of it, nothing prior or more principal can be conceived in matter that would be the first root and as it were origin of its causality, than its own essence. As for the second part, since the causality of matter is the causality of a subject and recipient, it is also clear that the receptive potency or capacity of matter is the proximate reason for causing. Likewise, because matter causes by receiving act; but act is proximately received in potency; therefore matter through its potency proximately regards act and causes its effect.

4. The minor premise is asserted by the mentioned authors. It is proved by reason first, because matter is essentially ordered to form, as was said above with Aristotle, II Phys., text. 26; but it is not ordered except as receptive potency; therefore matter is essentially such potency. Second, form through its essence is the act of matter, whence the soul is defined as the act of a physical body, etc.; therefore, conversely, matter is essentially potency to form; for they have a

proportional correlation between themselves, and thus they are essentially instituted so that through their essential entities they are immediately joined; and hence it is that they compose one essence per se and essentially; but they compose as act and potency united among themselves; therefore matter is essentially potency just as form is essentially act. Third, to confirm this, all the arguments by which we proved that matter is pure potency can be adduced; for philosophers do not only say that matter has potency, but that all of it is nothing other than potency, and this is what Aristotle said, that matter is the first subject. Augustine also, in the book De Natura boni contra Manichaeos, c. 18, says that matter is called in Greek hyle (ὕλην), because it is apt for workers, not so that it itself might make something, but from which something might be made. Damascus also, in his Physics, c. 3, says that matter, insofar as it is potency, is endowed with substance.

5. Finally, it is declared in this way: for either the potency of matter is the very substance and essence of matter, or it is some accident really distinct from it, or some mode at least different according to the nature of the thing; for nothing else besides these can be conceived; but the second or third cannot be said; therefore the first is true. The minor premise as regards the first part is proved first, because potency is proportioned to act; therefore to substantial act there must be substantial potency. Second, because otherwise form would be united to matter through some accident and thus would not compose with it one per se, because their union would not be substantial but accidental. Hence Aristotle, VIII Metaph., text. 15, teaches that substantial matter and form are immediately united per se so that they compose one per se. Third, because if it were some accident, it would be especially quantity; but this is not so; therefore. The major premise is clear, because no accident is closer to matter than quantity. The minor premise is proved because quantity is not ordered per se to receiving substantial form, but rather is either a property consequent to it, or at most is a disposition preparing the

subject for its reception. And it is confirmed, for otherwise just as whiteness, for example, is received in quantity, so also substantial form would be received in it and would communicate its substantial being to it, and consequently, just as when substance is removed and quantity is conserved per se without a new miracle that quantity remains white, so when matter is removed and quantity is conserved without a new miracle it would remain informed with substantial form, all of which are absurd. Finally, whatever that accident might be which is interposed by way of potency between the substance of matter and form, it is necessary that it be received in matter, because it must be received in some subject, and there is no other there, since such potency is supposed to be prior to form, and consequently also to the composite; therefore there is potency in matter for receiving such an accident in itself, since it is subjected in matter; I ask therefore whether that potency of matter is the very substance of matter, or another accident; this latter cannot be said, otherwise we would proceed to infinity; but if the former is said, therefore some receptive potency of matter is its very substance; therefore this is rather to substantial act than to accidental, or at least it is primarily ordered to that act; therefore it is per se and immediately receptive of it.

6. And from this the other part of the minor premise is easily proved, namely, that this potency is not a mode distinct according to the nature of the thing from the substance of matter. First indeed because there is no necessity nor trace of such a distinction. For such potency is connatural to matter and entirely inseparable from it, even by the absolute power of God; indeed, even by the intellect complete matter cannot be conceived in the essence of matter without being conceived as capable of form; therefore that capacity is not a mode distinct in reality from matter, but is as it were an essential difference of it; for matter is essentially a substantial entity, not complete but partial, not by way of act but by way of potency; therefore matter itself through its essence is both the principal and proximate reason for receiving form and for causing materially.

7. Matter essentially requires existence in order to cause. I say second: the existence of matter is also necessary for the causality of matter, not however properly as a condition only which would be outside the nature of a per se principle in the genus of material cause, but as intimately and formally included in it. The first part is proved because matter cannot be a real subject, or actually exercise the function of one while it is only in objective potency or in the power of the first cause, because according to the former consideration it is nothing, but is only conceived as not repugnant to being; according to the latter, however, it is nothing other than the creative essence itself; therefore in order that it may actually exercise the function of a real subject, it is necessary that it be actually in itself outside its cause and outside objective potency; but this very thing is to exist; therefore in order that matter may cause materially, it is necessary that it actually exist. And it is confirmed, for natural things are not created because they are made from matter; but they are not therefore not created because they are made from possible matter; therefore because they are made from actually existing matter, and consequently matter itself does not cause materially except insofar as it actually exists. The minor premise is proved, for matter itself when it is made by God, is made from possible matter, and nonetheless is created, because to be made from possible matter is to be made from nothing, in that possible matter, as such, is nothing. Hence the word "from" in that expression does not signify the relation of material cause, but of the terminus from which. When therefore it does signify the relation of material cause, it is necessary that it designate a thing which is not only possible, but also actually and outside causes. Finally, matter cannot cause materially unless it is created by God; but creation is terminated to an existing thing; therefore matter cannot cause materially unless existing. These reasons formally and immediately prove that matter does not cause materially unless it is outside its causes as an actual entity in its essential being; consequently, however, they prove concerning existence, because every actual entity outside causes is

formally constituted by existence, as we will prove below in its proper place.

8. How matter depends on form. And from this the latter part of the assertion is also easily proved; for that matter is an actual entity is not as it were an extrinsic condition necessary for causing, but is an intrinsic and proper reason for causing; for matter through its actual entity receives form; but it is constituted in the being of actual entity through existence; therefore the existence of matter is not in any way a necessary condition, but as per se and formally pertaining to the principle of causing. This matter will be more fully established from what will be said below concerning existence. Only this can be objected, that matter depends in its existence on form; therefore it cannot exist prior even in the order of nature before it receives form; therefore existence cannot be necessary for causing. The consequence is clear, because a condition necessary for causing is supposed prior to the effect. Nor can it be understood that a cause in its being necessary for causing depends on its effect. It is answered that an exact response to this objection cannot be given until we explain the causality of form toward matter and that proposition of Aristotle: "Causes are mutually causes of each other"; therefore it is briefly said that it is probable that matter does not depend properly on form as on its cause, which can be called antecedent dependence, but only as on a connatural act and as it were disposition and necessary condition, which can be called consequent dependence, according to which it is not inconvenient for a material cause to depend on its effect. Whether indeed it can be said that matter depends on form also a priori, we will see below.

9. Matter requires proximity with form for its causality. I say third: a necessary condition for causing in matter is intimate proximity or indistance from form. Thus, just as in efficient cause application to the patient is called a necessary condition for acting, so in material cause application to form; for in respect to it or with it it exercises its causality. This application is through intimate proximity and indistance, because matter and form cannot be united unless they are

indistant and as it were intimately penetrated through their entities. You will say that this is not a necessary condition, but the very conjunction of matter and form. It is answered that it is not so, because intimate presence is something distinct according to the nature of the thing from union; for when the soul is created in the body, it is not united to the body by virtue of creation in such a place; but by another action, and yet it is created intimately indistant from the body. Hence also in reality that intimate presence is separable from union. For just as an angel can be intimately present to matter and not inform it, so also can a rational soul, and indeed any other form, at least by the absolute power of God; therefore that intimate presence is something distinct from union and a necessary condition for it and for the causality of matter. This condition in the generation of man is manifestly prior by nature, because there form is supposed to be created without the causality of matter concerning it; in other forms, however, it does not seem so much a condition prior by nature as concomitant, because other forms absolutely and simply and according to the order of causality are not or do not come to be prior by nature before they are united, as we will see later. However, there is another priority of nature there, which is called in the consequence of subsisting; for such intimate presence is such that it can at least by divine power be conserved without union and consequently without material causality; conversely, however, material causality can in no way be actually conserved without intimate proximity, as is evident per se.

10. Matter does not require quantity as a necessary condition for causing. I say fourth that besides this condition there is no other that is simply necessary for the causality of matter, insofar as it is on its part. It is briefly explained, for as regards quantity, it is a sufficiently controversial matter whether it is in matter or in the composite and how. And although it is probable that it is in matter and is not naturally separated from it, this is not therefore because quantity is a necessary condition for material causality, formally speaking, but because matter

is such an entity that by its nature it demands such a property, so that quantity is rather a property consequent to such a material cause than a condition antecedently necessary for its causality. Hence it happens that either form, if it is also material, or at least in its way the information of form, participates in the effect or mode of quantity, not because that mode is per se necessary for union with matter, but because form accommodates itself to matter, insofar as everything that is received is received according to the mode of the recipient. And in a similar way, a material agent needs the extension of quantity in the patient in order to be able to act on it; this, however, comes from the fact that the agent itself by reason of such a property consequent to matter has a mode of existing and acting accommodated to it according to all faculties that depend on matter. Therefore (whatever may be the case concerning that question, about which we now define nothing) we now only say that quantity per se and formally is not necessary on account of material causality. Hence, if matter were conserved without quantity by the power of God, insofar as it is on its part it could exercise its function of sustaining form or its information.

11. Again, the determination (sigillatio) of matter which would be something distinct from quantity and qualities disposing matter is entirely something fictitious and invented, as was shown in the place cited above. Qualities, however, if perhaps they do not remain the same in the generated and corrupted, do not otherwise determine matter except because those qualities which precede the instant of generation denude matter and leave it free and ready so that the agent may introduce its form into it; but the qualities which are introduced at that instant only follow form and as it were cherish and retain it in matter. If, however, the same dispositions in number which were begun in the corrupted remain completed in the generated, they can more easily be said to determine matter to such a form; that, however, is not because matter of itself needs them for its causality, but either because of the natural mode and order of acting through intermediate accidents they are necessarily thus presupposed, or

because form itself demands such dispositions. Matter, however, although it is of itself indifferent to several effects or forms, is not of itself insufficient or incomplete for its individual effects, but rather in its genus it is like a universal cause, sufficient for individual effects. But a cause thus indifferent can well cause a determinate effect if from elsewhere other causes concur that are necessary for that determination, as are in the present case the agent or dispositions. Therefore per se and intrinsically by virtue of material causality, no determination is required for it as a necessary condition. Besides these conditions, however, no others have been devised up to now, nor can they easily be imagined, since no reason or foundation for such necessity appears. For I omit the general and as it were transcendental condition with respect to every created cause, namely, that it be conserved by God; for this is both common and is comprehended under existence. I also omit the necessary relation or reference to form, and (so to speak) the concausality of form; for this is rather something necessarily consequent than a required condition for causing. Therefore nothing else is necessary for the causality of matter on its part. And let these things suffice concerning this point; for the foundations of the other opinions which were suggested among those to be mentioned are sufficiently resolved and dispatched from what has been said.

SECTION IX

WHAT IS THE CAUSALITY OF MATTER

1. The causality of matter is not the very entity of matter itself. Various are the opinions on this matter. For some say that the causality of matter is nothing other than matter itself, which exhibits itself to the composite and through itself sustains the form, because its causality does not consist in the production of some thing distinct from itself, as does the causality of the efficient cause, but in this alone that it offers itself to its effect. But this opinion cannot be true; for, although

it is true that matter does not cause otherwise than by sustaining or composing that which it causes, nevertheless this which is to sustain or compose is something in the thing itself distinct from matter itself; for matter can exist in the nature of things and not cause this form or this composite, and successively vary its causality concerning various effects, while its entity remains unchanged; therefore the causation itself is other than its entity. Indeed, by absolute power matter can be conserved without any form, as we shall show below, and then it would cause nothing actually but would only be of itself potent for causing; therefore that by which it is constituted actually causing is other than that by which it is constituted potent for causing; for by this reason alone we prove that in the agent cause the action is other than the power of the agent. But if someone should perhaps say that matter causing does not add anything to matter itself, but connotes the existence of form in it, this will not satisfy. For, whatever may be the case concerning that addition, which we shall see later, for form to exist in matter, speaking formally and precisely, is not for matter to cause, but rather to be caused or to be informed; but it is necessary to designate something from which that denomination of causing is formally taken, and to declare whether that is intrinsic or extrinsic to matter.

2. The causality of matter cannot be a predicamental relation. Second, others say that actual causality adds nothing to matter beyond the relation of cause to effect. But if the discourse concerns a proper predicamental relation, this opinion cannot be true, because this relation follows upon the effect already having been caused and upon the foundation and term having been posited; therefore it presupposes causality as the proximate reason to which it follows; therefore causality cannot consist in this relation. This was also said above concerning cause in general and should be understood as said for all causes, lest it be necessary to repeat this further. But if the discourse concerns some transcendental relation, this opinion coincides with the fourth to be referred to immediately.

3. The causality of matter is not the same as every effect of it. Therefore a third opinion can be that this causality of matter is the very effect of it, signified and conceived in a diverse mode, because this suffices to explain this causality and scarcely can another be found or thought. But, although concerning some effect this is perhaps true, as I shall immediately declare concerning generation and union (for these are related just as action is to the agent cause, which can also be called its effect), nevertheless this cannot be universally true, both because causality in all causes is something intermediate between cause and effect, and also because the material form is an effect of matter and cannot be its causality. For the soul of a horse, for example, which is now caused materially by its matter, can be conserved in reality without such causality; therefore that causality is other in reality than that soul and than its entity. Just as the quantity of the Eucharist which was previously conserved through the mediation of the material causality of the substance of bread, is afterwards conserved when that causality ceases, which is a sign that causality is something diverse from the reality of quantity. But if form according to its absolute entity is not the causality of matter, neither can the whole composite be; especially because in the composite matter itself is included, which is not caused by itself, and in some composite, namely man, form is also included, which is not caused by matter; in what way therefore could the whole composite be the causality of matter?

4. The opinion of certain authors. A fourth opinion can be that the causality of matter is a certain mode of matter itself, real and distinct from the nature of the thing. For, the absolute entity of matter being considered, this mode is contained by it only in potency; but when the occasion of an agent introducing form is offered, matter also actually exhibits this mode, by which it receives in itself and fosters form and consequently composes the composite. But if such form should recede, with another form arriving, matter also loses the prior mode and exhibits another concerning the arriving form. Thus think

the Conimbricenses, II Phys., q. 6 et 8. The foundation is taken both from the sufficient enumeration of parts, and also because such a mode is necessary, since it has been shown that this causality is something, and it is not necessary that it be a distinct entity, since matter through itself is immediately united to form; therefore it is necessary that it be some mode really indeed identified with matter, but modally and from the nature of the thing distinct, since it is separable from it.

Resolution of the Question

5. The causality of matter with respect to generation is generation itself. Nevertheless this opinion seems partly false, partly doubtful. In order to declare this and open my opinion, I distinguish those four things which I said above are caused from matter: generation, union of form, entity of form, and the composite itself. Therefore concerning generation I think it is caused by matter through itself, with no other thing or mode added to matter beyond generation itself inhering in it; and thus the causality of generation itself from matter is nothing other than generation itself, as it is eduction from matter. For just as action is from the agent, not through another action but through itself, and has the nature of action as it is the very emanation from the agent cause and as such is the very causality of the agent, as I shall say below, so eduction or passive generation, insofar as it essentially depends on the subject and through itself is necessarily conjoined to it, is caused materially by it not through another causality, but through itself. This is proved first from the very declaration of the thing; for in this way the causality of matter concerning generation is best understood, and nothing else is necessary; therefore it is superfluous to feign something else. Second, this is declared from accidental mutations and unions; for when wood becomes heated, the heating occurs in such a subject and from the subject; but then there are not two mutations in that subject, one

which is the passive heating itself, another which is some mode by which such a subject materially causes heating or is united to it; for it is superfluous to multiply these mutations, since by this very fact that heating is such that it intrinsically expresses the relation of actual union and dependence on such a subject in the genus of material cause, both it is caused by the subject and the subject causes it and it is united to the subject, and the subject remains united to it; therefore it is superfluous to add another mutation in the subject; therefore the same is the case in the material causality of substantial generation. Whence it is confirmed third, because through the same thing or through the same mode by which the effect is caused, the cause causes, because causation itself as such essentially includes that double relation, to the cause as to a principle and to the effect as to a term, and therefore denominates each: one the cause, the other the caused; but generation, by this very fact that it is intrinsically and essentially dependent on matter, is caused by it through itself; therefore from the same thing as it is from matter, matter is denominated causing it; therefore no other thing or mode is necessary for matter to be denominated actually causing generation. Indeed neither can it be understood how matter might cause generation through another mode. This is declared fourth, for matter to cause generation is nothing other than to sustain it as subject; but it sustains it immediately in entity and through its entity, by this very fact that generation occurs in it; therefore every other mode is irrelevant to this causality, nor can it contribute anything to this sustentation.

6. Response to an objection. Finally I argue, because if beyond generation itself the causality of matter were a distinct real mode, it would have to be made by some agent; for every new real mode must be made by a new cause; but there is no agent by which such a mode is made; therefore. The minor is proved because just as the agent acts only through its substantial or accidental form, so it concurs efficiently only to the eduction of form, which is heating, for example, or generation; therefore, beyond that it does not make any

other mode. You will say: although per se primarily that other mode is not made, nevertheless it results; for by this very fact that this thing is united to that, the union of that to this results. But against this, first, because it has been shown that there is no necessity of such resultance for causality, nor does it seem necessary even for union because another thing can be denominated united through the union of another to it without a new mode of union in it, as theologians say in the mystery of the Incarnation, and in natural things when a man sits, for example, the sitting is united to the man and the man to the sitting; but who would feign that the man is denominated united to sitting through a new mode distinct from sitting and not rather through sitting itself, which through itself is united to the subject? Otherwise one would have to proceed to infinity. Thus therefore matter is denominated united to generation because generation occurs in it, nor is another mode which would result in matter necessary. Then I shall inquire what kind it is and from what that resultance comes; for it can be understood in two ways: first that, the action of the agent educing form being posited in matter, that mode results from matter; and thus matter would effectively make its material causality, which cannot be said even if it were said to be that efficiency through natural resultance. Second, that resultance can be excogitated such that it is made by an extrinsic agent through the mediation of the form which it introduces into matter, and thus the induced form would effect the material causality through which it itself is caused, and would be prior in nature in matter than that mode would result; from which it is easily convinced that such a mode is irrelevant to the causality of matter.

7. Generation cannot even supernaturally be conserved outside the subject. From these things therefore (as I think) it is sufficiently established that in the material causality of generation this kind of causality is not distinguished from generation itself as it is in matter, from which matter is denominated actually causing insofar as it is from it, just as from the same it is denominated actually generating agent insofar as it is from that. Whence, just as the denomination of

agent is not from some mode which is in the agent itself but extrinsically from action, so the denomination of actually causing in matter itself is not from some mode which is so intrinsic that it is the same in reality with it, but from generation itself insofar as it is from it, and for this reason such denomination could be called extrinsic, although because generation is in matter itself, for that reason it can be called intrinsic, in which it differs from the denomination of agent. You will say that God can conserve the same number generation separated from matter; but then it would not be caused by matter and consequently would not denominate it actually causing; therefore it is not denominated actually causing precisely from generation as such; therefore it is necessary to adjoin some other mode. It is replied first that the assumption is false; for it implies a contradiction for the action of generation to be or to be conserved outside the subject and without the causality of matter, both because generation is essentially mutation; but mutation cannot be understood without a subject. And also because generation in all things other than man is essentially eduction from the potency of matter; but in man it is the union of form with matter; but in either way it is repugnant to be understood without the concurrence of matter. And finally because action without the concurrence of subject is creation, or productive if it is new, or conservative if it is concerning a preexisting thing; therefore, by this very fact that form which was in the subject and depended on the subject is conserved outside the subject, the action is necessarily varied. Whence it is concluded that mutation, which is generation, essentially includes union to matter and the causality of matter, and therefore from it, precisely taken, matter is denominated causing. Add that, although we should gratuitously grant what is assumed, it would not thence be inferred that for that denomination a special mode in matter itself is necessary, but that generation itself distinguishes the entity and formality of generation from its union with matter, as we shall say below concerning form itself; but because in the mutation which is generation, this is not true, we shall not dwell on this now.

8. Matter flows into form and composite through generation as causality. From these things it is further concluded that the causality of matter, insofar as it is cause in becoming either of form or of composite, is nothing other than generation itself, as essentially dependent on matter; for through that matter concurs to the eduction of form or composition of composite; but the causality of cause is nothing other than its concurrence. Likewise because to cause some thing in becoming is nothing other than that the becoming of such a thing is from such a cause; therefore through the same causality a thing is caused in becoming through which the very becoming of the thing is caused. This is clear from the similar case of the agent cause; for the very action which is through itself from the agent is its active causality with respect to the term or thing in becoming; therefore the same proportion is to be observed in material causality. Finally many of the arguments made can be applied to this, especially that this reason of causing suffices for that denomination by which matter is said to cause the thing which is generated, and this reason of causing being posited and every other mode being cut off by the intellect, that denomination necessarily follows; therefore, whatever else is feigned is superfluous and without foundation. Only a difference seems to be noted in this causality with respect to form and with respect to composite, that with respect to form matter remains in some way extrinsically insofar as it sustains form in itself or as informing, but does not intrinsically compose it; and therefore it seems most manifest that the causality of matter with respect to form in becoming is nothing other than the eduction or union of it as it is from matter, which we have shown in reality is nothing other than generation itself. But truly with respect to composite, matter is compared more intrinsically because through itself it composes that, and therefore with respect to composite it seems necessary that matter itself be intrinsically included. But this is indeed true concerning inclusion in the caused effect, not however concerning the way or becoming by which one tends toward such an effect in this genus of material cause;

for matter is not so much a cause in the becoming of the generated thing that it itself also becomes; for it is always presupposed as made and only communicates itself to the composite which is generated in its genus of cause; and insofar as this communication is in becoming and matter is the cause of it, it is said to be the cause of the generated thing in becoming; but this communication is not in becoming except through the mediation of eduction or generation, and therefore this whole causality insofar as it is understood to be something intermediate between matter and effect or composite in reality, is nothing other than generation itself, as it is from matter.

The Causality of Matter Persevering After Motion

9. The union of form to matter is caused by matter through itself and depends on it. It remains to speak about the causality of matter in actual being, for the explanation of which one must begin from the causality of the union of form with matter; for we have also said that this is caused by matter; but now we add that it is not caused through any causality distinct from such union, but through the union itself. This can easily be demonstrated from what has been said about generation itself; for there is the same proportional reasoning. This I show thus: for this union of form with matter is also through itself conjoined to matter in the way it can be; therefore through itself it is dependent on matter in the way it can depend; therefore it is caused through itself; for it is caused to the extent that it depends; therefore conversely, matter causes that union through the union itself; for, as I said, the causality is the same from which both the effect is denominated as caused and the cause as causing. All the consequences have been proved in the above; but the antecedent is clear first a posteriori because it is impossible for that union to be conserved without the concurrence of matter or without being in matter in the way it can be; therefore it is a sign that it depends on matter through

itself immediately and essentially; for if it depended through the mediation of some mode distinct from the nature of the thing, God could, by removing that mode, conserve that union without matter; for by this reasoning he can conserve form, as I shall say below. The antecedent is clear because union cannot remain without actually uniting; but it cannot actually unite without conjoining the extremes and attaining each in the way it can and ought. And this is the a priori reason why that union through itself depends essentially both on form and on matter, on each in its genus, because it is like the actual bond of those things and does not need another interposed bond or mode by which it might attain them or be conjoined to them, lest one proceed to infinity. Finally it is confirmed by the reasoning made above, because this suffices for this causality, and without it it cannot be posited, and with it posited and every other mode cut off, such causality of matter is sufficiently understood; therefore everything else is fictitious and without foundation, nor is there any difficulty in this, beyond what is to be touched on immediately.

10. The permanent causality of matter in material form is union. What kind of connection the rational soul has with matter. From this I further add that the causality of matter in form itself (when form is such that it is caused by matter and depends on it) is nothing other than the proper union of such form with matter insofar as the union itself is materially caused by matter and through the mediation of that the form itself also depends on matter. I said it is nothing other than the proper union of such form because not every union suffices for this causality; for the rational soul has its proper union with matter, which union is also materially caused by matter and yet the soul itself is not caused; therefore not every union is the causality of form itself but that which is through eduction of form. From this we understand in passing that the union of rational soul with matter is singular and of a different essential nature than every union of material form, which we can call substantial inherence, and this we say is the causality through which matter causes such form.

11. An objection is met. You will say: why can we not distinguish in material form two modes, one of which is the mere union of form with matter such as is in the rational soul, and through that the form would not depend on matter but would only be united to compose the composite, but the other mode would be the dependence of such form on matter? I respond because it is either plainly impossible or altogether superfluous to distinguish and multiply such modes. First, because in accident we do not distinguish two modes one of which is union, the other inherence or dependence of accident on subject, but by the same inherence it is united and depends; therefore similarly, etc. Second, because proper dependence on material cause intrinsically and essentially includes union, so that it can neither occur nor be understood without intimately including it; therefore inherence, which is the same as material dependence, is not a mode distinct from the nature of the thing from the union of the inhering form, but is like a species of union in general; for one is inherent, another truly is not; therefore just as genus and species are not modes diverse from the nature of the thing in the same individual, so union and inherence or material dependence are not distinct modes in the same form. From these things therefore the assertion posited is easily left proved, because this form through its union depends on matter; therefore through the mediation of that it is caused by matter in its genus; therefore also matter causes form through the mediation of that according to the principle posited above, that to be caused and to cause express the same causation under diverse respects; therefore this very union is the causality of matter concerning such form. Second, because the causality of cause mediates in some way between it and the effect; but between matter and form nothing mediates except this union and quasi-inherence; therefore that is the causality of matter in form. Third, because this suffices for this genus of causality, every other thing being cut off even by the intellect.

12. You will say that neither does this seem necessary, because form and matter are immediately united, as was said above. It is replied that immediate union does not exclude a mode of union really or from the nature of the thing distinct from the extremes, but excludes a mediate form which would intercede as a common term in which the extremes are conjoined; but a mode of union cannot be excluded when the extremes are such that they can be separated, because unless either both or one of them is otherwise disposed than when they are disjoined, they will not be able to be really united, and therefore even in the mystery of the Incarnation theologians posit this mode of union on the part of humanity.

How Many Kinds of Union in Material Composite

13. But from this arises another difficulty, which alone seems to be of some moment in this opinion and on account of which we said the fourth opinion is partly doubtful, namely, because if form is united to matter through a proper mode of union, therefore also matter is united to form through a proper mode of union; therefore matter not only causes through the union or inherence of form, but much more through the proper union by which it itself is conjoined to form: and thus the causality of matter will be rather a proper mode of matter itself than of form. To this difficulty I confess the matter is doubtful whether in the composition of matter and form matter has a proper mode of union, distinct from the union of form. Nevertheless I say two things. One is that the part denying is highly probable, because for the union of two extremes which are immediately united among themselves one simple mode of union suffices, and a special reason can be assigned why such a mode pertains more to form and is really the same with it than with matter; therefore it is not necessary to multiply more such modes. The major is proved because every mode of union is a bond of two extremes, whence it expresses a relation to

both without which it cannot be; therefore any mode of union unites the two extremes whose union it is; therefore one suffices for conjoining such extremes. And therefore we said above that the union of form to matter cannot be or be understood in the nature of things without conjunction and dependence not only on form, but also on matter; and therefore, if through the intellect we cut off every other mode identified with matter, through the union of form to matter alone we shall understand matter and form to be perfectly united among themselves and matter to exercise in form the total causality which it has; therefore a double mode of union is not necessary, but one suffices. But the minor, namely, that this mode pertains rather to form than to matter is proved, because the total efficiency of natural agent is terminated formally and proximately to form by educing it or uniting it to matter; therefore whatever it makes anew is in form as in the formal term of action, but in matter only as in subject, and therefore it does not unite matter to form directly by effecting in matter a special mode, but only by uniting form to matter itself and by effecting in it information and union or inherence. And this is consonant with the mode of being disposed and concurring of matter and form; for matter underlies the action of agent and the advent and recession of forms. Whence as to its entity and every intrinsic mode of it it remains unchanged, and is only varied or changed by reason of privation or of form receding or newly arriving. This Damascene seems to have said in these words, in his Phys., c. 3, where concerning matter he says: "So that it may obtain the nature of subject, and as to that which is potency it is endowed with substance and is with privation and remains with form actually present, and conserves that which is its own, that is, potency, free from all mutation, and from this it happens that it does not migrate from that which is potency into act, but remaining in its state receives form and with form receding again retains its former state." But truly form is that which comes to matter and recedes from it, and therefore every mutation which occurs in matter is by reason of form, and similarly every union is through the

conjunction of form to it. This can moreover be declared by a material example: for a base which is supposed to a column is not varied in itself nor changes place or any other mode from the fact that a column is superposed to it or taken away or varied, but the total mutation occurs in the column which is superposed, from which comes every denomination into the base, which is said to sustain the column. And similarly in accidental mutations, when wood, for example, becomes heated, there is not a double mutation in the wood, one in the adhesion of heat, another in the union of wood to heat, but only one, which consists in the introduction of heat.

14. I add second, that even if we should gratuitously admit that there is in matter a proper mode of union distinct from the union of form, nevertheless it cannot be attributed that it is the causality through which matter causes form, because neither does matter through such a mode sustain form nor does form through that mode depend on matter. The first part is established because matter does not sustain form through a mode, but through its entity. The latter is proved because form depends on matter through its inherence, whence, if there is such a mode of union in matter, it will rather be as an effect consequent from information and, as far as it goes, will be of the same nature, whether form depends on matter or not. Concerning this union of matter, discourse will again occur when treating of formal cause.

15. By what causality matter constitutes composite. From these things it is further concluded that the causality of matter concerning composite adds nothing at all to matter itself beyond the union of form, and thus there is not another causality of composite except the very causality of form or of union and only adds with respect to composite that matter through the mediation of union exhibits itself to compose the composite intrinsically; whence the very entity of matter more intimately enters the causality of composite than of form or of union; nevertheless in reality nothing else intervenes except the entity of matter and the union or causality of form.

16. Matter functions with two distinct causalities. Satisfaction is given to the objection. Finally it is understood from what has been said, which was also insinuated above, that there are only two causalities of matter distinct from the nature of the thing, although by reason more can be distinguished. For the material causality with respect to thing in becoming or in actual being are distinct from the nature of the thing, just as generation is distinguished from the nature of the thing from form or from the generated thing, and union in becoming from union as accomplished; but we have shown that the causality of thing in becoming is not distinguished in reality from generation itself or union; but the causality of thing in actual being is similarly not distinguished from union as accomplished and formally terminating the uniting; therefore it is necessary that such causalities be distinct among themselves from the nature of the thing. You will say that these two causalities can be reduced to one because a thing in actual being is not caused except through the mediation of action; therefore the total causality consists in action and generation itself as it is from matter; for all the remaining things are rather something caused than causalities, just as with respect to the agent the total causality consists in action or union, and union in actual being is not the causality of agent, but something caused. It is replied that the reasoning is not equal, because material cause per se is the cause of thing in actual being even if all action should cease, so that if, per impossibile, a material composite did not depend on some agent in becoming or in being conserved, nevertheless matter would have its causality concerning such composite or concerning its form; there is therefore in matter a certain proper causality, which is not concerned with action or mutation nor is accomplished through that, but is immediately concerning the very being of the whole composite insofar as it includes the union of matter with form; and from the following section it will be established that sometimes matter is the cause of a thing and not of the production of the thing; therefore these causalities are distinct from the nature of the thing. But each of them

can be compared and precisely conceived in order to diverse things and according to various relations explained in order to form or composite; nevertheless that whole distinction is through reason or through our inadequate concepts, as is established from the above.

SECTION X

WHETHER SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL CAUSE IS FOUND IN INCORRUPTIBLE BODIES

1. Thus far we have explained material cause only in generable and corruptible substances, in which it is better known on account of continuous transmutation; now it remains to be seen whether this kind of cause also exists in incorruptible bodies. This matter contains many questions. First, whether there is matter in the heavens (for by the name of incorruptible bodies we understand these). Second, what kind it is and in what way it agrees with or differs from the matter of generable things. Third, how it exercises material causality with those bodies; and although the first two questions are physical and are usually treated in the books On the Heavens, nevertheless for explaining the third, which is proper to this place, the others must necessarily be premised.

First Opinion of the Commentator

2. Concerning the proposed question, therefore, there was the opinion of the Commentator denying that there is composition of matter and form in the heavens. So he holds in VIII Metaphysics, commentary 12, and book XII, commentary 20, and I On the Heavens, commentary 20, and in the book On the Substance of the Orb, chapters 1 and 2. And all his followers follow him: Jandun, On the Substance of the Orb, question 1; Zimara, theorem 107; Cajetan of Thiene, I Physics, question 21; and from the scholastics, Durand

and Gabriel, and others, In II, distinction 12, where also St. Thomas inclined to the same opinion, question 1, article 1, and in Disputed Questions on Spiritual Creatures, article 6, ad 2, and VIII Metaphysics, chapter 14. This opinion is founded principally on various testimonies of Aristotle, on account of which Scotus, In II, distinction 14, question 1, confesses it to be Aristotle's opinion although he does not approve it. The first is VIII Metaphysics, text 14, where he says that not all things have matter, but only those of which there is generation and transmutation among themselves; but whatever things exist without being transmuted, these do not have matter; and text 4 of the same book says: It is not necessary, if something has local matter, that it also have generable and corruptible matter, that is, which is the foundation of generation and corruption, which in his view seems to be the same as matter composing substance, as I will immediately show. And in the same sense he seems to add, text 12, that perpetual substances either do not have matter, or not such matter, but only that which is movable according to place, and book IX, text 17, he says that in perpetual things there is no potency to being simply, but only to Where: Otherwise (he says) there would also be potency to non-being: for every potency is a potency of contradiction. Finally XII Metaphysics, text 10, repeating the same opinion, he says: Whatever things are changed have matter, but diverse matter, for even of perpetual things, those which are not generable but movable by locomotion, nevertheless do not have generable matter, but that from which and to which.

3. The reason for this opinion is that the philosophers did not arrive at knowledge of matter except through the path of transmutation, taking the proportion from artificial or accidental transmutation to substantial transmutation; therefore in those substances where there is no trace of substantial transmutation, matter is not necessary; nor can there be any foundation for asserting it. Second, this reason is further clarified because nature does nothing in vain; but in the heavens this composition from matter is not necessary

for any end; for in these inferior things, because there were going to be continuous generations and corruptions, on account of their contrariety matter was necessary, which would be the first subject and foundation of them; but indeed when the heavens were established so that they would be perpetual, just as they were created without contrariety, so also without that composition which is proper to those things which, just as they are composed, so can be dissolved; for simple entity is more apt for perpetuity than composite. Third, because if there were any sign of matter in the heavens, it would be especially because it has quantity; but this is not a sufficient sign, because it is not repugnant for an entire substance to be made physically simple and capable of quantity; therefore quantity is not a sufficient sign of material composition. For if that substance is possible, let God make it; therefore then the extension of quantity would not be a sufficient indication of material composition in such a substance; therefore neither is it now in the heavens. For why should we not say that the substance of the heavens is such? Indeed, if a substance of this kind that is quantified is possible, it is better and more perfect if it is simple than if composite, other things being equal. Again, such a substance will pertain to the beauty and perfection of the universe; for there are certain simple substances in the universe that are not quantified, and other substances that are composite and corporeal; therefore so that there may be variety of all things or degrees in the universe, it fits very well that there be some substance simple as to physical and essential composition, but quantified and composite from integral parts; therefore such are those eternal bodies which from this aspect seem to approach more closely to the mode of existing of simple substances.

4. That what is assumed in this reasoning is not repugnant, namely, that there is given a substance not composed of physical and substantial act and potency and capable of quantity, is proved because no repugnancy is involved in these terms or conditions, nor can any reason be made on account of which such a being would not be

comprehended under the breadth of creatable being. You will say that every substance is either form, or matter, or composite; therefore a substance which is neither composite nor capable of matter will be a subsisting form; therefore intellectual; therefore incorporeal; therefore it is repugnant for a substance to be simple and corporeal; hence it is the same to say an immaterial and corporeal substance as to say an immaterial and material substance. And it is confirmed (and almost amounts to the same thing), for every substance is either potency, or act, or composite of potency and act; but that substance would not be substantial and receptive potency, otherwise it would be matter; nor would it be composite of act and potency; therefore it would be subsisting act; but such act is not capable of quantity, otherwise the way is blocked for proving that angelic substances are not capable of quantity. But these reasons do not seem to show repugnancy sufficiently; for the prior division of substance into matter, form and composite is not adequate to substance in general; for Aristotle, when he gives that division in II On the Soul, in the beginning, and VII Metaphysics, text 7, clearly speaks of informing form; but thus angelic substance is neither form, nor matter, nor composite; therefore inferior substance is divided there, or substance somehow subject to generation and corruption. Otherwise, so that the division may be adequate to every substance, in place of that member, namely, composite substance, complete substance should be placed; for every substance is either complete or incomplete by way of potency, like matter, or by way of act, like form. But complete substance must again be divided into that composed of matter and form, and simple according to the negation of such composition; but this can be further subdivided into incorporeal, which is so simple that it excludes even composition of integral parts, and corporeal, which has composition from these parts without composition from the essential principles of matter and form; for no reason is brought forward on account of which it would be repugnant for the same complete substance to have one composition without another.

5. Therefore that repugnancy by which such a substance would be material and immaterial seems to consist only in words. Hence that word "material" can be distinguished; for it properly signifies a thing composed of matter which is pure potency and form, and in this sense that simple substance would not be material but rather immaterial, taking this privative word in a contrary and proportionate signification; but thus immaterial and incorporeal would not be converted, according to the aforesaid opinion. But because integral parts are reduced to material cause by Aristotle, therefore that word can be taken more broadly, and every substance which has integral parts can be called both material and somehow composed of matter. And in this sense that substance of which we treat would not be called immaterial, but material; for immaterial taken in proportionate signification will be said reciprocally with incorporeal. Nor are these significations unusual, for the form of wood is called material although it does not consist of matter, because it is extended; but the form of man is immaterial for the contrary reason. But the other division of act and potency also suffers equivocation; for if by the name of subsisting act is understood an integral substance which does not need another substantial and intrinsic act in order to be in act, thus we concede that simple substance of which we treat will be subsisting act; but we deny that such subsisting act cannot be capable of quantity; nor is the way thereby blocked for proving that angelic substances are incapable of quantity; for this is not to be proved from the common notion of subsisting act in that signification, but from elsewhere, namely, because they are more perfect and indivisible and intelligent acts. Hence, if by the name of subsisting act is understood a substance so perfect that it entirely departs from the conditions of matter and from composition of integral parts, thus we deny that division to be adequate, or that simple and corporeal substance to be subsisting act. And this is the whole probability of this opinion, according to which it must be denied that proper and substantial material cause of which we treat is found in celestial or incorruptible

bodies, but only reductively insofar as integral parts, as I said, are reduced to material cause. For it cannot be denied that corporeal substance necessarily has this composition; for the contrary involves clear repugnancy.

Second Opinion of St. Thomas

6. The second principal opinion is that all bodies, even incorruptible ones, are composed of true and proper matter which is substantial physical potency to form. This is the opinion of St. Thomas and his disciples, I, question 66, article 2, and I On the Heavens, lecture 6, and VIII Physics, lecture 20; Capreolus, In II, distinction 12, question 1; Soncinas, XII Metaphysics, question 7; Javellus, book VIII, question 12; Soto, II Physics, question 1. Scotus also holds this, in the place cited; and Giles, In II, distinction 2, and I Hexameron, chapter 4 and following; Ockham, In II, question 22; St. Bonaventure, In II, distinction 12, article 2, question 1. Avicenna also held this, book I Sufficientiae, chapter 6; Paul of Venice, in Summa On the Heavens, chapter 2, where he reports Themistius, Theophrastus and others. And various testimonies of Aristotle are also brought forward for this side, so that what his opinion was in this matter seems to be quite obscure. For I On the Heavens, chapter 9, texts 93, 94 and 95, he expressly says that the heavens consist of matter, and from this he proves that there cannot be another heaven because it consists of all matter. Moreover, XII Metaphysics, text 22, he says that the principles of all sensible bodies are the same, namely, matter and form, and II On Generation, chapter 9, text 51, he says that two principles, namely, matter and form, are attributed even to eternal things and those holding first places; but in these inferior things a third is added, namely, privation, to constitute generation. Finally VIII Metaphysics, text 10, he says that every sensible substance consists of matter. This opinion is founded by reason on two principles opposed to the superior ones. One is that for the incorruptibility of the heavens or bodies, the absence of matter is

not necessary, which principle will be declared more fully in the following point. Now it is proved briefly because, although a thing consists of matter and form, the union of them can be indissoluble, which is sufficient for incorruptibility. The other principle is that the quantity of bulk, which all bodies even incorruptible ones have, is necessarily joined with matter, so that it is a property so proper to matter or to a thing composed of matter that it is a certain indication of it. Which Plotinus wrote in these words, Ennead II, book IV, chapter 6: Whatever has bulk, has matter.

Comparison of the Superior Opinions

7. Of these opinions neither can be evidently proved because there is no effect which evidently shows us that there is or is not matter in such bodies, which has been sufficiently declared in reporting the opinions themselves. For the prior one infers absence of matter from incorruptibility, which inference the posterior opinion evidently shows not to be good; for although an immaterial thing is necessarily incorruptible, it is not converted; and thus, although in an incorruptible thing as such composition from matter is not necessary, nevertheless for incorruptibility it can be necessary on account of other causes, incorruptibility not impeding. Because, although this often arises from the simplicity of the thing, nevertheless sometimes it can arise from the indissoluble connection of form and matter, as the posterior opinion correctly said. Nor can it be reasonably said that it is repugnant to the union of matter and form that it be indissoluble; for what is this repugnancy? For not every composition demands that it be able to be dissolved, even in natural things, as is evident in composition from accident and subject. If therefore there is given an accidental form inseparable from the subject, why could there not also be given a substantial form inseparable from matter? Likewise composition from integral parts can be naturally indivisible, as it is in the heavens; therefore also other composition from matter and form

will be able to be naturally indissoluble; therefore the inference which is made from incorruptibility to absence of matter is ineffective.

8. The heavens composed of matter and form. But the posterior opinion infers composition from matter from the quantity of bulk, which consequence also seems uncertain on account of the ultimate argument of the prior opinion. On account of which it is not evident to me that it implies contradiction for a simple and complete substance capable of quantity to be made; which if this does not imply, that consequence is entirely enervated since it is neither formal nor absolutely necessary. Nevertheless, insofar as we can judge from signs and effects, it is more likely that the heavens are composed of matter and form. First indeed, because in them are all the accidents which follow matter except corruptibility, such as quantity, which is of the same nature in all bodies. Then there is rare and dense in the heavens, which are defined through matter; for dense is that which has much matter under small quantity, as is evident from II On Generation. In addition to these, in the heavens there are certain accidents which seem ordered only to receiving, like quantity, according to which they are physically movable; but others to acting, like light, and if there are any other faculties through which they have influence; therefore, just as these indicate form, so those indicate matter. Finally all bodies that are physically movable are natural beings: for this reason indeed they are comprehended under the object of philosophy; hence Aristotle, I On the Heavens, chapter 2, places celestial bodies among natural beings which consist of nature; but according to the same one's doctrine, II Physics, chapters 1 and 2, nature is nothing but matter or form, nor do we know any other physical nature; therefore all bodies even incorruptible ones consist of such nature. This reason at least proves that this opinion is more consonant with the doctrine of Aristotle. What indeed should be responded to the prior testimonies we will see in the following section. And this resolution will be more persuaded from the following responses.

9. To the first reason of the prior opinion, therefore, it is responded that although the first knowledge of prime matter was discovered through the path of motion and transmutation, nevertheless, once this composition from matter in inferior bodies was known, from there reasoning proceeded to superior things, and from other similarities and accidents of such bodies it was understood that this composition is common to all bodies. Hence to the second it is responded that it is not necessary that composition from matter and form be on account of some other extrinsic end, but on account of the very substance to be composed which consists of them; and because the nature of such substance demands such composition so that it may have all things which are connatural to it, namely, matter, so that it can subsist, occupy place, be moved and similar things, but form, so that it may be in act and so that it can act. On account of which it seems falsely supposed in that argument that matter in these inferior things is only on account of generations and corruptions; for this is one of the properties of this matter, but not the adequate reason of matter as such.

10. To the third it is responded first that it is probable that quantity and matter are by their nature so adequately connected that it is repugnant for quantity to be connatural to any being which does not have matter; for this is more indicated by those things which we experience of bodies, and there is no sufficient foundation at all for imagining another kind of possible natural beings. Nor does this conflict with the infinity of divine power, as is sufficiently evident per se, because the infinity of divine power does not change the natures of things; and although it can operate above them, nevertheless it does not make that to be connatural which is not suitable or consonant to the order of nature. Hence we will show below conversely that it cannot happen that there be a substance composed of matter and form for which it is not natural to have quantity; what therefore should

seem wonderful that conversely it is also repugnant to give a substance altogether complete and quantified which is not composed of matter and form as from its parts? Therefore two orders of substances creatable by God are to be conceived, namely, those composed of matter and form and simple ones. To all the former is common this imperfection, that they are capable of quantity; but all the latter substances are so perfect (we speak of complete substances) that quantity is repugnant to them; and therefore such substances are called separated and simple and intellectual acts by Aristotle. But it is repugnant to the natures of things that these two orders be confused among themselves, and therefore one and the same thing cannot have the imperfection of one order joined with the perfection of the other.

11. I add then that, although we might admit this, namely, that there can be given a simple and integral substance subjected to the quantity of bulk, such a mode of substance cannot be conveniently attributed to the heavens, because it would be very imperfect, because it would not be the most perfect act, as is evident per se, because it would be more imperfect than intellectual substances, indeed even than many substances composed of matter and form, especially man, and from elsewhere it would also lack substantial act, which is the most perfect among informing acts. Just as therefore a created substance lacking all beauty of accidental form is very imperfect, so a corporeal substance lacking the beauty of substantial form would be very imperfect and quasi-monstrous. And perhaps from here is taken a not light proportional argument, and of no small weight (so to speak), just as there cannot be given a created substance incapable of accident, so there cannot be given a corporeal substance incapable of substantial form or not constituted through the actuality of that, if it be integral and complete; but if it be simple and subsisting under quantity, it is not integral but a potential part needing the actuality of form. And it is confirmed, for such a substance could not be active according to its whole self by any kind of action; not indeed by immanent action since it would be an inanimate thing, nor indeed by transient action because

this exceeds the limits of natural agents such as celestial bodies are, and thus it would rather be of no activity or efficacy. Just as therefore celestial bodies do not act except by inducing form in matter, so also they do not exist except through the existence of proper form in proper matter. On account of which, although simplicity, other things being equal, is an indication and argument of perfection, nevertheless that simplicity in corporeal substance would not be an indication of perfection but rather of imperfection; for beings are not always more perfect the simpler they are.

SECTION XI

WHETHER THE MATTER OF INCORRUPTIBLE BODIES IS OF THE SAME NATURE AS ELEMENTARY MATTER

1. In this matter, there was the opinion of Avicenna that the matter of all bodies is the same according to species, both celestial and terrestrial, both corruptible and incorruptible. Many theologians have followed this opinion, especially Aegidius in the places cited, and Scotus and others incline toward the same view. This opinion can be defended in two ways. First, by asserting that the heaven is a corruptible body of elementary nature, and Plato taught it in this way, as Saint Thomas, who will be cited below, also mentions; and Nemesius, in his book On the Nature of Man, chapter 5, reports that Plato posited that heaven consists of fire and earth. Second, that opinion can be defended together with the incorruptibility of heaven, and we will treat it in both ways, although in the present discussion we rather suppose the incorruptibility of some superior bodies, and with that incorruptibility supposed, we inquire into their material cause. The aforesaid opinion can be founded partly on natural reason, partly on theological grounds.

2. The first metaphysical argument is that a specific distinction between matters seems impossible, because according to Aristotle's testimony in Metaphysics VII, text 49, it is act that distinguishes, especially specifically and essentially; but every matter is pure potency; therefore no specific distinction can be found in it. And this is confirmed because prime matter is the lowest substantial being that can exist, and therefore is said by Augustine to be nearly nothing; therefore within the latitude of matter no specific distinction can be given; otherwise, since two things specifically diverse are necessarily of unequal perfection, one matter would be essentially more perfect than another, and thus some matter would not be the lowest being nor most distant from God, which contradicts the imperfection of matter. For pure potency is extremely opposed to pure act, and they seem to be like two extremes of the entire latitude of substances; hence just as in pure act there cannot be specific distinction, so neither does it seem possible in pure potency.

3. The second argument for the aforesaid opinion is that such a distinction is not necessary. For if anything compelled the introduction of it, it would be especially the incorruption of the heavens; but this is not the case. First indeed because, although the heavens are never actually corrupted, it does not follow from this that they are incorruptible from within; for it can happen that, although from the force of its substantial composition heaven is corruptible, it is never actually corrupted because, existing in its natural place and distant from all contrary agents, it is so disposed that it can resist all of them. Or second because, although heaven consists of this matter, it can be naturally incorruptible from within. Because prime matter alone is not a sufficient principle of corruptibility, unless the form is also such that its union is separable from matter, which usually comes from two sources, namely, either because it is united to matter through mediating dispositions having contraries, which two reasons are found in the forms of generable things, but not in the forms of the heavens; for the form of heaven, on account of its eminent perfection, virtually

contains inferior things, and thus by itself fills the entire capacity of matter and moreover[21] is united to matter through dispositions not having contraries; hence Aristotle proved from this alone that heaven is incorruptible because it has no contrary. Thus the argument is completed: for it is sufficient for heaven to be incorruptible that its union with matter be naturally indissoluble; but this can be without diversity of matter on account of the mode of information and dispositions; therefore on account of this cause it is not necessary to introduce that distinction of matters. This can be declared by a theological example; for the union of Christ's humanity to the Word is indissoluble, although that humanity is of itself capable of proper subsistence and lacks it, because the subsistence of the Word is such that it fills the capacity of humanity and has no contrary; thus therefore in the present case it can be understood concerning the information of the form of heaven, even if it is in the matter of generable things. And this is confirmed because otherwise, if on account of the incorruptibility of the heavens their matter had to be distinguished from inferior matter, for the same reason the matter of each heaven would have to be distinguished from the matter of others, which seems very absurd; but the consequence is clear from parity of reasoning.

4. The preceding opinion is strengthened by a theological argument. Third, theologians add a foundation taken from the first creation of things, which we cannot omit here so that we may declare that metaphysics does not contradict theology. They say therefore that it is established from the history of Genesis that God fashioned the heavens and elements from the same matter, and therefore there are no bodies that consist of distinct matters. The antecedent is proved from those words of Genesis 1: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth, but the earth was void and empty, and darkness was upon the face of the abyss." Here Augustine, Confessions XII, chapter 7,

[21] praeterea, 1960; alit. propterea. "La sustitución de preterea por propterea modifica notablemente el sentido". Cf. BHF, t. 2, p. 485.

understands heaven to signify the angelic nature, and by the name of earth the prime matter from which all bodies were formed. But others, because that interpretation of the word "heaven" seems too metaphorical, say that by the name of heaven is signified the empyrean heaven which is the seat of the blessed, concerning which much is read in the ancient Fathers, as can be seen in Damascus, book II of Faith, chapter 6; and Theodoret, Questions on Genesis, questions 11 and 14; and Basil, homilies 2 and 3 on Genesis; and Bede, in his Hexameron, in the beginning; and Chrysostom, explaining those words in Hebrews 8: "Minister of the sanctuary and of the true tabernacle which the Lord pitched, and not man"; and Hilary, on those words of Psalm 122: "To thee have I lifted up my eyes, who dwellest in heaven"; and Diodorus, in Lippomanus, in the Catena on Genesis. But by the name of earth they say is signified prime matter, or the corporeal mass from which God formed all bodies, in which they agree with Augustine. Abulensis follows this opinion in Genesis; and it is usually attributed to Bede, Strabo, and Hugh of Saint Victor; and the same is insinuated by Theophilus of Antioch, book II to Autolycus, somewhat from the beginning; and Philastrius, in his book On Heresies, refers among the ignorances of certain heretics that they were ignorant of the double acceptation of earth. One, by which it signifies this element which we inhabit; another, by which it signifies Hyle, that is, invisible and incomposite matter which is like the matrix of all things. This opinion can be confirmed by the difficult passage in Wisdom 11: "Thy almighty hand created the world from invisible matter"; therefore this matter was signified by the name of earth, and from it as from matter the entire world consists.

5. But others, since this interpretation of the name of earth is also very metaphorical and alien to historical narration, properly understand that by that word is signified the element of earth which God created on the first day together with the empyrean heaven. They add however that together with these was created water which filled that entire space which was interposed between earth and the

empyrean heaven, from which God afterward created all the heavens and the elements of fire and air; and thus they conclude that all these bodies consist of the same matter. They prove the assumption from those words immediately following: "And darkness was upon the face of the abyss"; for the abyss is copious water to whose bottom one cannot easily penetrate, as Basil declares on Genesis, and Augustine on Psalm 14. Hence immediately it is added: "And the Spirit of the Lord moved upon the waters." Therefore there were waters together with earth and heaven, and procreated between earth and heaven; and since it is not likely that any space interposed between heaven and earth remained empty, it is established that the whole was filled with waters, because Scripture makes no mention of another body then procreated by which it could be filled. And thus it is concluded that heaven was produced from water. Those words of Peter favor this opinion, in the second epistle, last chapter: "For this they willingly are ignorant of, that the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water by the word of God." And the same is reported to have been said by the same Peter when disputing with Simon Magus in book I of Clement's Recognitions, toward the beginning. Finally, the Hebrew word by which the heavens are called Shamayim also favors this opinion, for (as Jerome says, epistle 83, to Oceanus) that name is taken from waters. Some indeed add that the body by which the space between earth and heaven was filled was not the proper element of water, but aqueous matter like some vapor or mist, according to that passage in Ecclesiasticus 24: "As a mist I covered all the earth"; and that in Job 38: "Who shut up the sea with doors, when it broke forth as issuing out of the womb, when I made the clouds the garment thereof, and wrapped it in mist as in swaddling clothes?" And from this misty matter they say all the heavens were created except the empyrean, and thus it happens that they consist of the same matter.

6. And this opinion is confirmed by another double teaching of Scripture. One is that there are true waters above the firmament,

that is above the eighth and starry sphere, as is established from the same Genesis 1: "Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters, and God made the firmament, and divided the waters that were under the firmament from those that were above the firmament"; and in other places of Scripture mention is often made of waters existing above the heavens, as in Psalms 103 and 148, and in Daniel, in the canticle of the three young men. From this teaching of Scripture therefore it is gathered that heaven is not of different matter than the element of water, and that it was formed from water, and part of the waters was left above it. The other teaching of Scripture is that the heavens will sometime be corrupted and burned with fire and transformed into better substance, as Isaiah seems to predict expressly in chapters 51 and 65, and more clearly Saint Peter in the second canonical epistle, last chapter, and it is indicated in many other places. From this therefore it is correctly gathered that heaven consists of matter capable of substantial mutation, and consequently has matter of the same nature as the matter of these inferior things.

The Second Opinion Contrary to the First

7. The second opinion teaches that the matter of heaven is of different nature from the matter of these inferior things or, to speak more universally and more metaphysically, the matter of incorruptible bodies is necessarily of different nature from the matter of corruptible bodies. Thus teaches Saint Thomas, I, question 66, article 2, and I-II, question 49, article 4, and II Contra Gentiles, chapter 16; and the authors cited in the superior section follow it. Indeed even the Commentator, Metaphysics VIII, commentary 12, although he absolutely denies that heaven has matter, says conditionally however that if it has it, it is of different nature. And this is without doubt the opinion of Aristotle in the places cited for the opinion of the Commentator in the superior point; for in them he plainly denies that

heaven has such matter as these inferior things have; hence, since in other places he said it has matter, it is necessary that he assert it to be of different nature. This he affirms in almost express words, Metaphysics XII, text 12, and in this sense it is commonly explained that in Metaphysics X, chapter 5, he says the corruptible and incorruptible differ in genus; for this is not true of logical genus, since corruptible and incorruptible bodies agree in the genus of substance and body, therefore it must be understood of physical genus, which all understand to be matter, which is so called because it preserves that proportion to form which genus has to difference. Hence in On Generation I, chapter 6, he says more openly that those things which cannot mutually act and suffer do not have the same matter. Therefore this opinion is more consonant with philosophical doctrine; but to show that it is more true simply, we must proceed gradually, according to the three foundations of the prior opinion.

That Specific Diversity of Matters Is Not Contradictory

8. I say first that nothing contradicts the natures of things that there be specific and essential diversity in substantial potencies and matters. This is proved first ostensively from what was said above concerning the nature of prime matter. For we showed that it has true essence, real and substantial, and in the genus of being has its entitative actuality, although incomplete and with relation to form; therefore in that grade and mode of partial essence there can be diversity and greater and lesser essential perfection. The consequence is clear, because neither on God's part is there impotence, nor on the part of the thing is there contradiction. For just as accidental passive potency can be specifically diverse, because it is ordered to act specifically and generically diverse, in the same way substantial potencies can be distinguished. This is further declared; for some substantial forms are those which are united to matter through

generation of the whole, which can broadly be called generable forms; others indeed are forms which cannot be made or united through generation, but only through creation or concreation; therefore if matter is instituted apt to receive only forms of the prior kind and incapable of others, it will be plainly of diverse nature from matter capable of ingenerable forms; but it does not contradict that such matter be instituted with such nature and capacity; therefore it does not contradict that matters of diverse natures and essences be made.

9. The second way this can be proved is by solving the foundation of the first opinion and all the arguments by which its defenders try to prove this to be impossible. For when that principle is adduced from Aristotle: "Act is what distinguishes," if we use the name of act in its entire latitude, we will easily respond that one matter is distinguished specifically from another through intrinsic essential difference, which is compared to the genus of matter as metaphysical act; for we already showed above that it does not contradict pure potentiality that matter be constituted in the physical genus from metaphysical potency and act. Nor is it necessary to recur to the analogy of matter in common with respect to matters of diverse natures, which Cajetan constitutes, I, question 66, article 2. For such analogy is founded on no probable reason, since the essential nature of substantial potency most properly befits any matter and without any relation of one to another. Therefore, if we speak of metaphysical act, any matter has in itself intrinsic act by which it is distinguished from another, which is manifestly convinced from the essential distinction of matter from form, for if act is what distinguishes, it is necessary that matter have in itself act by which it is distinguished from form. Especially since it is very probable that there is a common univocal and generic concept for matter and form, namely in that mode by which genus can be found in parts, according to what was said above concerning universals; for the concept of nature, or of intrinsic and essential principle or cause, seems to be of this kind, therefore this genus is divided by opposite differences as by acts; thus therefore the

common nature of matter can be distinguished by various differences. But if there is discussion of physical or real act, we can still distinguish concerning entitative or formal act, and in the prior mode it is not necessary that every simple entity be distinguished from another of dissimilar nature through another act, beyond the very entity of the thing itself. Because simple entity cannot be distinguished in reality from another except by itself; for it is distinguished by the same thing by which it exists. But speaking of the latter act, namely formal, thus also all distinction can be attributed, insofar as it is made either through it, or through relation to it; for thus a composite is distinguished through form as through constituting act; but one matter is distinguished from another through relation to diverse generable or ingenerable form, as we declared.

10. The conclusion is further declared, because specific unity with numerical distinction does not contradict prime matter; therefore neither will specific distinction with numerical unity contradict it. The consequence is proved from this, that just as act is what distinguishes, so also act is what gives unity and constitutes specific nature; for to constitute is prior in nature to distinguishing. Likewise, because just as genus is compared as potency to specific difference, so species to individual difference. And finally because even numerical distinction, since it is actual and real, must be made through act, as is established from what was said above concerning the principle of individuation. The first antecedent is manifest as to both parts. For as to the first, all confess that all matters of generable things are of the same species. First indeed, because they are entirely similar in essence, whence they also have the same definition. Second, because any portion of matter is capable of all forms of which another is capable, for any is the common subject of these transmutations; and therefore Aristotle correctly said that those things have one matter which are mutually transmutable, which must necessarily be understood of specific unity. Finally, we proved above at length that the first material cause of generable things cannot be except one,

certainly according to species, which Aristotle teaches, throughout Physics I, especially text 69, and the Commentator there and Metaphysics XII, commentary 14; and Saint Thomas, I, question 66, article 2. Nor is the mode of speaking of some to be approved who say that the matter of generable things is one in species negatively, not positively; for they want positive specific unity to be through form. This is however an inept distinction, for if they speak of unity as formal, all unity is negative; but if as foundation of unity, this is as positive in many matters as in many forms or composites, for it truly has positive essence and positive likeness or agreement in its entire essential nature. As to the other part also concerning numerical distinction the matter is very clear; for the bodies of two men differ numerically, therefore also their matters, which distinction they retain even if they are deprived of their forms. Indeed even matters which are under specifically diverse forms, although as to proximate dispositions they are said to differ somewhat specifically, as is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, text 11, nevertheless prime matters as to their entities are only numerically diverse, with which distinction they can be conserved without any form actually informing. Nor does it matter that this entire matter of generable things could be constituted under a form of the same nature and under the same continuous quantity, and thus be numerically one, for this unity or distinction in matter is such as is wont to be in homogeneous things, whose integral parts, if they are actually divided, are also several individuals simply, and actually distinct numerically; but if they are not disjoined but continuous, they are actually numerically one and several in potency. Thus therefore it is established that unity or distinction both specific and generic or numerical does not contradict the nature or essence of matter.

11. To the confirmation which was founded on the imperfection of matter, it is responded first that it is probable that matter as such according to its common genus is so imperfect a being that none can be more lowest and imperfect in the genus of substance, not only comparing genus to genus, which is very clear, but also

comparing each and every thing contained under the genus of matter to all others which are contained under other genera or natures of substance. This is declared, for matter as such is distinguished within the latitude of substance, both from form, and from complete substance, whether composite or simple, and in this mode it is clear that the genus of matter as such is less perfect than the genus of form, and a fortiori than composite or complete substance. We can however further compare any form with any matter, and thus it is not so evident that every matter is inferior to any form. For what if someone should say that the matter of the empyrean heaven is a more perfect being than the form of earth? For by what evident reason will it be demonstrated that this is false? For that that form has more of the nature of actuating act does not seem sufficiently convincing, because accidents also have more of the nature of actuating act than matter, and nonetheless in their actual entity they are simply less perfect, because they confer absolutely lesser perfection in the genus of being. Thus therefore someone could say that matter is better which as it were begins the most perfect body such as the empyrean heaven is, than is the form which as it were consummates and completes the most imperfect body which is earth. Nor does it also obstruct that that matter is contained under a less perfect genus, for it often happens that a perfect species under a less perfect genus is simply nobler than some lowest species under a better genus, just as the will is absolutely a more perfect potency than sight, although the latter is contained under the genus of knowing potency, which is nobler. For the nobility of genus is not to be taken from comparison of each and every species, but either in itself and comparing precise natures, or certainly by conferring the supreme species of one genus to the supreme of another. Although however this can be thus disputed, nonetheless we admit as more probable that any matter is inferior to any form, because it is pure potency in the genus of substance, under which genus it can participate little perfection. Likewise, because otherwise someone could easily say that some matter is more perfect than some complete

and integral substance, because when it is posited to be more perfect than form and otherwise includes the entire perfection of matter, it can easily happen that at least intensively it exceeds in perfection some integral and composite substance, which is not likely. In this mode therefore it is very well explained that prime matter is the lowest being, not only by reason of this inferior matter of generable things, of which Augustine especially spoke when he said matter is nearly nothing, but also by reason of the entire genus or entire latitude of matter, for the whole pertains to the lowest grade of substantial being.

12. But it does not pertain to this lowest perfection of matter that in its latitude there cannot be grade or greater and lesser essential perfection, because it is not necessary that that perfection of matter be entirely indivisible essentially; for, as I declared, it can be divided and contracted through various differences. Nor as to this is pure potency to be compared with pure act, a manifest sign of which is that pure act is essentially numerically one and singular, but not pure potency. The reason however is that pure act is constituted in itself through infinite perfection simply, including in itself every other perfection, to which infinity and containment multiplication both essential and generic is contradictory, as we will see later. But pure potency is not constituted through infinite perfection, as is clear per se, since it is of lowest perfection; nor will it be constituted through lack of all perfection, nor through inclusion (so to speak) of all perfection, nor finally is it of the nature of matter as such that it have lowest and indivisible physical perfection, for the nature of pure potency does not postulate this, and from elsewhere it does not have it. But here immediately it occurred to ask which of these matters is less perfect; for they are not equal, as we already conceded and the reason of specific distinction seems to postulate. Again it can be asked whether another matter less perfect essentially than any created matter can be made, and consequently whether in these matters one can proceed to infinity. But these things will be declared more conveniently in the following section.

Section XI

Second Assertion

13. I say second: if we regard reason alone, it is more probable that the matter of the heavens is of different nature from the matter of generable things. To prove this conclusion, we suppose that heaven is ingenerable and incorruptible. Although, as I said, we do not here treat of heaven as it were materially (so to speak), but formally of incorruptible body. It is however certain that it does not contradict that some incorruptible body be given, concerning which the proposed question proceeds, whether it is actually given or not. Again concerning some celestial body, at least concerning the empyrean heaven, theologians hold for certain that it is an incorruptible body, as is established from the authors cited above. Finally, although concerning the inferior orbs many think them to be corruptible, and some of the ancient Fathers sometimes signify this and modern astrologers also think they demonstrate this from certain appearances of comets, the opinion of Aristotle is nevertheless more likely to us, that all those bodies up to the heaven of the moon are incorruptible by their nature, both on account of experience, for we see that corruptible bodies, either according to themselves as wholes, or according to parts, either are corrupted, or are altered, receiving foreign impressions or sometimes falling from their natural state; but indeed by most ancient experience it is established that the heavens, both according to themselves as wholes and according to all their parts, have remained intact from the creation of the world and are moved in the same way with invariable uniformity, nor are they altered or cast down from their connatural state, from which experience arose the common consensus of all peoples thinking that heaven is perpetual of itself, as Aristotle noted in the book On the World to Alexander, and On the Heavens II, chapter 1. Both also because this is more consonant with the end for which those bodies were created, namely that they be certain universal causes which by their motion and uniformly variable influence help all these inferior things so that they

are conserved through continuous succession and generation; for this end it was necessary that the heavens be perpetual and be moved in the same invariable way. Both finally because it does not contradict that the heavens be created of incorruptible nature, as is established from what was said and will be more apparent from what will be said, therefore it is more likely that they were created such; for, as I said, this is more consonant with their end and also pertains more to the perfection and beauty of the universe, nor is there anything in divine Scripture which contradicts this philosophical reasoning, as I will show in the following assertion. Indeed there are many expressions which favor it, as that the heavens are called most firm, II Chronicles 6, and most solid, Job 37, and eternal, namely, in the future, Psalm 148, and II Corinthians 5.

14. Having supposed this therefore, the conclusion posited is proved because, if heaven were composed of the matter of elements, it would be as corruptible of itself as the elements themselves are. The consequence is proved because the matter of heaven would be capable of other forms, for example, of elements, and would lack them; therefore it would be subject to proper privation of such forms and consequently, as much as is from itself, would desire them; but this is the entire root of the corruptibility of elements; therefore. Some respond by denying the major, because matter, while it is under one form, is not capable of another because it cannot have both simultaneously and therefore does not properly have privation nor desire of another, because that form which it has is content. But this is frivolous, for capacity for several forms is not to be declared in the composite sense (as they say), but divisively; for it is the same subject capable of contrary forms, not because it can simultaneously receive both, but because it is of itself indifferent to receive one or the other, and this is sufficient that, when it has one, it is truly deprived of the other, because it truly lacks the form of which it is capable. Otherwise neither would the matter of generable things be subject to privation, nor in any subject in which there is form or positive quality, would

there ever be privation of opposite form, which is against the common sense and mode of speaking of all. Finally, the matter of generable things is not the principle of corruption for any other reason, except because in this way it is capable of other forms which it lacks, and for that reason it is said to desire them, according to metaphor; for this desire is nothing other than natural capacity, as was declared in the first proemial disputation.

15. Others respond that the form of heaven fills the capacity of matter on account of its eminence and virtual containment, and on account of this peculiar reason matter existing under such form does not desire others, nor is it properly capable of them. But this also is false, for the form of heaven does not contain eminently and virtually all other forms; for it does not contain the rational soul, nor other forms of more perfect living things, nor does the form of one heaven eminently or virtually contain the forms of other heavens, supposing that they differ specifically. Hence, when it is said that the form of heaven fills the capacity of matter, it can be understood intensively, and this is neither true, nor sufficient, for the rational soul more perfectly actuates matter and, since it is most perfect, it alone can be said to fill the capacity of matter intensively, and nonetheless it leaves it so capable of others that it is a sufficient principle of corruption. It can be responded that the rational soul exceeds the form of heaven in the grade of form, but is exceeded in the mode of informing. But we say that from this excess and mode of informing the diversity of matter is sufficiently gathered and otherwise it cannot be explained what kind of excess this is, as will be more established from the following. Therefore either it is understood that the form of heaven fills the capacity of matter extensively, and this is impossible if that matter is of entirely the same nature and capacity as this our matter, because it is of itself plainly indifferent to all forms whose perfections the form of heaven contains neither formally nor eminently. Therefore it cannot happen that through itself alone and through its mode of informing it fills the capacity of such matter.

16. Another response is that the capacity of matter can be considered in two ways: in one way, according to itself and as it were remotely; in another way, proximately and as it is reducible to act. In the prior way they concede that the matter of heaven is capable of other forms, as the argument made proves; and similarly that it has privation and as it were radical desire; but proximately they deny that it has capacity, because now that matter is so effected, disposed and actuated, that it is not reducible to another act, because it is not separable from that which it now has. This however comes partly from dispositions which do not have contraries, partly from the information itself or mode of informing, which is such that it inseparably conjoins such form to this matter. But matter is the principle of corruptibility not as it is considered according to remote capacity, but as it is proximately disposed and affected. This response indeed is probable, but nevertheless it does not so satisfy that the contrary opinion is not left more probable. First indeed, because for an agent to be able to alter a patient, it is not necessary that it suppose in it a disposition positively contrary, but it is sufficient that it suppose capacity with privation, for these, joined to the form which the agent introduces, are sufficient principles of natural mutation; therefore, although in heaven there are not dispositions directly and positively contrary to the qualities of elements, if nevertheless in it there is matter capable of such qualities and lacking them, this is sufficient that heaven can be altered by elements and receive foreign impressions. You will say that heaven has some noble qualities formally repugnant and resistant to all these inferior qualities. But this is said voluntarily and without proof in the first place, and then from that response at most it is held that the heavens cannot be corrupted, because there is not in the inferior agent virtue which can overcome the resistance of the patient; if therefore the active virtue were increased or made stronger, it could alter heaven and dispose it to corruption.

17. And finally, although we should grant that that mode of incorruption is possible, nevertheless it cannot be denied that it is an

easier and nobler mode, if heaven is incapable of foreign impressions and forms not through resistance of qualities, but through intrinsic and substantial composition. Since therefore heaven was made so that it be abstracted from all these impressions and alterations and so that its matter never change form, it is more likely that it was made of itself incapable of all these forms and qualities, and therefore not only as to form but also as to matter heaven is of another nature and order from all inferior bodies. But if someone should say that this incapacity for foreign corrupting impressions is not to be attributed either to incapacity of matter or to resisting qualities, but to the mode of informing of the form, against this is that if matter has the same capacity, it can scarcely be understood how through the mode of information alone the composite itself is rendered incapable of inferior qualities, especially since passive potency for receiving these qualities befits bodies by reason of matter. And for this cause Aristotle, in the places cited above, rightly thought that just as those things which are mutually transmuted have common matter, so also conversely those which cannot be transmuted do not have common matter, because diversity in form alone cannot suffice for this. It is added that, although the form of heaven has such a mode of informing that by its nature it postulates inseparability from the subject which it informs, nevertheless through this very thing it is sufficiently indicated that the matter subjected to that form ought to be of diverse nature, because potencies are distinguished by acts; but the form informing in that mode is an act of far different nature from a generable form, and postulates in the subject conditions far different, namely inseparability and full satiety, and (so to speak) perpetual quiet under such act; therefore potencies or matters ordered to such acts are distinct.

18. All celestial spheres are ingenerable. What absurdities arise from the opposite view. Finally, no less effective arguments can be drawn from the fact that the heaven is ingenerable by natural generation; for up to this point we have only considered its incorruptibility. If therefore the matter of air and of the sun, for

example, were of the same nature, the matter of air would now be capable of the form of the sun and would lack that form and would desire it, for there is no lesser reason concerning that form than concerning other forms of which it is the act. Therefore, as far as the material cause is concerned, the heaven is truly generable from air; therefore it is generable absolutely. The consequence is clear both because this denomination is taken especially from the part of matter, and also because to a natural passive potency there corresponds a natural active potency, otherwise such a potency would be superfluous and idle in the nature of things. Or certainly, even if such an active force were not given in fact, it would nevertheless not be repugnant for it to be given within the order of natural agents. And thus, as far as it is concerned in itself, the heaven would be naturally generable. Rather, no reason could be given why the heaven itself or the sun could not generate something similar to itself from matter applied to it, because there is given in nature a subject containing that form in potency and lacking it; therefore that form is makeable through eduction from the potency of such a subject; therefore it is finite both in its being and grade and in the mode by which it can be made; therefore it can be educed by the finite power of a natural agent; why therefore is there not in the heaven or in the sun such a power for generating something similar to itself? Certainly no philosophical reason can be assigned. Since therefore the heaven is ingenerable, its form is such that it can neither be educed from the potency of matter, nor be united through generation; therefore it is not contained in the potency of that matter which is the subject of generation, nor does it regard or can actuate it; therefore conversely the matter which is subjected to such a form is by its nature a subject incapable of generation and consequently is of a different nature from other matter which is the subject of generation. And these arguments, although they have been made by way of example concerning the matter of heaven, nevertheless proceed universally and formally concerning a

body that is intrinsically incorruptible, which will be more confirmed by solving the second foundation of the prior opinion.

19. The second foundation of the prior opinion is therefore solved from the confirmation of the preceding assertion; for we have now sufficiently shown how from the incorruptibility of a body, if it is entirely natural and intrinsic, there follows a diversity of matter, and all the things that are touched upon in the discourse of that foundation have been treated and explained by us individually. But the example that is adduced there concerning the indissoluble union of Christ's humanity refers nothing to the present matter; for we do not deny that some union can be indissoluble by its nature, but we say that such a union of form with matter is an indication of diversity not only in the form but also in the matter, both because potency is proportioned to act, and also because such a union postulates matter incapable of foreign impressions.

The Matters of the Heavens Are Compared among Themselves

20. In the confirmation of that foundation, however, a special difficulty is raised concerning the matters of the heavens, whether they also differ among themselves in species, in which we can speak either by supposing that celestial bodies are of the same species, or from the hypothesis that they differ in species; and, as I have often said, it makes no difference to the present question what is in fact more true in this matter, for it is sufficient to speak of the possible, in which there is no doubt that there can be given bodies that are incorruptible and of both the same and different species. If therefore we speak of bodies having forms of the same nature, no question remains but that the matters must also be of the same essential nature, because they have nothing from which they might be distinguished. Nor can such agreement in matter obstruct the incorruptibility of such bodies because like does not suffer from like; whence between such bodies

there cannot be natural action and transmutation, nor does the matter of one desire the form of another, since they are of the same species. And in this respect the reasoning is the same concerning different bodies as concerning different homogeneous parts of the same body; but the parts of the same homogeneous body have distinct portions of matter, yet of the same nature, just as the forms are. It is not improbable, however, that this singular matter of such a species is naturally coadapted and proportioned to this singular form and has with it a peculiar bond and proper individual relationship, although this is uncertain and refers little to the present matter.

21. The difficulty therefore touched upon in the aforesaid confirmation proceeds by supposing a specific distinction between such bodies, whether that distinction occurs between integral bodies, such as are, for example, the empyrean heaven and the heaven of the moon, which it is far more likely differ in species, or whether they are related as parts of the same body, as the stars are in respect to other parts of celestial bodies. Concerning all these, therefore, there is difficulty, because if the argument made is effective, it equally proves that the matters of all incorruptible bodies differing in species are also different in species, which seems incredible.

22. The opinion of certain persons in this matter. In this matter the disciples of St. Thomas are divided, for Capreolus, whom Soncinas and others follow, does not think that consequence should be admitted, because, in order that matters be specifically diverse, it is not sufficient that forms be specifically distinct, since it is established that in these lower things the same matter receives various forms; it is therefore necessary that there be diversity in the mode of informing; but all the forms of the heavens agree in the same mode of informing inseparably and in fulfilling the appetite of matter, therefore, although those forms differ in essential grade, nevertheless the matter of all is one because it regards all as if under one formal aspect which is taken from the mode of informing, just as the matter of lower bodies is one because it regards several forms, insofar as they agree in another mode

of informing, namely separably. Whence Aristotle, although he said that the corruptible and incorruptible differ in genus, nevertheless never said that incorruptible things among themselves also differ in physical genus; therefore they do not differ in matter. Finally, all those bodies, just as they are incapable of corrupting alterations, so they are capable of those changes which do not bring corruption, such as local motion and passive illumination; therefore it is a sign that they have matter of the same nature.

23. The matter of celestial spheres is specifically diverse among themselves. But truly Cajetan concedes the consequence of the argument and teaches that all incorruptible bodies specifically diverse have not only forms but also matters specifically diverse. And in that opinion he speaks more consistently, because the arguments made have the same efficacy in the present case. For if the matter of the crystalline heaven, for example, is of the same nature as the matter of the empyrean heaven, therefore it is naturally capable of its form and of all the dispositions that are required for it; therefore the form of the empyrean heaven, as far as it is concerned in itself and on the part of such a subject, can be educed from its potency; therefore the empyrean heaven is naturally generable, and conversely the crystalline heaven will be naturally corruptible and transmutable into another. The consequence is clear because matter is said to be of itself indifferent to all those forms and to be determined to them through the proper dispositions of each; therefore there will be as much repugnance between the dispositions as between the forms; therefore through those dispositions that matter will be able to be prepared for rejecting one form and receiving another. Nor does perfect and positive contrariety seem necessary for this transmutation, but proper privative opposition with natural repugnance and incompossibility of forms and proper qualities or dispositions will suffice. But if all this is true on the part of natural passive potency, no reason can be brought forward why the natural active potency corresponding to that passive potency should be impossible; indeed, no reason can be given why it

is not found in fact in the heavens. Therefore, that such bodies are mutually impassible to such passion as disposes to corruption or generation, arises from the fact that each has its own matter so accommodated and commensurated to its proper form and dispositions that it is entirely incapable of others; whence it necessarily follows that the matters of these bodies are as diverse in species as their forms.

24. Therefore, although it is true that all matters of the heavens agree in this, that they are ordered to a form informing inseparably, nevertheless this agreement cannot be specific in them, but generic, and from it specific diversity is inferred. For, in order that each matter be inseparably conjoined to its proper form, it is necessary that by force of its entity and essence it can contract a natural bond with that form alone; for, if it were indifferent, by this very fact it could dismiss its own form and cohere to another repugnant one. Therefore to regard a form informing inseparably is nothing other than to regard determinately one's proper and unique form; and conversely, that a form informs inseparably is because it regards such a potency that is content with that act, nor does it desire another, because it is not capable of another. Nor can it be understood in any other way that each form of heaven satisfies the appetite of its proper matter. There is therefore in this a great dissimilarity between the matter of corruptible and incorruptible things, for the former regards a separable form because it indifferently regards several forms mutually repugnant, whence the very separability of forms requires unity in matter and such a capacity that is not entirely fulfilled by one or another form. But truly the matter of each heaven regards an inseparable form because it regards no other except its own, and therefore it is satisfied because it is not capable of others nor indifferent, but by force of its essence it is determined to such a form. Nor can Aristotle be repugnant to this opinion, since he said generally that those things differ in matter which are not mutually transmutable. But that he said in Metaphysics X that the corruptible and incorruptible differ in genus

does not prevent that the incorruptible things themselves can also be said to differ among themselves in physical genus, if this is nothing other than to differ in matter; but if more is indicated by that expression, then for a special reason corruptible bodies will be said to differ in genus from incorruptible ones, rather than incorruptible ones among themselves, because the former are of different orders, but the latter constitute one grade. Likewise the matters of the heavens and of the elements differ in a certain way in physical genus, because one matter is the subject of generation, but the other entire matter is incapable of generation; and thus there is also greater specific and subaltern similarity between the matters of the heavens among themselves than with the matter of these lower things. And that agreement is sufficient so that they can agree in certain local or perfective changes, as is evident per se. And thus the foundations of others are sufficiently satisfied and our opinion is confirmed.

Third Assertion, by Which the Testimonies of Divine Scripture are Satisfied

25. The empyrean heaven is far more incorruptible. I say thirdly: from the divine Scriptures it cannot be gathered that the heavens were made from the matter of the elements, and consequently there is nothing in sacred Scripture that is repugnant to the proposed philosophical truth. This assertion indeed exceeds the limits of metaphysics; we cannot however pass it over, both to satisfy the foundations of the opposite opinion, and also to touch briefly upon the material cause of the entire corporeal universe and its condition, on which not only theologians, but also philosophers from the beginning have labored. First therefore, as pertains to the empyrean heaven, the conclusion is beyond controversy; for theologians who admit that heaven teach that it was created in the first moment of the creation of things simultaneously with the earth; and that it is either signified, or at least comprehended in those words: "In the beginning

God created heaven." Whence, at least as regards this body, all the things said about the matter of heaven proceed without any theological difficulty. For this reason also theologians teach that that heaven at the end of the world is neither to be burned by fire nor to be renewed, because it is always most pure and most bright, as befits the seat of the blessed. But philosophers could know nothing of the existence of that heaven, because it has neither motion nor illumination or manifest influence by which it could be investigated by mortals through human discourse.

26. The lower celestial spheres were created simultaneously with the empyrean from nothing. Concerning the other heavens, however, the conclusion is proved, because no reason compels that by the name of heaven in the cited words only one celestial body, and that the supreme and empyrean one, should be understood, for the frequent and customary mode of speaking holds that by the name of heaven simply said the entire order of celestial bodies is comprehended. Which custom is also frequent in Scripture, especially because that singular in Hebrew is plural, because the word Samain lacks the singular, and in another place it is transferred in the plural, Psalm 101: "In the beginning, you, Lord, founded the earth, and the heavens are the works of your hands"; where it is signified that all the heavens were established simultaneously with the earth. Nor truly does it obstruct that a little later in the same chapter 1 of Genesis it is said that the firmament was made on the second day and called heaven; and the sun, moon and stars were created on the fourth day; this (I say) does not obstruct, both because it is more probable that these were not created on the second and fourth day as to their substance, but only as to certain accidental functions, as we will indicate a little later; and also because that firmament of which mention is made on the second day is not any of the incorruptible bodies of which we speak, as we will declare immediately. It is therefore more likely that Moses comprehended all the celestial spheres under the name of heaven, and spoke especially of this visible

heaven which is beheld by human eyes; for he especially acted in that work to show that God was the creator of all visible things, as Jerome noted, epistle 139 to Cyprian. It is therefore not to be believed that Moses began his narration from the creation of the invisible heaven alone; he therefore comprehended under that word all the visible heavens, as Basil also interprets, homily 2 on the Hexameron. Indeed it is quite probable that he comprehended all corporeal things up to and including air under the name of heaven; for it is frequent in Scripture that air is comprehended under the name of heaven, Psalm 103: "Stretching out heaven like a skin, you who cover its upper parts with waters." And frequently in Scripture mention is made of the birds or fowls of heaven, that is, of the air; and in the same place in Genesis it is said: "And God called the firmament heaven"; which firmament is either a certain part of the air, or includes the air. Just as therefore a little below it is said: "And he called the dry land earth," and nevertheless he called it by the same name (as if by anticipation) in the beginning, so also concerning the name of heaven it can be conveniently understood.

27. And from this it is further gathered that there is no argument that heaven was created from water, or that the entire space from the surface of the earth up to the empyrean heaven was full of waters, because in that first narration Moses made mention only of heaven, earth and waters. This (I say) argument is not effective. First, because it has already been declared that all the superior bodies up to the air were comprehended under the name of heaven. Second also, because the exposition of many Fathers is probable, who understand that air is signified by the name of spirit, when it is said there: "And the spirit of the Lord was borne above the waters," as can be seen in Theodoret, question 8 on Genesis, and others, whom Lippomanus refers to in the catena on Genesis. Third, because the exposition of many is also very probable, who think that Moses embraced the four elements disposed in their natural sites and proper order under the name of earth. Which is the opinion of Basil and Bede in the

Hexameron; and of Damascene, book II on the Faith, chapter 5, and the more common one of theologians; for, just as he could comprehend the entire superior sphere under the name of heaven, so he could comprehend the entire inferior world under the name of earth, understanding the middle things from the extremes. Especially because (as philosophers say), when one of contraries is posited in the nature of things, it is necessary that the other also exist; whence, mention being made of the creation of earth, fire also, which is extremely contrary to it in site and lightness, is understood to be created and the middle things are comprehended in them; or certainly air and fire are comprehended under earth and water, which are extremely opposed to those in the primary qualities. I add finally, if from the fact that in those words: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," only the element of earth is expressly named, it is rightly gathered that air and fire were not then created, by equal reasoning it can be gathered that neither was water then created because neither is this narrated of it, but immediately it is added: "But the earth was void and empty and darkness was over the face of the abyss," etc. Whence certain heretics took occasion to say that God did not create that abyss of which mention is made there, nor that invisible and unformed earth, because it is not said of these that they were created, but that they were certainly before the creation of things was made. And they said that those words signified that ancient chaos which philosophers or poets devised, or the prime matter which Plato thought was uncreated, from which they said God created the elementary heaven and earth. Which exposition is heretical. It is therefore necessary that we also understand water under heaven and earth; whence, just as the immediately following words: "But the earth was void and empty," are not understood of another earth than of that which was created in the beginning, so the abyss of waters of which mention is made in the same words is understood to have been created in the same beginning simultaneously with the earth; therefore it is necessary that something else besides what the words

expressly signify be comprehended under those words: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth"; therefore by what reason water is comprehended, the other elements will also be comprehended.

28. The accepted exposition of the Greeks and Latins. And indeed if we understand that the entire celestial body up to the aerial heaven is signified by the name of heaven, earth and water, which are so conjoined that they compose one body and the inferior world in a certain way, are excellently signified by the name of earth. Nor does it matter that in that beginning in which they were created they were not so disposed, nor did they have entirely that position which they now have; for it is sufficient that when Moses wrote, they were already so constituted that he would speak of them as one. But if only the proper celestial spheres are understood by the name of heaven, the remaining elements are comprehended under the name of earth for the reason already given. And so in either way it is concluded that the entire universe consisting of simple bodies as to their substance, but without the ornament and disposition which it now has, is comprehended under the name of heaven and earth there. And this is the more accepted exposition of the Greeks and Latins on Genesis; nor does it displease Augustine, book XI of the City of God, chapter 33, and book II against Maximin, chapter 3, although he sometimes adds something more, which does not pertain to the present disputation.

29. From these things it is established that no argument can be gathered from the history of the creation of the world by which it would be persuaded that the heavens and elements were established from the same matter; but if this is not had from there, it can be gathered from no other testimony of Scripture; but both will become more manifest by responding to the third foundation of the prior opinion. That exposition therefore which understands prime matter by the name of earth, and says that all bodies except the empyrean heaven were formed from it, is indeed Augustine's as to the former part, but not as to the latter. For although he understands prime

matter by the name of earth, it does not follow from this that he understood there to be one and the same matter from which celestial and terrestrial bodies were formed, but only that both were created from some unformed matter. Especially because the same Augustine, in the book on Genesis against the Manicheans, chapter 7, judges that the unformed matter from which heaven and earth were formed is signified by the name of heaven and earth, which he says is so called not because it already was this, but because it could be; therefore by the same reasoning it can be understood that Augustine sensed that some diversity in the unformed matter itself had preceded, on account of which it was called by those distinct names. But (what pertains to the matter) that entire exposition of Augustine is very metaphorical and alien to the historical sense, which ought to be proper and not diverge to metaphors, especially obscure and unusual ones. Whence it is one thing to say that angels are comprehended under the name of heaven, not excluding the proper sense of the word but adding that the contained is comprehended in the container, or the located in the place, but another to say that the angelic nature alone is signified by the name of heaven, which is incredible because that metaphor is very obscure and unusual, especially when in the same chapter it often signifies a visible body; but it is much more incredible that unformed matter is signified by the name of heaven. And almost the same is true of the name of earth, which in that entire chapter signifies the element earth, and this alone is its proper signification, which ought not to be excluded although water or other elements are also comprehended under it, as we have explained. And this is, as I said, the common sense of the Fathers; indeed Tertullian, in the book against Hermogenes, chapter 21, vehemently inveighs against him because he interpreted unformed matter by the name of earth. Likewise also the name of abyss and the name of waters would signify unformed matter, which greatly repugnates the certainty and truth of history.

30. The passage of Wisdom 11 is expounded. But to the passage of Wisdom 11: "Your hand created the world from invisible

matter," it can be responded in two ways; first that those words "from invisible matter" do not signify a material cause preexisting in temporal order to the creation of the world, but only in natural order, so that they do not properly signify the material cause of the creation itself, but of created things, so that the sense is: Your hand created the world consisting of unformed matter which the same hand of yours established, so that from it it might form the entire world. Which exposition is consonant with the doctrine of Augustine, who in other places says that the unformedness of matter preceded the creation of bodies not in time but in nature, as we will see below. According to this interpretation, however, it is not necessary that those words "from invisible matter," or unformed (as the Greek has literally), signify any ultimate species of matter, but absolutely matter, whether it be of one genus or species. Second and more literally, it is responded that the Wise Man is not speaking there of the first creation of things, which was made not from matter but from nothing, but of the ornament, disposition and distinction of things by which this world was established, and constituted in that state and beauty which it now has. For although the Latin Vulgate translates "created," it does not take that word in that rigor by which it signifies production from nothing, but as it is also accustomed to signify any effection; and thus the Greek word κτίζω, which corresponds there, signifies to fabricate and establish generally. Whence by invisible matter is not understood there prime matter (of which divine Scripture never made express mention), but all the simple bodies from which God constituted and adorned this world are signified, in the way that stones and wood are usually called the matter of a house, and universally the thing that is supposed for action or fabrication is usually called the matter of the action. But that matter is said to be unformed, not with substantial unformedness absolutely and simply, but either accidental on account of the lack of light, motion, etc., or also with some substantial unformedness, because the forms of mixed things had not yet been introduced into matter, and for a particular reason it could be said to

be invisible matter on account of the darkness which was over the face of the abyss. But this exposition can be declared from Paul, who seems to have alluded to the aforesaid words of the Wise Man when he wrote to the Hebrews 11: "By faith we understand that the worlds were fitted together by the word of God," where according to Cajetan Paul notes that he speaks of the work of distinction and ornament and therefore does not say that all things were created, but that the worlds were fitted together, because in six days God fitted and disposed this world so that from invisible things, that is, from hidden and unadorned bodies, both on account of darkness and because the earth was hiding under the waters, visible things might be made, that is, they might be constituted in that state in which they could be seen; and both simple bodies and mixed ones, and especially animate beings, could enjoy this visible world.

31. A noteworthy inference. Moreover, from what has been said it also stands established that it is not gathered from the history of Genesis that the entire space which lies between the empyrean heaven and the earth was previously full of waters, so that the heavens might be procreated from them. For the abyss is sufficiently spoken of concerning the entire element of water which then surrounded the earth and was surrounded by darkness; but above it was the air and other celestial bodies. But those words of St. Peter: "The heavens existed before, and the earth consisting of water and through water" do nothing to the matter, both because there the discourse is not of the ethereal heaven, but the aerial one, and also because not the heaven, but the earth is said to consist by the word of God of water and through water, not indeed as to its substance, but as to the state which it now has so that it might be habitable and able to be fruitful, as I have more broadly expounded in volume II, part III, disputation 57, section 2. Finally, that the Hebrew name by which the heavens are named is taken from waters, is not because heaven was established from water, but because heaven was interposed between the waters, so that it might divide the waters from the waters.

32. Aqueous vapor was not the matter from which the bodies situated between the empyrean and the earth were made. The passage of Ecclesiasticus is expounded. Nor is that other opinion more probable which says that all things except the empyrean heaven and earth were made from aqueous vapor; for, if that aqueous vapor is something distinct from water, it repugnates Scripture, which says that water was created above the earth, not aqueous vapor. It also repugnates reason, because that vapor cannot be except some imperfect mixed thing; but it is against reason to say that mixed things were made before simple bodies. Whence it also repugnates all the ancient expositors, because they made no mention of that aqueous vapor in the first instant when it was created with heaven and earth. Nor do the testimonies of Scripture which are asserted to confirm this accomplish anything; for what Wisdom says of itself in Ecclesiasticus 24: "Like a mist I covered the whole earth," is expounded literally in two ways. First, that it does not signify any peculiar work of divine wisdom, but its presence and majesty by which it fills the whole earth, which is declared through the similitude and metaphor of mist, just as God indeed sometimes exhibited his presence in the form of mist in the tabernacle; and according to this sense mist in the said testimony is not of the ablative case, but nominative. The other sense is that wisdom is said to have covered the earth with mist not formally (so to speak), but effectively; and thus it can be referred to the first creation of the world, when darkness was over the face of the abyss; or it can be referred to the continuous succession of darkness and night after the illumination of the sun, which the immediately preceding words seem to indicate: "I made light to arise unfailing in the heavens, and like a mist I covered the whole earth."

33. Where the passage is elucidated. But the other words of Job 38: "Who shut up the sea with doors?" etc., only commend the divine omnipotence by which on the third day of the creation of the world he gathered the water into one place, which on the first day quasi burst forth, so that it might surround the entire earth. But when

it is added: "When I made the cloud its garment, and wrapped it in darkness," nothing else is signified than what is said in Genesis 1: "And darkness was over the face of the abyss." But someone can take occasion from that place to think that the water was then surrounded by some very dense cloud which was the cause of those darknesses, and therefore the cloud is said to have been as it were the garment of the water, etc. Which opinion, even if it is admitted to be true, it is not necessary to imagine that that cloud filled all the superior places up to the empyrean heaven, but only that it was near the water in density and magnitude, which would suffice so that it might wrap the water in darkness. But if it was perhaps done thus, the reason for the darkness which was then over the face of the abyss is easily given; nevertheless the reason why God willed to create that cloud in the first instant and to cover the water with it is not easily given. Nor do those words compel that we understand cloud properly; for the dark and shadowy air which surrounded the water could have been called clouds by metaphor. But if this is so, the cause of the darkness could have been either because God did not give light to the sun in the first instant or because he does not concur with it for illuminating. However this may be (for this does not pertain to the present matter), no matter can be assigned, nor any body, from which the celestial bodies and elements were established.

34. Are there true waters above the firmament? To the other confirmation concerning the waters above the firmament, omitting the many things which can be disputed about that question and are learnedly treated by Benedictus Pererius, book I on Genesis, in the work of the second day, that opinion has always pleased me which denies that there are true and elementary waters above the ethereal heavens, because the opposite does not have sufficient foundation in Scripture, which being removed, it is established that that opinion is alien to all philosophical reason. The major is now only shown by declaring the place in Genesis; for it is established from the entire opinion of interpreters and from the property of the word rakia that

firmament does not signify only one body, but this entire expanse of heaven both aerial and ethereal, of which whole it is said: "Stretching out heaven like a skin." But since in that expanse there are various parts, something is sometimes attributed to it according to the supreme part, as when it is said that God placed the stars in the firmament of heaven, but sometimes according to the lowest part, and thus it is said that God placed the firmament, that is, this lowest region of air, in the middle of the waters, namely of the pluvial and terrestrial ones. And in the same way it is added in the cited place: "Who covers its upper parts with waters"; for he calls them upper in respect to us, not in respect to the supreme bodies, and all the places of Scripture in which mention is made of waters existing above the heavens can be expounded very easily concerning these waters and the aerial heaven. And Jeremiah indicates this interpretation sufficiently, chapter 10, saying: "Who makes the earth by his strength, prepares the world by his wisdom, and by his prudence stretches out the heavens. At his voice he gives a multitude of waters in heaven and raises clouds from the ends of the earth"; and chapter 5: "When he gives his voice, the waters are multiplied in heaven, who raises clouds from the end of the earth." Some object that in Genesis chapter 2, after paradise was already established, it is said: "The Lord had not yet rained upon the earth"; whence they gather that pluvial waters could not have been elevated and divided from the lower ones on the second day. For this reason some concede that vapors and clouds were not raised up to the middle region of air on the second day, but only the air was designated to divide the waters from the waters. But this does not please, both because Scripture says that the division of waters was made on that day, and also because, this division and elevation of waters being excluded, that designation of air is nothing except perhaps some extrinsic denomination. Nor do I see the force of the collection of that argument; for it is not the case that as soon as aqueous vapors ascend to the middle region of air they are so disposed that it immediately

rains; especially since it is written in Job 26: "Who binds the waters in his clouds, so that they do not break forth together downward."

35. What kind of change of all things will occur on the day of judgment. The final confirmation of that opinion was taken from the future renovation of the world on the day of judgment, in which heaven is to be burned according to Scripture, concerning which matter I have disputed at length in volume II, part III, disputation LVIII, section 2, where I showed that on the day of judgment the celestial bodies are not to be changed according to their substances, but only according to certain accidents pertaining to the perfection of the state of glory, and that the fire of conflagration will not ascend above the aerial heaven; where we have also extensively expounded the place of Peter and other testimonies of Scripture, which it is not necessary to repeat here.

SECTION XII

WHETHER CELESTIAL OR ELEMENTAL MATTER IS MORE PERFECT

1. Since from what has been said it is established that nothing is found in the Scriptures that opposes the incorruptibility of the heavens and their creation from nothing, it follows that the opinion which affirms that heaven has matter of a different nature from the matter of generable things is more consonant with philosophical doctrine and opposes nothing in Catholic teaching. But it can subsequently be asked which of these matters is more perfect; for they are not equally perfect, since they differ in species, as was said in the preceding sections.

2. And indeed, comparing the matters of the heavens among themselves, it is certain that matter is more perfect which by its nature is destined to receive a nobler form. This is proved because that potency is nobler which is by its nature ordered to a nobler act; but

any matter of heaven is ordered to its form as to an act adequate to it; therefore, that matter is nobler which is ordered to a nobler form. Nor does any probable reason for doubt occur in this matter.

3. The difficulty, however, lies in comparing the matter of generable things to the matter of incorruptible things as such, namely which of them is less perfect. And the reason for doubt is that they are related as exceeding and exceeded, for the matter of heaven is determined to a certain most perfect form; but the matter of inferior bodies is indifferent to forms even most imperfect. Second, the matter of heaven is always and necessarily joined to its act; whereby it happens that both according to its being and according to its union with its act, it is wholly incorruptible; but the other matter, although it is incorruptible according to its being, nevertheless it changes according to its union. Third, the former matter is not subject to privation; whence it cannot be corrupted according to that aspect either; but the latter is always subject to some privation, indeed to infinite privations according to which it can be corrupted, as Aristotle said in Physics I. Fourth, the former matter is always fully satisfied, because it is always fully actuated; whence it does not desire another form besides the one it has; therefore it does not have appetite in the manner of desire, but only in the manner of love and rest; but the other desires and as it were longs for other forms which it does not have, and therefore it is called ugly and maleficent by Aristotle in Physics I, text 81, and is said to be the principle of corruption in Metaphysics VII, text 22.

4. But truly the matter of corruptible things surpasses celestial matter in this respect, that it is simply capable of a nobler form than that matter: indeed it seems to be capable of the noblest form of all that can exist, namely the rational soul; but this excellence alone seems to be of greater moment and to pertain more to the absolute perfection of matter than all the others enumerated. For the perfection of a potency must be estimated not from any act whatsoever, but from the noblest act; therefore, although the matter of generable things is

capable of many forms, among which some are less noble than celestial forms, nevertheless, because in that whole order of forms there are others, or at least some one nobler than all celestial forms, this is sufficient for this matter to be judged absolutely nobler. And this is confirmed because the matter of generable things also exceeds in the amplitude and capacity of its potency, which also contributes per se to the perfection of passive potency; just as the intellect, because it is the most perfect potency in the genus of cognitive potency, can receive more forms; therefore, if it is added from elsewhere that this amplitude of matter encompasses under itself the noblest form, such matter will be absolutely nobler.

5. Celestial matter is far superior to inferior matter. Nevertheless, all authors who distinguish these matters consider celestial matter to be nobler; indeed, commonly this matter of generable things is regarded as the lowest of all things that can exist, even by the absolute power of God, within the genus of substance. This is the view of Richard in Quodlibet II, q. 5; and Giles in Quodlibet III, q. 5; Durandus in In II, dist. 12, q. 1, and there also Richard, q. 2; and Scotus inclines to this in q. 2, to the arguments, although he is doubtful; Thomas de Argentina holds the same in In I, dist. 44, q. 1, a. 2; Abulensis in chapter 22 of Matthew, q. 222. And the reason is that, generally speaking, the greatest imperfection belongs to passive potency, if it is compared with the perfection of an act of the same genus; therefore, among substantial passive potencies, that one is most imperfect which is of itself maximally passive, and thus maximally indifferent to receiving any act whatsoever, whether perfect or imperfect. And this is confirmed and declared in this way: for the matter of generable things can be conserved under the minimal form; therefore it is a sign that it is of minimal perfection and being. Finally, the matter of celestial bodies is incapable of all alteration and foreign impression; therefore it is a sign that it is constituted in a higher order. Whence, although in active potencies perfection is considered with respect to the most perfect act, this is not so in passive potencies

unless other things are equal; but their proper and adequate act must be considered, and especially the mode of acting. In this also celestial matter excels, because it regards an act that informs inseparably, but the matter of corruptible things regards a form that informs separably; and therefore any celestial matter is more perfect than elemental matter.

6. Whether any matter can be inferior to this lowest matter. But that by absolute power no matter inferior to this can be created is not so constant and certain; for if we conceive matter capable of the form of stone, for example, and so determined to it that it is incapable of all more perfect forms, that would doubtless be less perfect than the matter of generable things which now exists. Nevertheless, the common opinion seems more probable because, as I said, this matter seems to be of the highest potentiality and almost nothing, as Augustine said. Nor does matter capable of one corruptible form seem possible which is not also capable of others from itself, both because all corruptible forms agree in this aspect of informing separably, which is sufficient to constitute a certain ultimate species of matter, under which essential division cannot be understood; and also because by the very fact that matter is joined to a corruptible form, it is subject to privation and consequently capable of diverse forms and contrary dispositions; and therefore such matter cannot be determined to a form nor be capable of one without also being capable of all opposing forms that can drive it away from the same subject. And therefore the matter of corruptible things is not only less perfect than that of celestial things, but also the lowest of all that can exist.

SECTION XIII

WHAT KIND OF CAUSALITY BELONGS TO THE MATTER OF INCORRUPTIBLE BODIES

1. Celestial matter exercises its causality with respect to the composite and form. It remains to speak about the material causality which the matter of an incorruptible body exercises. We distinguished above two causalities of matter with respect to substance: one, as to its constitution; the other, as to its production. Concerning the former, it is certain that it is exercised by celestial matter with respect to its composite and consequently also with respect to its form. For that composite is such that it essentially consists of its matter and form; therefore it depends essentially on that matter as on an intrinsic and essential principle and material cause component. The form of heaven likewise is such that it cannot be conserved outside its matter; therefore it depends on that being as on a subject in which it is sustained; therefore that matter exercises its causality with respect to such a form. From this it also happens that that matter exercises this causality through the union of the form of heaven with that matter, for that union also depends essentially on such matter, and through it, the form and the whole composite depend on the same matter, nor is any other mode necessary besides that which is the causality of such matter, as can easily be proved from the preceding; for in this respect there is the same principle for incorruptible and corruptible body.

2. Whether matter has cooperated in some way in the production of heaven. But concerning the other causality as to production, there can be difficulty whether in some true sense it can be said that the matter of heaven in its genus of material cause concurs in the production of heaven. And the reason for the difficulty is that heaven and universally an incorruptible body comes to be only through creation; therefore the production of it is from nothing; therefore no material cause of that production can be given, for these two are repugnant. And this is confirmed, for the production of heaven is (so to speak) the total production of the substance of heaven, even as to matter; but matter cannot be the material cause of the production of itself; for this is repugnant in every genus of cause except the final, because in the others, causing presupposes being;

therefore matter cannot be the cause of the production of heaven. But to the contrary is the fact that when heaven comes to be, its form comes to be dependently on matter, for in being it depends on that matter; therefore also in becoming; therefore the production of the whole heaven depends on matter. This last consequence is proved: for the production of the whole composite depends on the same material cause on which the production of the form depends, especially when the form is such that it does not come to be except united to matter; but the production of the form of heaven depends in the genus of material cause on matter; therefore also the production of the whole composite. The minor is clear from what has been said, for if the form depends in becoming on matter, therefore its production depends on matter. Also because such is that form that it cannot naturally come to be except united to a subject. Whence it comes to be by the same action by which it is united to the subject and it is united by the same action by which it comes to be; but the uniting action essentially depends on the subject to which the union is made; therefore. But the major also seems clear because a composite does not come to be except through the union of form with matter; therefore if that action depends on the subject, the production of the composite also depends on the subject. Also, a corruptible composite comes to be through action dependent on matter for no other reason than because its form comes to be or is united to matter through action dependent on that matter; but it has been shown that the same happens in an incorruptible body; for I suppose that the form of such a body is not subsistent but material and dependent on matter, which form properly does not come to be, but is coproduced with the composite; and therefore by the same action by which it comes to be and is united, the composite also comes to be.

3. This difficulty does not proceed concerning the creation of heaven insofar as it is terminated to its matter; for thus it is established that there is no material cause of it, but a terminus. It proceeds concerning that production of heaven insofar as it is formally

terminated to its form and to the union of form with matter, and to the composite insofar as it results from that union, whether, namely, that action as to that part (so to speak) has a proper material cause; for the arguments made in the latter place seem to convince the affirmative side. Whence someone could devise that just as an incorruptible body is composed of two parts, so its production is composed of two parts or partial dependencies, of which one is terminated to matter absolutely, but the other to form as informing matter, and thus to the composite as such. For action is proportioned to the terminus, with which it is identified; therefore, just as the terminus is composite, so also is the action or dependency. Therefore that action, by reason of that part which is terminated to matter, does not have a material cause, as has been said; but as to the other part it seems to have it, and this is sufficiently proved by the arguments made. But in this opinion it is difficult to explain whether there are two actions or one; for if there are two, one will be the creation of matter, the other truly generation, or the eduction of form from the potency of matter; but if there is one, it will be as it were mixed and composed from creation and eduction, and it does not appear how those two partial actions are united to compose one.

4. Therefore it can be said otherwise that that action is one and indivisible, by which first and per se the whole incorruptible body is produced and the parts are coproduced, which action cannot have a material cause, because it is wholly from nothing. And thus it happens that the matter of these bodies in no way concurs materially in their production. But in this opinion also it is difficult to believe that an action terminated to a composite thing is in itself indivisible. For the reasoning made above seems to prove the opposite, because action is identified with the terminus produced; therefore, just as the terminus coalesces from parts, so it is necessary that the integral action productive of that terminus arise from partial actions productive or coproductive of the parts of that terminus.

5. In how many ways an action can be indivisible. It must therefore be noted that an action can be called indivisible in two ways: in one way, because it is not composed of parts, as the creation of an angel is indivisible; and in this way the production of heaven cannot be called indivisible, as the reasoning made correctly proves. In another way an action can be called indivisible by nature, because, although it consists of parts, nevertheless it cannot be done except indivisibly or inseparably, nor can one part be made or remain without another, nor by itself alone, but simultaneously with the whole action. And in this way I think there is one and indivisible action by which heaven is created and its matter and form are concreated. For whatever may be the case concerning absolute power, which we shall see below, nevertheless from the nature of the thing the creation of the matter of heaven depends so much on the actual information or union of the form that naturally there cannot be that production of matter without the partnership of another partial action, by which the form is introduced into it; nor conversely can that introduction of form be done per se in the mode of a total action, but only in the mode of a part composing one total action simultaneously with the production of matter. In this the production of an incorruptible body differs from the production of a corruptible body, for in a corruptible body the action by which matter is created can remain the same with varied action by which the form is induced, either according to number or even according to species; although it is necessary that some action remain or succeed; and conversely, the action inductive of form can be done per se in the mode of a total action, as generation happens, as we shall declare more fully below when treating of the eduction of form.

6. The proposed difficulty is solved. Therefore, this being supposed, to the proposed difficulty it must be said that that integral and indivisible action does not depend on matter in the genus of material cause absolutely and simply, because no subject is presupposed to action as such; nevertheless it must be admitted that that action, as to that part by which it is coproductive of form,

depends on matter as on a subject and material cause; for this the reasoning made above correctly proves. Nor indeed does it follow from this that that action as to some part is generation or proper eduction of form from the potency of the subject, for this character belongs only to an action which can be done per se and separately and in the mode of a total action; but that partial action should be called concreation, because it is by its nature part of one total action which is true creation. Nor is it repugnant to concreation as such to depend on a subject and material cause as to that aspect or part according to which it is called concreation; just as also, insofar as it is partial concreation of matter, it depends in its own way on the form and its union. Which is nothing other than to say that there is a certain total creation which consists of material and formal parts, proportioned to the parts of which its terminus consists; which is most true. And thus satisfaction has been given to all reasons for doubt, and all these things will be better understood from what will be said below concerning creation and concerning the eduction of substantial form, where I shall say more about this difficulty.

SECTION XIV

WHETHER A SUBSTANTIAL MATERIAL CAUSE CAN BE GIVEN IN INCORPOREAL THINGS, AND HOW QUANTITY IS COMPARED TO THIS MATERIAL CAUSE

1. This question presupposes that among created substances there are some that are incorporeal, that is, lacking that quantity of bulk which bodies possess, which we must prove below when treating of separated substances. This being presupposed, therefore, this question seemed necessary for explaining in general material causality concerning substance, or for assigning the limits by which it is

bounded, or for designating a certain property by which it can be recognized.

Various Opinions

2. In this matter some have erred by saying that material causality is not limited to corporeal things, but is also found in incorporeal things. This opinion can be understood in two ways. The first is that it be understood concerning matter of the same nature as the matter of corruptible things. In this sense Avicebron held this opinion, in his book Fons Vitae, as St. Thomas reports and declares, I, q. 50, a. 2. But this sense is easily rejected from what has been said, besides some things which we shall add presently. Because we have shown that celestial bodies, on account of their incorruptibility, cannot consist of this matter; but incorporeal substances are incorruptible and more abstracted from alterations of this kind than celestial bodies; therefore [they cannot consist of such matter].

3. In another sense, therefore, that opinion can be understood concerning matter of another specific nature from this matter of ours, yet of the same generic nature as the matter of corporeal things; so that in itself that matter which is said to exist in fact in incorporeal things would be capable of corporeal bulk and quantity, if the form should admit it. And in this sense that matter is said to be of the same common nature as the matter of corporeal things, although in its state it differs and actually lacks corporeal bulk on account of the form. This also Avicebron asserted, in the cited place. But this sense is also improbable, because it is connatural to corporeal matter to be under quantity and to be divided into parts under it or through it; therefore it is impossible that any substance should by its nature consist of matter of this kind lacking corporeal bulk. The consequence is evident, both because such matter cannot be without quantity, at least in a connatural way; but no substance can naturally consist of matter and not have it in a connatural state, but in a prodigious and miraculous

one; and also because such an incorporeal substance would consist of a portion or part of matter distinct either from the whole matter of corporeal substances, as St. Thomas argues in the cited place, or also from the matters of other incorporeal substances, as Cajetan adds there. But it is repugnant to this matter according to its common nature to be divided into parts except by means of quantity.

4. But someone might say that it is not of the nature of this matter taken in common to have quantity, nor does it positively (so to speak) demand it as a property necessary to itself, but only relates itself indifferently so that it may have it or not have it, according to the requirement of the form. But this is primarily alien to every philosophical reasoning, because we have never experienced matter of this kind except under quantity; therefore not only is this matter capable of quantity by its nature, or can admit it if the form does not oppose it, but also by its nature it demands to be under quantity, indeed can scarcely be understood without it. And this is confirmed, for if there is a capacity for quantity in matter, it cannot naturally lack it on account of the form; for this would happen especially when the form would be spiritual; but we see in man that the form is spiritual and the matter is not therefore deprived of its quantity. But besides this I argue a priori in this way, for either that matter of incorporeal substances would be indivisible in its entity and lacking entitative parts integrating it, or it would have entitative parts nonetheless penetrating each other on account of the lack of quantity. If the first is said, it plainly follows that such matter not only does not actually have quantity but is also entirely incapable of it, because it is repugnant to an indivisible thing to be extended through quantity, as is self-evident from the terms themselves; therefore such matter will not agree with the matter of corporeal substances, even in this common genus of corporeal matter or matter capable of quantity. If, however, the second is said, it is repugnant (at least naturally) for that matter to be separated from quantity, both because the matter of corporeal things demands quantity for no other reason than because it is divisible into

parts; and also because there is neither any indication or trace of such matter in nature; nor can it easily be conceived as existing in that way, as I was saying, especially by its nature.

5. Therefore it could be devised otherwise (and let this be a third way of speaking) that in an incorporeal thing there is composition from matter that is entirely spiritual and indivisible, so that, just as there is given a substance composed of corporeal matter and form and a substance composed of corporeal matter and incorporeal form, so also there can be given a substance composed of incorporeal matter and form. For what is repugnant to there being such composition in a spiritual substance? And Alexander of Hales considers this opinion probable, II, q. 20, memb. 2, at the end, and q. 44, mem. 2, where he distinguishes a twofold matter, namely elemental, celestial, and spiritual; and Bonaventure, In II, dist. 3, a. 1, q. 1 and following; and indeed he speaks of proper matter, as it is an essential part really distinct from the form; and Richard holds the same, same dist., a. 1, q. 2; and Aureolus is referred to the same opinion there; and Plotinus taught the same, book IV Enneads, 2, c. 5, where he says that the depth of each thing is matter, even in the intelligible world. Proclus held the same, in Elementarium, proposition 210. Aristotle is cited for this opinion from among the philosophers, II Metaphysics, text 12, where he says that everything that is moved has matter; and the Commentator, XII Metaphysics, text 20, saying that matter is the cause of potency in things in which there is potency, namely passive, signifying that all things which are in some way in potency have matter; which he also has in VIII Physics, text 15. And Avicenna has the same, II Metaphysics, c. 2. Whence, in book IV, c. 2, he says that everything that has being after non-being has matter. From the Fathers, truly, Augustine, book I De Mirabilibus Sacrae Scripturae, c. 1, says that God from formless matter, which he first created from nothing, divided the multiform species of all visible and invisible things, that is, sensible and insensible, intellectual and lacking intellect; and XII Confessions, c. 20 and 21, among other expositions

of those words: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," he places this one, that is, God made formless matter of spiritual and corporeal creature. Damascene also, book II De Fide, c. 3, says that although certain creatures are said to lack matter with respect to us, nevertheless whatever is other than God is thick and consists of matter. And Boethius, book De Unitate et Uno, says that an angel is one by the conjunction of matter and form; and book I De Trinitate, c. 3, says that a form which is without matter cannot be the subject of accidents.

6. From all these things this opinion concludes that there cannot be given a created substance which is a pure subsisting form, because no created substance exists which, although it actually is by reason of form, is not in potency so that it can be and not be, which belongs to it by reason of matter. Likewise, no created substance exists which cannot act and be acted upon or be moved; but the first belongs to it by reason of form; therefore the second belongs to it by reason of matter, because the same potency cannot according to the same simple nature be active and passive, because it cannot according to the same thing be in act and in potency. Finally, no created substance can be pure act; therefore neither pure form; therefore it must be consisting of matter and form. Nor indeed does this composition repugn to a spiritual thing, because it is not repugnant to understand a substantial entity that is indivisible and incorporeal which in its genus is pure potency and depends on some substantial act informing it. For, just as an integral spiritual substance is in potency to proportioned accidental forms, so there can be given a partial spiritual substance which is in potency to a proportioned substantial form. Finally, just as there are degrees in forms, why can there not also be degrees in matters up to a spiritual degree?

7. This opinion is without doubt false; nevertheless it has two parts. One is that material causality is necessary in every created substance, however incorporeal. The other is that this causality at least

does not repugn to it. Because therefore the first part is more easily attacked than the second, it must be spoken of separately.

Resolution of the Question

8. I say therefore first: it is not of the nature of a created and complete substance to have an intrinsic material cause from which it is composed. All authors who teach that there are in fact created substances not composed of matter, namely angels, suppose this conclusion. Thus nearly all the scholastics think, In II, dist. 3; and St. Thomas, I, q. 50, a. 2, and II Contra Gentiles, c. 50 and 51, and De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 2; Marsilius, In II, q. 2; Henry, Quodlibet V, q. 16; Hervaeus, Quodlibet, XI, q. 3; and it is the express opinion of Dionysius, c. 4 De Caelesti Hierarchia, and De Divinis Nominibus; and without doubt Damascene thinks the same, book II, c. 3; Aristotle also, XII Metaphysics, c. 6, clearly teaches that intelligences are abstracted from matter, although in this he seems to exceed by making them pure acts, concerning which matter we shall speak below in its place. Now the assertion is proved by reason, because neither from the nature of created substance as such, nor from the properties or affections of such substance can the necessity of this composition or material causality be gathered; therefore there is no such necessity. The antecedent as to the first part is evident, because of the nature of substance as such it is only that it be a being subsisting through itself or by its nature apt for subsisting. But that such substance is created adds only dependence on another, and consequently that such substance is finite and is not of itself a necessary being nor entirely simple; but this entire nature of created substance is optimally preserved and understood without composition from matter and form or from substantial act and potency really distinct; therefore. The assumption is proved because, for a substance not to be entirely simple, metaphysical composition suffices, either from nature and suppositum, or from being and essence, concerning which we shall

speak below, besides which there is also composition from genus and difference; which also suffices for such substance to be understood as finite; nor does such composition indicate true composition from matter and form, because it is not necessary that genus and difference be taken from parts of substance really distinct, as has been said in the preceding sections. Finally, for such substance to depend, it suffices that of itself and from its intrinsic essence it is not a being in act, but through the efficiency of another; but this can belong to a substance by the very fact that it has some composition from being and essence, or from the mode of dependence and the thing which depends; therefore for the nature of created substance proper composition from matter and form is not necessary.

9. The other part of the antecedent is proved because it is not repugnant for the same thing to be in act in the genus of substance and to be in potency to accidents, as we shall say more broadly in the following disputation. And it is briefly evident because with respect to different things act and potency are not repugnant. Indeed, by the very fact that a created substance does not have all perfection through itself, it follows that after substantial perfection it is perfectible through accidents; and this is to be in potency to them. Then, if such substance is living and especially intellectual, through the same real faculty it can have the power of acting and receiving, just as through the same will it can elicit and receive the act of willing; and in the same way it can move itself, not by reason of matter but by reason of its own proper substance; therefore these are not sufficient indications of proper composition from matter and form, because they do not necessarily require it; but besides these there are no other indications of such composition which are necessarily found in every created substance; therefore there is no necessity of attributing this composition to every created substance.

10. The rational soul includes no matter. And this discourse is confirmed and declared from the rational soul separated from matter; for it is a created substance, dependent and not entirely simple and

capable of understanding, willing and moving itself; and it is capable of all these things without composition from matter and form. Whence the authors of the contrary opinion, forced by this example, indicate that this composition is also found in the soul; nevertheless this is very alien not only to natural principles, but also to faith. For either they understand that the soul, even while it is in the body, is composed of spiritual matter and form; but thence it follows that the soul is not the true form of the body, both because the soul will be through itself a complete and integral substance, as composed of its own substantial matter and its own form; and also because it will not be able to inform the body through its matter because matter is not an act actuating, but the first subject of form; nor even through its form, because the same form cannot simultaneously inform two matters, nor have a connatural and intrinsic transcendental relation to them. Or they understand that the rational soul, as soon as it is separated from the body, receives some spiritual matter to which it is united and in which it is conserved; and this is equally false and erroneous. For thence it happens first that the rational soul is truly not conserved as separated. Second, it follows that the creation of new matter is necessary so that the soul can remain outside the body, because that matter could not have preceded; otherwise it would have been necessary either for it to be without form, or for something else to be corrupted so that the rational soul could remain outside the body. All of which are absurd. Indeed, besides this it follows that it is not necessary for such a soul ever to return to the body; for if it already has its own and more perfect matter which it informs, why should it be deprived of it to return to the body? Especially since that composite of such matter and soul would be naturally incorruptible. Therefore in no way can it be said that the rational soul consists of matter and form.

11. An objection is met. But someone will say that there is not the same reason concerning the rational soul and concerning the complete substances of which we now treat; for since it is incomplete and by its nature instituted for informing matter, it is not surprising

that it is entirely form and does not consist of matter; but it can be otherwise in complete substances, which so subsist through themselves that they cannot inform matter. But this difference does not obstruct; rather, from the fact that the rational soul, although it is an incomplete substance, because it is incorporeal, can be subsisting through itself without matter and operate in itself and move itself, from this (I say) we infer that it is not repugnant that there are given complete incorporeal substances which do not consist of matter and can operate in themselves and move themselves. And the reason of this consequence is that, just as in the soul the same thing can be the principle of effecting and receiving motion and accidental act, so in those complete substances. And just as the separated soul does not need matter for its acts and motions, so neither will a complete and incorporeal substance need it. And from elsewhere matter is not necessary for the nature of complete substance as such, for God is a complete substance without matter; nor from the fact precisely that a substance is created does it demand that its complement be from composition of matter, as has been demonstrated; therefore.

12. And hence arise two other reasons excellently confirming the conclusion. One reason is St. Thomas's, in the cited place, because it is not repugnant to give a complete created substance having simple operation independent of matter; therefore it is not repugnant to give a substance having complete being without matter. The consequence is proved because being is for the sake of operating, whence it is proportioned to operation and operation to being itself: if therefore a substance in no way needs matter for operation, neither will it need it for its complete being; especially since such matter could contribute nothing to the being or subsisting of the form; because the form, as is supposed, would be incorporeal, therefore independent in being from any subject and subsisting through itself, just as our soul is; therefore such a form, neither as to being nor as to operating, will need matter; therefore it cannot by its nature be the act of matter, but an act subsisting through itself, as a complete substance. The antecedent is

proved because it is not repugnant to give a created substance that is purely intellectual; but intellectual operation through itself and by its nature is independent of all matter, as is proved broadly in III De Anima; and it is briefly evident, both from its object, for it embraces under itself every being however abstracted from matter; and from its mode, because of itself it abstracts from time and place, and from all composition; and finally from the primary intellectual substance which is God, in whom there is no genus of matter, and from the lowest which is man, or the rational soul. For, although this soul is the act of the body, whose ministry it can use in some way for its mental operations, nevertheless the rational soul does not need any matter through itself and formally for intellectual operations; whence separated it exercises them without any matter; if therefore it is not repugnant to give a created substance that is totally intellectual, it will not be repugnant to give a created substance lacking composition from matter.

13. The other reason is taken from the similitude of effect to cause, at least according to common and analogous reasoning; since therefore God is a simple complete substance, it will not be repugnant to give a substance similar to God in this perfection, at least as to the lack of composition from really distinct parts; for every similitude to God which does not conflict with the nature of an equivocal and dependent effect, or which from elsewhere does not conflict with the nature of being as such, can be communicated by God to some creature; concerning which discourse we shall say more below, treating of created intelligences.

14. Material cause is repugnant to incorporeal substance. I say second: it is entirely repugnant for an incorporeal creature to be made having a true substantial material cause. I do not find this conclusion so expressed in the authors; for they only say that angels lack all matter; nevertheless insofar as they gather this from the fact that they are incorporeal, they plainly suppose that composition from matter is repugnant to incorporeal substance as such, whatever that matter

might be feigned to be. The assertion can be proved first from the effect, or rather from the end, because composition from matter cannot belong to any substance except insofar as it is connatural to it; but nature does not demand composition from matter except for some use or end consonant both to the composite and to the form, for matter is for the sake of form; but incorporeal matter can be of no use to incorporeal form; therefore. The minor has been sufficiently proved in the preceding assertion; for incorporeal form does not need matter absolutely in order to be, nor even in order to operate intellectually, as was proved there; nor in order to be moved locally, as the example of our separated soul also proves. And the reason is that local motion can be received in any subsisting thing having finite and limited place, whether that thing is composite or simple. Nor can another genus of operation be feigned for which such matter would serve, because in incorporeal matter there cannot be senses, nor any mode of cognition which is not better exercised through form alone; nor even could there be an act of vegetative life, since incorporeal substance is incorruptible; therefore such matter is most inept for every use of nature; therefore it cannot be connatural to any substance; therefore it is simply impossible; for matter either is part of nature, or is not matter. Likewise, if some matter is possible, a form which is its natural act is also possible; therefore such material cause will be connatural to the composite from both; if therefore no form or composite can have such matter as connatural, neither can it be absolutely. The reason a priori seems to be taken from the nobility of the grade and order of incorporeal substance, for that order of things is more actual than is every corporeal and extended substance; and therefore it is repugnant to give in that order a substantial entity by the mode of pure potency needing substantial form really distinct, so that it can be.

Matter & Quantity Mutually
Infer Each Other

15. From these things I infer that matter and quantity relate themselves inseparably and reciprocally, so that every composite from matter is necessarily quantified; and also every quantified body is necessarily composed of matter; for this latter part was proved in the preceding section; the former is established from what has just been said. Whence it follows that quantity is compared to matter as its property, for since they accompany each other inseparably, it is necessary that they have some natural connection between themselves; but since matter is substance and quantity is accident, they cannot be connected otherwise than as property and essence, root, or foundation. Indeed, if we speak of real and physical property, we shall find no other in matter; for if anything else is usually assigned, either it is not property but essence, like being potency to form; or it is not positive property, but one which through negation declares the same essence, like being ingenerable and incorruptible, being formless of itself and in some way unknowable, lacking active power, and similar things. Or finally it only explains by metaphor the same essential capacity of matter, like having appetite for form. But truly quantity is a true and real property having its own entity (concerning which we shall speak below in its place), naturally and necessarily conjoined with the entity of matter. And it is very proportioned, for it is most apt for receiving and being acted upon and of itself is not ordered to acting anything. But immediately grave questions present themselves in this place, namely, whether quantity is so the property of matter that it is coeval, and whether it emanates from it or by means of form, and whether it is immediately subjected in it or in the whole composite; but these questions are not necessary for the present disputation, and will have a more convenient place in the following.

16. A small doubt. Response. Only this can be doubted in this assertion: if quantity and matter follow each other, how is it that when the nature of matter is varied the nature of quantity is not varied; for we have said that the matter of incorruptible bodies is distinct from the matter of corruptible ones; but no one will say that quantities are

of diverse natures. But if it is said that quantity follows matter as such, according to its generic nature, it will remain to be inquired what property follows this matter, what indeed that matter insofar as it is such, or how a specific property follows the generic nature of matter, and yet no property follows the specific natures of matter. To this it must be said briefly that there is no inconvenience in two natures or matters specifically distinct having a common property insofar as they are similar to each other in some way, for this is frequent even in forms and complete substances. For just as two specifically distinct causes can have an effect of the same nature, because they can have common power, either formal or eminent, so two matters can have common property on account of agreement in some condition of nature, although they do not agree simply in the whole essence. For all matters have extension and composition of integral parts, and in this they are entirely similar, and according to this nature the property belongs to them; but they have further that they are potencies to form, and according to this nature they differ through diverse relation to form. And according to this specific nature and distinction, it is true that one matter does not have any peculiar accidental property distinct from quantity or from the properties of other matter. Nor is this inconvenient, because matter, since it is pure potency, does not need other properties or faculties.

Solutions of Arguments

17. The passage of Augustine is explained. Damascene is explained. Boethius is explained. To the arguments of the other opinion it is responded that Aristotle, when he says that all things which are moved have matter, speaks of physical motion, in which one part of the mobile passes through space before another. But the Commentator and Avicenna proceed in that error that all intelligences are necessary and eternal beings. As to Augustine, first that work De Mirabilibus Sacrae Scripturae is of uncertain authorship; then St.

Thomas, De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 1, ad 4, explains that Augustine does not speak of matter properly as it is part of essence, nor of substantial informity, but of matter as it designates any substance or subject accidentally inform. Whence by formless matter in intellectual nature he understands nothing other than the intellectual nature itself not yet illuminated by the Word. Or perhaps the author of that book thought that angels are corporeal. And in this way Capreolus responds, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, to another passage of Augustine from the books of Confessions, that that exposition is according to the opinion of Plato, who thought that angels are corporeal; especially since Augustine does not approve, but only relates that exposition. But Damascene openly holds that angels are immaterial, although by comparison to God he calls them thick and material, not because they consist of matter, but because they are in some way composite and potential. So approximately St. Thomas, q. 50, a. 1, ad 1. But Boethius, in the former place, either thought that angels are material, or speaks broadly of matter and form as they are sometimes called of any potency and act, whether they are genus and difference, or essence and being. In the latter place, however, he either speaks of pure form which is pure act, as Capreolus expounds, or speaks according to formal precision, that form as form does not receive accidents, but insofar as something participates in the conditions of matter, or of potentiality.

18. And from these last words the response to the reasoning of that opinion is nearly given; for it is denied that a created substance not composed of true matter is impossible. To the first proof it is responded that it is false that every created substance can not be through intrinsic passive potency, which belongs to things by reason of matter subject to privation; but if there is discourse of potency to non-being through denomination alone extrinsic from the efficient cause, that does not require matter. To the other proof it is responded that the same living thing can move itself accidentally, or reduce itself to act, because for this it can be through its substance in eminent or

virtual act and in formal potency, as was declared above, confirming the truth, and we shall speak more broadly treating of efficient cause.

19. To the last proof it has already been declared whence it is repugnant to give an incorporeal substance and pure potency in the genus of substance, namely, from the eminence of that grade and order; and therefore it is not similar concerning potency to accidental forms, because a substance which is simply in act can be in potency to accidents; which is not potency to being simply but secundum quid. Finally, there is a diverse nature of form and matter, for form, since it is act, deservedly can be found in the incorporeal grade, and likewise the corporeal grade can participate in the actuality of substantial form, because that order is not so imperfect that within it there is not found being simply in act constituted through form; but conversely matter on account of its imperfection cannot be elevated to the incorporeal grade.

DISPUTATION XIV

ON THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS

Having explained material causality in its first root and cause of that kind, it is easy to apply it to all subjects that exercise this kind of causality with respect to accidents; for concerning substance, only prime matter has true and proper material causality, because although integral parts or dispositions are usually referred to this kind of cause, this is only through a certain reduction, not through proper attribution. Therefore, concerning the material cause of accidents, we shall first see whether it exists and what kind it is and with respect to which accidents. Then we shall examine to what things it belongs.

SECTION I

WHETHER A TRUE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS IS GIVEN

1. We can speak of accidents in two ways: in one way in the abstract, that is, concerning the accidental form alone; in another way in the concrete, that is, concerning the composite of such a form and subject. And according to this twofold consideration, the material cause of an accident can be inquired about in two ways, namely, either as composing it or as sustaining it or its union.

A Material Cause of Accidents is Given

2. First, therefore, it is certain in general that a material cause of accidents is given. This is evident first from Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, text 13, where, resolving the question that he had proposed in book III, text 15, he says that the principles of all genera are the same according to proportion; for (as the Commentator explains), although potency to substantial being is different from potency to accidental being, nevertheless they agree proportionally in the nature of material cause. Hence this causality is demonstrated by the same method and proportion by which the causality of prime matter is demonstrated; indeed, as being better known to us, it is known first, and through proportion to it we have come to knowledge of prime matter, as we saw above. For we experience that in the same subject a change occurs from one accident to another, as from hot to cold; from which we understand that there is given a subject that underlies both accidents, and we call this the material cause of the accident. For indeed it is a cause, since the accident depends upon it; and insofar as it is a subject, it does not participate in another genus of causality, as is evident per se, and will become clearer from what is to be said. Furthermore, because this transmutation does not occur in all accidents, a universal reason must be added, which must be taken from the nature of accidental entity; for accidental entity cannot subsist in itself, but requires a subject in which it is sustained; and therefore it requires a material cause as necessary from the nature of the thing in order to be able to exist. This reason proves not only that a material cause of accidents can be given, but also that all accidents by their nature necessarily require this cause; because the being of an accident is to inhere (inesse), as we shall declare later in its proper place; but in the very nature of inhering, a subject is included and consequently a material cause.

3. From this is gathered the difference between substance and accident: that even created substance does not universally require a material cause, as was shown above, but every accident requires it. And the reason is that the nature of created substance or form from this precise and common nature does not require matter, since by virtue of those natures it is not repugnant for a thing to be subsistent and simple, but it is required from the particular nature of such a substance, namely corporeal, or of such a form, namely material. But truly an accident from the precise and common nature of accident demands a material cause, because it designates an entity so diminished that by its nature it is unfit for subsisting, and therefore needs some sustaining subject. Whence it happens that this material causality also extends to incorporeal things, for even spiritual accidents require a material cause, the name "material" being extended beyond that from which it was taken. For matter properly and strictly speaking is called corporeal matter, and from it the denomination "material" has been taken; thence, however, it is extended to every cause that has the same or proportional nature of causing, even if according to its own entity it is spiritual and incorporeal; and in this way spiritual accidents, although they are in themselves indivisible and incapable of quantitative extension, nonetheless have a material cause. Indeed, according to the principles of divine theology, even supernatural accidents require a material cause, for however much they may be beings of the most perfect order, nevertheless, by the very fact that they are accidents, they require a subject by which they are supported. It should be noted lastly, however, that in this conclusion the discourse concerns proper accidental entity, for an accidental mode that does not of itself have proper entity, but is intrinsically identified with some accidental entity of which it is a mode, does not always have a proper material cause, but the very entity that it proximately modifies suffices, whether it is conjoined as to a subject, or in another way, which cannot be declared in particular except by explaining the various genera of these accidental modes, which we

shall provide in the course of this matter. And therefore I omit the special difficulties that would occur here concerning relation as relation, and concerning transient action as such, and concerning place or other extrinsically denominating forms, for they will be treated more conveniently in their proper places.

An Accident in the Concrete Is Composed of Matter, Not in the Abstract

4. I say second: accidental entity taken in the abstract does not have a material cause from which it is intrinsically composed, but in this way a material cause of an accident in the concrete, or of an accidental composite, is given. This conclusion, especially as to the first part, is held by Soncinas, Metaphysics XII, q. 26, and Javellus, q. 8, and they indicate that some have felt the opposite because of Aristotle there, text 26, saying that in every genus proper potency and act are given. The conclusion is nevertheless most certain, speaking of proper and real matter, because the whole accidental entity is a certain form; therefore it does not need intrinsic and real composition from proper matter and form. The antecedent is declared because the whole accidental entity is in the subject as form; whence those who feign in an accident the said composition from matter, it is necessary that they confess that part which they call matter of another formal part, is with respect to the subject act and form at least partial. From this, however, the first consequence is proved, because form as form does not require composition from really distinct potency and act, as is evident in substantial things and was proved above especially concerning the rational soul. Nor can a proper reason be conceived in accidental form why it should require that composition; for although such a form consists of genus and difference, which are compared by the mode of metaphysical matter and form, nevertheless they are not distinguished in reality, nor do they per se require really distinct principles or foundations, as was proved in the preceding matters. Nor indeed do

these accidental forms because of their imperfection require that composition from really distinct potency and act, because an imperfect thing, if it is partial and incomplete or a form of another, can be really simple, indeed also indivisible, like a point, for simplicity does not always import or require great perfection, but only then is it a sign of greater perfection when other things are equal; therefore no probable reason can be conceived for attributing this composition to accidents.

5. Add furthermore that it cannot be understood what kind of matter that is from which accidental form is intrinsically composed; for either it is such that the same in number is successively under diverse accidental forms, or it is always transmuted or perishes with the form itself. The first cannot be said, otherwise not only would cold be made from hot, but also coldness from heat, and hatred from love, and so of others, which is openly false. Likewise, because active heat is active according to its whole entity; therefore it introduces heat in the subject according to the whole entity of it, as to that degree which it introduces; therefore it expels the opposite degree of coldness similarly as to its whole entity; therefore it does not expel only the formal part from the material so as to introduce another opposite formal part into this, but it simply expels the whole form, or the whole contrary degree, in order to introduce its own. Just as in purely privative change, as for example in the cessation of light, not the formal part of light perishes and the potential remains, but absolutely the whole light. But if the transmutation of an accident always occurs in the whole entity of the form, therefore that matter from which accidents are feigned to consist serves nothing for the transmutations of accidents, nor does it serve so that they inform substance; for the nature of matter of itself rather impedes information, because matter as such is not act actuating, as we said above. Likewise it does not serve for action; indeed it can rather impede the form from being active according to its whole self, for matter according to itself is not active; since therefore many accidental forms are active according to

their whole entity, they do not consist intrinsically of matter and form. Finally, if an accident thus consists of matter and form, also the form of that accident will consist of matter and form. And thus one will proceed to infinity; if therefore one must stop somewhere, as indeed is the case, let us stop at the first, which is the accident itself, which is only form whose matter is the subject that it informs. The first consequence is evident, because there is no greater reason concerning one form than another, because both are imperfect and incomplete entity and form of another, and in both generic and specific nature can be conceived; therefore the reason is the same.

6. And from these things the other part of the conclusion is easily evident, because an accidental composite intrinsically consists of subject and accident, and in that composition the accident has the nature of form; therefore the subject has the nature of material cause. Whence it happens that this causality with respect to the composite must be explained by the same proportion in these accidental composites as we declared it in substantial ones. For the composite itself is the effect of such a cause, since it consists of it and depends upon it. The reason or principle of causing is the first potency or entity by which the subject receives the accident, concerning which potency and entity we shall speak ex professo in the following sections. The causality in reality is nothing other than the union of the accidental form to the subject, for through this mediation it occurs that from subject and accident one composite coalesces. For we speak of the composite and its causality in actual being (in facto esse); for concerning causality in becoming (in fieri) we shall speak immediately. Nor is it necessary to feign in the subject of the accident a distinct mode of union besides the accident itself as united to the subject, because when an accident is made in the subject, two changes do not occur in the subject itself, one through the information of the accident, another through a peculiar mode of union identified with the subject itself; and because of other reasons made above, which

have the same or greater force here. And thus this whole causality with respect to the accidental composite is evident.

7. An objection is met: You will say: this accidental composite is one per accidens; therefore with respect to it true material causality cannot intervene. Otherwise every composite per accidens would arise from causality of this kind; which is evidently false in a heap of stones, or also in a house, insofar as it consists of foundation, walls, and roof. It is responded from the things said above concerning unity, that in beings that are one per accidens there is latitude, and some have greater unity than others. Therefore a composite of subject and accident is one per accidens, because it consists of things of diverse categories and of act and potency not per se ordered, but accidentally. Nevertheless, however, that unity which it has is not only metaphorical or apparent, but true and physical, because it is through true union and real union of one to another, and therefore such a composite truly arises through real causality of the components, both among themselves and with respect to the composite. But a heap of stones is so one per accidens that it does not have true and physical unity, but only metaphorical or apparent unity (so to speak); and therefore, just as it does not arise from true union of the component parts, so it is not necessary that true material causality intervene there, but only according to proportion, insofar as in position and order one part is conjoined to another. In artificial composition, however, some greater conjunction and subordination of parts is wont to intervene, but not true and physical union; and thus neither true material causality; which is understood by comparing the integral parts of the artifact among themselves, for if the whole artifact is compared to its proper artificial form, which is figure, with respect to that there is more proper material causality, insofar as figure is compared to its subject as true accident really united.

An Accident in the Abstract Is Educed
& Sustained by Matter

8. I say third: an accident as to its accidental entity taken precisely and abstractly, has a material cause, not from which it is composed, but by which it is sustained in its being; whence that is not only the material cause of the accident as to union, but also as to its entity, which it causes in its genus through the mediation of union; nor is it a cause only in actual being (in facto esse), but also in becoming (in fieri). This whole assertion follows from the preceding by sufficient division, for from the first assertion it is established that accidents need a material cause because of the diminished entity that they have; and in the second it was proved that accidental entity does not need this cause so that it is intrinsically composed from it; therefore so that it is sustained by it. Indeed, even those who feign a material cause intrinsically composing accidents do not exclude a material cause sustaining the whole accident itself composed from intrinsic matter and form; which is a new argument that that intrinsic composition of accident from matter and form is falsely feigned. Again, from the same diminished and imperfect entity of accident it is established that it depends on its material cause not only in union, but in its entity, because it can in no way subsist in itself naturally. Likewise, because an accident depends no less on its material cause than a material substantial form depends on matter; but this depends not only in union, but also in entity; therefore [so does an accident]. Finally, from this it is also concluded that it depends not only in actual being (in facto esse), but also in becoming (in fieri), both because becoming is proportioned to being itself, and also because the action by which an accident is naturally made is also a certain accident necessarily depending on the subject in which or from which it is made. This must be understood with proportion, however, for some accidents are made through proper action, others only through resultance or consequence to the effection of other things; therefore each accident in the way that it is made depends on some subject in becoming, and thus has a material cause of its effection in the way that

it can naturally be made. What this causality is need not be declared again; for it is entirely the same as in substantial causality, proportion being preserved.

9. In what manner material cause is said of substantial and accidental: Someone might ask whether material cause is said univocally of that which is of substance and of the material cause of accident. And the reason for doubt can be that the material cause of accident is in itself either more perfect or equally perfect than the material cause of substance, for it is either integral substance, or form, or at minimum matter itself; therefore also in the nature of material cause it is either more perfect or at least equally perfect, because in this causality the cause offers itself and its own being; therefore if it is equally perfect in itself, it will also be equally perfect in the nature of cause. On the contrary, however, is the fact that the being that results from this causality is not being simply, but secundum quid, namely accidental being. Likewise, the production or generation of accident is only production and generation secundum quid. The union also of accidental form with subject is only secundum quid, as being accidental; but actual material causality consists in actual union itself, or uniting, insofar as it depends on the subject; therefore this causality with respect to accident is only secundum quid. And thus it must be said that material cause formally in the nature of cause is said analogically of these causes and more principally of the cause of substance; but materially the thing that causes accidents can be either equally or more perfect. This, however, is not sufficient for it to be more perfect in the nature of cause, even if it enters the composition of the whole accidental composite through itself, because the nature of cause is not to be taken from that, but from the actual causality that it exhibits and from the formal being that arises from it.

SECTION II
WHETHER SUBSTANCE AS SUCH CAN BE THE IMMEDIATE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS

1. Concerning this causality formally taken, nothing else remains for us to say; but concerning the foundation of such causality and the power through which it causes, it is necessary to say certain things. For since material causality consists in reception, two things are required on the part of the cause: namely, the thing which receives and the power through which it receives, which can be distinguished either really or conceptually. We suppose, however, as self-evident from what has been said, that substance is like the first foundation or first thing which causes accidents materially, because the entire order of accidents is imperfect and insufficient to subsist in itself; and therefore the first foundation upon which accidents depend cannot be some accident, but must be substance. We inquire therefore through what power substance causes accidents materially, whether through an accidental power really or by nature of the thing distinct from itself, or truly through itself or through a power distinguished only conceptually.

The Prior Opinion is Treated

2. For certain authors hold that no accident is received in substance except through the mediation of an accidental power pertaining to the same category. Thus hold Soncinas, XII Metaph., q. 26, and Iavel., q. 8, who say that there is in substance a receptive power of quantity, which is reduced to the category of quantity, and another receptive of quality, pertaining to the category of quality; or rather Soncinas says that in the surface itself there is something potential of

the genus of color for receiving color, whatever that may be (he says), for instance transparency or something of this kind. Their foundation is a certain saying of Aristotle, XII Metaph., text. 26, that the same are the principles of all genera. Which the Commentator explains concerning identity according to analogy, for every thing of any category has those three principles: matter, form, and privation; nevertheless, they are not the same in all categories, but proportional. Hence they conclude that just as in each category there is a proper form and proper privation, so also there is a proper power, constituting the proximate material principle of that genus. Whence it is rightly concluded that substance as such cannot be the proximate material principle of any accident.

3. And from this has been taken that axiom: Power and act are in the same genus, which is received by many as a first principle in metaphysics because of the said testimony of Aristotle, to which they add another of the Commentator, V Phys., com. 9, that the power toward each category is in that genus of category in which the act is; and I de Anim., com. 6, that power and act are differences which occur in all categories, and he speaks of receptive power, for he treats of the soul insofar as it is act and of the power which corresponds. Saint Thomas often uses the same principle, notably I, q. 77, a. 1, where he says: Since power and act divide being and every genus of being, it is necessary that power and act be referred to the same genus; and therefore if the act is not in the genus of substance, the power which is said in relation to that act cannot be in the genus of substance. In these words both that principle and the intended conclusion and the reason for the conclusion seem to be contained. The reason is that powers are specified by acts; therefore the power for receiving an accidental form takes its species from the act to which it is ordered; therefore that power cannot be substance. For by similar reasoning we proved above that the power of matter is not an accident, but substance; and by proportional reasoning it can be concluded that the power for receiving quality is in the genus of quality. From which reason some

extend that principle to active and receptive power; whence they generally infer that power toward accidental act is an accident and is referred to the same genus.

Substance is by Itself the Immediate Material Cause of Accidents

4. But this opinion, insofar as it pertains to the present matter, cannot be defended, unless perhaps there is equivocation in the sense of the words. I say therefore that substance through itself, without the addition of any thing really distinct or any mode diverse by nature of the thing, can be the material cause immediately receiving in itself some accident. The first part is proved, because if substance receives quantity, for example, through the mediation of some distinct thing, which would be a power for receiving quantity, I ask whether that thing is substance or accident. It cannot be substance, both because otherwise it would not be a thing beyond the whole substance of the thing, and also because then substance would already be posited as receptive of accident through itself. If it is an accident, therefore it is in some proximate subject; I ask therefore whether that would be an accidental power really distinct, or the very substance itself; if the latter is said, we have what is intended. If however the former is said, concerning that accident the question will return again, and thus we will proceed to infinity, unless we finally stop at substance itself. And so it is truly necessary, for although substance can be united to some accident through the mediation of another, as we shall say later, nevertheless comparing substance to the whole collection of accidents, it cannot be united to it through the mediation of any thing which is not either substance or accident; therefore it is necessary that some substance and some accident be immediately united, that is, with no thing distinct from the extremes mediating[22]. Finally, the

[22] extremis, 1960; unitis alit. add. "In other editions unitis is added, a word which does nothing but complete the sense." Cf. BHF, t. II, p. 552.

reason a priori can be taken from this, that accident is added to created substance to perfect it and supply what such substance cannot have through itself; therefore it is necessary that in the entity of such substance the capacity for receiving accidents be intimately included; therefore this capacity of substance which is receptive of accidents, as such, cannot be a thing distinct from substance itself; whence regarding this part the conclusion posited seems evident.

5. In the other part, however, concerning the mode distinct by nature of the thing, we are not dealing primarily with the mode of actual union, about which it was said above, but with the mode (so to speak) potential, or concerning some power distinct by nature of the thing from substance as a mode and not as a completely diverse thing. And thus the reasoning made can nearly be applied; for even that power modally distinct will be a true accident, for if it were substance, it would be falsely said to be distinct by nature of the thing from the whole substance of the thing; therefore it inheres in its own way in substance through itself and depends on it in the genus of material cause; therefore it is received immediately by it through proper substantial entity. Moreover, this distinction by nature of the thing is fictitious in the present case, with real distinction excluded, for this capacity of receiving the first accident (so to speak) is so intimate to created substance that it is inseparable from it, even by the absolute power of God; for by the very fact that the substance of an angel, for example, is such essentially, it is through itself capable of intellective power; and although we grant that God can separate the intellect of an angel from its substance, we necessarily understand that substance always remains capable of intellect, and however bare God may conserve that substance, it is impossible that it not remain capable of its natural intellective faculty; and in the same way we understand that composite substance consisting of matter and form is compared to quantity, for through itself it is capable of it nor can it be deprived of this capacity, even if every thing or mode which is separable from it were separated from such substance; therefore the distinction by

nature of the thing between such capacity and substance is falsely contrived.

6. Cajetan restricts the opinion opposed to ours. The limitation of Cajetan is disapproved. Whence Cajetan, I, q. 54, a. 3, while he partly adheres to the prior opinion cited, limits it to those accidents which are acquired through the mediation of some action and passion; for those which are congenital to substance do not need a mediating power, but substance itself through itself is capable of them; and in this way he avoids the process to infinity. The reason for this distinction and limitation, which is gathered from him in the same I, q. 77, a. 1, is that the power congenital to substance is essentially a power primarily ordered to this, that it receive act; but that it is an act of substance, it has only from the common notion of accident; and therefore it does not require another power through which it might inhere in substance; but other accidents are primarily and per se acts and therefore require proper powers through which they might inhere in substance. Nevertheless, from this doctrine I conclude primarily that by virtue of the material causality of accident as such, a mediating power is not required per se, but substance through itself is sufficient for this causality. This is evident, because for receiving those accidents which are essentially receptive powers, another power is not required; because these powers do not actuate substance according to some special notion of act but on account of the common notion of accident; therefore by virtue of the causality of accident as such, such power is not required, but if it is required in some cases, it will be because of some special reasons. Then this is falsely limited to those accidents which are per se primarily instituted to be receptive powers; for quantity does not require in substance a mediating power through which it is received, as has been proved, because substance through itself is capable of quantity, and it is superfluous and plainly absurd to feign another mediating power distinct by nature of the thing, and yet quantity is not per se primarily instituted to be receptive power, as they themselves also confess, otherwise quantity would essentially be

quality. Whence quantity is per se primarily instituted to extend the parts of substance, so that naturally they cannot penetrate each other in place. From this, however, it consequently has that it is a medium for receiving certain other accidents; therefore not only those accidents which are per se primarily instituted to be receptive powers, but also others which for any reason have immediate relation to substance, do not require a mediating power in order to be received or materially caused by it.

7. Indeed, I add that perhaps no purely receptive accidental power is found really distinct from substance, as can be shown briefly by induction. For in inanimate corporeal substances there is no receptive power of accidents besides quantity, as has been partly shown and will be more evident from what follows; but quantity, as I said, is not per se primarily receptive power, but is the form giving to material substance this corporeal mass and extension, by reason of which it is apt to occupy place. But in living things as such we do not acknowledge any purely passive powers, for all those which belong to living things as living are in some way active; which can also be considered in angelic substances; therefore precisely for receiving accidents, it is not necessary to feign in substance distinct powers, unless necessity arises from elsewhere.

8. From which it is further concluded that that limitation or distinction concerning congenital or transmutable accidents is not formal nor universally true. The first is evident, because if substance through itself can be capable of accident as such, it will also be able to be capable of change to such accident, if perhaps it is separable. But if it is inseparable, that is accidental and something material with respect to the causality of substance. The second is evident, because quantity, according to the common opinion, is an accident which is transmuted and acquired through proper motion; and nevertheless it does not require in substance a power distinct from it. Likewise, local presence or Where is an accidental mode which sometimes affects immediately the substance itself, as appears more clearly in spiritual substance, and

is true in its own way in material substance, as we shall say below in its place; and yet that accident can be acquired and lost through proper change. Likewise, if it is true that the relation of similarity or specific identity is something distinct by nature of the thing from the subject and foundation, such accident does not require in substance a special power, and yet it is not congenital, but can be lost or newly result. It remains therefore that we say absolutely that for the material causality of substance concerning accident, whether it is in it through the mode of passive or active power, or through the mode of simple form or disposition or quantity or another mode of accident, whether congenital or adventitious, per se and by virtue of these general reasons precisely taken, a special power distinct by nature of the thing from substance is not necessary on the part of substance.

The Prior Opinion is Disapproved

9. Induction proving that a power of the same category does not correspond to every act. And hence I infer that an accident does not always require in substance a receptive power properly pertaining to its category, but indeed this happens rarely, except in some accidents because of peculiar reasons. This is plainly inferred from the preceding assertion. And it is declared further by induction, for in spiritual substance there are only accidents pertaining to intellect and will and those which regard place. I speak naturally, so as to omit those which can be done by divine grace or virtue. Although, if some gift of grace can be posited in spiritual substance which is not in the intellect nor in the will, as truly it can, that does not suppose in substance a power of the same genus, for that gift is quality, but obediential capacity is not quality, but the very substance of the soul, as is evident from theology. Therefore accidents which pertain to motion or local presence do not suppose in substance a power pertaining to the category of Where or of action or passion; for how can such power be conceived or on what foundation can it be feigned? since the notion of

power, if it is proper, pertains to quality; but if it is taken broadly, it is quasi-transcendent and a certain notion intimately included in various things of diverse categories, and thus it happens in the present case, for spiritual substance through itself is capable of such presence. But intellect and will without any doubt do not suppose in substance another power of the genus of quality, as has been proved. But the acts of these powers inhere in substance through the mediation of the powers themselves, although concerning the mode there is controversy to be treated below, sect. 4; nevertheless this comes from the proper notion found in such acts, as we shall say there. And it is still under judgment whether such acts are of the same category as the powers themselves; for some place them only in the genus of action. And although it is true that they are qualities and suppose a power which is quality, nevertheless this does not come from that general reason, but from a peculiar cause and nature.

10. Concerning the accidents of corporeal substance, however, all confess that among accidents having proper entity really distinct from substance, the first accident of such substance is quantity, which does not suppose in substance any power which pertains to the category of quantity, as all the things we have said thus far prove a fortiori. But quantity itself is the medium or power through which this power receives corporeal qualities and similar accidents; but quantity is not a power pertaining to the category of quality, as is self-evident. Nor indeed between surface, for example, and whiteness can any power of the genus of quality be feigned to mediate or intervene, through which surface receives whiteness; which the arguments made thus far also prove, because such power, if it is not distinct in reality from surface, cannot be true quality; but to feign that it is distinct, either as a thing or as a mode diverse by nature of the thing, is both superfluous and without foundation; and either we will have to proceed to infinity, or if we must stop at the intrinsic capacity of surface, by which through itself it is receptive of that power, it will be said more truly that we must stop at the same intrinsic capacity of

surface, by which through itself it is immediately receptive of whiteness, and that unintelligible and minimally necessary power will be removed from the middle. Thus therefore it is established that the power through which substance receives accident does not always pertain to the same category as the accident received. And the reason a priori is that from accident and subject it is not necessary that one per se be made, but per accidens, and therefore it is not required that such power and act pertain to the same genus; whence it is not necessary that such power be per se instituted and ordered to such act.

11. How some escape the force of the preceding reasons. You will say that by these arguments it is rightly proved that the receptive power of accident is not always properly and directly in that category in which the received accident is, but not proved that it is not placed in that at least reductively, which alone the authors of the prior opinion assert; for since accident implies an intrinsic order to the subject insofar as it is capable of that accident, it is necessary that the subject according to that capacity be reduced to the category of the accident. Because of this evasion I suggested above that there can be equivocation in words in this question, for if the sense is only that substance or quantity conceived by us under the formality of capacity for such accident is reduced in some way to the category of that accident as something additional through which such accident is defined, thus the controversy is about our mode of speaking or conceiving; for according to the thing, no true mediating power is added between substance and quantity, or between quantity and quality, but only a certain denomination or respective conception. But we speak of real and true power, about which Saint Thomas speaks when he says that power and act are referred to the same genus; otherwise he would not rightly conclude from this that the powers of the soul are things distinct from the soul, which he intends in those places; and Cajetan speaks in the same sense, who therefore employed the limitations and distinctions cited above. The Commentator also

seems to speak in the same sense when he says that power and act are opposite differences dividing individual categories.

The Axiom is Declared: "Act & Power are in the Same Genus"

12. How therefore is that axiom to be understood: Act and power are in the same genus? Is it to be rejected entirely, lest it seem to obstruct the opinion posited by us and the resolution given? It is answered first that that axiom is not rightly founded in Aristotle, XII Metaph.; for there he only asserts that things of all categories have the same principles according to proportion or analogy, but never says that all those principles are placed in the same category; indeed, giving examples, he says that in colors white is the principle as form, black as privation, surface as matter, and in illumination light is form, darkness privation, air the subject, and in healing health is form, disease privation, body matter, in which examples he never assigns a power which ought to be of the same category as the form; therefore Aristotle did not say that matter and form always pertain to the same genus, although he said that things of all genera can have in some way a formal and material principle. Whence there he says that things of all genera have an efficient or moving cause, yet he does not say or think that that cause pertains to the same genus as the thing effected. Nor does Soncinas's reply help, that efficient cause is extrinsic and therefore need not be of the same genus; but the material principle is intrinsic, which ought to be of the same genus. For I respond that the material principle of accident, if it is compared to the whole composite, is intrinsic to it, yet that composite as such is not properly in one genus, since it is one per accidens and consists of things of diverse genera; but if it is compared to the accidental form, it is not an intrinsic principle of it, that is, composing it intrinsically, but only through the mode of something added or subject to which the

accidental form is united. But this principle is not necessarily of the same genus as the form in accidental composition.

13. How Scotus explains the said pronouncement. What is objective power according to Scotus. Hence Scotus, In II, dist. 16, q. 1, responds that that axiom, understood of receptive power and its act, is false, and brings against it the instances suggested by us concerning substance and accident, surface and color, etc. And similarly he teaches that it is false understood of active power and its act, for he also has clear instances, especially in powers which act by transient action, whether they are compared to action as action is, because they manifestly pertain to diverse categories; or to the thing or form made, for motive power according to place is quality, but it effects Where or local presence, and augmentative power is quality, but it acts quantity or substance. He says therefore that that axiom is to be understood of objective power. This interpretation many reject, sharply attacking this objective power. But regarding this I think these dispute with Scotus concerning the name and equivocally; for he does not understand by objective power any true thing which is actually in the nature of things, in which sense only active or passive power is real power, as I shall say more broadly below treating of the essence of creature and declaring the species of quality which is power; but by objective power Scotus understands the thing in possible state before it actually is, in which way we say a thing is in potency before it is; and because the thing, as it is possible, is the object of active power, therefore it is said by Scotus to be in objective potency. And thus he says this power and act are of the same genus, because the possible thing and the thing in act are of the same genus; indeed he could also say they are the same thing negatively (as they say), because they are not two things, but the same conceived in diverse states. Wherefore the thing which Scotus intends in that interpretation is true, yet that interpretation is not rightly accommodated to the authors who taught that axiom before Scotus; for Aristotle, as is evident from what was said, never spoke in that sense, nor Averroes, who in the place cited says that power and act

are opposite differences; and when in the beginning of IX Metaphysics he numbers various acceptations of power, he never made mention of that objective power.

14. It must be said therefore that that axiom is commonly understood of proper receptive or active power. But in order that it be true, it must be understood primarily of power per se primarily instituted and ordered to such act, not indeed of power or capacity intrinsically included and as it were accompanying some absolute entity. This is declared, for in two ways it can be understood that some virtue, both active and receptive, is compared to act. In one way, because from its primary notion and essence it is ordered to such act; thus matter is power to form, as was declared above; thus gravity is active virtue for effecting motion downward or permanence in that very place downward; thus finally intellect is active and receptive virtue of intellection. Such power therefore is said to be per se primarily instituted for the sake of act, and therefore takes its species from it; and concerning it that axiom can be verified at most in the way immediately to be declared. In another way, however, some entity can have force or capacity for some action or act, not because it is primarily instituted for it, but because either on account of the eminence of its nature, or on account of the natural condition or mode of being which it has as it were concomitantly, or rather connaturally, it has through itself such force or aptitude. Thus God has omnipotence of acting; thus also intellectual creature has both capacity and active obediential force of supernatural acts or gifts; thus finally material substance is capable of quantity and quantity itself is capable of qualities. And in this latter genus of power or capacity it is not necessary that power or capacity and act be in the same genus; because, since such power is not ordered per se primarily to act, nor takes its species from it, nor composes with that act something per se one, there is no reason why such power and act should be placed in the same genus. Nor did Saint Thomas ever speak of this latter genus of power, but of the former; and concerning the same Averroes is to be

explained, if it is necessary to defend his sayings. Nor does the reason made to the contrary prove more; whence through these things sufficient response has been made to the foundations of the contrary opinion.

15. How Saint Thomas and the Commentator understand the axiom. But in order that that principle remain exactly declared, it is necessary to add that in two ways it can be understood that power of the prior order and act are of the same genus. First, that genus be taken broadly for the general notions of substance and accident, so that power per se ordered to substantial act be substantial, to accidental act accidental; not indeed that in rigor it is necessary that power and act be of the same category of accident, although in substance this is true, because there is only one category of substance. And this exposition pleases many, because it avoids difficulties. But others even in accidents want such power and its act to pertain to the same category in rigor, because otherwise it is not true in rigor that power and act are of the same genus. But this is difficult to defend universally, especially in active powers. Wherefore it can probably be said that accidental passive power (for concerning substantial enough has already been said), when from primary institution by virtue of its essence it is ordered to act, is contained under the same genus and category as its act. And concerning this power Saint Thomas and the Commentator seem to speak in the cited places. But under passive powers we comprehend the powers of the soul, which although they are also active, nevertheless are simultaneously passive and have their consummated perfection in passion and reception or information. But this assertion explained in this way can be proved by induction in all these powers; for the habits and acts of them are placed in the same genus in rigor; for although action as action pertains to the category of action, nevertheless as vital act having consummated and perfect being in its genus, it is placed in the category of quality; but when power is compared to act and is said to pertain to the same genus, it is not to be compared to act in becoming, but to perfect and

consummated act; for to that it is per se primarily ordered and from it receives species. And thus I find no example in which this rule fails. But the reason can be given, because when receptive power is per se ordered to act, and is compared to it as imperfect to perfect in its genus, and in some way seems to constitute something per se one with its act in that order; as intellective power is per se conjoined with the act of understanding, and so concerning others; and therefore it is necessary that such power and act be placed under the same genus, so that they also maintain greater proportion among themselves.

16. But truly in active powers, even if they are per se primarily ordered to acting, it does not seem necessary that power and act be contained under the same genus in rigor. For if by the act of this power we understand action as action is, it is established that power and action pertain to diverse categories. Nor is it of any moment that some say that power and action directly indeed and per se pertain to diverse categories; nevertheless by reduction, both power is placed in the genus of action, and action in the genus of power, because they have a mutual transcendental relation among themselves; but the term of relation is reduced to the category of relation. This (I say) is irrelevant, because this reduction is only according to extrinsic denomination which the term includes as term; but we speak of placement under one genus according to its proper nature and essence. For in this sense it is necessary that authors speak when they say power and act are under the same genus; otherwise they would not rightly conclude from this that matter, for example, is intrinsically substance, because it is power to substance, and intellect is quality because it is power to accidental and vital act, etc. Therefore active power compared to its action, as action is, is not constituted under the same genus; but if by the act of this power we understand the formal term of its action, it is not necessary to be placed in the same category, as the example adduced above concerning gravity proves, which can be adduced universally concerning motive power according to place, whether it be progressive, or attractive, or expulsive, or impulsive or the impulse

itself, which many think is quality and yet is not ordered to making quality, but motion or Where. And the reason can be given, because active power as such is not ordered to act as imperfect to perfect, nor as composing with it something per se one, but as extrinsic cause to effect; but it can happen that active cause is not of the same notion or genus as the effect, but of more eminent, and therefore it is not necessary that it be placed in the same category as its act. Although it seems necessary, if the most proper act of such power is accidental, that the power itself also be accidental, because substance as such is not ordered per se primarily to accidental act; therefore such power will be accident, although it be placed under a more noble genus of accident.

17. An objection is dissolved. Notable point. You will say that sometimes accidental power is ordered per se primarily to producing substance, as nutritive and generative power. I respond first that it is not yet explored nor treated by us how accidents attain the production of substance; for if they only attain by disposing matter, the difficulty ceases; but if they also immediately effect and introduce substantial form, it must be said that they do not attain substance except instrumentally. But they do not attain instrumental action except through prior action connatural and most proper, which is always accidental; and with respect to that it must be verified that such power and act are of the same genus, for the other instrumental action, although perhaps it is more principally intended by nature, nevertheless with respect to such power is not so proper and accommodated that the nature of such power or quality is commensurated to it. Indeed from this it can be gathered in passing that, beyond locomotive powers, every other power per se primarily ordered to acting is placed in the same category as its proper act or term of its action; for such power is always quality and effects nothing except through prior proper action tending to quality, for as I said, although it effects substance or even quantity instrumentally, it always effects this through prior proper action tending to quality; but to other

categories besides Where there is no per se action, but they always result from the term of another action. And thus it happens that every accidental active power besides motive is ordered to effecting some quality through most proper action, although perhaps through that it can be ordered to things of other categories at least as instrument. And these things are said in explanation of that axiom: Power and act are under the same genus.

SECTION III

WHAT SUBSTANCE CAN BE THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ACCIDENTS

1. Since it has been stated that the primary material cause of an accident is substance, it is necessary for the complete exposition of this cause to declare what substance can exercise this causality. I assume here that there is no question about uncreated substance, which is established not to be capable of accident, and we must briefly examine all created substances. Among these, some are simple, others composite; concerning these and the parts composing them there can be controversy. Therefore, so that we may treat those matters which present difficulty, let us briefly premise those things which are certain.

2. Simple substances subsisting in themselves are material causes. First, therefore, it is certain that simple substances subsisting per se are sufficient for receiving or materially causing accidents proportioned to themselves. This is established in all created spiritual substances, for these are what we speak of. For every created substance, because it is potential and imperfect, is capable of accidents, and for sustaining them it suffices to have per se subsistence, if there is otherwise capacity. When we say that these substances are per se sufficient for this, we do not exclude that they can materially cause one accident by means of another, as we shall say in the following section; but with respect to the collection of all their

accidents we say they suffice per se and do not require another support beyond their own substance and proper subsistence.

3. Substantial form subsisting is sufficient matter for accidents. Hence secondly it is also certain that a subsisting form, even if it is an incomplete substance and the act of a body, is a sufficient material cause of some accidents which are proportioned to it. This is established in the rational soul, not only when separated from the body, but also when conjoined; and the reason is nearly the same as concerning angelic substances. For the fact that the substance of the soul is incomplete does not prevent it from being able to sustain some accidents, since it can exist per se and does not depend on the subject itself. From this, taking the argument contrariwise, it is established, and is also certain, that substantial forms which cannot naturally subsist are unsuited for materially causing accidents per se alone, because what does not subsist in itself cannot sustain another; but these forms are not capable of proper subsistence, even partial, as we shall say later. Whether they truly stand under accidents together with matter, we shall see shortly. Only one might doubt concerning certain relations, for example, of union or similarity, etc., which seem to be subjected in these forms. Nevertheless it is more probable that these relations do not add a thing distinct from the substance or from the substantial modes of the form. It is also probable that the entity of such a form, as sustained in its own way in matter, is capable of some accidental form or mode, in the way we shall explain concerning the accidents themselves in the following section.

4. Integral parts are sufficiently receptive of accidents. Hence it is also established in passing what must be said about the integral parts of substance; for there is no doubt that in the way they exist and subsist, they can materially concur in the being of accidents; for they can receive and sustain them in themselves, as is established by induction. And indeed if these parts are actually divided from the whole, and are only called parts because of their relation to it, it is established that they are in reality true subsisting substances, and

therefore can sustain accidents, as nearly all judge concerning blood. But if they are properly continuous with other parts, they are not properly said to subsist in themselves, but in the whole; and for this reason the whole is sometimes denominated from accidents which inhere in them, as a man is called curly-haired; nevertheless the entire material causality which intervenes there is exercised through that part in which the accident inheres; and the same will endure, if such a part is preserved when separated according to its entire substance.

Whether Quantity Inheres in Matter

5. Therefore there remains only the question concerning prime matter and concerning the integral substance composed of matter and form; for concerning matter the question is whether it can per se materially and immediately cause some accidental form; this nearly coincides with the common question whether and how matter can be the subject of accidents. This, so that it may be treated more briefly and distinctly, must be entirely reduced to quantity; for now we do not deal with relations or accidental modes, concerning which we shall speak in passing later, because they present scarcely any difficulty, but we deal with proper accidental forms really distinct from substance, among which quantity holds the first place, and others inhere by means of it, as we shall say in the following section. Hence in whatever subject quantity may be, there will be the remaining corporeal qualities.

The Opinion Denying That Quantity Inheres in Matter

6. Testimonies of Aristotle for the related opinion. There are therefore in this matter two very common opposing opinions. The first is of those saying that matter per se does not have sufficient entity for materially causing any accident, but requires first conjunction with

substantial form, so that from both results a composite which can receive accidents. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, I, q. 76, a. 6, and q. unic. de Spiritualib. creatur., a. 3, ad. 18; and Albert, in Summa de homine, II p., q. An nutritio fiat ex simili, a. 1; Durand., In I, dist. 8, II p., q. 4; Capreol., In II, dist. 13, q. 1, conclus. 2 et 3, et dist. 18, q. 1, conclus. 6; Caiet., de Ente et essent., c. 7, q. 16; Soncin., VIII Metaph., q. 7, et 15, 17 et 18; Ferr., IV cont. Gent., c. 81, q. 2 et 3; Soto, I Phys., q. 7; Astudill., I de Generat 1. And it is attributed to Aristotle, because in I de Generat., text. 23, he said that generation occurs from matter, with nothing sensible remaining; from this passage and from what Aristotle adds, text. 24, all authors of this opinion take it that in substantial transmutation no accident remains in prime matter. But if this happens, it certainly occurs because matter does not suffice to sustain accidents, but only the composite; and therefore they perish when the composite is corrupted, which could happen for no reason if they inhered in prime matter. Secondly this confirms that Aristotle, I Phys., text. 81 and 82, says that prime matter regards per se first the substantial form. Thirdly, lib. V, text. 8, and lib. I de Gen., text. 24, he establishes a difference between generation and alteration or augmentation, that the subject of generation is matter alone, which he calls matter simpliciter, but the subject of alteration and augmentation he calls integral substance, which he calls matter secundum quid. Fourthly, VII Metaph., text. 8, he says that matter is not a what, nor how much, nor what kind, nor anything of this sort. Fifthly, VII Metaph., text. 4, and XII Metaph., text. 43, he says that substance is prior by nature to accident. Sixthly, in Praedicam., c. de Substantia, he says that when first substances are destroyed, it is impossible for anything to remain; but first substances are integral substances, simple or composite.

7. Several reasons are adduced for this opinion. First, because matter is pure potency, so that it has no being except what it begs from form; therefore it is per se impotent for sustaining accidents, unless it is first joined at least by nature to form and receives being from it. The

consequence is proved, both because being secundum quid, which accident gives, presupposes being simpliciter, and also because nothing can sustain another unless it first subsists in itself; but nothing subsists in itself unless it has actual and simple being. The second reason, which St. Thomas uses, is that matter is potency to all acts in a certain order; therefore it regards substantial form as its first act, to which it is per se primarily ordered; but accidents as secondary acts following the first. The antecedent is proved, because matter cannot equally primarily regard acts so diverse; otherwise it would also take diverse species from them and would be simultaneously substantial and accidental potency. But the consequence is proved, both because substantial potency must primarily regard substantial act, since it is per se primarily ordered to that and takes its species from it; therefore it must also receive that first; and also because accidental form is compared to substantial as second act to first; but second act always presupposes first.

8. The third reason is this: if any accident were in prime matter, it would be quantity maximally; but this is not the case; therefore. The major is accepted by all and is established from what was said at the beginning. The minor is proved, because quantity is a property of corporeal substance necessarily accompanying it; but it cannot be a property following upon matter as such, but upon form; therefore it cannot be received in matter according to itself, but as informed by form, or in the composite. The minor is proved, because property flows actively from the essence of which it is a property; but quantity cannot flow from the essence of matter as such, because this flowing is some efficiency; but matter according to itself has no efficiency, as is established from Aristotle, I de Gener., text. 55, and lib. II, text. 53; therefore quantity does not flow from matter, but from corporeal substance by reason of substantial form as it is the form of corporeity. This also has excellent proportion, both because accidental form, since it is informing act, ought to be a participation of substantial form rather than of matter; and also because substantial

form, as it is the form of corporeity, has no other property which follows upon it, besides quantity. And it is confirmed, because if quantity inhered in matter prior to substantial form, substantial form would be received in matter through the mediation of quantity; for this reason corporeal qualities inhere in substance through the mediation of quantity, because they presuppose it in substance. But the consequent is false, both because otherwise quantity would be a more intimate and more proper act of matter than substantial form. And also because there could not be made one per se from matter and substantial form; for they would be united through the mediation of an accident; whence rather from matter and quantity there should be made one per se; for potency rather makes one per se with its first and immediate act than with a secondary one which it receives mediately; nor can it be understood that the composition of a being per se is founded in a being per accidens. And finally because otherwise not only matter, but also quantity would be the material principle of substantial generation. Secondly the same reason is confirmed, because if quantity were in matter alone, it would be ingenerable and incorruptible, just as matter itself is, which is repugnant to Aristotle who posits motion per se to quantity. But the inference is evident, because quantity could not be corrupted at the corruption of the subject, because matter is incorruptible; nor could it be corrupted by a contrary, because it truly does not have one, as is established from Aristotle in the Categories; nor does it depend on another cause, through whose absence it could naturally cease to be; therefore quantity could in no way be corrupted, and consequently neither generated.

9. The fourth reason is this: because it is not repugnant that quantity and all corporeal accidents be received in the whole composite through the mediation of form; and this is more consonant with the natures of things; therefore. The major is declared, because it is not repugnant that one accident be received in substance through the mediation of another, as is established concerning corporeal

quality and quantity, and among the qualities themselves this order is sometimes found, as will be evident in the following section; therefore much more can it be found between substantial and accidental act. But the minor is proved, because potency for receiving accident is only secundum quid; but the potency of matter for receiving substantial form is potency simpliciter; therefore it is maximally consonant with the natures of things that this potency of matter be first reduced to act simpliciter, which only leaves potency secundum quid, and through that mediation receive accidents by which the composite is actuated as to the potency secundum quid which remains in it. Thus therefore it seems sufficiently proved that matter alone cannot be the material cause of any accidental entity.

The Opinion Affirming That Quantity Inheres in Matter

10. The second opinion is that prime matter from the force of its entity is a sufficient material cause of accidental forms proportioned to it; first indeed and immediately of quantity and, through its mediation, of others; Averroes taught this opinion, in the book de Substantia orbis, and I Phys., comment. 63, and in epitome Metaph., tract. II, c. ult., who says there are in matter coeval indeterminate dimensions, and in the thing itself ingenerable and incorruptible and only accidentally mutable. By indeterminate dimensions he understands nothing other than quantity itself, which as far as it is on the part of matter, requires neither a certain density, nor rarity, nor a definite boundary of magnitude or smallness, nor any peculiar figure; and therefore, just as matter is said to be per se formless, so quantity, as coeval, is said to be indeterminate, although in reality it always has some boundary, according to the requirement of form or the action of an agent; and according to this variety of boundaries, figures, or dispositions it is accidentally changed, although it always perseveres the same in its entity. Simplicius also

held this opinion, as to the inherence of quantity in matter, in I Phys., text. 69, and attributes it to Aristotle and Plato; Philoponus also holds it, I lib. de Generat., text. 33 and 40, where he says that matter affected by dimensions is the subject of generation. And Ammonius, in Praedicam., c. de Quantitate, says that matter first receives bulk through quantity; St. Thomas, In IV, dist. 12, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiunc. 4, reports and follows the opinion of the Commentator, as it has been related by us; but in Opusculum 32, which is de Natura materiae et dimensionibus interminatis, c. 4, although he reports the opinion of the Commentator in the same way, he nevertheless reproves it. Finally all authors who hold that the same corporeal accidents numerically remain in the generated and corrupted thing, also hold that quantity and material dispositions are subjected in prime matter, such as Gregor., In II, dist. 12, q. 2, a. 2; and Aureol., apud Capreol., In II, dist. 13, q. 1, argum. contra 3 concl.; Marsil., I de Generat., q. 7; Paul. Venet., Summ. de gener., c. 54; Aegid., VII Metaph., q. 4; Niphus, VIII Metaph., disp. IV; Zimara, Theorem. 46.

11. Passages of Aristotle for the immediately preceding opinion. And Aristotle favors this opinion in many places, for VII Metaph., text. 8, he signifies that quantity first inheres in matter; and in III Phys. he holds that quantity is a property of matter itself; and lib. II de Generat., text. 6, he holds that dispositions to substantial forms, and the alteration which is made to them, are proximately concerned with matter; and lib. I de Generat., and lib. II, text. 27, he says that the accidents in which the generated thing agrees with the corrupted remain the same. Plato can also be adduced for this opinion, who in the Timaeus called matter great and small, that it has quantity from itself, indifferent however to magnitude or smallness. The reasons for this opinion are partly metaphysical, partly physical; but from both an integral discourse must be constructed; for the metaphysical reasons seem to prove that it is not repugnant on the part of matter, or that there is in it a sufficient foundation of entity so that it may materially sustain accidents; but the physical reasons show that this is more

consonant both with the end or office for which matter is instituted and with the sensible effects which we experience.

12. First therefore it is proved that this causality can belong to matter, because matter has its proper actual entity with its proper existence, as was said above, and also its proper partial subsistence, as will be shown below; therefore from this part it has sufficient entity so that it may sustain some accident. The consequence is evident, because what subsists in itself, although it may otherwise be a partial entity, can sustain accidents proportioned to it, as we were saying shortly before about the rational soul. Perhaps it will be said that matter depends in its being on form, and from this part is of inferior condition than the rational soul is compared to matter. But this does not hinder, even if we admit that dependence, which some deny; because that dependence of matter on form is not as on a true and proper cause of matter itself, but as on a certain condition naturally necessary so that matter may be conserved in being; but this kind of dependence, which is extrinsic to the entity of matter, that is, supervening and not intrinsically composing it, can hinder nothing from the entity of matter being according to itself sufficient for sustaining accidents in the genus of material cause, for the dependence of one cause on another extrinsic in its being prevents nothing from it being sufficient in its genus for causing a proportioned effect. And it is an excellent and very accommodated example ad hominem; for the substantial composite depends on its natural dispositions, for, when these are removed, it is dissolved; and yet this does not hinder the composite itself from being according to itself the material cause of other accidents. Indeed, what is more, the composite itself is the material cause even of those dispositions, although it otherwise depends on them; what therefore is surprising that matter, although it depends on form, can be the material cause of accidents? It is added that, although matter depends on form, it can be the material cause of the same form; therefore, although it depends on form, it will be able to be the material cause of quantity. The consequence is evident,

because there seems to be greater repugnance between those two relations of dependence and causality with respect to the same thing than with respect to different things.

13. From this the reason made is finally strengthened; for prime matter has in itself sufficient existing and subsisting entity, by which it sustains in itself material substantial forms; therefore also so that it may sustain or materially cause quantity. The consequence is proved, both because it seems no less, indeed more, to sustain substantial form; nor is subsistence and existence or actual entity less necessary for this; and also because just as matter is said to depend on form, so it can be said to depend on quantity; therefore, just as this does not hinder matter from sustaining form, so also it will not hinder it from sustaining quantity. The consequence holds from parity of reasoning; and the antecedent is proved because, just as matter cannot be conserved without form, so neither without quantity, so much so that even in order to the absolute power of God it can be more easily understood that matter exists without form than without quantity, as I shall show below.

14. An objection is dissolved. You will say that matter cannot simultaneously be the material cause of substantial form and of quantity; indeed, by the very fact that it is substantial potency to form, it is disproportioned so that it may simultaneously be potency or material cause of quantity. But this introduces no difficulty, because it often happens that one cause has several effects, one of which is nobler than another; as the same form is the principle of dispositions or properties which flow from it and simultaneously is the principle of generating something similar to itself, and in the genus of formal cause simultaneously is the cause of its composite. Thus therefore it will not be repugnant that matter simultaneously be the cause of quantity as a property connatural to it and of form as the principal act to which its nature is ordered. And this happens more easily when such effects are ordered among themselves, as in the present case are quantity and form; for quantity is like a certain disposition of matter, through which

it becomes a suitable subject of alteration and of dispositions by which it is accommodated to receiving substantial form. Hence all authors, even those who defend the former opinion, confess that matter is the material cause of form and of quantity, although some say that with respect to form it is a total cause in its genus, but with respect to quantity only partial, because the whole composite is the total cause. But others even according to the former opinion concede that matter is the total cause in its genus, both of quantity and of form, but in this order, that by nature it is first the cause of form rather than of quantity; therefore it is not inconvenient that the same matter be the material cause of both. And, as regards order, it seems more consonant that although according to the order of perfection and end matter first receives form rather than quantity, nevertheless in the order of execution and generation, it first receives quantity rather than form. For the order of execution is usually opposite to the order of intention. This is also necessary in the present case, since matter is prepared and adapted to form through quantity. And therefore it also does not prevent matter from being substantial potency; for, just as substance can be capable of accident, not through accidental potency, but through itself, because it concomitantly has that capacity from the force of its entity, so substantial potency, which is such because it is per se primarily instituted for receiving substantial act, can concomitantly through itself have capacity for receiving an accidental property or disposition consonant with its nature and accommodated to the end for which it is instituted.

15. From these things therefore it seems sufficiently demonstrated that on the part of matter there is no repugnance nor any disproportion, that it cannot be a sufficient material cause of quantity. That this is indeed so, the example of the human body seems especially to convince, in which I suppose there is no other substantial form besides the rational soul, which I shall show generally in the following disputation, and has been proved in part in the preceding. I suppose secondly that the soul of man is spiritual and altogether

indivisible. Hence therefore the reasoning is concluded, for the quantity of the human body cannot be in it by reason of the whole composite of matter and form; therefore it is in matter alone, for it is established that it is not in form alone. The antecedent is proved, because an accident which is in the whole composite attains simultaneously by its union form and matter through the mode of one; but truly quantity cannot in any way attain the rational soul, since this is spiritual; therefore it cannot be in the whole human composite, but in matter alone.

16. Quantity can be received in no spirit. Perhaps it will be said that it is not repugnant that a material accident attain by its union an immaterial form as informing matter; for an immaterial form attains by its union matter itself; why therefore will a material accident not be able to attain such a form? Also in the union of the incarnate Word we see a gross and material body having union terminated to the supreme spiritual suppositum, such as is the Word of God; what therefore is surprising that quantity terminates its union to the lowest spirit, as united to body? But nevertheless this cannot be said, because quantity is united to its subject as its form and act, and therefore it can be united only to as much reality as is capable of its formal effect; but the rational soul is in no way capable of the formal effect of quantity, because it is not capable of quantitative extension, even while it informs the body; therefore it cannot in any way receive in itself either totally or partially quantity; nor can the union of quantity be terminated to it, because that union is nothing but information; but information cannot be terminated except to a thing capable of formal effect. Hence there is no proportion in the examples adduced, as is established from what has been said.

17. It can be responded otherwise that this argument indeed convinces that the quantity of man is received inherently in matter alone, but it is not proved that in such matter the information of human form giving being to matter and constituting the composite which is said to receive and cause quantity is not presupposed,

although it does not per se first and according to its whole self receive it, but by reason of the other part. But first from this response I take that matter alone is the subject to which the quantity of man inheres, and consequently that it alone is the material cause of quantity; for that is the material cause to which the union or inherence of the form which is materially caused is terminated, but the union and inherence of the quantity of the human body is terminated to matter alone, as the argument made proves and is conceded in the response; therefore matter through its entity is sufficient for materially causing quantity; whence consequently it follows that in any thing it has the same sufficiency and force, as far as it is from itself. And this can be confirmed and declared more fully, for, since in man there are matter and soul, between matter and soul there is immediate substantial union, and between quantity and matter there is also immediate union, although accidental; but between quantity and soul there is no immediate union by which they are united among themselves, but they are united only per accidens in one third thing, namely matter; therefore matter alone is what exercises the office of material cause with respect to quantity, because this is exercised through the immediate union of the same, as was declared above.

18. Although this seems to be sufficient for what we now intend, hence nevertheless it can be concluded further that it is said without cause or foundation that the union of matter to soul is prior by nature to the union of the same matter to quantity, prior (I say) in the order of generation; for concerning the order of perfection and end this is most true, but nothing refers to the present matter. But that the other priority is nothing, is proved, because first the soul does not give to matter intrinsic and proper being of that matter, but presupposes it so that it can be united to matter, as has been often said; therefore from this part the union of matter to soul is not necessarily presupposed in the order of nature. Again neither under any other aspect is union to soul the cause of union to quantity; therefore it is in no way prior by nature. The antecedent is evident, because it is not a

cause in the genus of material cause; for it has been shown that matter through its entity alone materially causes or receives quantity. Nor is it a cause in the genus of efficient cause, because neither is one union made by the other, as seems self-evident, nor is the soul itself which is united the efficient principle of the quantity of its body, because there is no indication nor sufficient reason of this efficiency, as I shall show more generally below; and especially an incorporeal form seems very disproportioned so that it may per se be the effective principle of corporeal bulk and quantity. Therefore in no way does the union of matter to soul precede the union of matter to quantity. Indeed this seems to be presupposed in the order of nature in the genus of material cause, at least as a condition on the part of matter necessary so that matter may be a suitable subject, both for the action by which soul is united to matter, and also so that the soul itself may be able to inform and undergo the role of form of corporeity, informing matter in a certain extended way, since it remains in itself unextended.

19. And hence it further follows that the union of matter to quantity is also prior by nature, as it is said, in the consequence of subsisting; for first it is beyond controversy that the union of matter to soul cannot naturally be or be conserved without union to quantity, not only because soul cannot naturally be in matter lacking all quantity, which is most evident; but also because, while this union of this matter to this soul perseveres, this quantity cannot be varied in this matter; for quantity cannot be directly expelled by another quantity, because all are similar, nor does one quantity have another contrary or so repugnant, that it expels it from the same subject; therefore, with the same matter and the same total or partial composite remaining through union to the same soul, quantity cannot be varied. Conversely however, even if the soul recedes and another form comes, the same quantity can persevere in matter; therefore union to quantity is simply prior in the consequence of subsisting, and thus matter alone will be the proper material cause of quantity. The consequence is clear from what has been said, nor is there any

controversy about it. But the antecedent can be proved a priori from what has been said, because union to quantity depends in no genus of cause on the soul or on its information and from elsewhere the soul can be directly expelled from matter through the introduction of another repugnant form and through the change of other dispositions which such a form necessarily postulates in the matter which it informs; therefore no reason can be given why, when the soul recedes from matter, quantity recedes or its union with matter is dissolved; for one thing is corrupted only at the cessation of another, when it depends on that. And although it can be said that quantity depends mediately on soul insofar as matter depends on it, this dependence is nevertheless sufficiently supplied by the subsequent form, which by informing and by its proper being actuating the same matter numerically, sufficiently terminates its dependence on form; therefore there is no cause why, when the soul recedes, the quantity of the human body recedes. This reasoning proves in the same way concerning all accidents which inhere in body through the mediation of quantity and do not depend effectively on the soul.

20. The same can be proven a posteriori, for we experience that in a human corpse immediately after death there remain the same bodily accidents that were in the living person, except for those faculties that are proper to the living and therefore depend effectively on the soul. To this experience it is commonly replied that those accidents appear to be the same, but are not actually the same, but rather similar in species, degree, and mode, yet numerically different. This response could indeed be admitted if there were both an intervening reason that would effectively compel us to correct our senses, and if a sufficient cause of such accidents could also be rendered; but neither of these occurs here. The first has been sufficiently shown by the metaphysical reasoning by which we tacitly overturn the foundations of the contrary opinion, to which we shall respond more distinctly below. The second is proven because if the accidents that are present in the corpse at the instant of death are

numerically distinct from those that were in the person, there will be necessary some efficient cause that produces them anew in that instant; but this often does not intervene; therefore. The minor is proven especially by some concerning quantity itself, because it cannot be made by another quantity, since quantity is not active; nor can it be made by quality, because quantity is prior to corporeal quality; hence it cannot be made by it; nor can it be made by substantial form, both because this is not immediately active, and also because there is no substantial form common to all corporeal things, although quantity is common to all. It is added that if quantity were to be made anew in the matter of the corpse, it would be made in it as it is prior by nature to being quantified and indivisible, which involves a contradiction. But these reasons are not effective; for it can be replied that quantity is produced or rather co-produced by an extrinsic agent introducing the form, but proximately is introduced by the form itself through natural resultance; for in this way it is not inconvenient for a form to effect immediately some accident, as from the form of water there emanates an intensity of coldness when it reduces itself to its pristine coldness. Nor would it be necessary for this that all bodies should have some common substantial form, but the agreement of all forms in the common nature of substantial form could suffice. Nor is it inconvenient that quantity should be co-produced in matter and from matter that is prior by nature to being quantified; for in every opinion it is necessary to confess that quantity was at some time produced or co-produced; and in whatever way it was made in a manner consonant with its nature, it is necessary that it was made in matter and from matter; therefore it was made from matter as it is prior by nature to being actually quantified but quantified in potency, and actually indivisible quantitatively but divisible in potency. This therefore does not include a contradiction, because that quantitative indivisibility is not understood to precede actually and as it were positively in matter, but only as it were negatively, namely, because matter of itself does not actually have that divisibility unless it is conferred by quantity; but it

has the aptitude, because it has an entity apt to receive such a form, for which it is necessary that matter itself should have from itself a certain entitative divisibility, which I shall explain below when treating of quantity. In the same way, therefore, quantity could result from the form of the corpse and be made from matter without contradiction. Concerning quantity, therefore, the assumed proposition cannot, as I think, be effectively proven, unless it is supposed from elsewhere that natural agents can do nothing except in a subject that is quantitatively extended and divisible; concerning which reasoning we shall speak a little below.

21. Therefore the minor proposition assumed above is principally proven concerning qualities, which often do not have an efficient cause from which they are made, if the same ones do not remain numerically; for they are not made through natural resultance from the form of the corpse, because they are not connatural to it, but rather are foreign and extraneous; hence it happens that they are gradually lost after a brief time, as is evident concerning heat and similar things. Nor are they made by an extrinsic agent, because sometimes there is no surrounding or proximate agent that could induce so much heat or such a temperament as remains for some time in a human corpse, especially when death is violent through suffocation, throat-cutting, etc.; in which kind of death a particular cause that could induce the form of the corpse is scarcely found; and sometimes we have recourse to universal causes that effect it for a universal reason, namely, lest matter remain without form; but concerning similar qualities, since they are not per se necessary for the introduction of such a form, to which they are not connatural, there is no reason why they should be made per se and by proper action from universal causes; but proper and particular causes are often none, as is established by induction and experience. Nor finally can it be said that heat of this kind and other qualities are made in that instant by the vital spirits that remain for some time, or by the humors, especially blood; because first, there is also doubt concerning blood and spirits

whether they are informed by the same soul, or at least whether their forms, which are as it were partial, depend on conjunction with the soul, so that they perish immediately when it departs; hence many think that blood, as soon as it flows from the veins and is separated from the remaining blood that stays in the body, changes its substantial form, even if it retains heat and similar accidents for some time. Then the time during which such spirits or humors can endure is very brief; but similar accidents remain for a longer time. And finally, not only in man or other animals, but also in other things similar accidents remain, as we reported above from Aristotle, even if they are not intrinsic and connatural to the thing generated, so that they could emanate from its form; as, for example, if from humid vapor that is not extremely cold but has some heat, water is made by condensation, it is not always made extremely cold and pure, but retains the same heat; yet there is no new extrinsic cause from which it is made, but the same heat remains, because it cannot be expelled so quickly by the form of water.

22. And from this is also taken an excellent and general argument, because these qualities that are intensifiable and remissible and have a contrary, if they do not emanate from an intrinsic form, but are made through extrinsic alteration, are not made suddenly in an intense degree, but gradually, because both the intrinsic form and other surrounding bodies resist; but we see these qualities remain at the instant of death in great intensity; therefore it is not likely that they are then suddenly made per se through the action of an extrinsic agent; since therefore they are not made through intrinsic emanation from the form of the corpse, it is a sign that they are not then made, but the same ones numerically remain. Some say that no efficient cause of these qualities is necessary, because they succeed by natural consequence to the perishing of similar qualities. But in these words a contradiction is involved; for what is signified by the name of natural consequence? Either the necessary succession of one after another or the natural emanation of one from another. If this latter is signified,

that very emanation is a certain efficiency; and therefore a contradiction is involved; and moreover it has been shown that there is no principle or form from which such emanation could come. But if the former is said, it is necessary first to give a reason for that necessary succession; for that a similar quality has preceded is not a sufficient reason that a similar one should necessarily succeed, if the subject is entirely changed and what succeeds to the former subject does not seek a similar quality. And moreover every necessary succession requires an efficient cause; for what succeeds to another is made anew; therefore it is made by something; therefore either through intrinsic resultance or extrinsic efficiency, nor can natural consequence be understood otherwise. Since therefore sometimes and often such intrinsic or extrinsic cause does not intervene, it is a sign that there is not natural consequence there, but the duration of the same disposition or quality numerically. But if the same quality remains, therefore also quantity; for since such quality is present by means of quantity, the same quality could not remain if quantity were changed.

23. Besides these physical arguments, which are taken peculiarly from the human body, although some of them can be extended to other things, there are others common to all generable things, which are taken from the mode and order of natural generation. For first, matter of itself is a sufficient subject of natural generation, insofar as it can be through the action of a corporeal and natural agent; and on the other hand it is of itself indifferent to any form that can be introduced through generation; from both conditions it can be understood that matter has from itself coeval quantity, and does not change or in some way acquire it through generation. From the former indeed, because in order that matter may be a suitable subject with respect to a corporeal and extended agent, it is necessary that it be pre-understood as corporeal and extended, because a corporeal agent prerequires an extended and corporeal patient and a local and quantitative application of it; indeed also

contact, as philosophers commonly say. Nor is it sufficient that in the whole time of the alteration preceding generation the alteration is made around a quantified subject, but it is also necessary that the same should happen in the intrinsic instant of generation in which there is a new action proceeding also from a corporeal and quantified agent; therefore the subject that is supposed to the action is also supposed to be corporeal and quantified; therefore it is not made quantified through that action, neither immediately nor mediately; for a necessary condition on the part of the subject so that it can exercise the office of subject cannot be made by an agent that necessarily supposes the subject already suitable so that it can act.

24. It can be replied that for the action of a corporeal agent it is sufficient that throughout the whole time of the preceding alteration it supposes a quantified subject, and in the instant of generation the agent itself induces such a form to which the quantity of the subject follows. According to this response it must be denied that extension or quantitative contact is strictly a prior condition or necessarily prerequisite to every action of a natural agent, but either prerequisite or concomitant; for it is prerequisite to accidental action and alteration, because through alteration such a form is not made to which quantity follows, but one that rather supposes quantity; but to substantial action it will be denied to be a prerequisite condition in that very instant, but following in the order of nature, because through that action such a form is introduced that can bring with it quantity and the corporeality of matter. And in this way the argument of the Commentator can be solved, namely, that matter has from itself quantity by which it is divided into diverse parts, because it is ordered to be the subject of diverse forms, which it cannot receive except in diverse parts, which diversity of parts it does not have except through quantity as medium. For even if I omit that it can be replied that for this the entitative distinction of parts that matter has from itself is sufficient, and not formally through quantity, it can also be said that matter was divided from the beginning into various parts, because it

was established under diverse forms, and consequently under diverse parts of quantity. But afterward in individual generations and corruptions this matter is conserved as distinct from others throughout the whole time of the preceding alteration, through the quantity it has under the form of the thing that is corrupted; but in the instant of generation, through the quantity it obtains in the same instant by means of the form of the thing generated.

25. But although this response appears reasonable, nevertheless it seems more philosophical and more consonant with corporeal agents that in every action of theirs they suppose a quantified and divisible subject distinct from others not only entitatively, but also quantitatively, and proximate to them or applied with proper and local application, which is not made except through quantity as medium. And this is especially confirmed from the other condition of matter, which is indifference to many forms; for since it is such of itself that it receives a determinate form, it is necessary that it be first accommodated and proximately disposed to such a form by an agent; but this accommodation and disposition is not made except by preceding accidental dispositions, which must be received in matter, both because they precede the form to which they dispose, and also because physical and natural disposition must be proximately and immediately in that subject which it disposes and prepares; but these dispositions are present in the subject through quantity as medium; therefore quantity is also present in the same matter.

How Substantial Form & Dispositions to it Maintain Order in Matter

26. The first response is rejected. Various responses are given to this reasoning, which must be proposed and examined so that this opinion may be confirmed at the same time, and if there is any probable way of defending the former opinion, it may become known. The first response therefore is that matter is sufficiently adapted and

accommodated to form through dispositions that precede the introduction of substantial form by time or moment; for although in that instant in which the form is introduced, all preceding dispositions cease to be, so that in that moment they no longer exist, nevertheless they leave matter accommodated and sealed (as they say) so that it is proximately capable of such a form in species and individual rather than another. This response, however, was rejected above when treating of the principle of individuation, because that sealing of matter can be nothing in matter, if matter remains entirely denuded of prior quantity and all qualities. But that such qualities have immediately preceded in matter is only an extrinsic denomination, because they leave no thing nor real mode in matter, according to this opinion; but it cannot be understood that matter, which was of itself indifferent, remains disposed through mere extrinsic denomination.

27. The second response is disproved. The second response is that in the same instant of generation matter is disposed through ultimate dispositions and through them is prepared and accommodated to form, and nevertheless they are not subjectively in matter, nor are they introduced into it except as already informed with substantial form, but indeed they follow from the form itself through natural emanation. The way in which this can be understood or done is declared from that principle of Aristotle: Causes are mutually causes in diverse genera. Hence it happens that form and ultimate disposition can be mutually causes to each other; for heat as eight degrees, for example, is the cause of the form of fire in the genus of disposition, which is reduced to material cause, but the form of fire is the cause of heat as eight degrees in the genus of active or formal principle. Hence it happens that heat in its genus is prior by nature than form, and thus is understood to precede by disposing and coaptating matter to form, although in another genus it is posterior by nature, and thus is understood to follow form and to be subjected in the whole composite.

28. But against this response many things occur, which (as I think) are difficult to satisfy. First I do not understand how any quality is truly preparing and adapting the subject to form, and effectively follows from the form itself. I say truly preparing and adapting; for if it were only a disposition adorning and perfecting, it could easily be understood as following from form and also necessary for the natural conservation of form; but here we are dealing with preparing disposition, which determines and as it were proximately limits the capacity of the subject; and consequently also determines the agent to introducing such a form; therefore it cannot happen that such a form effectively follows from the form introduced. The consequence is proven, because if the disposition flows from the form immediately, and the form from the agent, therefore the agent simply begins its action from the introduction of form, and does not attain the disposition actively except through form; therefore such disposition in no way determines the agent to such introduction of form, but rather through the form the agent is determined to effecting such ultimate disposition. Likewise, that disposition can have no real causality except insofar as it has been made; but it is made by means of form; therefore it cannot be understood as having real causality concerning the very action by which form is made. Moreover, dispositive cause does not dispose except by informing, as I declared above; hence, although with respect to the term to which it disposes it is said to be reduced to material cause, nevertheless with respect to the subject that it disposes, it is truly formal cause; if therefore these accidents do not inform matter, how do they dispose it? Likewise, if in the genus of material cause that disposition is prior, therefore in the same genus it is present first, both because its being is to be present, and also because it does not dispose except by inhering and informing; but if it is present prior by nature, in what, I ask, is it present? Not in matter, because if in real duration it is not present in matter, it can exercise no genus of causality by means of such inherence; therefore according to no priority of nature or causality can it be truly conceived as thus

inhering. Nor can it inhere in the composite insofar as it exercises such causality, because it prepares for the composite and because it does not dispose the composite, but matter, because it disposes that in which it inheres.

29. Moreover, if the disposition inheres in the composite, it is necessary that substantial form precede in the genus of material cause and in the genus of preparation and disposition to the accidental form itself; therefore it is impossible that in the same genus the accidental form should precede. The consequence is clear, because a circle cannot be committed among causes in the same genus of causality. And the antecedent is proven, because either the accident inheres in the whole composite per se primo, and thus partially inheres in the substantial form; therefore substantial form precedes in the genus of material cause; or the accident inheres in matter as previously informed with substantial form, and thus substantial form is at least the medium through which matter receives quantity and subsequent dispositions; therefore much more can substantial form be called the disposition of matter for receiving quantity and other dispositions than the contrary.

30. To this it is usually replied that in substantial form there are degrees, and insofar as form confers a superior and generic degree, it completes the subject of dispositions of the subsequent degree; and thus no circle is committed in the same genus of cause between the same things according to the same nature; as, for example, the soul, as it gives corporeal being, completes the receptive subject of quantity, in which subsequently can be received dispositions to the degree of the living, and so concerning subsequent ones. But this response could never please or satisfy me, both because that distinction of form according to diverse degrees is a distinction of reason through our precise or confused concepts; therefore it can refer nothing to real causality and inherence of accidents in matter or composite; and also because, even if we speak of form according to the first degree of substantial form giving corporeal being, a determinate form distinct

from the rest is introduced in matter; for form in common is not introduced; therefore disposition preparing matter precedes; and moreover because the form that is corrupted is not first expelled under the generic degree than under the specific; for it is impossible to understand the specific degree without the generic, because this is as it were the foundation of that; hence if some order ought to intervene, it should be begun from the inferior degrees; therefore neither is the opposite form introduced first according to the generic degree, etc. Finally it is false that the agent first disposes matter to the generic degree; for fire, for example, does not dispose to the form of element except by disposing to the form of fire; and so concerning others.

31. A corrupted disposition cannot instrumentally and physically induce form. Finally an argument is usually made concerning the nature of efficient cause; for ultimate disposition effectively attains the eduction or introduction of form; for accident in the power of substance attains its effection; therefore the same disposition cannot effectively emanate from the form that it effects. Some respond that not the ultimate disposition, which remains with form in the instant of generation, but that which immediately preceded, effectively attains the introduction of form as its instrument. But this is improbable, because what is not cannot be an instrument of acting; but that disposition in that instant no longer exists, according to this opinion. But that it has proximately preceded is not sufficient, because it is only an extrinsic denomination; and although there is a natural consequence between that disposition and form, it is necessary that that very consequence be from the power of another efficient cause; for that consequence is not emanation of form from disposition, since a thing does not emanate from what no longer exists, but is only necessary and immediate succession after such disposition, which succession must necessarily be founded in the efficiency of some cause, which effects one thing immediately after another. A better response is that no disposition received in the patient effectively attains the introduction of form; but when it is said

that accident in the power of substance effectively attains substance, this is not to be understood concerning accident that is received in the patient or effect, but concerning accidental faculty that is in the agent itself, as for example, concerning heat that is in fire, or concerning seminal power that is in seed. But although we admit this, from it is taken no light argument; for natural instrument does not attain the superior action of the principal agent except by previous proper and connatural action, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 5, to be treated below; therefore if fire through the heat that it has in itself attains substantial form in the instant of generation, the heat of the same fire in the same instant acts by previous heating; therefore the heat that is received in the patient as ultimate disposition to the form of fire does not emanate effectively from the form itself of the thing generated, but is made through proper action by the heat that is in the generating fire; otherwise rather the action by which substantial form is educed would be previous to the emanation of heat, which is ultimate disposition, than the converse. Nor can it be said that that ultimate disposition is made simultaneously in two ways, namely directly and immediately by the heat of fire through previous action in the genus of material cause, and again by the form of the generated fire through natural emanation, because the same effect cannot naturally be made simultaneously by several causes and actions that are total and per se sufficient; and because according to the other previous action that disposition ought to be made in matter, although through the other emanation it is said to be made in the composite.

32. Concerning the third response judgment is made. The third response to the principal reasoning and more probable is that no disposition is required per se in matter, but only per accidens to expel the contrary form and dispositions. Hence all the alteration that precedes the instant of generation is ordered only to this, that in the instant of generation matter remains without any repugnance to receiving the perfect action of the agent; but in matter thus left the agent immediately introduces its substantial form without previous

disposition with all the dispositions accompanying it. For it is not because matter is of itself indifferent that ultimate previous disposition is necessary by which it is determined to such form, because it is indifferent through universality or integral capacity for any form; but the agent from its form is determined to introducing this form in species rather than another; and from circumstances or the concurrence of the first cause is determined to introducing this form numerically. This is declared by a similar case from accidental action, for wood is of itself indifferent to heat and cold; but if fire is applied, it receives heat rather than cold, not because of previous disposition, but because of the determination and nature of the agent.

33. This response is indeed apparent; but it seems little consonant with the common doctrine of philosophers, among whom most accepted is the distinction of matter into first and proximate, that is, prepared and ultimately disposed to determinate form; and conversely the same are accustomed to say that each form according to its proper species regards not only nude matter, but prepared and accommodated to itself through connatural dispositions. Hence also the soul is defined as the act of a physical, organic body, etc. Then not all physical effects can be conveniently saved in that way. First, because according to that opinion a perfect agent would always effect from any matter an effect perfectly similar to itself in all qualities connatural to it; because if it first entirely denudes matter and leaves it without any repugnance and in it first introduces its form perfectly similar to itself in specific nature, it is necessary that to that form there necessarily follow all qualities and dispositions connatural to it, because there is nothing that formally resists in matter itself; but we see that this does not happen thus in natural generations, but many things are substantially generated with an admixture of foreign qualities because of the disposition or impurity of matter from which they are generated. Second, in equivocal agents sufficient reason cannot be given why they are determined to introducing one substantial form rather than another; as, for example, when the sun generates gold, if in

the instant in which it introduces the form of gold it finds nude matter and of itself entirely indifferent, it cannot be determined by it; nor is it determined from itself, otherwise it would always induce such form in indifferent matter. And in the generation of man this difficulty is also excellently declared; for if in the instant in which the rational soul is introduced into the body all the matter of the body is pre-understood as nude of all dispositions, it is equally indifferent according to all its parts that the soul should inform them in this or that way and that from it should follow these or those dispositions in this or that part of matter; whence therefore is it determined that it should be united in this part rather in this way than in another?

34. I see that it can only be replied that this is the natural succession of things, that after such preceding alteration such form or union of form follows, even if matter is of itself indifferent and the power of the agent more eminent. But the reason of this necessary succession can only be given, either because the agent by its nature is determined to acting in such a way, or because things themselves are thus coordinated of themselves. Nevertheless this response is only apt for fleeing the difficulty, not for declaring the thing and giving its reason. Especially because all the alteration that precedes according to this opinion is per accidens, only for removing impediments that are on the part of the patient; therefore the order and succession between that alteration and the following action cannot be per se; nor can sufficient reason of determination be taken from it. Third, the reasoning made above urges, at least ad hominem, because fire or sun introduces form through heat or light as instrument; therefore it acts by previous heating, etc. It can be replied similarly that it acts by previous heating not in the same instant, but by previous heating that precedes throughout the whole time before the instant of generation. This response does not satisfy for the same reason, because that temporally prior heating is only per accidens previous according to this opinion, for expelling the repugnant form. Hence if we should suppose that heating is not necessary for corrupting the prior subject,

but it could be corrupted in another way, nevertheless in the instant of generation fire would generate fire through its heat as medium; but the order of instrument in acting by previous proper action is per se and not per accidens; therefore it ought to be not only in the action that precedes in duration, but also in the very instant of generation.

The Present Question is Divided into Four Parts

35. The foundations of the latter opinion seem indeed very urgent, and to convince something that pertains maximally to the present question, but to persuade something quite probably, which that I may declare and open my opinion, I distinguish various questions that are involved here. The first and principally intended in the present is whether by reason of proper subject and material cause matter alone can terminate the dependence of accidental form, so that proximately and adequately accident should inhere in matter alone, even if otherwise it ought to be informed with substantial form as necessary for the being of matter, yet not as concurring simultaneously in the nature of subject or material cause to the being of accidental form. The second question is if quantity and other accidents that are present inhere in matter in the aforesaid way, whether it follows from this that quantity is coeval with matter and remains the same numerically with other accidents in the generated and corrupted thing. The third question is whether in any genus of cause form can be said to be united to matter first than accidents, and how in various opinions one should speak. The fourth question can be, granted that quantity can inhere in matter alone, whether when substantial form is material and extended just as matter, then quantity also immediately inheres in the whole composite per se primo, so that it proximately attains both its essential parts.

Quantity Sometimes Inheres in Matter Alone

36. I say therefore first that by the reasonings made in the latter place it is sufficiently convinced that matter can be and in fact sometimes is the proper subject in which quantity alone inheres, although not outside the substantial composite, which is usually said by others that matter is the subject of inherence, although the whole composite is the subject of denomination, or otherwise, the composite is what receives quantity, but the reason of receiving is matter alone; just as the whole man is denominated intellectual and to have or receive intellect, although the reason of receiving or subject of inherence is the soul alone. And this conclusion is of the authors of the second opinion and is not contrary to the authors of the first. I except only Durandus, who expressly declares the contrary sense, only because of that reason that matter is pure potency and therefore cannot receive accidental act without substantial. This reason only proves that substantial act is required or at most prerequired before accidental act, not that the substantial act itself must necessarily concur materially to receiving accident. Nor do I see how Durandus frees himself from the argument made concerning the quantity of the human body; for he also concedes that the rational soul concurs proximately and immediately with matter to receiving quantity; yet he denies that it follows from this that the soul participates in the formal effect of quantity, because (he says) form can be received per se primo in the composite by reason of both parts immediately receiving the accidental form partially, and nevertheless not confer its formal effect except to the other part of the composite. This is indeed clear repugnance and contradiction in terms, as has been declared and proven above in various ways; for to receive materially an accident is the same as to be informed by accident; therefore, if it receives partially, it is informed partially; but it is contradictory to be informed and not to receive information according to the mode of information, namely, either total or partial. And it is confirmed and declared: for the remaining substantial forms, by this very fact that they are informed partially by quantity, receive its formal effect; therefore if

rational soul is also informed partially, it will participate in the same effect. But if it is said that other forms participate in that effect because they are capable of it, but our soul is incapable, this very response convinces that human soul is not capable of proximate and immediate partial reception of quantity, just as other substantial forms are. This reasoning therefore seems to convince the assertion posited.

37. In which proximate subject immanent acts inhere. It can only be objected concerning immanent acts of sensing and loving sensibly, which are extended and consequently immediately received in quantity; and yet it is necessary that they inform, at least partially, the soul itself immediately; otherwise how would they constitute the soul as living? For man certainly does not see through the body, but through the soul. But this objection demands a longer disputation, pertaining to the books on the Soul; for many because of this cause think that even sensitive powers are not really distinguished from the soul, and the acts themselves of sensing are spiritual and received immediately in the soul alone, by which it is difficult either to gather the immortality of the soul from operation or to avoid that the same should follow in the souls of brutes. Others say that knowing and loving consist principally in effecting those acts; and therefore it is sufficient that the soul actually and immediately flows into them, although it is not proximately informed by them. Others finally say that efficiency and reception are indeed necessary, but it is sufficient that acts are received in the power and body, to which the soul is intimately and formally conjoined. And therefore it is not so properly said that the soul sees as that it understands, but the whole man is what per se primo sees, principally indeed through the soul, but instrumentally through the body. What of these is truer must be treated in its proper place.

Which Accidents of the Corrupted Remain the Same in Number in What is Generated

38. In how many ways an accident can perish. I say secondly: although it is probable that naturally the same accidents do not remain in number in the generated thing that were in the corrupted thing, nevertheless the opposite seems more probable regarding quantity and dispositions that are either ordered toward the form of what is generated or do not conflict with it, especially when they previously inhered in matter alone. Why I add this limitation will be evident from the resolution of the fourth question proposed. This conclusion (as I judge) is sufficiently proven by many of the arguments made in the second opinion. And it is briefly declared by supposing what Cajetan noted, de Ente et essent., c. 7, q. 17, that an accident can cease to exist in only four ways, namely: either through the corruption of the subject, or through the introduction of a contrary, or through the cessation of a terminus, or through the absence of another conserving cause. In the present case, therefore, such accidents cannot cease to exist from the defect of their proper subject in which they inhere; for we suppose them to inhere in matter alone, which does not perish. Likewise, the second mode of corruption has no place here, because quantity has no contrary; and although quality has one, we suppose nevertheless that in the case of which we speak, it is not introduced. Concerning the third mode also, it is evident that it is not relevant, because it is proper to relations. It remains therefore to speak of the fourth, for if all accidents of the composite perish through the absence of substantial form, and not from the defect of material cause, because we suppose that form does not immediately concur per se, even partially, to receive quantity, it is necessary that form have with respect to accidents some other genus of causality, by reason of which the corruption of such accidents follows from the absence of such a cause. For if accidents do not depend on form in some genus of cause, there is no reason why they should perish when form departs. But they can be understood to depend in two ways, namely in the genus of formal or efficient cause.

39. How accidents depend on substantial form in the genus of formal cause. The prior dependence cannot be immediate, but mediate; for substantial form does not inform quantity or other accidents, nor can it be understood in what other way it immediately exercises the function of formal cause around those things; therefore accidents cannot depend on form immediately in that genus of cause. But mediate dependence is true and easily understood; for, because accidents proximately depend on matter as on a subject, and matter depends on form in the genus of formal cause, it happens that at least mediately quantity depends on form in the genus of formal cause. But this dependence is not sufficient that quantity should perish when form departs, because another form succeeds the departing form that conserves the same subject in number. For indeed under this aspect quantity does not depend on form for any other reason except because matter depends; therefore, if concerning matter that dependence is sufficiently supplied by the subsequent form, much more so concerning quantity. And it is declared by a similar case; for if matter were effectively conserved by one agent, and afterward ceased to be conserved by that one and were conserved by another, it would nevertheless have the same substantial form and the same accidents would remain in it, because it is irrelevant to forms and accidents that matter be conserved by this or that agent, or by this or that action, but it is only necessary per se that it be conserved the same in number; therefore the same is true in the present case. Indeed, if God through absolute power were to conserve matter without form, supplying effectively the formal concurrence of form (which we shall show below can be done), as much as is from the force of this dependence, all accidents that inhere in that matter would remain, because for those things it is only required that matter be conserved; but whether this happens in this way, that is, by means of form, or through the efficacy alone of a higher cause, matters little. Just as in the mystery of the Eucharist theologians say that, with quantity conserved without substance, the accidents that inhere are conserved in it without a new

miracle, because, supposing that they inhere, they only depend on substance mediately as on what sustains quantity; hence, by the very fact that God effectively supplies that material sustentation, the same accidents can inhere in quantity and be conserved. Therefore, on account of this mediate dependence alone, accidents will not be destroyed when form departs.

40. Whether accidents depend on substantial form in the genus of efficient cause. Another mode of dependence can be in the genus of efficient cause, which is probable, yet entirely uncertain and not yet proven by any sufficient reason, as I showed above, and will be more evident from the solutions of arguments. Now I add that, even admitting that immediate effective dependence, it does not follow that quantity perishes when substantial form departs, for the reason intimated a little before, namely, because another similar cause succeeds the departing cause, sufficient to conserve the same effect in number without interruption; but when efficient causes succeed each other in this way, the effect is not changed, but the same in number is conserved. This latter proposition is supposed from what will be said below concerning efficient cause. But the former proposition is proven because, although the substantial form that succeeds another is specifically diverse, nevertheless in the aspect of effectively causing quantity, in any form there is sufficient power. Hence even those who say that quantity is changed admit that from the succeeding form, however imperfect, there flows a quantity entirely similar to the prior one and equally perfect; therefore by much greater reason will that form have the power to influence preexisting quantity and to conserve it, nor can a sufficient reason be given why in this effect this should be more repugnant than in others. For, although someone could say that that efficacy which is through natural resultance is so intrinsic that it cannot be continued (so to speak) through succession of similar or equal cause around the same property or effect, this nevertheless will be said merely gratuitously to escape the force of reason, both because that emanation, however intrinsic it may be called, does not transcend

effective causality, and also because, whatever that efficacy may be, another similar one succeeds, and there no other formal or material connection is added, nor is the individuation of quantity through this form; therefore nothing can prevent the same quantity from being conserved through the influence of a similar form; therefore, whether quantity effectively depends on substantial form, as it is a form of corporeity, or not, from this it cannot be inferred that accidents are changed into other similar ones numerically distinct when form is changed. But if no sufficient cause of corruption is assigned, things are superfluously multiplied and such great change is introduced where even the senses themselves seem to oppose it. I omit that this way of speaking is more favorable (so to speak) for explaining certain theological matters, such as the mystery of the Eucharist and the effects that follow from it, and the veneration of relics; for, when we touch quantity and extrinsic accidents, greater devotion is fostered around the bodies of Saints, if we understand that this same quantity which we touch was in the living body of the same Saint.

The Mutual Dependence & Priority Between Quantity & Substantial Form

41. I say thirdly: in some genus of cause it is true that substantial composite and the union of form with matter are prior by nature to quantity and other accidents, although in another genus they are posterior. This assertion can first be proven by this general reason: that substantial form requires quantity in matter; and conversely, accidents have some dependence on the composite and on form; but every dependence brings with it some priority of nature; therefore. The major premise is evident from what has been said; for at least there must be mediate dependence insofar as matter depends on the composite and on form. But the particular mode of declaring and defending this genus of causality can be various, according to various modes of attributing causality to form in quantity. Of these, that one is

easier and clearer, and in rigor sufficient, according to which form is said to suppose quantity as a preparation of matter and its priority is reduced to the genus of material cause; but quantity is said to depend on form only mediately in the genus of formal cause. Hence, just as matter and form mutually depend and are prior and posterior in their genera without repugnance, so similarly quantity and substantial form can be related; and for the same reason, just as matter, although it depends on form and under that aspect is said to be posterior to it, can nevertheless remain under a distinct form, so the same is proportionally true in quantity.

42. Some thing can be prior by nature than that which is posterior in duration. From this it is also understood incidentally that it is not repugnant for the same thing to be prior in duration than another and posterior by nature in some genus of cause; I speak of the same thing materially (so to speak) and not formally, insofar as it is the effect of another; for thus the matter of this wood, for example, is absolutely prior in duration than the form of wood, for it was created from the beginning of the world and from then has being; now however, insofar as it depends on this form, it is by nature posterior to it. Similarly, if one light previously produced by a preceding luminous body is conserved by another afterward created, such light is prior in time to its conserving cause; but as long as it is conserved by it, under this aspect it is by nature posterior; and, as it preceded in time, it was not the effect of such a cause; and therefore that temporal precedence is accidentally related to the causality or order of nature afterward ensuing; and therefore it is not repugnant for the same thing, which now is by nature posterior, to have preceded in time; for it is only necessary per se that an effect by nature posterior, from when it began to be an effect or insofar as it is an effect, should not be prior in time to its cause, on which it depends through real influence, which I add to exclude final cause. Therefore in this way one must philosophize about quantity and substantial form; for quantity can be said to be by nature posterior to substantial form, insofar as it depends on it in the mode

said above, and nevertheless be prior in time to this or that form. Therefore that reasoning has no force: substantial composite is prior by nature than accidental, and substantial form than quantity; therefore quantity does not inhere in matter; therefore when this form departs, this quantity perishes. For both inferences are denied, because with posteriority of nature there can be priority of time, and because what is prior in one respect can be posterior in another.

43. And this mode is easy, as I said, and in rigor sufficient; but another can be devised to explain this mutual order between quantity and form, namely, that one with respect to the other is a necessary condition so that matter can receive them; for matter cannot naturally receive form unless it is extended, nor quantity unless it is terminated by form; and for this reason quantity and form can mutually depend under diverse material aspects. For, although form with respect to matter is formal cause, with respect to quantity however it is reduced to material, according to this way of speaking, because it is like a disposition of matter so that it can sustain quantity. Nor is it inconvenient that dispositions of diverse natures have this mutual dependence among themselves, both because they are ordered to diverse formal effects that from diverse aspects are necessary to the subject, and especially because they do not have that mutual order among themselves immediately, but with respect to the subject for whose being they are necessary. An example can be in the heat and dryness of fire; for each quality is a necessary disposition for the conservation of fire; hence both heat can be called a necessary disposition for dryness and dryness for the heat of fire, because that necessity does not arise from the qualities themselves according to themselves, but insofar as each is necessary for the conservation of such a subject. Nevertheless this mutual dependence of quantity and form does not prevent quantity from being able both to inhere in matter and to remain when form is changed, because per se it does not require this or that form, but absolutely substantial form. I add also that in this kind of mutual dependence the priority itself of nature is of

diverse nature in each extreme; for in quantity it is by way of origin and execution and preparation of matter; but in form it is by way of perfection, intention and ultimate termination of matter. And for this reason also it is more easily understood that form can be changed while the same quantity remains in matter. And thus this mutual priority could also be explained through the relation of final and material cause, as is easily evident from what has been said. Finally by many it is explained through the relation of material and efficient cause, because quantity is related materially to form by mode of disposition; but form to quantity efficiently. But this mode is in itself more difficult because of what I said while arguing for the second opinion; nevertheless it will be more intelligible, if quantity is not posited as a disposition that prepares, but only as one that conserves and fosters. And, even with this posited, it does not prevent quantity from inhering in matter and being able to remain in it when form is changed, because quantity can flow from form into matter and be conserved the same through various forms, as has been explained above. Nevertheless the prior modes seem to me more probable, and to satisfy all difficulties sufficiently.

It is More Probable that Quantity Always Inheres in Matter Alone

44. I say fourthly: in substantial composites from matter and extended form it is probable that quantity has a peculiar union with form, or is received immediately in it partially together with matter; nevertheless the opposite is more probable, that is, that one must philosophize in the same way about all material substances. There is in these forms a special reason for doubting, because these extended forms participate in the formal effect of quantity; for they are coextended and their parts cannot naturally penetrate each other in place because of quantity; therefore it seems necessary that quantity be united to them far differently than to the rational soul; therefore it

is united to them proximately and immediately; but it is united by the mode of accidental form and giving its formal effect according to the capacity of what receives; therefore it inheres in them and is received in them partially. And it is confirmed, for from the negation of the formal effect of quantity in the rational soul we inferred the negation of proximate union and partial inherence; therefore from the opposite affirmation the contrary affirmation is also rightly collected; for indeed negation follows negation because affirmation requires affirmation. Finally it is confirmed, because in only two ways can some thing participate in the effect of quantity, namely, either because it receives quantity or because it is received in quantity, like heat or color; but substantial form does not participate in the effect of quantity in this latter way, because it cannot itself be received in quantity; therefore it must happen in the prior way. The major premise is evident, because unless they are conjoined in one of those two ways, quantity and the thing that is quantified (so to speak) will not be united per se immediately, but only accidentally, insofar as they are united to the same subject; but this is not sufficient that one should participate in the effect of the other, as is evident in the rational soul and in accidents; for, although whiteness and sweetness are united in the same subject, whiteness does not become sweet, nor sweetness white. Because of these reasons therefore it seems probable that it is singular in man that quantity inheres in matter alone, which, even if it were true, would not be repugnant to what we have said so far about the causality of matter with respect to accidents; for it has only been said that matter from itself can through its entity alone exercise this causality without the aid of form (so to speak) as co-receiving the accident; now however we probably add that the composite can per se first and adequately exercise this causality immediately around quantity and mediately around accidents that are in quantity; hence it is concluded that matter sometimes through itself alone, sometimes together with form exercises this causality.

45. But to persuade the other part of the assertion, by which we say the opposite is more probable, it occurs to ask, according to the said opinion, if quantity is immediately in some material composite, so that it is proximately united to form and matter partially, whether in quantity there is one indivisible union to matter and form, or whether there is one composed of two partial ones. For, that it is indivisible seems to be proven from the fact that the thing that is united is indivisible; for we do not now consider in quantity the divisibility of integral parts, but the indivisibility that it has in the nature of form; for comparing the whole quantity and its individual parts to the subject, the same entity of quantity that is united to matter is united to form, and conversely; and in this sense we say that it is indivisible in the nature of form; therefore the union is indivisible, although the thing to which the union is terminated is composite. The consequence is evident, both because union, since it is a mode of the form that is united, ought to be proportioned and accommodated; and also because through that union quantity is indivisibly united to the composite and to each part of it. And it is confirmed, for in effective causality, when an effect proceeds from two causes per se, either partial in one order or total in diverse ones, the effect flows from each cause by one indivisible action; therefore in the genus of material cause, quantity, which is adequately in the whole composite and partially in matter and form, depends on each by the same indivisible union.

46. But on the contrary, that union of quantity to matter can be conserved, even if the union to this form is dissolved; therefore it is not one and indivisible union; for what is indivisible cannot partially remain and be partially corrupted; for this conflicts with indivisibility. Hence, when an effect depends on two causes through the same indivisible action, that action cannot be conserved with respect to one cause and cease with respect to the other, for how will that which is indivisible be divided? But the first antecedent is proven, because matter from itself is sufficient to sustain quantity, as has been shown

above; therefore from itself it is a sufficient terminus of the union of quantity to itself; therefore although the union to form is dissolved, if matter remains in the nature of things, the union to itself will be conserved, so that, for example, if God, with form taken away, were to conserve matter by effectively supplying the concurrence of form, without a new miracle the union of quantity to matter would be conserved, because of the said reason; and yet, with form taken away, it is necessary that the union to it be removed; therefore it is necessary that those unions be at least partially distinct. Likewise, in fact in man the union of quantity to matter is conserved without immediate union of the same quantity to form; therefore by equal reason in any other body the same union of quantity to matter can remain, with the union to form dissolved or changed. For it is not likely that the union of quantity to matter is greater or of another nature in man than in other substances; because it does not have a greater or different formal effect in the body of man than in other bodies; therefore it does not inhere in that more or in a different way. Finally otherwise it would be necessary, when form is changed, that the whole union of quantity to its subject be changed, because if it is indivisible, it cannot be diminished or increased, or changed in one part and remain in another, but it ought either to remain wholly, or be wholly changed; but it cannot remain wholly, if it is indivisible and is terminated immediately to material form in a peculiar way and immediately; because if the form that departs is material, now the union to it is removed; but if the form that departs is immaterial, it is necessary that a material form succeed to which quantity is peculiarly united, which could not happen through increase of union, if the union is indivisible; therefore it will be through change of the whole union; therefore as often as form is changed, the whole union of quantity must necessarily be changed; therefore quantity itself also, because quantity cannot be changed from subject to subject, nor be conserved the same with inherence changed; but we have shown that it is more probable that quantity is not necessarily changed when form is changed; therefore.

47. Quantity is not joined to matter and form by simple union. Because of these things therefore it seems more probable that quantity is not united to matter and form by one and indivisible union. For it is not likely that the union of quantity to matter is of diverse nature in man and in other things; because we cannot judge of union except from its terminus and effect; but this is of the same nature in the matter of man and of other things; therefore if that union in man does not bespeak a relation essentially and indivisibly to two things, neither will it include it in other things. Therefore, if in other things quantity is united to forms in a peculiar way, this happens through increase of union, namely by adding a peculiar or partial union to form.

48. Substantial form is not immediately united with quantity. But from this I further infer a proof of the posterior part of the conclusion; namely, that it is more probable that even in entirely material things there is no special partial union between form and quantity. It is proven first, because in all things quantity is united to matter as to a total and sufficient cause in the genus of cause. The antecedent is proven, because in man quantity is united to matter as to a total cause in that genus, but that union is of the same nature and perfection in other things; therefore. Likewise, because matter from itself is sufficient to be a total cause, and in its genus it necessarily and naturally causes as much as it can; therefore in any thing it thus causes and is united to quantity by the mode of sufficient and total cause. Finally, because when matter is transmuted from the form of man to the form of a cadaver, it is not likely that its causality around quantity is diminished, and, as I was saying, that diminution could not be sufficiently understood without transmutation of quantity itself. But the first consequence is proven, because of one effect only one total cause can be given in any genus and order; therefore if matter is sufficient and total cause by the mode of subject of inherence of quantity, it is superfluous to feign that something else concurs proximately in the same genus of cause. Likewise, because the union

of quantity to matter is integral and total in its species, as is evident in man; therefore it cannot be conjoined with another partial union to compose one integral union. Finally, because quantity is an intrinsic property of corporeal substance; therefore by its nature it bespeaks a definite relation to some subject of inherence connatural and proportioned to itself; therefore either that is always matter, or always the composite; for it cannot be understood that it indifferently and as if under distinction regards each, since its relation is simple and of one nature and determines the subject or terminus proportioned to itself. Therefore if this subject is the whole composite, quantity will be in man in a preternatural mode and as if inadequate; but if the transcendental relation of quantity is to matter as to its proper and adequate subject of inherence, always and everywhere quantity is in matter alone as in such a subject.

49. How forms inherent in a quantified subject are extended. And it is confirmed by solving the reason to the contrary; because, so that a material form may be extended and quantified in its way, it is not necessary that it be subjected to quantity, but it suffices that it inhere in a quantified thing, not by inhering in quantity itself, but in a thing per se first quantified through quantity, by coaptating and coextending itself, which is manifest in some accidental forms or modes, as we shall treat in the following section. And it is declared a priori briefly, by supposing that the distinction of parts as to entity, neither in matter nor in form comes formally from quantity, but is rather supposed in each entity from its intrinsic nature and degree of perfection, and in matter is like the first foundation and aptitude for quantity. Therefore material forms by their nature consist of entitative parts (in which they differ from the rational soul), which they do not have from quantity, but from their specific and essential nature, because they do not transcend such a degree of perfection and because they are educible from the potency of matter, on which they depend in being and becoming. But from this nature it follows in them that when they are united to matter they are coextended with entitative extension (so to

speak), that is, that they are united to one part of matter through one part of themselves and to another through another, etc.; which extension they do not have formally through quantity, but through their entity. Hence, if God were to conserve material substance without quantity, form and matter would remain united with the aforesaid extension or entitative distinction of parts. But from this it further comes about that, when matter is affected with quantity and, by reason of that, its parts are impenetrable in order to place, the material form that is coextended to such matter, by this very fact participates in that condition of quantity, not by reason of itself, but by reason of the subject; for, because the parts of form inseparably adhere to the parts of quantified matter, it is necessary that they be impenetrable among themselves or with another similar form, just as are the parts of matter itself; therefore because of this mode of being of such forms it is not necessary that quantity immediately inhere in such form, as in a partial subject. Hence to the argument in form it is responded that to be quantified accidentally is not a formal effect of quantity, but only to be quantified per se first, for also motion and time are quantified accidentally, by reason of subject or space, and this will be more evident from the solution of the second confirmation.

50. Therefore to the first it is responded, if there is discussion about the proper and rigorous formal effect of quantity, that quantity has this effect neither in material forms nor in accidental ones; but if the effect of quantity is said more broadly to be any corporeal extension, thus the consequence is denied. For, although from the fact that the rational soul does not have extension per se or accidentally it is rightly inferred that it is not immediately united to quantity by the mode of subject, nevertheless that negation is not an adequate reason, and therefore from the opposite affirmation, as to extension accidentally, it is not rightly inferred that material forms have the aforesaid union to quantity.

51. That I may respond to the second confirmation, first from it I take that the quantification (so to speak) of corporeal forms or

qualities does not pertain to the formal effect of quantity, for sometimes this effect or condition results from quantity, not as from form, but as from subject; but quantity does not give its formal effect as it exercises the function of subject, but as it is an inherent form; for by the prior reason it rather receives a formal effect, while it becomes white, etc. Therefore, that whiteness inherent in quantity is quantified in its way is not through information or formal causality of quantity, but is a condition and denomination that it participates from its subject, in which by inhering, it is coextended to it, for from this it happens that the parts of form are thus distant from each other or impenetrable, just as are the parts of the subject. Hence therefore it is further said that to those two members posited in the argument a third should be added, or rather the second should be subdivided, for form can be extended to the extension of the subject, either because it is received in quantity or because it is received in a thing extended through quantity, as has been declared and will be more evident from what will be said in the following section.

The Arguments of the Prior Opinion are Solved

52. What Aristotle thought about this. It remains that we respond to the arguments of the prior opinion: and first to Aristotle it is responded generally that, although he often said that substance or actual being is the subject of accidents, he never nevertheless explained that it is per se first subject by reason of the whole composite. But it can be simply attributed to the composite that it receives accidents, although it does not receive them through itself, but receives them through a part. Nor did he ever say openly that all accidents perish when substance is corrupted; but rather he often signifies that sometimes the same affection remains in the generated thing that was in the corrupted one; although (to confess the truth) he also did not say expressly that it is the same in number, and it can be explained as the same in species; but he speaks absolutely of identity,

as is evident I de Generat., text. 24, and certainly in qualities that which is numerically diverse is not called the same, but similar. Then it is responded to individual testimonies.

53. The testimonies of Aristotle adduced to the contrary are explained. The first was from I de Generat., where, establishing the difference between generation and alteration, he says that in generation the sensible subject does not remain, and below he says that there is substantial generation when nothing sensible remains as subject. Nevertheless it is responded that by sensible subject Aristotle understands the substantial composite, which is commonly called sensible substance. Hence it is the same to say subject as sensible supposit; for that is in which accidents are principally and of which they are predicated; therefore when in transmutation such a subject remains according to the same name and the same nature, only alteration has been made; but when such a subject does not remain, substantial corruption and generation occur. Therefore some badly explain "with nothing sensible remaining," that is, with no sensible quality or accident remaining, when the same Aristotle expressly added: "With nothing sensible remaining as subject," namely integral and complete. But in text. 24 Aristotle does not say that in substantial corruption all accidents are changed, but rather says that when in the generated and corrupted thing the same integral affection remains, like the same coldness or transparency in water and air generated from it, one should not think that the cold or transparent is some common subject, whose affections are to be water or to be air, otherwise (he says) only alteration would have been made; for alteration occurs whenever what is transmuted is a passion of what remains. And thus St. Thomas expounds that place. From which exposition it is rather gathered that substantial transmutation can occur in a subject although the same affection remains.

54. The second testimony, from I Phys., presents no obstacle; for we admit that matter per se first regards substantial form, because this does not prevent it from receiving quantity and accidents insofar

as they dispose to it. To the third from V Phys. it is responded that the difference between substantial generation and other accidental motions is that matter, as it is the subject of generation, is not supposed to be informed by any substantial form; hence both the adequate and proper and principal subject of generation is matter itself as it is in potency to being simply; but for accidental mutation there is always supposed a constituted being simply or substantial supposit, which is absolutely denominated the subject or principal one of such mutation; and in the same sense the subject of accidental mutation is said to be actual and simple being; nevertheless it is not necessary that according to its whole self and per se first it receive such mutation, but it can receive it through a part. You will say: in the instant when substantial generation occurs alteration precedes in matter alone. It is responded, if there is discussion of the motion of alteration, that it does not precede in matter alone according to the aforesaid sense, but precedes in wood, for example, or water (if generation occurs from it), as in supposit or principal subject, which alone is of the nature of motion properly said, although it is in matter as in the proper subject of inherence, which is not repugnant to the nature of motion. But if there is discussion of alteration as to the ultimate and momentary terminus of it, thus it is true that by natural order it occurs in matter before it is understood to be substantially informed, but nevertheless that termination is not motion properly said, but a certain instantaneous mutation, or rather a certain mutated being extrinsically terminating motion. I add also that it happens accidentally that that mutation occurs in prime matter, because it is conjoined with substantial generation and corruption of the prior subject, which was moved during the whole time preceding that motion.

55. The fourth testimony, from VII Metaph., has no difficulty; for thus matter is said to be from itself neither qualified nor quantified, as it is said to be formless; but it is said to be formless, not because it is not formed, but because from itself and in its entity it includes no form; thus therefore it is said not to be qualified, not because it is

affected by no quality, but because from itself it has no quality nor includes it in its entity. You will say: at least it will be called quantified because from its nature it has quantity. I respond first that it can be said not quantified from itself, because in its entity it does not include quantity, although it postulates it; but in this way even integral corporeal substance could be said not quantified. Otherwise therefore matter can be said not quantified from itself, because it postulates no certain terminus of quantity; and therefore from itself it is neither large, nor small, etc. Likewise, because although it is the subject in which quantity inheres, because nevertheless only the supposit is that which simply is, therefore to it alone such denominations are simply attributed. Nevertheless if we regard the thing itself only, there is no doubt that, just as matter is called corporeal, so also it can be called quantified.

56. To the fifth testimony, from VII and XII Metaph., it is responded that substance is prior by nature to accident absolutely and simply, if they are also compared absolutely and simply; but if each substance is compared to its accidents, it is also prior simply and in every genus, either according to the whole or according to a part; but comparing composite substance to its quantity, it is indeed prior by perfection, and prior by nature in the nature of end, and in its way also in the genus of formal cause; nevertheless in some genus of cause, namely material, it is not repugnant that some accident be prior by nature to some substance, which in almost every opinion nearly all authors concede; and thus we say that, by way of generation, quantity inheres in matter by nature prior to form. To the sixth testimony from the chapter de Substantia, it is responded that Aristotle does not say that, with this or that substance destroyed, all accidents that are in it are destroyed, but with first substances destroyed, which is very true, because unless another substance succeeded the corrupted one, accidents would not remain. Then, even if we speak of particular substance, it must be understood that with substance destroyed entirely, that is, according to whole and according to part, what is in it

cannot remain; for if the whole substance is destroyed and a part remains, it will not be repugnant that something remain in it; for thus with man destroyed the intellect remains in the soul, which remains; therefore since matter remains, quantity will be able to be conserved in it.

57. The arguments of the first opinion are resolved. First. Second. The arguments of that opinion have been expedited almost from the proofs of the second. For regarding the first, it has already been frequently said that matter has its own proper being, which, although it is incomplete in the genus of substance, nevertheless in comparison to accident is being simply and per se subsisting partially; and although it depends on form in some genus, and therefore in that regard it can be said that matter by nature is first conjoined to substantial form rather than to accidental form, this nevertheless does not prevent matter from being capable, both through its own entity and under another aspect and in another genus of cause, of being conjoined by nature first to accidents in sustaining them. Regarding the second, we concede that matter primarily regards substantial form, and therefore is first conjoined in the order of intention or end, but not in the order of execution; for rather under this aspect it is by nature first conjoined to accidental form as a medium or disposition toward substantial form. For often a potency which is primarily ordered to some act, in execution first receives another by which it is disposed toward the other, as sight is primarily ordered to vision, yet first regards light, species, etc., and in general this order of nature is fitting, that things prior in intention are posterior in execution, and conversely, that things which are more imperfect precede in the way of origin. But what is said there, that accidental form is compared to substantial form as second act to first, is not necessary in general; for quantity does not seem to be compared in this way, but only as a connatural disposition of substance by reason of matter. And similarly extrinsic accidents, which neither flow from form nor are received in it, are not compared to it as second acts to first. But I add further that

even if we freely grant everything that is assumed in that argument, nothing is inferred against our opinion; for we have shown that although we admit that form is the first act of matter in the order of perfection, intention and first origin, and also in the order of efficient causality, nevertheless it is perfectly consistent and most true that quantity is received in matter alone as in its proper subject of inherence and material cause, which is what we principally intend in this place. But that, notwithstanding this priority of form, quantity can remain in matter and be prior in time in it than any determinate form except the first which is concrete with matter, has been declared by us with sufficient probability (as I think) in the second assertion.

58. Third. By how many titles does connection intervene between quantity and matter. From this it is easy to respond to the third argument, first, by freely conceding that quantity actively follows substantial form as it is the form of corporeity, and denying the consequence, because (as I have often said) it can flow from form into matter, and be conserved in it through succession of forms. Second, it is most probable that quantity is a property following matter, or (which is the same) due to the composite by reason of matter. For the first common axiom is that quantity follows matter and quality follows form; for by this reason the Doctors distribute the absolute predicaments and assign their sufficiency. Then it is per se fitting to reason that, since matter has a true and real essence proper to it, although partial, by reason of that it should have some property; nor is it necessary that form by the common notion of substantial form should have some certain specific property; but it suffices that some common or generic notion of quality should correspond. Just as from the common notion of immaterial substance no specific accidental form follows, but intellect and will follow as such. Moreover, since man consists of matter and a completely spiritual form, and nevertheless claims for himself the same quantity as other material things, it is a sign that he demands it by reason of matter, not by reason of form. Finally, the very proportion between quantity and matter

sufficiently indicates that quantity follows matter; for quantity per se is not active, just as neither is matter. Likewise, it is apt for receiving, either as proximate potency or as reason and condition well disposing for suffering and receiving; it is therefore quite probable that quantity is due to matter or by reason of matter. This can also be confirmed from what we proved above, namely, that every thing having matter also has quantity, and conversely. But this natural conjunction between matter and quantity can be understood in two ways. First, only by reason of passive potency intrinsically demanding such an affection by its nature. For it is not necessary that every innate property be due by reason of an active principle, but sometimes a passive one suffices; in which way many think that motion is natural to heaven, and being in the center is natural to earth, and intelligible species are natural to angelic intellect according to receptive, not active potency. In the second way it can be understood through intrinsic active emanation. And although the prior way suffices, this latter has no inconvenience, because although matter is potency toward substantial form, it nevertheless has in itself true actual and entitative essence; what wonder therefore that from it remains some property proportioned to it? For that matter is not active through proper action is because, since it is pure potency, it neither can act on something similar to itself, because it would have to create it, nor can it act on similar potency, because it does not have from itself proportioned act, except in merely receptive potency. But it often happens that a thing which cannot act by proper action on another has intrinsic emanation in itself; as the substance of an angel does not have active power of similar substance; yet it has power from which proportioned potencies emanate in it; and substantial form according to received doctrine is not immediately active of accidental form, and yet through intrinsic emanation intellect flows from soul, and intensification of cold from the form of water when it reduces itself to pristine coldness. Finally, it is very probable that other modes really distinct by nature actively flow from the essence of matter, such as

partial and intrinsic subsistence, local presence and relations, if they are something really distinct by nature from the foundation.

59. Whether matter should be said to receive substantial form by means of quantity. To the first confirmation the consequence is denied, speaking absolutely, although it can be distinguished that matter can receive substantial form by means of quantity can be understood in two ways. First, only as disposition or necessary condition, and thus it is conceded, nor do the arguments and inconveniences which are proposed there proceed against this sense. Second, as potency proximately receptive of substantial form, and in this sense this consequent is rightly disproved in that confirmation; we nevertheless deny that it follows, because it has no necessary connection with the doctrine handed down. But what should be said about corporeal qualities, we shall see in the following section. To the second confirmation I concede the consequence, namely, that quantity is incorruptible as to its entity, although as to various terms it can begin and cease to be, through division and conjunction of quantity. But how motion is per se to quantity cannot be examined here because of the difficulty of the matter; briefly however I say that there is no per se motion to the production of quantity, but to accretion; and that this does not happen because new quantity or a new part of quantity simply begins to be in the nature of things, but because one quantity is adjoined to another, and what was alien becomes proper through a certain special action per se tending to this.

60. To the fourth it is first said (applying the given distinction) that if matter receiving quantity by means of form is understood only as necessary condition and principal term of its existence, thus the whole argument can be conceded and nothing is inferred against the given doctrine, as will be easily apparent to one examining it; but if it is understood by means of form as partial subject and proper material cause, thus it must be said that sometimes this manifestly conflicts, as in man; and from this it is quite probably

gathered that this is not fitting to the natures of things and to the causality of matter and form in all natural things.

61. The arguments of the latter opinion, insofar as they prove that matter is the proper subject of inherence and sufficient material cause of quantity and of accidents which inhere through it, do not have, as I think, a probable solution. Whence also the Thomists, and especially Astudillo, I de Generat., q. 2, concede this even in the doctrine of St. Thomas, provided that it is not denied that substantial form also simply precedes by nature in matter both quantity and accidents depending entirely on it. But insofar as those arguments proceed against this latter part and prove that the same accidents remain in the generated which were in the corrupted, they could perhaps be probably solved; but because they seem to us to persuade this more probably at least, we do not care to linger in dissolving them.

SECTION IV
WHETHER ONE ACCIDENT CAN BE THE PROXIMATE MATERIAL CAUSE OF ANOTHER

1. Supernaturally one accident inheres in another as in a subject which it is. Otherwise naturally. We speak according to the natures of things; for, supposing some miracle, there is no doubt that some accident can concur by way of subject and material cause to the being of some accident and to its production, as the more reliable theologians teach concerning quantity in the consecrated Eucharist. According to the natures of things, however, two things are certain: first, that no accident can be the primary and (so to speak) fundamental subject of another accident, which is called by some the subject which (subiectum quod). This is clear because no accident can sustain another without both being sustained in another, and in this progression one cannot proceed to infinity; otherwise nothing would

exist in which that entire causality would be materially founded. And for the same reason it cannot stop at some accident, otherwise the whole collection of accidents would not be in another, but in itself, which is contrary to the nature of accident; therefore it is necessary to stop at a substantial subject or matter. And in this sense it is customary to say that an accident cannot be the primary material cause of an accident, but at most the proximate one. And this Aristotle teaches expressly in book IV of the Metaphysics, in the passage to be treated immediately.

2. One accident is received in substance by reason of another. Second, it is certain that some accidents inhere in substance through the mediation of other accidents; this is clear by induction, for acts of the intellect inhere in spiritual substance through the medium of the intellect, and acts of the will through the medium of the will, and so proportionally concerning the remaining acts or habits of the sensitive powers; and corporeal qualities, in everyone's opinion, inhere through the medium of quantity. And a more general reason can be given because, although all accidents are ordered to substance, they are not without order among themselves, and therefore one can regard substance through the mediation of another.

The Point of the Question

3. The difficulty therefore is how one accident inheres in substance through the mediation of another, whether only as that by which (ut quo) or also as that which (ut quod), for philosophers use these terms. In these matters equivocation must be avoided so that the point of controversy may be reached; for in one sense it can be denied that an accident is a subject which, only because it is not the primary foundation and as it were the basis of the entire causality by which another accident is sustained; but according to this sense some accident will be said to be a subject by which, because it is that by which substance receives another accident through mediation,

whether the posterior accident truly and properly inheres in the prior accident or not. And this sense cannot fall into doubt, nor is there controversy about it. In another sense an accident can be said to be only a subject by which and not which of another accident, because one accident cannot be even a proximate subject in which another accident truly inheres, although it can be the reason for inhering, that is, a necessary condition or prerequisite disposition in substance so that another accident can inhere in it, in which way many think transparency is related to light. And according to this sense truly and properly one accident is not the material cause of another, except perhaps in that sense in which a dispositive cause is reduced to the material; in which way also an accident can be the material cause of substance; but we are dealing with proper material cause, in which the accidental form proximately inheres and is received. Hence on the contrary an accident will be called the subject which of another accident, if it truly receives that accident in itself and proximately terminates the union and inherence of that accident in itself, even if it is not the primary (so to speak) support of both, and in this sense the present question is treated.

Various Opinions

4. The first opinion is that no accident is the true subject and material cause of another accident. So holds Gregory, In II, dist. 12, q. 2, a. 2; and he attributes this to Aristotle, IV Metaph., text. 13 and 14, where he proves that accident does not happen to accident, except because both happen to the same thing, and he adds the cause, because there is no greater reason why one accident should happen to another than conversely. The same thing the nominalists seem to suppose, who deny that the qualities of bread inhere in quantity, even after the consecration of bread, whom I cited in III tome III part., disp. LVI, sect. 3. Capreolus can be referred to the same opinion, In I, dist. 3, q. 3, a. 2, ad 2 Scoti cont. 1 conclusionem, where he does not

sufficiently explain in what sense he speaks of subject by which and which; nor from the places of St. Thomas which he brings forward can this be sufficiently established, as we shall see; but Gregory spoke more clearly, who does not produce reasons of great weight; for the sum of all is that form cannot be the principle of suffering or receiving, otherwise the office of form is confused with the function of matter; but every accident is a true accidental form; therefore it cannot be the receptive principle of an accident.

5. The second opinion is that one accident can be the proximate subject in which another is received, and consequently can exercise proper material causality concerning that accident. Durandus holds and well explains this, In I, dist. 8, 2 part., q. 4, n. 15, and St. Thomas and other authors suppose it, who (as I alleged in the aforesaid place) say that in the Eucharist after the consecration of bread the qualities inhere in separated quantity, not through new inherence, which is conferred on them through consecration, but through the ancient inherence which they had in quantity, which previously inhered in matter as in a subject, which being removed, the other accidents remain founded upon the quantity itself, as St. Thomas expressly teaches, III, q. 77, a. 2, ratione 2. And in the solution ad 2, he explains that one accident cannot be the subject of another per se, because it is not per se; insofar as it is in another, it can be a subject, because one accident can be received in a subject through the mediation of another; and thus he says that surface is the subject of color; which would not be absolutely true, if an accident were only a medium by which in the prior sense declared above. And I-II, q. 7, a. 1, ad 3, and q. 56, a. 1, ad 3, where he repeats the same doctrine, he says that one accident inheres in another, which cannot be truly said of pure disposition. He has similar things almost in In III, dist. 33, q. 2, a. 4, quaestiuncula 1, and very well in quaest. De Spiritual. creat., a. 11, ad 13, and often elsewhere. And I judge this opinion to be true.

Resolution of the Question

6. But to prove and explain it more fully, I say first: although not every accident can proximately inhere in another accident, nevertheless this can befit some accidents. The prior part is known, because since the whole collection of accidents must necessarily inhere in substance, it is necessary that some accident immediately inhere in substance; for no medium can be found between substance and accident, although another accident can intercede between substance and some accident, because just as the general division of being into substance and accident is adequate, so that no medium can fall between the dividing members, so between the first subject of accident, which is substance, and the whole collection of accidents, or between substance and its first accident, no medium can be found. Which St. Thomas rightly noted, I, q. 77, a. 1, ad 5.

7. Spiritual accidents truly inhere in other accidents. The latter part is proved first by induction in corporeal accidents; for all inhere in substance through the medium of quantity, as all philosophers teach; and it seems to be proved by experience, for whiteness extends in surface, and heat similarly, when it is diffused through a body, extends in its quantity. It can be responded that from this it is only gathered that quantity is a necessary disposition in the subject so that other corporeal accidents can be in it in a connatural way, but not that quantity itself is the proximate subject, to which such accidents truly inhere. Just as concerning substantial form we said above probably that it does not enter into matter, except extended through quantity; but supposing that disposition, it is immediately joined to the entity of the matter itself and coextended to it; why therefore could not the same be said of whiteness and of heat, etc.? It is responded that the reason is very different, for substantial form, since it is of a higher order, is disproportionate to inhere proximately in an accident. Also, it is not united through an accidental mode, but a substantial one, and therefore it ought to be united immediately to substance; but corporeal quality is an accident and is united through

an accidental mode, and therefore from itself it is proportioned so that it can proximately inhere in an accident; therefore, when such is the quality, that per se and necessarily it presupposes quantity in substance in order that it may be received through the mediation of that quantity, it is more likely that it is immediately received in that quantity. And it is confirmed from the mystery of the Eucharist, for accidents inhere in separated quantity, as I suppose from theology; therefore from their nature they are apt to inform quantity, because form cannot exercise its formal effect outside a subject proportioned to it; therefore before consecration those qualities inhered in quantity, because quality naturally informs the subject proportioned to it, if it is conjoined. Also, because new inherence is superfluously feigned, made anew and miraculously in those qualities, if according to the nature of the thing it can be understood both to have preceded and always to have remained. And this induction is more evident in certain accidents which are not things entirely distinct from the accidents in which they are founded, but are modes of them, as figure is with respect to quantity and motion, and Where or local presence with respect to the same, and relation (if it is a distinct mode) with respect to its foundation. Moreover, in spiritual accidents (and the same reason applies to material ones, which are proportioned to them) this seems most certain, for first it is necessary that operative habits immediately inhere in the powers which they are ordered to assist; because these habits provide inclination and facility to these powers; but they do not provide this facility except formally through themselves; therefore they inform these powers; therefore they are proximately received in them. And for this reason knowledge is received in the intellect, and impressed species in the cognitive power proportioned to them, and thus also theologians say that faith is in the intellect and charity in the will. And the same or greater reason applies to vital acts, which are essentially immanent acts; whence it is necessary that they be received immediately in the proximate principle from which they proceed. But the reason a priori of this part must be

taken from the natural subordination of such accidents, which we investigate from the effects themselves and natural indications, and there is no reason why it should be contrary to the nature of accident as such.

8. Second conclusion. I say second: one accident can truly exercise material causality with respect to another proportioned to it. This assertion follows from the previous one, for a subject receiving a form in itself exercises proper material causality toward that form; but one accident is the proximate subject receiving another accident in itself; therefore. Second, because an accident which is received in another depends on it in being and becoming; and not as from an efficient cause, formally and precisely speaking from the force of reception, which can sometimes be really separated from production, as is clear in quantity, which does not make the whiteness which it receives in itself; whence whiteness does not depend on it through mediate action, but through mediate union and inherence; therefore that dependence pertains to material causality. Third, an accident which inheres in another is its form, whence vital acts are called second acts of powers, because they ultimately actuate and inform them, and whiteness denominates surface as white by informing it; therefore, conversely, an accident receiving another exercises material causality concerning that accident.

9. A small question is treated and resolved. But someone will ask, when one accident causes another materially, whether only that accident proximately concurs in that genus, or also the subject itself or some other accident. Some respond that some accidents are simple, that is, neither formally nor identically composed of various entities, as whiteness, vision, etc.; but others are composed of various entities, which composition will never be found in accidents which have their own entity; for, although in them there can be composition of intension or extension, this however is compared in order to the subject through the mode of simple entity; but in accidents which are modes of things, sometimes that composition is found; for example,

the local presence of bread is not only in quantity, but also in the substance of bread; whence that entire presence is composed of the presence of substance and the presence of quantity. Concerning the former accidents therefore, when one inheres in substance through the medium of another, they say that material causality is exercised through the accident alone proximately, and conversely the union or inherence of the accident is terminated per se and immediately to the accident alone, but to the subject of the other accident only remotely and as it were per accidens; for, since such an accident is a simple mode or simple entity, it cannot be immediately united to several things; thus Ockham, In IV, q. 4, says that a simple accident cannot be except in an equally simple subject.

10. But truly, when an accident is composite in the explained way, it is adequately in a composite subject; and therefore, although according to one part it is in another accident, according to another part it can be immediately in substance; and in this way discrete quantity is customarily said to be in many subjects partially, concerning which in its place. And in this latter part there is no difficulty in the thing, although there can be a question about the name, whether that should be called one accident or rather two, since in reality they are so distinct that one can remain without the other; just as in fact the presence of the substance of bread was destroyed and the presence of quantity remained, and it could also have happened in the contrary way. Whence there is no doubt that those presences are distinct in reality and of different natures. But whether on account of some union they should be said to compose one, it does not matter to the present thing, and it seems a question about the mode of speaking.

11. But concerning the prior part there is greater doubt, for that principle that a simple accident in its entity cannot be immediately and adequately received in a composite subject, is neither certain nor seems necessary. For first many so think concerning all corporeal accidents, that they are per se primo in the substantial composite, at least when it is material on both sides (which opinion

from this precisely, that the subject is composite and the accidental form is simple, does not involve contradiction); therefore for the same reason it will be able to be in an accidental composite. Also, sometimes one and the same accident or accidental mode regards two distinct things, as the mode of union both regards or affects the thing which it unites and the thing to which it unites; therefore similarly one accidental entity can per se primo regard two things as composing one adequate subject, for example, matter and quantity as they compose this quantified subject. Finally, in this no intrinsic contradiction appears. I think therefore that from this principle it cannot be generally defined when one accident inheres in substance through the mediation of another, whether substance there concurs only remotely or also proximately, nor do I find another general principle from which this can be universally resolved.

12. Therefore I think we must look to the nature of each accident and to its formal effect; for, if the formal effect of an accident on account of its special nature does not postulate immediate material concurrence of substance, it is more likely that substance only concurs remotely, and that immediately only one accident inheres in another, and thus Durandus absolutely affirms, in the place cited above. And the reason is because if that proximate cause is sufficient, it will be superfluous to add another. And in this way I think that whiteness and similar qualities inhere in quantity so that the mode of their inherence is proximately terminated in quantity alone. The best sign of which is that, with matter removed and quantity remaining, the same inherence is conserved. Nor is there any other sign or indication which shows that more is required for the formal effect of these accidents.

13. But truly, if there is some accident which from its special mode of informing requires immediate inherence, not only to some faculty, but also to the very substance of the thing, it will not be contrary for it to happen thus. I specially note this on account of vital acts, for example, of intellect or will, which some think are so in the

faculties that they also immediately reach the very substance of the soul or angel on account of the intrinsic mode of affecting of the vital act, and because it is so essentially an immanent act that it immediately affects the whole intrinsic principle, immediately influencing into it; but this principle, as these authors consequently think, is not the power alone, but also the very substance of the angel or soul. Which opinion does not contradict the force of material causality, but its truth must be examined elsewhere. And in the same way it is probable what some judge in theology, that per se infused habits, just as they concur actively with powers to elicit supernatural acts, so also they concur materially to receive those acts; for this (if it is proved necessary or more connatural to such acts from elsewhere) does not contradict, from the fact that power and habit are distinct things, because it is sufficient that they are united and concur through the mode of one integral faculty.

Response to Arguments

14. Whether accident happens to accident. The foundation of Gregory has no difficulty; for the proposition of Aristotle, that accident does not happen to accident, is to be understood as to a subject which in the prior sense declared above. Which sense St. Thomas indicates there. It could also be said that Aristotle there deals not only with accidental inherence, but also with accidental predication by which one accident is said entirely per accidens of another, as when a musician is said to be white; for such predication does not arise from the fact that one happens to another, but that both are conjoined in one third thing. But truly sometimes an accident can be predicated of an accident, not entirely per accidens, as in this proposition: the quantified is in place, or the intellectual understands, the appetitive loves; and in these it does not contradict that accident inhere in accident in the way explained above; and in the same sense it will not contradict that accident happen to accident, not merely per

accidens, but on account of some per se order which they have among themselves, in which way also surface is said to be white, and so concerning others. To the reason it is responded that it does not contradict that a thing, which is form with respect to one thing, be receptive potency with respect to another, which is clear in the rational soul and in any accidental passive power, and from what was said in sect. 1 it is sufficiently clear; nor does a new difficulty occur here.

R.P. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

VOLUME TWO